Andrew Lee Boyer v. The State of WyomingAndrew Lee Boyer v. The State of Wyoming
Representing Appellant:
Office of the State Public Defender: Brandon T. Booth, Wyoming State Public Defender; Kirk A. Morgan, Chief Appellate Counsel; Elizabeth B. Lance and Toni E. Hartzel, Lance & Hall LLP, Cheyenne, Wyoming.
Representing Appellee:
Bridget Hill, Wyoming Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Deputy Attorney General; Kristen R. Jones, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Samuel Williams, Senior Assistant Attorney General.
Before BOOMGAARDEN, C.J., and GRAY, FENN, and JAROSH, JJ., and PHILLIPS, D.J.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
PHILLIPS, District Judge.
[¶1] Andrew Boyer entered a conditional guilty plea to felony possession of methamphetamine. He reserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress the evidence obtained from a search of his vehicle following a traffic stop. He challenges the reasonableness of the traffic stop under
ISSUE
[¶2] Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Boyer‘s motion to suppress?
FACTS
[¶3] On August 3, 2023, at approximately 12:40 p.m., Deputy Derek Lang observed a black sedan stopped at the intersection of Burma Avenue and Warlow Drive. At this intersection, there are two lanes designated for travel facing the northbound direction. The left lane is a turn-only lane for vehicles turning westbound on Warlow Drive. The right lane of traffic allows drivers to proceed straight or turn east onto Warlow Drive. Deputy Lang first observed the black sedan stopped behind a silver SUV in the right lane of travel, facing northbound. There were three or four cars between Deputy Lang‘s patrol vehicle and the black sedan. Deputy Kyle Borgialli was near the intersection to assist Deputy Lang with the execution of a warrant off Warlow Drive. He was positioned in the line of cars stopped at the light and could see two vehicles in front of the black sedan. Though Deputy Borgialli was only one vehicle behind the black sedan, a large SUV partially obstructed the view in front of him. When the light turned green, the SUV stayed in place, and the black sedan overtook it on the right side to turn east onto Warlow Drive. The black sedan did not leave the paved surface of the road during the overtaking. Deputy Borgialli noticed that the black sedan was further ahead than expected when it turned onto Warlow Drive, based on the lineup of cars he saw at the intersection. After being passed, the SUV also turned east onto Warlow Drive. Deputy Lang could not see if the SUV used its turn signal before completing the right-hand turn. He decided to follow the black sedan after observing the overtaking, as the presence of two vehicles turning right from that same location heightened his concern for safety. Deputy Lang‘s front-facing dashcam was inoperable and did not capture the black sedan‘s maneuver. It took Deputy Lang approximately one and one-half miles to catch up to the vehicle, traveling faster than the posted speed limit. He provided dispatch with the vehicle‘s information once he caught up. Dispatch informed Deputy Lang that the car was registered to Andrew Boyer and that Mr. Boyer did not have a valid driver‘s license. By then, Deputy Borgialli had also caught up with the black sedan and positioned his vehicle parallel to visually confirm that Mr. Boyer was the driver. However, he could only see a silhouette that resembled Mr. Boyer‘s physical characteristics.
[¶4] Based on that information, Deputy Lang initiated a traffic stop and identified
[¶5] Mr. Boyer was charged with taking a controlled substance into jail, a felony and violation of
[¶6] Mr. Boyer moved to suppress the evidence seized from his vehicle. He argued that the deputies improperly expanded the scope of the traffic stop after stopping him based on incorrect information from dispatch. Mr. Boyer further claimed that because there was no observed traffic violation, the reasonable suspicion for the stop ended once he presented his valid driver‘s license, prior to Torc conducting his free-air sniff.
