Arthur Quattrucci et al. v. James Lombardi, in his capacity as Treasurer of the City of Providence, Rhode Island.
No. 2017-248-Appeal. No. 2017-249-Appeal. (KM 13-1127)
Supreme Court of Rhode Island
June 30, 2020
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or Email opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.
Chief Justice Suttell, for the Court. This appeal concerns a retired firefighter and two retired police officers (collectively plaintiffs) who contend that the City of Providence (the City) violated the terms of two Superior Court consent judgments entered in 2004. The plaintiffs filed a miscellaneous petition in Superior Court seeking to enforce those judgments and to hold the City in contempt. The plaintiffs now appeal from a final judgment dismissing their petition and granting judgment for the City. For the reasons stated in this opinion, we vacate the judgment of the Superior Court and remand the case for further proceedings.
I
Facts and Procedural History
The plaintiffs are Arthur Quattrucci (Quattrucci), who served as a firefighter for the City and retired in 1992, and John A. Santilli (Santilli) and Robert P. Garvin (Garvin), who served as police officers for the City and also retired in 1992.1 All three plaintiffs retired under collective bargaining agreements (CBAs).2 At the time of their retirements, City of Providence Chapter 1991-5, Ordinance No. 18 provided a 5 percent compounded cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) for police officers who retired on or after June 30, 1991, and the same for firefighters who retired on or after July 1, 1991. After plaintiffs’ respective retirements, the City enacted ordinances in 1995 and 1996 reducing their COLAs. The plaintiffs, among others, sued and reached settlements with the City in 2004, which were embodied in consent judgments (the 2004 Consent Judgments).3 Each consent judgment provides, in part:
“[t]he defendants, their agents, successors and all persons acting under them are permanently enjoined from denying the * * * plaintiffs the COLAs that are required to be paid under the CBAs that were in place at the time of their retirement. * * * The defendants, their agents, successors and all persons acting under them are compelled to pay the * * * plaintiffs the COLAs that are required to be paid under the CBAs that were in place at the time of their retirement.”
Thereafter, in April 2012, the City enacted Chapter 2012-20, Ordinance No. 276 (the Pension Ordinance), which amended Chapter 17, Article VI of the Providence Code of Ordinances governing the retirement system and suspended plaintiffs’ COLAs, which the City refused to pay as of
The day after the city council passed the Pension Ordinance, it passed Resolution of the City Council No. 277 (Resolution 277). The relevant portion of Resolution 277 states, “[T]he City Council by this Resolution authorizes and instructs the Mayor and City Solicitor to take all actions on behalf of the City, including, without limitation, commencement of legal action in a court of competent jurisdiction, necessary to challenge and/or modify the Consent Decree and effectuate suspension of the COLAs * * * .”
City employees, including these plaintiffs, sued the City in response to its enactment of the Pension Ordinance, and many of them, excluding these plaintiffs, ultimately settled with the City; the settlement was embodied in a final consent judgment (the 2013 Judgment). The 2013 Judgment provided, “Persons who opt-out of and are thereby excluded from the Settlement * * * shall remain bound by the Pension Ordinance, subject to their right to challenge the Pension Ordinance.” The “opt-outs” filed three lawsuits, including the case at bar.4
The plaintiffs, who did not settle with the City in 2013, filed a petition to enforce the 2004 Consent Judgments and hold the City in contempt of those judgments.5 The City filed an answer and counterclaim, which included five claims under
Thereafter, plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on their petition, and the City filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on the same and on its counterclaim. The hearing justice found that “the clear and unambiguous language” of the 2004 Consent Judgments “did not specifically enjoin the City to pay the named individuals a certain COLA percentage or other pension amount * * * nor did the judgments seek to prevent the City from otherwise altering the terms of the CBA as directly referenced in the 2004 judgments. * * * The consent judgments, in essence, order the City to refrain from the breach of contract in 2004.” She further found the 2004 Consent Judgments could not affect the City‘s ability to alter the terms of the CBA under which plaintiffs retired. Finally, she concluded that it had
Based on the above, the trial justice denied plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment for the City on plaintiffs’ petition. She denied summary judgment on all counts of the City‘s counterclaim, and, thereafter, the City dismissed its counterclaim by stipulation. Final judgment in favor of the City entered the following day. The plaintiffs filed separate timely notices of appeal, and the two appeals were thereafter consolidated before this Court.
II
Standard of Review
“It is well settled that ‘this Court will review the grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo, employing the same standards and rules used by the hearing justice.‘” Cranston Police Retirees Action Committee v. City of Cranston, 208 A.3d 557, 580 (R.I. 2019) (brackets omitted) (quoting Cancel v. City of Providence, 187 A.3d 347, 349 (R.I. 2018)), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 652 (2019). We will affirm the trial justice‘s decision “only if, after reviewing the admissible evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we conclude that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. at 580-81 (quoting Cancel, 187 A.3d at 350). “In a motion for summary judgment, ‘the nonmoving party bears the burden of proving by competent evidence the existence of a disputed issue of material fact and cannot rest upon mere allegations or denials in the pleadings, mere conclusions or mere legal opinions.‘” Id. at 581 (quoting Cancel, 187 A.3d at 350).
III
Discussion
The plaintiffs argue that a consent judgment cannot “be overruled or otherwise modified by city ordinance” and point to two cases, Mansolillo v. Employee Retirement Board of City of Providence, 668 A.2d 313 (R.I. 1995) (Mansolillo I), and City of Providence v. Employee Retirement Board of City of Providence, 749 A.2d 1088 (R.I. 2000) (Mansolillo II), in support of that proposition. Thus, plaintiffs contend, the hearing justice erred when she found that the Pension Ordinance modified their rights under the 2004 Consent Judgments and such finding violated separation of powers principles.7 The City counters that, had the Superior Court found the City to be in contempt, separation of powers principles would have been violated because courts cannot restrain municipal bodies from exercising their legislative powers.
