Ardella PATTERSON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHRYSLER GROUP, LLC, nka FCA US LLC; Chrysler LLC UAW Pension Plan, nka FCA US LLC-UAW Pension Plan, Defendants-Appellants.
No. 16-1365
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Argued: October 18, 2016; Decided and Filed: January 11, 2017
845 F.3d 756
Club Reply Br. at 21; EPA Br. at 53-54. As this court previously explained, New Source Review is not designed to “force every source to eventually adopt modern emissions control technology.” DTE Energy, 711 F.3d at 650. Accordingly, the fact that DTE was able to delay imposing updated pollution controls by “keep[ing] its post-construction emissions down in order to avoid the significant increases that would require a permit” is “entirely consistent with the statute and regulations.” Id.
The district court relied additionally on the fact that post-project emissions did not actually increase. The underlying purpose of the statutory and regulatory scheme of permitting improvements that do not increase emissions therefore appears to have been met. However, because the undisputed facts establish that DTE complied with the basic requirements for making projections, I do not rely on the district court‘s alternative reason for granting summary judgment.
I would affirm
ARGUED: William E. Altman, THE MURRAY LAW GROUP, P.C., Bingham Farms, Michigan, for Appellants. Jack M. Schultz, JACK M. SCHULTZ, P.C., Bing-
ham Farms, Michigan, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: William E. Altman, THE MURRAY LAW GROUP, P.C., Bingham Farms, Michigan, for Appellants. Jack M. Schultz, JACK M. SCHULTZ, P.C., Bingham
Before: BOGGS, SUHRHEINRICH, and McKEAGUE, Circuit Judges.
OPINION
SUHRHEINRICH, Circuit Judge.
In this ERISA action brought pursuant to
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff and Henry Lee Patterson wed on February 15, 1987. They divorced on September 27, 1993. The Judgment of Divorce declared that Plaintiff was entitled to one-half of the pension benefits Henry had accrued during his marriage to Plain-
tiff, with full rights of survivorship, and that these benefits were due to Plaintiff when they became payable to Henry. It further stated that Henry was forbidden from choosing a pension payment option that would deprive Plaintiff of these benefits.2 Henry worked for the Chrysler Corporation for 334 months, from June 3, 1965 to January 29, 1992, and began receiving retirement benefits under the Chrysler-UAW Pension Plan (the Plan)3 on April 1, 1994, in the form of a “Lifetime Annuity Without Surviving Spouse” option. Thus, Henry violated the Judgment of Divorce by selecting an option that did not provide Plaintiff with the benefits awarded to her.
Attempting to override Henry‘s choice of benefits under the Plan, Plaintiff‘s first attorney, Terry Williams, submitted the Judgment of Divorce to the Plan administrator on December 14, 1994. On January 18, 1995, a Plan representative called Williams and informed him that the Judgment of Divorce lacked the clerical information required by
Plaintiff did not communicate with the Plan again for almost thirteen years, until after Henry had died. Henry died on November 23, 2007. Plaintiff called the Plan on January 4, 2008. During the call Plaintiff (1) told the Plan about the Judgment of Divorce and how it ordered benefits to be paid to her once Henry had retired; (2) said that she would be mailing in the Judgment of Divorce; and (3) admitted to not having a domestic-relations order that satisfied the ERISA clerical requirements. On February 1, 2008, Plaintiff faxed the Plan a copy of the Judgment of Divorce. On February 28, 2008, the Plan sent Plaintiff a letter denying her benefits request, on the grounds that the Judgment of Divorce did not have the necessary clerical information, and because “the participant [Henry] does not have a remaining benefit to be assigned to an alternate payee.” R. 11-2 at 201.