[¶7] After considering the evidence, the district court denied Mr. Boyer‘s motion to suppress. It found that Deputy Lang had reasonable suspicion to stop Mr. Boyer‘s vehicle after observing his driving maneuver at the intersection of Burma and Warlow, and based on information from dispatch that Mr. Boyer was driving without a valid driver‘s license. The district court also found that the traffic stop was not unnecessarily extended. For those reasons, the district court found there was no violation of
[¶8] Mr. Boyer entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of possession of methamphetamine, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The district court sentenced him to two to four years in prison. Mr. Boyer timely appealed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[¶9] The standard of review we apply to a district court‘s denial of a motion to suppress is well established:
We defer to the district court‘s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the district court‘s determination because that court conducted the hearing and had the opportunity to assess the witnesses’ credibility, weigh the evidence, and make the necessary inferences, deductions, and conclusions. On issues where the district court did not make specific findings of fact, this Court will uphold the general ruling of the court below if supported by any reasonable view of the evidence. The
ultimate question of whether the search or seizure violated a constitutional right is a question of law that we review de novo.
Labbe v. State, 2024 WY 99, ¶ 10, 556 P.3d 211, 213 (Wyo. 2024) (quoting Chace v. State, 2024 WY 20, ¶ 9, 542 P.3d 1078, 1081 (Wyo. 2024)).
DISCUSSION
[¶10] In his only issue on appeal, Mr. Boyer argues that Deputy Lang lacked reasonable suspicion to justify the initial traffic stop. Mr. Boyer challenges the denial of his motion to suppress under
[¶11] “When a party raises a state constitutional claim and provides proper argument on appeal and in the trial court below, the state constitutional analysis takes primacy—that is, the claim is first analyzed under the
[¶12] Nevertheless, within the context of the facts of this case, we apply the same considerations in our
[¶13] The
[¶14] On appeal, Mr. Boyer contends that the traffic stop initiated by Deputy Lang was not justified at its inception because his act of overtaking the SUV did not constitute a violation of
[¶15] Deputy Lang first observed Mr. Boyer‘s black sedan stopped at the intersection of Burma Avenue and Warlow Drive, positioned behind an SUV in the right lane of travel, facing northbound. In that lane, Mr. Boyer could have proceeded straight through the light or turned right onto Warlow Drive. As the light turned green, the SUV did not proceed straight. Rather than waiting to determine the SUV‘s intentions, Mr. Boyer overtook it and made the right-hand turn first. Deputy Lang did not see whether the SUV had its turn signal on, but he saw it turn right onto Warlow Drive after being passed by Mr. Boyer. Because both vehicles turned right from that single lane of traffic, Deputy Lang believed Mr. Boyer‘s improper driving maneuver posed a safety concern and violated
[¶16]
(a) The driver of a vehicle may overtake and pass upon the right of another vehicle only under the following conditions:
(i) When the vehicle overtaken is making or about to make a left turn;
(ii) Upon a roadway with unobstructed pavement of sufficient width for two (2) or more lines of vehicles moving lawfully in the direction being traveled by the overtaking vehicle.
(b) The driver of a vehicle may overtake and pass another vehicle upon the right only under conditions permitting the movement in safety. The movement shall not be made by driving off the roadway.
[¶17] Based on this observation, Deputy Lang decided to follow Mr. Boyer east onto Warlow Drive. While trailing Mr. Boyer, Deputy Lang received information from dispatch that Mr. Boyer did not have a valid driver‘s license. It was then that Deputy Lang initiated a traffic stop due to a suspected violation of
[¶18]
No person, unless exempt under this act shall drive, steer or exercise any degree of physical control of any motor vehicle or a vehicle being towed by a motor vehicle upon a highway in this state unless the person has been issued a driver‘s license for the class and type and applicable endorsements valid for the motor vehicle being driven.
[¶19] Deputy Lang informed Mr. Boyer that he was pulled over for not having a valid driver‘s license and for overtaking the SUV at the stoplight. Mr. Boyer did not dispute the improper driving maneuver and attributed it to frustration with his girlfriend. Even though Mr. Boyer stated he had a valid driver‘s license, Deputy Lang testified that an individual may possess a physical copy of their driver‘s license even though their driving privileges are revoked. While Mr. Boyer searched for proof of insurance, K9 Torc alerted to the presence of controlled substances within Mr. Boyer‘s vehicle, eventually leading to the discovery of methamphetamine, marijuana, and other drug paraphernalia. Deputy Lang confirmed that Mr. Boyer had a valid driver‘s license several minutes after Torc‘s alert.