“The doctrine of separation of powers is an inherent and integral element of the republican form of government,” In re Advisory from the Governor, 633 A.2d 664, 674 (R.I. 1993), that “prohibits the usurpation of the power of one branch of government by a coordinate branch of government.” Moreau v. Flanders, 15 A.3d 565, 579 (R.I. 2011) (quoting Town of East Greenwich v. O‘Neil, 617 A.2d 104, 107 (R.I. 1992)).8 The doctrine is presented in article 5 of the Rhode Island Constitution and states, “The powers of the government shall be distributed into three separate and distinct departments: the legislative, executive and judicial.”
We previously adopted the separation-of-powers test set forth in Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980), aff‘d, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). See In re Advisory from the Governor, 633 A.2d at 674; see also State v. Jacques, 554 A.2d 193, 195-96 (R.I. 1989).
“The twin purposes of preventing concentrations of power dangerous to liberty and of promoting governmental efficiency are served if we define a constitutional violation of the separation of powers as an assumption by one branch of powers that are central or essential to the operation of a coordinate branch, provided also that the assumption disrupts the coordinate branch in the performance of its duties and is unnecessary to implement a legitimate policy of the Government.” Jacques, 554 A.2d at 196 (brackets omitted) (quoting Chadha, 634 F.2d at 425).
“Functionally, the doctrine may be violated in two ways. One branch may interfere impermissibly with the other‘s performance of its constitutionally assigned function. Alternatively, the doctrine may be violated when one branch assumes a function that more properly is entrusted to another.”
Woonsocket School Committee v. Chafee, 89 A.3d 778, 793 (R.I. 2014) (deletion omitted) (quoting City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 58 (R.I. 1995)).
Furthermore, under our state constitution, “[t]he judicial power of this state shall be vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts as the general assembly may, from time to time, ordain and establish.”
There can be no doubt that consent judgments are as inviolable as judgments declared by a judicial officer. We have long recognized the sanctity of final judgments entered by the various courts in this state and, in particular, consent judgments.
“We have said that absent fraud, mutual mistake, or actual absence of consent, a judgment entered by consent cannot be opened, changed or set aside without the assent of the parties. The integrity of any decree or judgment is necessarily derived from its entry by the particular court in the exercise of its judicial function. The fact that it was consented to does not in any way detract from its efficacy. It is to be given the same force and effect thereafter by everyone, including the court, as though it had been
entered after a hearing.” Mansolillo I, 668 A.2d at 316 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
In Mansolillo II, we held that consent judgments are “clearly protected by the impenetrable posted authority that we know as separation of powers, based upon articles 5 and 10 of the Rhode Island Constitution.” Mansolillo II, 749 A.2d at 1098. In Mansolillo II, we applied the principles of Taylor v. Place, cited supra, and held “that the General Assembly was, by virtue of our state constitution‘s separation of powers provision, utterly powerless to enact legislation that would serve to interfere with, set aside, or reopen a judgment * * * .” Id. (citing Taylor, 4 R.I. 324 (Ames, C.J.)).
In light of these principles, we are of the opinion that, by enacting the Pension Ordinance, the City attempted to “alter * * * [a] decision once made” by the Superior Court, a decision entered in the form of the 2004 Consent Judgments, Lemoine, 342 A.2d at 620, and thereby infringed on the exercise of judicial power by infringing on “powers that are central or essential to the operation of a coordinate branch,” violating the first prong of Chadha.9 Jacques, 554 A.2d at 196 (quoting Chadha, 634 F.2d at 425). An attempt to skirt the judgment of a court in this state by a city council clearly “disrupts the coordinate branch in the performance of its duties[.]” Id. (quoting Chadha, 634 F.2d at 425). We have previously defined “disruption” in this context as “the act of ‘throwing into confusion or disorder.‘” In re Advisory from the Governor, 633 A.2d at 675 (brackets omitted) (quoting The American Heritage Dictionary 408 (Second College Ed. 1982)). Thus, the second prong of Chadha is met. Finally, although the City has a legitimate interest in its own fiscal health, the Pension Ordinance is “unnecessary” to achieving that interest because interfering with judicial power is not a “necessary” exercise of authority. Jacques, 554 A.2d at 196.
Accordingly, to the extent that the Pension Ordinance purports to nullify the 2004 Consent Judgments, it violates separation-of-powers principles embodied in our state constitution. The hearing justice, therefore, erred in granting the City‘s cross-motion for summary judgment with respect to these plaintiffs.
IV
Conclusion
We therefore vacate the final judgment of the Superior Court in favor of the City, and we remand this case to the Superior Court for further proceedings.
OPINION COVER SHEET
| Title of Case | Arthur Quattrucci et al. v. James Lombardi, in his capacity as Treasurer of the City of Providence, Rhode Island. |
| Case Number | No. 2017-248-Appeal. No. 2017-249-Appeal. (KM 13-1127) |
| Date Opinion Filed | June 30, 2020 |
| Justices | Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ. |
| Written By | Chief Justice Paul A. Suttell |
| Source of Appeal | Kent County Superior Court |
| Judicial Officer From Lower Court | Associate Justice Sarah Taft-Carter |
| Attorney(s) on Appeal |
For the Plaintiffs: Lauren E. Jones, Esq. Kevin F. Bowen, Esq. Thomas J. McAndrew, Esq. Robert S. Thurston, Esq. For the Defendant: William M. Dolan, Esq. Kenneth B. Chiavarini, Esq. Matthew T. Jerzyk, Esq. William K. Wray, Jr., Esq. Nicholas L. Nybo Esq. Jeffrey T. Dana, Esq. |