Between 2008 and 2014, Plaintiff, both on her own and with the help of two other attorneys, attempted four more times to have the Plan qualify the Judgment of
Divorce, and each time it was denied. In addition to explaining that the Judgment of Divorce did not meet the requirements of
On February 28, 2014, to remedy the original clerical deficiencies in the Judgment of Divorce, Plaintiff, through the efforts of her fourth and current attorney, Jack Schultz, obtained from the Wayne County Circuit Court a nunc pro tunc order (the Nunc Pro Tunc Order). The Nunc Pro Tunc Order corrected the Judgment of Divorce by adding the missing “clerical” information required by
Mr. Schultz submitted the Nunc Pro Tunc Order to the Plan on March 3, 2014. On June 24, 2014, the Plan declined Plaintiff‘s request for benefits by letter, stating that it had determined that the Nunc Pro Tunc Order was not a qualified domestic-relations order because “[d]ue to the optional form of payment chosen by [Henry]
On February 12, 2015, Plaintiff filed her complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division. Plaintiff asserted two claims under ERISA: (1) a claim for recovery of pension benefits and (2) a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. Plaintiff later dropped the second claim, and the district court held it waived. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that (1) Plaintiff‘s claim is barred by the statute of limitations, and (2) the Nunc Pro Tunc Order is not a qualified domestic-relations order because: (a) it provides for a change in the form of benefits not otherwise provided under the Plan, in violation of
On February 17, 2016, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff. In its order, the district court held that: (1) the proper statute of limitations, borrowed from state law, is six years; (2) to the extent that Plaintiff‘s claim is based on the Plan‘s denial of benefits based on the Judgment of Divorce, the claim is time-barred because the statute of limitations began to run on February 28, 2008; (3) however, to the extent Plaintiff‘s claim is based on the Plan‘s June 24, 2014, denial of benefits based on the Nunc Pro Tunc Order, Plaintiff‘s claim is timely; and (4) because the Nunc Pro Tunc Order relates back to September 27, 1993, the Plan‘s compliance with that order does not (a) require the Plan to provide a change in the form of benefits not otherwise provided under the Plan, nor (b) require the plan to pay increased benefits, and therefore the Nunc Pro Tunc Order is qualified and does not violate ERISA.
On timely appeal, Defendants challenge the district court‘s determinations that Plaintiff‘s claim is not time-barred, and that the Nunc Pro Tunc Order does not violate ERISA.
II. JURISDICTION
The district court had jurisdiction over Plaintiff‘s
III. ANALYSIS
Defendants challenge (1) the district court‘s decision to restart the statute of limitation upon Defendants’ denial of benefits under the Nunc Pro Tunc Order in 2014, (2) the district court‘s ruling that the statute of limitations initially began to run on February 28, 2008, and (3) the district court‘s ruling that the Nunc Pro Tunc Order is a qualified domestic relations order and does not violate ERISA under either
A. Effect of the Nunc Pro Tunc Order
Defendants first challenge the district court‘s ruling that their June 24, 2014 denial of the Nunc Pro Tunc Order reset the statute of limitations. We review questions of law de novo. Tri Cty. Wholesale
Distrib., Inc. v. Labatt USA Operating Co., LLC, 828 F.3d 421, 430 (6th Cir. 2016).
Without providing any accompanying analysis or citation of authority, the district court held that to the extent Plaintiff‘s claim was based on Defendants’ denial of the Nunc Pro Tunc Order, Plaintiff‘s claim was not time-barred, as her suit was filed within six years of that denial. Thus, it seems that the district court either believed that the issuance of a nunc pro tunc order gave Plaintiff a new cause of action, or that it reset the statute of limitations. Either scenario misapprehends the effect of nunc pro tunc orders under Michigan law.
As in other states, Michigan court orders issued nunc pro tunc do not retroactively modify substantive rights declared in older court orders. See Sleboede v. Sleboede, 384 Mich. 555, 184 N.W.2d 923, 925 (1971). Rather, they merely “make [the court‘s] records speak the truth—to record that which was actually done, but omitted to be recorded.” Id. at 925 n.6. That is, nunc pro tunc orders fix clerical mistakes in old orders. Nunc pro tunc orders do not revise the substance of what has transpired, backdate events, or give rise to new substantive rights, including resetting the statute of limitations. Crangle v. Kelly, 838 F.3d 673, 680 (6th Cir. 2016) (finding that Ohio nunc pro tunc orders “merely correct[] ... record[s] to accurately reflect the court‘s actions ... not ... reset[] the statute of limitations....“); Glynne v. Wilmed Healthcare, 699 F.3d 380, 383-84 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding that nunc pro tunc orders “correct mistakes or omissions in the record so that the record properly reflects the events that actually took place. [They] may not be used to retroactively record an event that never occurred or have the record reflect a fact that never existed.“); W.N.J. v. Yocom, 257 F.3d 1171, 1172 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding nunc pro tunc orders cannot be used to rewrite history); Central Laborers’ Pension, Welfare and Annuity Fund v. Griffee, 198 F.3d 642, 644 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he only proper office of a nunc pro tunc order is to correct a mistake in the records; it cannot be used to rewrite history.“); Walls v. United States, No. 2:06-CV-12441, 2006 WL 1851184, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 93850 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 29, 2006) (same).
