ARMEN AVOYAN, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., Defendants.
Case No. 2:24-cv-00434-HDV-JC
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
April 2, 2026
Hernan D. Vera, United States District Judge
On December 11, 2020, Plaintiff Armen Avoyan and United States Postal Service (USPS) employee Azad Hovhannesian were involved in a car accident. The accident occurred as both drivers intended to turn right from Brand Boulevard onto Lexington Drive in Glendale, California, with Plaintiff‘s Ford Fusion to the right of Hovhannesian‘s USPS truck in an extra-wide right lane. Plaintiff experienced neck and back pain following the accident.
Plaintiff, who alleged negligence, proceeded to trial on September 30, 2025. After reviewing and weighing all of the evidence, the Court finds that both parties are equally at fault for the accident. Plaintiff should not have positioned himself to the right of a truck that had its right turn blinker on. But Hovhannesian should have seen Plaintiff‘s car before he started moving his truck. And it was the USPS truck that collided with Plaintiff‘s Ford Fusion. The Court also finds that some, but not all, of Plaintiff‘s medical care was reasonably necessary as a result of this accident. The Court awards Plaintiff $12,155.19 in damages.
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff initiated this action on January 17, 2024, against Hovhannesian, USPS, the United States of America, and various Doe defendants.1 Complaint [Dkt. 1]. Plaintiffs asserted a single claim for negligence under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). Id. ¶¶ 9-15. Hovhannesian and USPS were dismissed by stipulation. [Dkt. 14].
The Court held a bench trial, which began on September 30, 2025 and ended on October 2, 2025. [Dkts. 62-64]. Plaintiff rested his case in chief on the second day of trial. See [Dkt. 63]; Trial Transcript (Tr.) [Dkts. 69, 70, 79] at 283:18-285:25. Defendants rested their case on the third day. See [Dkt. 64]. The Court ordered the parties to file closing briefs. [Dkts. 60, 64]. Upon the parties’ joint stipulation, the initial closing briefs were to be filed simultaneously on January 15, 2025, and responsive closing briefs were to be filed simultaneously on January 25, 2026. [Dkt. 73].
In a bench trial, the judge acts as the fact-finder—weighing the evidence, determining witness credibility, and deciding questions of fact as well as issues of law. Rutter Group Prac. Guide, Fed. Civ. Trials & Ev. ¶ 17:30 (June 2025); see also Stillaguamish Tribe of Indians v. Washington, 102 F.4th 955, 961-62 (9th Cir. 2024) (The district court‘s task . . . was to evaluate all the . . . evidence . . . .). [T]he court must find the facts specially and state its conclusions of law separately. The findings and conclusions may be stated on the record . . . or may appear in an opinion or a memorandum of decision filed by the court.
IV. LIABILITY
A. Trial Testimony
Hovhannesian testified that, on December 11, 2020, at approximately 5 p.m., he drove his USPS truck northbound [on] Brand Boulevard in the lane that‘s ... [on] the curbside and prepared to mak[e] a right turn ... [on]to Lexington Drive [as] a part of [his] regular route which he drove five days a week for [m]any years. Tr. at 52:6-10, 59:11-14, 60:8-14, 78:12-15. As he g[ot] closer to the intersection, [the] cars slowed down in front of [him] and ... stopped, so he also slowed down and came to a full stop. Id. at 78:16-21; 78:22-24. He made sure he had [his] right turn signal light on, look[ed] at [the USPS truck‘s] mirrors and wait[ed] [for] ... the cars [ahead of him] ... to move. Id. at 78:25-79:4. 3. The five mirrors the USPS driver checked gave him a wholly unobstructed view of everything to the right side of his truck, without any blind spots. Id. at 72:2-4, 15-17; 73:17-74:1; 76:25-77:4; 72:15-17, 74:15-18, 75:7-9, 76:13-18; Exs. 1104, 1105,
Plaintiff testified that he was driving along Brand Boulevard towards Lexington to go to Eagle Rock to complete a food delivery. Tr. at 232:18-19; 235:4-6; 269:23-270:1. Plaintiff admits that [w]hen [he] arrived [at the Brand-Lexington intersection], the [USPS] truck was already there and he saw it waiting at the light. Id. at 232:18-20; 270:11-13; see also id. at 234:12-15. Plaintiff testified that the USPS truck did not have its turn signal on. Id. at 234:15-23. Plaintiff pulled alongside the USPS truck, position[ing his] vehicle next to it on the right side. Id. at 235:12-16. Plaintiff remained stopped and waiting for the light to change from red to green for [a]round 15 seconds. Id. at 232:21-22; 235:17-19. But Plaintiff never looked back towards the USPS truck he had pulled up alongside—instead, he first looked to the right and then merely look[ed straight] ahead at the red light. Id. at 271:24-272:2, 16-20. As soon as the light turned green, [the USPS truck began to] move[] and the impact happened. Id. at 271:11-13.
Ian Miller, who has a master‘s degree in mechanical engineering, testified as the United States’ accident reconstruction expert. Tr. at 287:8-291:3. He reviewed photographs, property damage estimates, deposition testimony, a Traffic Collision Report, [and] conduct[ed] inspections . . . of the [accident] site and [the USPS] vehicle[]. Id. at 291:7-17. He made a 3D laser scan of both the intersection and the USPS vehicle. Id. at 292:1-22, 296:24-297:14, 299:15-21. Miller was unable to inspect Plaintiff‘s car because Plaintiff disposed of it before filing suit, but he gathered information on it from Carfax, the California D.M.V. database, and the Expert Auto Stats database. Id. at 297:15-25, 298:22-299:8. Miller analyzed all the available physical data, used
B. Credibility and Weight
The exact manner in which the December 11, 2020 accident at the heart of this case unfolded is hotly disputed. The Court has only Plaintiff‘s and Hovhannesian‘s testimony on this point, which in some instances is flatly contradictory. There was no video from a dashboard or surveillance camera and no other eyewitness testimony presented at trial. Many factual findings thus depend on which party the Court finds more credible.
The Court finds Hovhannesian to be a more credible fact witness than Plaintiff. First, Hovhannesian has less of an interest in this case and thus less motive to slant, unconsciously or otherwise, his testimony. United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52 (1984); see also United States v. Hankey, 203 F.3d 1160, 1171 (9th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff is a party, with a financial stake in the outcome of the trial. Hovhannesian is not.3
Second, Plaintiff was less than forthcoming with respect to other occasions in which he had been in car accidents and made claims. For example, when questioned about earlier car accidents he
The Court also observed Plaintiff‘s and Hovhannesian‘s demeanor and body language while testifying, and concludes that these factors support the Court‘s credibility determination.
The Court finds the United States’ accident reconstruction expert, Miller, to be credible and forthright with reasonable and supported conclusions. Plaintiff did not present a competing accident reconstruction expert, and Plaintiff‘s attacks on Miller‘s methodology are not convincing.5
The motor vehicle accident at the heart of this case occurred on December 11, 2020 around 5:22 p.m. Tr. at 57:8-19; Ex. 3. It was getting kind of dark. Tr. at 57:8-14; 237:2-4; 258:6-9.6
The accident occurred at the intersection of Brand Boulevard and Lexington Drive in Glendale, California. Tr. at 57:8-19; Ex. 3. An aerial view of that intersection, indicating the widths of the various lanes, is depicted below:
analysis on potentially faulty assumptions. Plaintiff‘s Opening Post-Trial Brief at 9. But Plaintiff disposed of his vehicle before filing suit, and the postal truck did not have an event data recorder. Tr. at 297:15-25, 323:7-11. And Miller credibly testified that his assumptions were bas[ed] . . . on the physical evidence that‘s observed where possible and on peer-reviewed scientific literature otherwise. Id. at 341:18-342:4.
Along the right side of northbound Brand there are diagonal parking spaces. Tr. at 62:12-17; Exs. 1005, 1006, 1008. The Court finds that there were cars parked in those spaces at the time of the accident. See Tr. at 67:18-68:3 (Hovhannesian‘s testimony); Ex. 3-14 (police image).7 The right-most lane is not a dedicated right turn lane—cars in that lane can either cross the intersection and continue northbound on Brand or turn right onto Lexington. Tr. at 295:22-24. It widens from 16’ to 21’ after those parking spaces end, and then further widens to 23’ near the intersection. Id. at 62:12-17, 63:13-21, 293:17-294:24; Ex. 1008.
Avoyan was driving a 2015 Ford Fusion, which weighs approximately 3,600 pounds. Tr. at 325:13-20. Hovhannesian was driving a USPS Morgon Olson two-ton delivery truck. Id. at 52:6-10, 297:7-12. The USPS truck weighs 8,125 pounds empty with a driver in the driver‘s seat. Id. at 325:13-17, 326:13-15. At the time of the collision, there were a lot of outgoing packages in the back of the truck, so it likely weighed even more. Id. at 88:7-12; see also id. at 326:21-327:4 (suggesting that the two tons in its name refers to the maximum cargo capacity of the truck).
