Case Information
*1 Before BURKE, C.J., and HILL, DAVIS, FOX, and KAUTZ, JJ.
NOTICE: This оpinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
*2
FOX, Justice.
[¶1] Appellant Carl Wayne Allgier was the passenger in a car stopped for a traffic violation by a Wyoming Highway Patrol trooper. After Mr. Allgier appeared to have suffered a seizure, the trooper searched the pocket of the jacket Mr. Allgier had left in the car and discovered marijuana. A subsequent search of the car revealed felony quantities of marijuana and drug paraphernalia. Following the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence, Mr. Allgier entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of possession of a controlled substance, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7- 1031(c)(i)(A), and was sentenced to three to five years’ incarceration. Mr. Allgier appeals the district court’s ruling on his motion to suppress, claiming that the initial stop and subsequent search of his jacket violated the Fourth Amendment. Because the trooper had reasonable suspicion that the driver of the vehicle was breaking the law, and because the search of his jacket was justified by the community caretaker exception to the warrant requirement, we conclude that the stop and subsequent search did not violate Mr. Allgier’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. We affirm.
ISSUES
[¶2] We rephrase the issues as follows:
1. Did the trooper have a reasonable suspicion that the driver of the car in which Mr. Allgier was riding was breaking the law by following too closely behind the vehicle in front of him?
2. Was the subsequent search of Mr. Allgier’s jacket justified by an exception to the constitutional prohibition against warrantless seаrches? [1]
FACTS
[¶3] On the afternoon of March 12, 2014, Wyoming Highway Patrol Trooper Tegdesth, who was traveling southbound on U.S. Highway 287 in Albany County, observed a white Jeep Grand Cherokee traveling northbound, about fifty feet behind a silver passenger vehicle. Trooper Tegdesth also noticed that the jeep had a cracked windshield. He turned around and activated his lights to pursue the jeep, pulling the driver over for following too closely and for having a cracked windshield. The jeep was driven by George Maestas; Mr. Allgier was seated in the front passenger seat. The trooper’s initial sighting of the vehicle and the encounter that followed werе recorded on the video by the trooper’s L3 Camera System.
*3 [¶4] Trooper Tegdesth approached the passenger side of the jeep, startling Mr. Allgier, who had just lit a cigarette. He informed Mr. Maestas of the reason for the stop and asked for his identification and insurance information. He also asked Mr. Allgier for his license because he was not wearing a seatbelt. Trooper Tegdesth then initiated a conversation with Mr. Maestas and Mr. Allgier as to the general nature of their travel plans. They indicated they had been in Fort Collins, Colorado, visiting Mr. Allgier’s girlfriend, and that they were headed to Green River, Wyoming. Troopеr Tegdesth then asked Mr. Allgier the name of his girlfriend, but Mr. Allgier responded with a “blank stare,” a pause lasting four seconds, and then, “What?” Trooper Tegdesth questioned whether he knew her name and Mr. Allgier replied that he did but it was his business and he wasn’t going to tell the trooper. By this time, tensions were escalating and Mr. Allgier had begun to raise his voice.
[¶5] Trooper Tegdesth asked why Mr. Allgier had an “attitude all of a sudden” and why he had lit up a cigarette. Mr. Allgier replied that he was “getting irritated.” Trooper Tegdesth inquired whether there were any weapons in the vehicle and Mr. Allgier denied having any. Trooper Tegdesth testified that at this point, given Mr. Allgier’s contentious bеhavior, “red flags” were going up in his mind and that, based upon his training and experience, Mr. Allgier’s behavior was not characteristic of the “innocent motoring public.” Because he was concerned for his safety, Trooper Tegdesth asked Mr. Allgier to step out of the vehicle. Mr. Allgier refused, and Trooper Tegdesth then reached inside the passenger side window, unlocked the passenger door, and opened it. Mr. Allgier removed his jacket as he stepped out and threw it in the back seat of the vehicle. Trooper Tegdesth testified that this behavior “caused even more concern;” that once he was out оf the car, it appeared as if Mr. Allgier “wanted a confrontation;” and that “he was going to try to fight me or something of that sort.”