Thus, when the Wayne County Circuit Court issued the Nunc Pro Tunc Order, it merely articulated the substantive rights already declared in the Judgment of Divorce in a form that complied with ERISA. Consequently, the Nunc Pro Tunc Order is treated as if it were the Judgment of Divorce but with clerical mistakes corrected. It did not bestow on Plaintiff any new, or modify any old, substantive rights. Therefore, neither the Wayne County Circuit Court‘s issuance, nor the Plan‘s rejection, of the Nunc Pro Tunc Order could provide Plaintiff with a new cause of action or have any effect on the statute of limitations.
Furthermore, accepting the district court‘s view would create an untenable situation regarding submission of domestic-relations orders to pension plans. Under this view, no matter how long ago a plan denied a domestic-relations order, the denied claimant could circumvent the statute of limitations and revive his cause of action by obtaining and submitting a nunc pro tunc version of the denied order to the pension plan, force the plan to reiterate its denial, and effectively reset the statute of limitations. In such a world, no claim would ever truly be time-barred, but merely waiting for a nunc pro tunc order to issue. Such a system defeats the clearly understood policy goals of statutes of limitations. See Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342,
348-49, 64 S.Ct. 582, 88 L.Ed. 788 (1944) (noting that statutes of limitation are designed “to promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.“); Carey v. Int‘l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 363 Pension Plan, 201 F.3d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating that statutes of limitation serve to encourage “rapid resolution of disputes“).
Therefore, we reverse and hold that the Nunc Pro Tunc Order did not give rise to a new cause of action, or reset the statute of limitations.
B. ERISA § 1132(a)(1)(B) Accrual for Purposes of the Statute of Limitations
Defendants also challenge the district court‘s ruling on when the statute of limitations began to run on Plaintiff‘s claim. The district court found that Plaintiff‘s claim was barred to the extent it was based on the denial of her benefits under the Judgment of Divorce. The district court acknowledged that the limitations period begins when a plaintiff discovers, or should discover, a clear repudiation of benefits, citing Bender v. Newell Window Furnishings, Inc., 681 F.3d 253, 272 (6th Cir. 2012), and Morrison v. Marsh & McLennan Cos., 439 F.3d 295, 302 (6th Cir. 2006). However, without any accompanying analysis, the district court determined that the limitations period began on February 28, 2008, when the Plan sent Plaintiff a letter denying her benefits under the Judgment of Divorce for the second time, even though she had already been denied benefits under the same order thirteen years earlier. Despite the earlier denial, and based on the six-year statute of limitations, the court determined that this cause of action became time-barred on February 28, 2014.
Defendants argue that, at the latest, Plaintiff‘s claim accrued for statute-of-limitations purposes when a Plan representative called Plaintiff‘s first attorney on January 18, 1995, and informed him that the Plan was denying benefits claimed under the Judgment of Divorce, and therefore, that her claim became time-barred on January 18, 2001. We review mixed questions of law and fact de novo. Tri Cty. Wholesale Distrib., Inc., 828 F.3d at 430.
Although Plaintiff did not specify, we determine that her claim was brought pursuant to
The Sixth Circuit has found that the most analogous Michigan cause of action to a denial-of-benefits claim under
Similarly, because ERISA is silent on the matter, federal common law determines when claims accrue under
Under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations for Plaintiff‘s claim began to run when she was put on notice (formal or informal) that the benefits she sought would be denied to her. Redmon, 547 F.3d at 538. This occurred, at the latest, on January 18, 1995, when a Plan representative informed her then-attorney (Williams) that the Judgment of Divorce was not a qualified domestic-relations order, and therefore would not pay Plaintiff benefits in accordance with that judgment. At this point Plaintiff had indisputably been put on notice that the Plan had rejected her claim for benefits, and the clock began to run. In other words, the Plan‘s first denial on January 18, 1995 was sufficient to put Plaintiff on notice that the Plan had clearly repudiated her claim, and therefore started the statute of limitations. Redmon, 547 F.3d at 538; Morrison, 439 F.3d at 302. Consequently, Plaintiff‘s claim became time-barred on January 18, 2001. Thus, the district court‘s decision to start the clock as of the Plan‘s second denial of the Judgment of Divorce on February 28, 2008, is erroneous.
At oral argument, Plaintiff asserted that it was inequitable for the court to start the limitations period in 1995, and that the Plan should have done more to alert Plaintiff to her claim and help her file a qualified domestic-relations order in accordance with ERISA. However, the Plan was very
Given our conclusion that Plaintiff‘s claim is barred by the statute of limitations, all other issues on appeal are moot.
IV. CONCLUSION
The judgment of the district court is reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss Plaintiff‘s claim as time-barred.
SUHRHEINRICH
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE