In re: ARVADA VILLAGE GARDENS LP, Plaintiff, v. Ana GARATE, Defendant.
Supreme Court Case No. 23SA34
Supreme Court of Colorado
May 15, 2023
529 P.3d 105
HART, J.
Attorneys for Respondent Jefferson County Court: Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Emily Burke Buckley, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Emma Garrison, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, CO
Attorneys for Amici Curiae Apartment Association of Metro Denver; Colorado Apartment Association; National Association of Residential Property Managers, Denver Chapter; National Association of Residential Property Managers, Colorado Springs Chapter; Southern Colorado Residential Rental Association; Colorado Landlord Legislative Coalition; Boulder Area Rental Housing Association; Weld County Apartment Association; Northern Colorado Rental Housing Association; and Apartment Association of Southern Colorado: Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani LLP, John R. Mann, Tamara Seelman, Denver, CO
No appearance on behalf of Plaintiff
En Banc
JUSTICE HART delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which JUSTICE MARQUEZ, JUSTICE HOOD, JUSTICE GABRIEL, JUSTICE SAMOUR and JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER joined.
JUSTICE HART delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Before landlords may evict tenants they must provide notice. Under Colorado law, the required notice period is ten days. During the COVID-19 pandemic, however, Congress passed a law requiring a thirty-day-notice period for eviction from certain rental properties. The question we confront here is whether that thirty-day-notice requirement is still in effect or whether it expired along with other aspects of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (“CARES Act“). Looking at the plain language of the
I. Facts and Procedural History
¶2 Ana Garate is the tenant and Arvada Village Gardens LP (“Landlord“) is the landlord of a property located at Arvada Village Apartments. Garate receives a federal
¶3 On December 6, 2022, Landlord served an eviction notice on Garate, providing that she must “within Ten Days” either pay overdue rent and fees or surrender the premises. Twenty-three days later, on December 29, Landlord filed a forcible entry and detainer (“FED“) proceeding in Jefferson County Court.
¶4 In response, Garate filed an answer and a motion to dismiss, arguing that Landlord failed to satisfy the
¶5 This C.A.R. 21 petition followed.
II. Jurisdiction
¶6 The exercise of this court‘s original jurisdiction under C.A.R. 21 is discretionary, and any relief pursuant thereto is “an extraordinary remedy that is limited in both purpose and availability.” People in Int. of T.T., 2019 CO 54, ¶ 16, 442 P.3d 851, 855-56 (quoting Villas at Highland Park Homeowners Ass‘n v. Villas at Highland Park, LLC, 2017 CO 53, ¶ 22, 394 P.3d 1144, 1151). We have previously exercised jurisdiction under that rule “when an appellate remedy would be inadequate, when a party may otherwise suffer irreparable harm, [or] when a petition raises ‘issues of significant public
¶7 Given these considerations, original jurisdiction is appropriate here for two reasons. First, an appeal would be an inadequate remedy for Garate if the eviction moves forward. Not only would she lose possession of her home, the eviction would mar her rental history and could lead to termination of her subsidized housing voucher. Second, this petition raises an issue of significant public importance that we have not yet considered. FED actions are very common, amounting to 26% of all county court cases in Colorado.1 And county courts around the state have reached different conclusions about whether the
¶8 We now turn to the merits of Garate‘s claim.
III. Analysis
¶9 We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. Est. of Brookoff v. Clark, 2018 CO 80, ¶ 5, 429 P.3d 835, 837. In so doing, we aim to give effect to the legislature‘s intent, looking first to the language of the statute to ascertain its meaning. Przekurat ex rel. Przekurat v. Torres, 2018 CO 69, ¶ 8, 428 P.3d 512, 514. We interpret statutory terms in accordance with their plain and ordinary meanings, Bill Barrett Corp. v. Lembke, 2020 CO 73, ¶ 14, 474 P.3d 46, 49, and don‘t add or subtract words from a statute, Nieto v. Clark‘s Mkt., Inc., 2021 CO 48, ¶ 12, 488 P.3d 1140, 1143. If the language is clear and unambiguous, we apply it as written—nothing more. Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Scholle, 2021 CO 20, ¶ 13, 484 P.3d 695, 699.
¶10 To resolve the dispute here, we must interpret
§ 9058. Temporary moratorium on eviction filings
...
(b) Moratorium
During the 120-day period beginning on March 27, 2020, the lessor of a covered dwelling may not—
(1) make, or cause to be made, any filing with the court of jurisdiction to initiate a legal action to recover possession of the covered dwelling from the tenant for nonpayment of rent or other fees or charges;
...
(c) Notice
The lessor of a covered dwelling unit—
(1) may not require the tenant to vacate the covered dwelling unit before the date that is 30 days after the date on which the lessor provides the tenant with a notice to vacate; and
(2) may not issue a notice to vacate under paragraph (1) until after the expiration of the period described in subsection (b).
¶11 Examining these provisions, the county court concluded that all parts of this statute expired on the date identified in
¶12 The county court now raises a slightly different argument. It concedes that both provisions could not expire on the same day given that no eviction actions on covered properties could be filed until the expiration of the Moratorium Provision and the Notice Provision requires landlords to provide thirty days’ notice before filing an eviction action. Instead, it argues that the Notice Provision must have expired thirty days after the expiration of the Moratorium Provision.
¶13 Neither of these constructions is consistent with the clear statutory language. By its terms, the Moratorium Provision expired on July 24, 2020, after the “120-day period beginning on March 27, 2020.”
¶14 The statute‘s title, “Temporary moratorium on eviction filings,” doesn‘t change anything. By its own terms, the Moratorium Provision was temporary. But just because the word “temporary” is in the title doesn‘t mean that the Notice Provision must receive the same treatment. To the contrary, a title cannot limit the plain meaning of a more specific provision within a statute. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass‘ns, 531 U.S. 457, 483, 121 S.Ct. 903, 149 L.Ed.2d 1 (2001). Instead, the title is useful for purposes of statutory interpretation only when it “shed[s] light on some ambiguous word or phrase in the statute itself.” Id. (alteration omitted) (quoting Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 267, 120 S.Ct. 2159, 147 L.Ed.2d 203 (2000)).
¶15 Courts in Washington, Oklahoma, and Connecticut (the only other jurisdictions that we are aware of to consider this issue) have come to the same conclusion. See, e.g., Sherwood Auburn LLC v. Pinzon, 24 Wash.App.2d 664, 521 P.3d 212, 220 (2022); Nwagwu v. Dawkins, No. BPHCV215004438S, 2021 WL 2775065, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 2, 2021); see also Watson v. Vici Cmty. Dev. Corp., No. CIV-20-1011-F, 2021 WL 1394477, at *11 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 12, 2021) (applying the thirty-day Notice Provision to an FED action filed after the Moratorium Provision expired).
¶16 If Congress made a mistake and intended to include an expiration date for the entirety of section 9058, then it should amend the statute. We are not empowered to “rescue Congress from its drafting errors, and to provide for what we might think ... is the preferred result.” Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 542, 124 S.Ct. 1023, 157 L.Ed.2d 1024 (2004) (alteration in original) (quoting United States. v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 68, 114 S.Ct. 1259, 127 L.Ed.2d 611 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
IV. Conclusion
¶17 For these reasons, we make the rule to show cause absolute. A landlord of a property covered by the
JUSTICE BOATRIGHT did not participate.