Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. OgilvieAttorney Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Ogilvie
Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Claire L. K. K. Ogilvie, Misc. Docket AG No. 4, September Term, 2016. Opinion by Greene, J.
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE- CONVICTION FOR A SERIOUS CRIME- DISBARMENT
Respondent Claire L. K. K. Ogilvie violated Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct 19-308.4(a), (b), and (d). These violations stemmed from Respondent‘s criminal conviction for breaking and entering, malicious wounding, and abduction, all of which occurred in the Commonwealth of Virginia. The Court of Appeals held that disbarment was the appropriate sanction for Respondent‘s misconduct.
Barbera, C.J. Greene, Adkins, McDonald, Watts, Hotten, Getty, JJ.
Claire L. K. K. Ogilvie (“Respondent“) was admitted to the Mаryland Bar on February 5, 2007. On August 18, 2014, Respondent was indicted in the Circuit Court for the City of Charlottesville, Virginia. Commonwealth of Virginia v. Claire L. K. Kennedy Ogilvie, Case Nos. CR 1400209-01, CR 1400209-02, and CR 1400209-03. The indictment charged Respondent with one count of felony breaking and entering while armed with a deadly weapon,1 one count of felony malicious wounding, and one count of felony abduction. On Januаry 23, 2015, Respondent entered an Alford plea2 to the charges of felony breaking and entering, felony malicious wounding, and felony abduction in violation of the
On March 30, 2016, the Attorney Grievance Commission (“Petitioner“), acting through Bar Counsel, petitiоned this Court for disciplinary action pursuant to Maryland
It is professional misconduct for an attorney to:
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another;
(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the attorney‘s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as an attorney in other respects;
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation;
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice[.]
On March 31, 2016, this Court issued a Show Cause Order directing Respondent to show cause in writing why she should
I do not think I should lose my ability to practice law because of my 2014 convictions.
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[] I do not feel that my charges violate the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct. While these convictions would reflect adversely on myself as a person, they do not do so on my honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness to practice law specifically. Although an attorney is personally answerable to all criminal laws, she should be professionally answerable only for those offenses indicating a lack of characteristics desirable and relevant to law practice, such as those involving dishonesty, fraud, or the like.
In addition, my experiences while incarcerated have in fact made me more fit to practice law. The injustices I‘ve witnessed and experienced, including those committed by my own attorney, have opened my eyes to the inadequate resourсes available to defendants, and the prejudice defendants face in the criminal justice system and in the media.
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For these reasons, I ask the court to neither suspend nor disbar me from the practice of law. Should the court nevertheless find suspension appropriate, I ask it be for a short, definitе period of time, after which my good behavior while on probation would be sufficient for reinstatement.
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On May 18, 2016, this Court temporarily suspended Respondent from the practice of law, subject to further order of the Court. On August 14, 2017, Respondent was released from the Fluvanna Correctional Center for Women, lоcated in Troy, Virginia.
On December 6, 2017, Petitioner requested further proceedings pursuant to Maryland
Conclusions of Law
MARPC Rule 19-738(i) provides that “a final judgment of any court of record convicting an attorney of a crime, whether the conviction resulted from acceptance by the court of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, or a verdict after trial, is conclusive evidence of the attorney‘s guilt of that crime.” Accordingly, we conclude that there is clear and convincing evidence of Respondent‘s guilt of breaking and entering, malicious wounding, and abduction in violation of the
Rule 19-308.4(b) provides, “[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer‘s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects.” Attorney Grievance Comm‘n of Maryland v. Greenleaf, 438 Md. 151, 159, 91 A.3d 1066, 1070 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). Respondent demonstrated a lack of trustworthiness and a complete disregard for the law when she maliciously enterеd the home of another without the owner‘s knowledge or permission. “This Court has long held lawyers to a higher standard of conduct than the average citizen.” Attorney Grievance Comm‘n of Maryland v. Sheinbein, 372 Md. 224, 253, 812 A.2d 981, 998 (2002). Respondent‘s malicious wounding and abduction of another human being is not the “behavior of a[ny] responsible, mature, and trustworthy adult,” and falls well below the high standаrd set for attorneys. See Attorney Grievance Comm‘n of Maryland v. Van Dusen, 443 Md. 413, 429, 116 A.3d 1013, 1023 (2015) (disbarring an attorney who failed to report his prior convictions in his application for admission to the bar) (internal citations omitted). We, therefore, conclude that Respondent violated MARPC 19-308.4(b).