Both Hovhannesian and Avoyan were driving northbound on Brand Boulevard in the right-most lane, intending to turn right onto Lexington Drive. Tr. at 52:6-10, 59:11-14, 60:8-14, 78:12-15 (Hovhannesian); id. at 232:18-25, 235:12-16 (Plaintiff). This was part of [Hovhannesian‘s] regular route. Id. at 59:11-14, 60:8-14, 78:12-15. Plaintiff was go[ing] to Eagle Rock to complete a food delivery, and was using a GPS navigation system on [his] phone, which was mounted on a stand on [his] air-conditioning vent on his right. Id. at 231:20-22; 232:4-5, 18-19; 235:4-6; 269:23-270:10.
Hovhannesian arrived at the intersection first. Tr. at 232:18-20; 270:11-13. He came to a complete stop at the red light. Id. at 64:12-15, 78:22-24; 89:23-90:12. The Court finds that
When Avoyan arrived at the intersection, also intending to make a right turn, he positioned his vehicle to the right of the USPS vehicle and was stopped at the red light for some time. Tr. at 234:15-235:3, 235:12-19.
Hovhannesian checked his mirrors while he was stopped, and then again as he started to move in preparation for his turn. Tr. at 79:2-81:7. He claims that his truck has no blind spots, and that he never saw Plaintiff‘s vehicle in his mirrors. Id. at 76:25-77:4, 80:12-18.
D. Conclusions of Law
Under the FTCA, the United States may be held liable for the negligent acts of its employees acting within the scope of their employment in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances according to the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.
To establish negligence, Plaintiff must establish: (1) a legal duty to use due care, (2) a breach of that legal duty, and (3) that the breach proximately or legally caused the resulting injury. Vasilenko v. Grace Family Church, 3 Cal. 5th 1077, 1083 (2017). Plaintiff bears the burden of proving Defendant‘s negligence by a preponderance of the evidence. Ortega v. Kmart Corp., 26 Cal. 4th 1200, 1205 (2001).
California is a pure comparative negligence state. Recovery is not barred just because the plaintiff‘s [own] negligent conduct has contributed as a legal cause . . . to [his] harm, even if the plaintiff is equally . . . or more at fault than the defendant. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 808 (1975); see also id. at 827. Instead, the damages awarded shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the [plaintiff]. id. at 829. Defendant bears the burden of establishing plaintiff‘s comparative fault. Pfeifer v. John Crane, Inc., 220 Cal. App. 4th 1270, 1285 (2013), as modified on denial of reh‘g (Nov. 27, 2013).
The Court first considers whether Plaintiff has established Hovhannesian‘s negligence. As the Court found the facts, Hovhannesian made a right turn from a position that was not immediately adjacent to the right-hand curb, colliding with Avoyan‘s vehicle on his right in doing so. See supra Section IV.C.
Plaintiff argues that Hovhannesian is presumptively negligent because he violated section 22100(a), which requires that an approach for and a right-hand turn shall be made as close as practicable to the right-hand curb or edge of the roadway. Plaintiff‘s Opening Post-Trial Brief at 7. The Court disagrees. Although Hovhannesian‘s vehicle was not particularly close to the curb, Hovhannesian testified, and the Court finds, that he was as close as practicable given the conditions—the size and turning radius of the USPS truck, the number of distracted pedestrians around the intersection, and the parked cars in the way. Tr. at 47:3-9, 48:6-49:18, 64:7-23, 66:2-8, 66:25-67:14, 81:3-22;
Nevertheless, the Court finds that Hovhannesian was negligent. See CACI No. 418 (when there is no negligence per se, negligence can still be proven by other means); Ramirez v. Plough, Inc., 6 Cal. 4th 539, 548 (1993) (Where a statute, ordinance or regulation is found to define a standard of conduct for the purposes of negligence actions, . . . the standard defined is normally a minimum standard, applicable to the ordinary situations contemplated by the legislation. This legislative or administrative minimum does not prevent a finding that a reasonable [person] would have taken additional precautions where the situation is such as to call for them. (emphasis added)). According to the defense‘s own accident-reconstruction expert, it was Hovhannesian‘s moving vehicle that collided with Plaintiff‘s almost-stationary one, not the other way around. Tr. at 312:8-23. The failure to use reasonable care in driving a vehicle is negligence. CACI No. 700. Drivers must keep a lookout for . . . other vehicles and must also control the speed and movement of their vehicles. Id. That a driver has the right of way does not absolve him of the duty to exercise ordinary care—he must be watchful of the direction in which danger is most likely to be apprehended. Malone v. Perryman, 226 Cal. App. 2d 227, 234 (1964). Hovhannesian testified that his truck has no blind spots and that he checked his mirrors multiple times and never saw Avoyan‘s car to his right until after the collision. Tr. at 76:25-77:4, 79:2-81:7. But this Court has found that Avoyan‘s car was in fact stopped to Hovhannesian‘s right at the red light for some time. See supra Section IV.C. When there is evidence to the effect that one did look but did not see that which was in plain sight, it follows either that some part of such evidence is untrue or that the person was negligently inattentive. Daun v. Truax, 56 Cal. 2d 647, 651 (1961). Hovhannesian‘s negligence was a substantial factor in causing the accident and any of the harm to Plaintiff that resulted therefrom. See CACI No. 430; infra Part V.
