232 A.3d 1062
R.I.2020Background
- Three retirees (one firefighter, two police officers) retired in 1992 under CBAs that provided a 5% compounded COLA tied to Ordinance 1991-5.
- City later reduced COLAs (mid-1990s); plaintiffs sued and obtained 2004 consent judgments enjoining the City from denying the COLAs required by the CBAs in force at retirement.
- In April 2012 the City enacted the Pension Ordinance suspending COLAs for retirees effective January 1, 2013; City Council also authorized legal action to challenge/modify the consent decrees.
- Many retirees settled with the City in 2013; these plaintiffs opted out and filed a petition to enforce the 2004 consent judgments and seek contempt against the City.
- The Superior Court granted summary judgment for the City, finding the 2004 consent judgments did not command a specific COLA percentage or prevent the City from altering CBA terms; plaintiffs appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a municipal ordinance can nullify/modify a prior consent judgment | Consent judgments may not be overruled or modified by city ordinance | City argued courts cannot restrain municipal legislative powers; ordinance valid | Ordinance cannot nullify consent judgments; municipal action violated separation of powers |
| Whether consent judgments created vested rights immune to later ordinance | Plaintiffs: judgments fix their COLA rights under the CBAs and cannot be altered by ordinance | City: consent judgments did not specify particular COLA amounts and did not bar ordinance action | Court treated consent judgments as judicial decisions entitled to protection; Ordinance impermissibly altered those rights |
| Whether the Superior Court erred in interpreting the scope of the 2004 consent judgments | Plaintiffs: judgments enjoin denial/payment of COLAs required by CBAs — broader protection | City: judgments only required City to refrain from breach in 2004 and did not preclude later ordinance | Court found the hearing justice erred to extent she concluded Ordinance could modify or nullify the judgments |
| Remedy: contempt / enforcement of consent judgments | Plaintiffs sought enforcement and contempt for nonpayment | City defended under ordinance and procedural posture; argued separation-of-powers limits judicial remedies against municipal legislation | Court vacated Superior Court judgment for City and remanded for further proceedings on enforcement/remedy |
Key Cases Cited
- Mansolillo v. Employee Retirement Bd. of City of Providence, 668 A.2d 313 (R.I. 1995) (consent judgments cannot be reopened absent fraud or mutual mistake)
- City of Providence v. Employee Retirement Bd. of City of Providence, 749 A.2d 1088 (R.I. 2000) (separation-of-powers bars legislative action that interferes with court judgments)
- Chadha v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980) (separation-of-powers test adopted by Rhode Island decisions)
- In re Advisory from the Governor, 633 A.2d 664 (R.I. 1993) (adoption of Chadha separation-of-powers framework)
- Lemoine v. Martineau, 342 A.2d 616 (R.I. 1975) (defining exercise of judicial power as control or alteration of a decision)
- Jacques v. State, 554 A.2d 193 (R.I. 1989) (explaining Chadha two-prong test for separation-of-powers violations)