Ardella Patterson v. Chrysler Group
845 F.3d 756
| 6th Cir. | 2017Background
- Ardella Patterson was awarded one-half of Henry Patterson’s pension (with survivorship) in their 1993 Michigan divorce judgment; Henry was ordered not to elect a pension option that would deprive her of that share.
- Henry began receiving Chrysler pension benefits on April 1, 1994, selecting a “Lifetime Annuity Without Surviving Spouse” option, which did not provide Patterson the survivorship benefit the divorce judgment sought to secure.
- Patterson’s counsel submitted the divorce judgment to the plan administrator in December 1994; on January 18, 1995 the plan informed counsel the judgment lacked the clerical information required for a QDRO under ERISA, and denied benefits, providing a sample QDRO form.
- Patterson made no effective further progress for many years; Henry died in November 2007; Patterson submitted the judgment and later (2014) obtained a Wayne County nunc pro tunc order adding the missing clerical details and re-submitted it, but the plan again denied benefits in June 2014.
- Patterson sued under ERISA § 1132(a)(1)(B) in 2015 to recover benefits; the district court held the 6-year Michigan statute of limitations applied and (1) claims based on the original judgment denial were time-barred, but (2) the 2014 nunc pro tunc order denial was timely and related back to 1993, so the QDRO was valid — entering judgment for Patterson.
- The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding (a) nunc pro tunc orders only correct clerical records and do not create new substantive rights or restart limitations periods under Michigan law, and (b) Patterson’s claim accrued no later than January 18, 1995 (when the plan first denied the judgment), so her suit filed in 2015 is time-barred.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a nunc pro tunc order can create a new cause of action or restart the statute of limitations | Nunc pro tunc corrected clerical defects and thus the plan’s 2014 denial created a timely new denial | Nunc pro tunc only corrects records; it does not create new substantive rights or restart limitations | Nunc pro tunc orders only correct clerical records; they do not give rise to new causes of action or reset the statute of limitations (reversed) |
| When the § 1132(a)(1)(B) claim accrued for statute-of-limitations purposes | Accrual should be tied to the 2008 or 2014 denials (later communications) | Accrual occurred at the latest on Jan. 18, 1995, when the plan first clearly repudiated the judgment | Claim accrued no later than Jan. 18, 1995; limitations expired six years later, so the claim is time-barred |
| Whether the district court properly applied Michigan’s six-year limitation to the claim | District court: six-year Michigan period applies; but the 2014 denial made the claim timely | Defendants: six-year period applies and began at the first clear repudiation (1995) | Six-year Michigan statute applies and began on the plan’s first clear repudiation in 1995 |
| Whether further factual or ERISA QDRO questions needed resolution after finding the claim timely | N/A (Plaintiff sought merits ruling that nunc pro tunc related back and QDRO was valid) | N/A (Defendants argued QDRO would require impermissible benefit changes) | Court did not reach merits of QDRO validity because claim is time-barred; other issues moot |
Key Cases Cited
- Sleboede v. Sleboede, 184 N.W.2d 923 (Mich. 1971) (nunc pro tunc orders correct clerical omissions and do not change substantive rights)
- Crangle v. Kelly, 838 F.3d 673 (6th Cir. 2016) (nunc pro tunc orders correct records and do not reset statutes of limitation)
- Morrison v. Marsh & McLennan Cos., 439 F.3d 295 (6th Cir. 2006) (ERISA § 1132(a)(1)(B) claims accrue upon clear and unequivocal repudiation; discovery rule applies)
- Redmon v. Sud-Chemie Inc. Ret. Plan for Union Emps., 547 F.3d 531 (6th Cir. 2008) (accrual occurs when the claimant is on notice that benefits will be denied)
- DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983) (federal courts borrow the most analogous state statute of limitations when ERISA is silent)
- Stevens v. Emp’r-Teamsters Joint Council No. 84 Pension Fund, 979 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1992) (discussion of when an ERISA cause "arises" in jurisdictional/preemption context)
- Central Laborers’ Pension, Welfare and Annuity Fund v. Griffee, 198 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 1999) (nunc pro tunc orders cannot be used to rewrite history)