The Court next turns to whether Plaintiff was also negligent. Defendant argues Plaintiff violated four provisions of the Vehicle Code. See Defendant‘s Opening Post-Trial Brief at 6-7 (citing
Section 21750 provides that drivers should generally overtake and pass to the left, at a safe distance without interfering with the safe operation of the overtaken vehicle, subject to the limitations and exceptions set forth below. Even if Avoyan‘s positioning to the right of the USPS truck could properly be characterized as an attempt to overtake or pass, this statute does not in all instances forbid doing so to the right; it is explicitly subject to the following more specific provisions regarding when it is permissible to do so.
Section 21754 provides that a driver may overtake and pass to the right [u]pon a highway within a business or residence district with unobstructed pavement of sufficient width for two or more lines of moving vehicles in the direction of travel.
As to the apportionment of fault, the preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that Hovhannesian and Avoyan‘s negligence contributed in approximately equal measure to Avoyan‘s injuries. As such, the Court apportions fault equally between the parties.
A. Trial Testimony
Avoyan testified that the sides and fronts of his car, including the front tires and wheels, sustained damage. Tr. at 238:15-23. His car had to be towed away from the scene. Id. at 240:24-241:4. The car was eventually declared useless and a total loss because the cost of repair was very high in comparison to its value. Id. at 238:15-23, 241:5-6. As a result, Plaintiff paid $1,778 to rent a car from Hertz Rent-a-Car for roughly two months. Id. at 241:17-242:7, 243:2-9; Ex. 2. He was then without a vehicle for another two months, until he was able to purchase another vehicle. Tr. at 243:8-12. In those two months, he testified that he could not drive for Doordash, Postmates, or Uber, from which he generally earned $5,000 or $6,000 per month. Id. at 243:13-244:8; see also id. at 235:4-7, 269:23-270:1.
As to his injuries, Plaintiff testified that he was pain-free the day before the collision. Tr. at 246:18-20. Three days after the collision, Plaintiff presented to Dr. Jon Postajian, a chiropractor, with back, neck, and shoulder pain. Id. at 244:9-12. Plaintiff received chiropractic treatment from Dr. Postajian multiple times weekly over seven months. Id. at 244:23-245:2. Plaintiff was billed $9,075 for these services—a sum he has not yet paid and still owes. Id. at 247:13-248:23; Ex. 5. When his condition did not fully resolve, Dr. Postajian referred Plaintiff to Dr. Lawrence Miller for injections. Tr. at 245:6-23. Dr. Miller performed two injections on Plaintiff, who testified that he experienced significant improvement in his pain levels after the second injection, dropping from 10/10 to much more manageable levels. Id. at 245:24-246:12. Plaintiff testified that he owes $7,424 to Dr. Miller. Id. at 248:24-249:7; Ex. 7.