[¶20] Relying on Levenson, Mr. Boyer argues that Deputy Lang was unjustified in following him for more than one mile and exceeding the speed limit to catch up. He also argues that there was no reason for the deputy to request his driver‘s license information from dispatch. In Levenson, a trooper decided to follow a vehicle on the interstate without first observing a traffic violation. Levenson, ¶ 28, 508 P.3d at 239. To catch the vehicle, the trooper reached a speed of 111 miles per hour. Id. ¶ 4, 508 P.3d at 232. During the pursuit, the trooper positioned his patrol vehicle in such a way that the target vehicle was forced to follow too closely behind a semi-truck that was slowing to exit the interstate. Id. ¶ 5, 508 P.3d at 232. After calculating the distance between the target vehicle and the semi-truck, the trooper initiated a traffic stop for following too closely. Id. ¶ 6, 508 P.3d at 232. Based on the totality of the circumstances, we held that the trooper‘s actions were unreasonable because his conduct negated the objective justification necessary for the initial traffic stop. Id. ¶ 29, 508 P.3d at 239.
[¶21] The facts of this case are distinguishable from those in Levenson. Here, Deputy Lang‘s decision to pursue Mr. Boyer was reasonable because he first observed a traffic violation at the intersection of Burma Avenue and Warlow Drive. Levenson, ¶ 28, 508 P.3d at 239. Further, Deputy Lang‘s elevated speed to catch Mr. Boyer did not contribute to the two bases that ultimately justified the stop. Compare Levenson, ¶ 29, 508 P.3d at 239, with Ramirez, ¶ 25, 532 P.3d at 237 (holding that a trooper exceeding 120 miles per hour was constitutional when the action did not provoke a traffic violation). It was the overtaking violation that served as the catalyst for requesting Mr. Boyer‘s information from dispatch.
[¶22] We defer to the district court‘s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. After considering the evidence, the district court identified two bases that justified the initial stop of Mr. Boyer‘s vehicle. First, the district court made a factual finding that Deputy Lang had reasonable suspicion to believe that Mr. Boyer had committed a traffic violation when he overtook the SUV at the intersection of Burma Avenue and Warlow Drive. An initial traffic stop is justified under the
[¶23] In Kansas v. Glover, 589 U.S. 376, 378, 140 S.Ct. 1183, 1186, 20 L.Ed.2d 412 (2020), the United States Supreme Court addressed this very issue when it considered whether a police officer violated the
As an initial matter, we have previously stated that officers, like jurors, may rely on probabilities in the reasonable suspicion context. Moreover, as explained above, Deputy Mehrer did not rely exclusively on probabilities. He knew that the license plate was linked to a truck matching the observed vehicle and that the registered owner of the vehicle had a revoked license. Based on these minimal facts, he used common sense to form a reasonable suspicion that a specific individual was potentially engaged in specific criminal activity—driving with a revoked license. Traffic stops of this nature do not delegate to officers “broad and unlimited discretion” to stop drivers at random. Nor do they allow officers to stop drivers whose conduct is no different from any other driver‘s. Accordingly, combining database information and commonsense judgments in this context is fully consonant with this Court‘s Fourth Amendment precedents.
Id. at 385, 104 S.Ct. at 1190 (internal citations omitted). Like Glover, Deputy Lang relied on database information and a commonsense judgment to initiate the traffic stop on Mr. Boyer‘s vehicle. The traffic stop satisfied the first prong of the Terry analysis.
[¶24] Accordingly, the record supports the district court‘s conclusion that Deputy Lang had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting that Mr. Boyer was engaged in a violation of Wyoming law. The traffic stop was justified by reasonable suspicion, the standard required by the
CONCLUSION
[¶25] The district court properly denied Mr. Boyer‘s motion to suppress after finding that Deputy Lang had reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop. Therefore, the initial stop did not violate the