“It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. In general, an attorney violates M[A]RPC [19-30]8.4(d) when his or her conduct impacts
Finally, we conclude that Respondent violated MARPC 19-308.4(a), which provides that “it is professional misconduct for an attorney to violate . . . the [MARPC.]”
Sanction
Respondent did not file exceptions and did not appear for oral argument before this Court. Therefore, we need only decide the appropriate sanсtion. See Attorney Grievance Comm‘n of Maryland v. Clinton, 308 Md. 701, 705, 521 A.2d 1202, 1204 (1987). In determining the appropriate sanction, this Court‘s goal is not to punish the attorney but “to protect the public and the public‘s confidence in the legal profession.” Greenleaf, 438 Md. at 163, 91 A.3d at 1073.
In Attorney Grievance Comm‘n of Maryland v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376, 419, 773 A.2d 463, 488 (2001), we made it clear that disbarment is the appropriate sanction for “an attorney who steals or commits othеr serious criminal conduct[.]” (Emphasis added). A review of our case law does not yield many cases concerning an attorney who committed and was convicted of criminal acts that are similar in severity and nature to the criminal acts of Respondent. We have, however, disbarred attorneys who сommitted criminal acts against people, even in the absence of aggravating factors. In Greenleaf, we disbarred an attorney who “deliberately solicited and preyed” on a minor. 438 Md. at 167, 91 A.3d at 1075. In that case, the presence of one mitigating and one aggravating factor did not dissuade us from concluding that the attоrney was a “sexual predator” who was unfit to continue the practice of law. Id. In Attorney Grievance Comm‘n of Maryland v. Painter, 356 Md. 293, 307, 739 A.2d 24, 32 (1999), we recognized that an attorney who commits acts of violence which are “contrary to the policy of this State, which abhors such acts. . . at the very least, engages in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.” In that case, having noted only one aggravating factor, we determined that disbarment was the appropriate sanction for an attorney who committed repeated acts of domestic violence against his wife and children. Id.
We have also concluded that disbarment is the аppropriate sanction for attorneys who committed criminal acts that did not cause physical harm to others. In Attorney Grievance Comm‘n of Maryland v. Dechowitz, 358 Md. 184, 186, 747 A.2d 657, 658 (2000), an attorney was convicted of one count of possession with intent to distribute marijuana in the state of California. There we concluded that the attorney‘s conviction clеarly demonstrated a violation of MAPRC Rule 19-308.4(b), (c), and (d), and that despite the California Bar‘s suspension of the attorney, disbarment was the appropriate sanction. Id. at 190-91, 747 A.2d at 660-61. In Attorney Grievance Comm‘n of Maryland v. Sheinbein, we disbarred an attorney who helped his son
Our review hаs revealed, at least, one instance in which an attorney who advised another to commit an illegal act received a lesser sanction than disbarment. In Attorney Grievance Comm‘n of Maryland v. Kerpelman, 288 Md. 341, 382-83, 420 A.2d 940, 960 (1980), we sanctioned an attorney by imposing a two-year suspension based on the attorney‘s acts of advising his client to take possession of a child in violation of a court order, the attorney‘s attempt to charge his client more than the agreed-upon fee, and the attorney‘s misrepresentations to his client that were made to justify an improper fee. Respondent‘s conduct is more severe than the attorney‘s conduct in Kerpelman, because, unlike the attorney in Kerpelman whо advised his client to commit criminal acts, Respondent actually committed the criminal acts herself, was convicted, and sentenced to fifty years of incarceration, with all but four years suspended.
Although Respondent‘s criminal conduct may not rise to the level of egregiousness as the attorneys’ conduct in Greenleaf and Painter,9 her conduct surely rises above the level of severity as that of the attorneys in Kerpelman, Clinton, Dechowitz, and Sheinbein. Considering the felonious nature of Respondent‘s conduct, her criminal conviction and sentence, her failure to report her charges and conviction to Bar Counsel, and the absence of any extenuаting circumstances, we concluded that Respondent‘s “serious criminal conduct” warrants disbarment. See Vanderlinde, 364 Md. at 419, 773 A.2d at 488. For the above reasons, on March 6, 2018, we disbarred Respondent and awarded costs against her.