Dr. Jon Postajian, DC, a chiropractor, testified as one of Plaintiff‘s treating physicians. Tr. at 103:25-104:12, 113:2-12. He first saw Avoyan three days after the accident. Id. at 97:24-98:3, 275:16-25. Avoyan complained of headaches, neck pain, pain in his upper, mid, and lower back, and bilateral shoulder pain. Id. at 100:19-24. Dr. Postajian‘s examination documented certain objective findings, including a positive foraminal compression test with pain and a shoulder depression test. Id. at 452:15-21. His records do not reflect any suspicion of malingering. Id. at 476:17-19. Dr. Postajian did not review any of Avoyan‘s medical records or imaging. Id. at
Dr. Lawrence Miller, a pain medicine physician, both treated and testified as an expert for Plaintiff. Tr. at 146:13-18, 156:10-20, 178:24-179:2. He first saw Avoyan in April 2021. Id. at 179:19-20. Dr. Miller examined Avoyan and found that he had positive right Lasegue, positive right Bowstring, and positive right straight leg raise tests.12 Id. at 167:2-13. He did not have any sense that Avoyan was malingering. Id. at 168:8-14. He also examined Plaintiff‘s 2021 MRIs, but he did not review any of Avoyan‘s medical records or imaging from before the accident. Id. at 144:24-145:2, 156:2-8, 192:14-24. Dr. Miller diagnosed Plaintiff with left cervical radiculopathy, right lumbar radiculopathy, multilevel cervical and lumbar disc protrusions, cervical and lumbar central canal stenosis, lumbar neural foraminal stenosis, and posttraumatic cervical and lumbosacral spine injury. Id. at 207:23-208:17. Dr. Miller recognized that Avoyan had a history of prior back pain and degenerative changes. Id. at 157:25-158:1; see also id. at 146:2-5. However, based on Plaintiff‘s experience of no pain before the accident, pain afterwards, and less pain after treatment, Dr. Miller concluded that Avoyan‘s preexisting conditions were aggravated by and his pain was caused by the accident. Id. at 157:17-158:2, 192:25-194:8, 195:1-9; see also id. at 146:6-147:5. Dr. Miller gave Plaintiff two epidural injections at the L5-S1 levels on April 29, 2021 and June 1,
Dr. Miller also opined that the charges for his services, for anesthesiologist services and the surgery center associated with the epidural, and for the MRIs were reasonable and customary in the geographic area. Id. at 170:1-171:21, 172:14-174:8, 174:24-175:19, 176:16-177:15.
Dr. Brian Rudin, an orthopedic surgeon, testified as an expert for the defense. Tr. at 391:2-5. He examined Plaintiff in May 2025. Id. at 387:23-388:2; see also Ex. 1067 (Rudin‘s expert report). He testified that, in that examination, Plaintiff was malingering a bit—faking or exaggerating symptoms. Tr. at 391:18-19, 392:19-395:2, 474:12-20, 476:24-479:15. Dr. Rudin also reviewed Plaintiff‘s medical records and imaging, from both before the December 2020 accident and afterwards. Id. at 392:20-24. He testified credibly and persuasively that Avoyan has a number of degenerative conditions unrelated to the accident. He showed how many of these conditions (or signs associated with them) were visible on X-rays from 2019, before the accident; how many appeared similar in 2021 and 2023 MRIs; and explained that they are not acute and related to the accident. Dr. Rudin concluded that Plaintiff suffered at most a minor sprain or strain injury as a result of the accident, for which appropriate treatment would have been at most 12 chiropractic therapy sessions. Id. at 445:13-16, 448:6-449:4. Dr. Rudin explained that epidural injections are for pressure on the nerves and nerve pain, and Avoyan had no pressure on his nerves, and in any case it was not related to the December 2020 accident. Id. at 446:18-447:7.
Dr. Allen Yu, who has a Ph.D. in biomedical engineering, testified as the United States’ biomechanics expert. Tr. at 343:6-344:1, 347:3-8. He relied on Miller‘s accident reconstruction opinions and compared it to biomechanics literature. Id. at 347:13-22, 353:16-20, 364:11-15, 367:25-368:3. Dr. Yu testified that the forces of the accident would have caused Avoyan to move to the left and rear inside his vehicle, and that his movement to the right was voluntary and shows that the forces were actually rather minor. Id. at 349:12-21, 350:21-353:10. Dr. Yu also opined that the forces experienced by Plaintiff during this accident are not consistent with his diagnosed structural injuries. Id. at 349:22-350:13. Rather, Dr. Yu testified, the forces that Avoyan was exposed to during the sideswipe collision are consistent with being non-injurious or associated with soft tissue
Finally, Lindsay Knutson, a Director in the Health Analytics Practice at Berkley Research Group, testified as an expert for the defense regarding the reasonable value of the medical services Avoyan received. Tr. at 489:18-493:7. She uses payer and provider data sets, government benchmarking data, and industry studies and surveys to determine reasonable rates of reimbursement for healthcare services. Id. at 490:4-11, 493:10-19, 498:16-499:10. Knutson testified that the reasonable value of health services is the amount that a willing buyer would pay and a willing seller would accept in an arm‘s length transaction. Id. at 493:20-24. Her basic methodology for
| Provider | Reasonable Value |
|---|---|
| Jon M. Postajian DC | $7,827.60 |
| Tip Top Anesthesia Group | $1,168.44 |
| Lawrence Miller | $1,044.37 |
| Beverly Oaks Surgery Center | $1,486.09 |
| Glenoaks Imaging Professionals | $963.73 |
Id. at 501:5-502:11. These rates are higher than the Medicare and worker‘s compensation rates. Id. at 515:15-516:17. She explained that Plaintiff‘s eligibility for Medicare, health insurance (or lack thereof), or the fact that he was treated on a lien basis does not affect her analysis. Id. at 519:3-25.
B. Credibility and Weight
The Court finds the testimony of Dr. Postajian, Dr. Miller, Dr. Rudin, Dr. Yu, and Knutson to be credible and forthright with reasonable and supported conclusions.
However, as between Drs. Postajian and Miller and Dr. Rudin, only Dr. Rudin had reviewed Plaintiff‘s medical imaging and records from before the December 2020 accident. Tr. at 117:20-118:19 (Dr. Postajian); id. at 144:24-145:2, 156:2-8, 192:14-24 (Dr. Miller); id. at 392:20-24 (Dr. Rudin). Dr. Rudin‘s testimony carefully discussed and explained how his conclusions followed from the imaging, and Plaintiff failed to rebut that testimony. Dr. Rudin also noted that Dr. Postajian‘s and Dr. Miller‘s examinations documented some inconsistent results. Id. at 485:11-17; see Urias v. United States, No. 22-cv-1680-KK-PVCX, 2024 WL 2132510, at *9 (C.D. Cal. May 13,
The Court generally finds Knutson‘s methodology for evaluating the reasonable value of medical expenses to be more reliable than Dr. Miller‘s. See Urias, 2024 WL 2132510, at *12 (adopting Knutson‘s methodology); Pedroza v. United States, No. ED-20-cv-00131CJC-KKx, 2021 WL 4441974, at *9-10 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2021) (same). Dr. Miller determined a reasonable and customary charge based on the bills he has encountered over the course of his career treating patients in the community. Tr. at 202:4-25. He does not maintain any type of repository of bills from which to determine a median amount; it is based only on what he can recall. Id. Dr. Miller had no specific objections to Knutson‘s methodology. Id. at 203:1-16.14 Knutson, on the other hand, determined the Medicare benchmark rate for the service provided at a certain date and time, and then adjusted it to reflect what commercial payors generally pay for such services. Id. at 498:16-499:10, 503:15-506:12, 506:21-507:3, 509:20-25, 510:21-511:5, 511:11-512:25, 513:12-514:9.15
is more sophisticated than an across-the-board reduction. Plaintiff‘s contention that workers’ compensation rates exceed Knutson‘s reasonable value calculations, and that she answered only what Medicare would pay for these services, Plaintiff‘s Opening Post-Trial Brief at 19, simply mischaracterizes her testimony.
C. Findings of Fact
The sides and fronts of Avoyan‘s car sustained damage. Tr. at 238:15-23, 336:10-337:2, 380:2-13. The left front tire was punctured and displaced from the rim and the right front tire ended up on the 6-inch curb. Id. at 323:24-324:8, 327:17-329:10; Exs. 3-9, 3-18. Avoyan‘s car had to be towed away from the scene. Tr. at 240:24-241:4. The car was eventually declared useless and a total loss because the cost of repair was very high in comparison to its value. Id. at 238:15-23, 241:5-6, 333:2-5, 370:20-25.
As a result, Plaintiff rented a vehicle from Hertz Rent-a-Car—he paid $1,778 to rent a car for roughly two months. Tr. at 241:17-242:7, 243:2-9. He was without a vehicle for another two months. Id. at 243:8-12. During that latter period, he could not drive for Doordash, Postmates, or
Plaintiff, who was a smoker in his late fifties who had been in several previous car accidents, already had a number of medical conditions on the date of the accident. Tr. at 19:5-7, 158:12-160:9, 161:15-162:14, 246:13-17, 251:16-252:1, 395:3-18, 396:17-397:17, 458:25-459:12; Exs. 5, 9-2, 11, 13. The Court finds that Plaintiff has a number of degenerative conditions not connected to the December 2020 accident. First, Plaintiff has diffuse idiopathic skeletal hyperostosis (DISH). Tr. at 398:2-12, 398:23-399:3. Avoyan‘s DISH was visible on 2019 X-rays and diagnosed in 2019. Id. at 398:10-14. Second, Plaintiff also suffers from chronic degenerative disc disease, which is when the discs—which are like cushions between bones—wear out, shrink down, and blob out. Id. at 391:8-10, 399:13-18. When degenerative disc disease is advanced, or has been there a while, bone spurs tend to form around it. Id. at 399:4-25. Avoyan‘s March 2021 MRIs revealed significant disk bulging without signs of acute trauma in the same spots that the 2019 X-rays revealed bone spurs,16 indicating that he had been suffering from chronic degenerative disc disease for some time before the 2020 accident. Id. at 411:4-425:9, 454:10-456:20. Third, Avoyan has concentric annular tears or fissures. Id. at 400:6-402:11, 405:6-15, 407:13-19, 408:22-409:5. This kind of annular tear (as opposed to a radial or transverse tear) is degenerative, very common with degenerative disc disease, and very uncommon from trauma. Id. at 400:17-21, 401:15-20.17 Fourth, Avoyan had very mild foraminal stenosis, which is narrowing or tightness where the nerves come out of the side of the spine. Id. at 425:10-23, 426:12-14, 428:5-434:25. Avoyan had mild central canal stenosis at C5-6. Id. at 436:16-24, see also id. at 425:16-19. This stenosis was caused
Despite these conditions, Avoyan was not experiencing any pain on December 10, 2020. Tr. at 246:18-20, 99:25-100:15; see also id. at 147:6-18, 459:17-20, 483:21-24.18
During the accident, Plaintiff, who was wearing his seat belt, moved to the right inside his vehicle. Tr. at 250:25-251:2, 272:21-24. This movement was not due to the force of the impact, but to Plaintiff attempting to brace himself. Id. at 250:25-251:2, 272:21-273:3; see also id. at 349:10-21, 351:19-353:10. None of his left shoulder, left arm, and his head made contact with the inside of his car. Id. at 273:8-274:6.
Avoyan did not seek medical attention immediately after the accident. Tr. at 274:15-275:15. He first experienced pain when he went home that night. Id. at 251:3-6. The next morning, his pain was worse; he still did not seek medical care. Id.; id. at 275:16-20. He did not seek medical care on December 13 either. Id. at 275:23-25.
Avoyan first saw a chiropractor—Dr. Postajian—three days after the accident. Tr. at 97:24-98:3, 275:16-25. Avoyan complained of headaches, neck pain, pain in his upper, mid, and lower back, and bilateral shoulder pain. Id. at 100:19-24. Over the course of seven months—between December 14, 2020 and July 13, 2021—Avoyan had about 40 chiropractic therapy sessions with Dr. Postajian. Id. at 102:8-11, 123:8-17, 452:8-14; Ex. 5-1. The Court finds that all of these
In March 2021, Plaintiff received MRIs of his cervical and lumbar spine. Tr. at 156:2-8, 176:21-177:4. The Court finds that this diagnostic imaging was medically necessary after the accident. See id. at 245:3-5 (Dr. Postajian recommended the MRI scans).20
In April 2021, Avoyan went to see Dr. Miller, a pain management specialist. Dr. Miller gave Plaintiff two epidural injections at the L5-S1 levels on April 29, 2021 and June 1, 2021. Tr. at 246:1-12. The Court finds that these epidural injections were not medically indicated as a result of the December 11, 2020 accident. Id. at 446:18-447:7 (Dr. Rudin explaining that epidural injections are for pressure on the nerves and nerve pain, and Avoyan had no pressure on his nerves, and in any case it was not related to the December 2020 accident).21
Defendant must pay Plaintiff reasonable compensation for the harm it caused him. See CACI No. 3900. Plaintiff requests $10,000 for the loss of use of his car, $41,099 in past medical expenses, an amount in the Court‘s discretion for future medical expenses, and an amount of non-economic damages commensurate with the physical pain suffered and the impairment of Plaintiff‘s ability to care for his aging parents in the Court‘s discretion. Plaintiffs’ Opening Post-Trial Brief at 20, 23. The Court addresses each item separately.
1. Loss of Use
Plaintiff is permitted to recover damages for the loss of use of his personal property—here, his car. See CACI No. 3903M. This theory of damages is distinct from the physical damage to the property. Compare CACI No. 3903M with CACI No. 3903J (damage to personal property); see also Reynolds v. Bank of Am. Nat‘l T. & S. Ass‘n, 53 Cal. 2d 49, 50-51 (1959) (where a vehicle is damaged or destroyed, the plaintiff may for the damage done to the vehicle and also for the loss of being deprived of its use during the time reasonably required for repair or replacement).22
The proper measure of such damages is the reasonable cost to rent a similar vehicle for the amount of time reasonably necessary to repair or replace the damaged vehicle. CACI No. 3903M;
A plaintiff may recover damages for past medical expenses. Ochoa v. Dorado, 228 Cal. App. 4th 120, 134 (2014) (citing Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions, Inc., 52 Cal. 4th 541, 555 (2011)). Such damages are limited to the lesser of (1) the amount paid or incurred for past medical services, and (2) the reasonable value of the services. Id.
The United States is not liable for Avoyan‘s pre-existing conditions or the natural progression of those conditions. See, e.g., Whyatt v. Kukura, 157 Cal. App. 2d 803, 805 (1958). It is liable, however, for damages caused by the collision that are over and above the natural progression of his pre-existing conditions; for the extent that his condition has worsened as a result of the accident. Sanchez v. Kern Emergency Medical Transportation Corp., 8 Cal. App. 5th 146, 168 (2017) (citation omitted).
Plaintiff bears the burden of proving that his past medical care was reasonably required and attributable to the accident. Foshee v. United States, No. 8:23-CV-00375-ODW (JDEX), 2025 WL 2879645, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2025). As the Court found supra Section V.C, Plaintiff has met this burden with respect to his chiropractic therapy with Dr. Postajian and his March 2021 MRIs. He has not, however, met it with respect to the epidural injections, which Dr. Rudin credibly testified were not medically necessary.
In light of its evaluation of Knutson and Dr. Miller‘s methodology for calculating the reasonable value of medical services, the Court concludes that the midpoint (or average) between Knutson‘s estimates and the charges actually incurred represents a fair estimate of the reasonable value of these expenses. See Bermudez v. Ciolek, 237 Cal. App. 4th 1311, 1330-31 (2015) ([T]he measure of damages for uninsured plaintiffs who have not paid their medical bills will usually turn on a wide-ranging inquiry into the reasonable value of medical services provided . . . .); Pebley v. Santa Clara
No. 3903M with CACI No. 3903C (lost earnings), and the reasonable rental value is an appropriate measure of the former. That measure makes sense here—had Plaintiff mitigated his damages by renting a vehicle in the second two months, as he did for the first two months, he would have been able to work as a driver and would not have lost these earnings. See CACI No. 3931 (duty to mitigate damages).
A plaintiff is also entitled to recover the reasonable value of medical care that he is reasonably certain to need in the future as a result of the accident. Cuevas v. Contra Costa County, 11 Cal. App. 5th 163, 183 (2017) (quoting CACI No. 3903A as an accurate statement of the law). Avoyan has not met his burden in establishing the need for future medical treatment related to this accident. He testified that he is no longer in any pain. Tr. at 276:24-277:2. And he has been in at least three other car accidents since the 2020 one, from which he has claimed injury for which he has undergone additional medical treatment. Id. at 258:13-24; 259:7-260:4. Plaintiff has not met his burden to show which of his lingering symptoms (if there are any) are attributable to the 2020 accident as opposed to subsequent ones.
3. Non-Economic Damages
Finally, Plaintiff seeks to recover non-economic damages for his physical pain and suffering, the impairment of his ability to care for his aging father and emotional distress associated with that inability, and the ongoing interference with his daily activities and work. Plaintiffs’ Opening Post-Trial Brief at 22.
In California, a plaintiff may recover reasonable compensation for past and future pain and suffering. See Capelouto v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 7 Cal. 3d 889, 892-93 (1972); Duarte v. Zachariah, 22 Cal. App. 4th 1652, 1665 (1994); Hilliard v. A. H. Robins Co., 148 Cal. App. 3d 374, 412 (1983).
For the same reasons that he has not established his entitlement to future medical expenses, Avoyan has also not established his entitlement to future non-economic damages related to the accident.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Court finds that Plaintiff proved his claim of negligence, and has established total damages of $24,310.37 = 3,577.20 + 10,733.17 + 10,000.00. The Court has also found that Plaintiff‘s negligence contributed in equal measure to his injuries. Considering the parties’ comparative fault, Defendant is liable for 50% of Plaintiff‘s damages. The Court therefore awards Plaintiff $12,155.19 in damages. The Court orders the parties to meet and confer and lodge a proposed final judgment consistent with this Order no later than fourteen days from the date of this Order.
Dated: April 2, 2026
Hernan D. Vera
United States District Judge