[¶6] Once Mr. Allgier was out of the vehicle, Trooper Tegdesth, who was standing behind him, reached for Mr. Allgier’s arms from behind and began to pat him down. Mr. Allgier became rigid, began yelling and complaining of shoulder pain. Trooper Tegdesth found a Kershaw pocket knife in Mr. Allgier’s rear left pocket. Trooper Tegdesth testified that this caused him even more concern because Mr. Allgier had earlier indicated he had no weapons. At this point, Mr. Allgier appeared to suffer a seizure, fell to his knees, and then the ground, and began to shake. Trooper Tegdesth testified that he was unsure whether Mr. Allgier was having a seizure or faking it, so he handcuffed him before going to his patrol car and calling for an ambulance and back up.
[¶7] Trooper Tegdesth returned to check on Mr. Allgier, informing him that he had called for an ambulance and repeatedly telling him to relax. Trooper Tegdesth also asked Mr. Allgier if he had any medication. Mr. Allgier responded that he did not. The trooper approached the vehicle and, while taking the jacket from the backseat, asked Mr. Maestas “any meds in here?” He then looked in one of the poсkets and saw a plastic purple *4 prescription bottle, which appeared to have a label on it. Trooper Tegdesth recognized the bottle as the type that comes from medical marijuana dispensaries in Colorado. He removed the bottle from the jacket pocket and saw that the label on it was indeed a medical marijuana label with Mr. Allgier’s name on it. Trooper Tegdesth then opened the bottle and found what he suspected to be marijuana inside.
[¶8] Trooper Tegdesth ordered Mr. Maestas to get out of the jeep, handcuffed him, and placed him in his highway patrol car. Troоper Tegdesth then returned to check on Mr. Allgier and waited with him until the ambulance arrived.
[¶9] A subsequent search of the jeep revealed a felony amount of marijuana, along with other drug paraphernalia. Both Mr. Allgier and Mr. Maestas were charged with one count of possession of a controlled substance and one count of unlawful possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance.
[¶10] Mr. Allgier moved to suppress the evidence found by Trooper Tegdesth during his search of the jacket and the vehicle. After a hearing, the district court denied the motion. Mr. Allgier and the State then entered into a conditional рlea agreement, pursuant to which Mr. Allgier pled guilty to felony possession of marijuana; the State dismissed the possession with intent to distribute charge; and Mr. Allgier preserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The district court accepted the plea agreement and sentenced Mr. Allgier to three to five years in prison. This appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[¶11] We review the district court’s factual findings on a motion to
suppress for clear error. We defer to those findings and view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing
party because the district court is in the best position to weigh
the evidеnce, assess the credibility of witnesses, and make the
necessary inferences, deductions, and conclusions. However,
“we review the ultimate determination regarding the
constitutionality of a particular search or seizure de novo.”
Ward v. State
,
DISCUSSION
I. Did the trooper have a reasonable suspicion that the driver of the car in which Mr.
Allgier was riding was breaking the law by following too closely behind the vehicle in front of him?
[¶12] Mr. Allgier contends that the traffic stop made by Trooper Tegdesth violated his
federal constitutional rights against unwarranted search and seizure. Mr. Allgier’s
argument relies on Fourth Amendment decisions and does not advance an argument
under the state constitution. We will, therefore, decide this issue under the Fourth
Amendment.
See Garvin v. State
,
[¶13] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
[¶14] In
Tiernan v. State, Department of Transportation
, wе attempted to clarify the
distinction between probable cause and reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop. 2011 WY
143, ¶ 12,
A traffic stop for a suspected violation of law is a “seizure” of the occupants of the vehicle and therefore must be conducted in accordance with the Fourth Amendment. Brendlin v. California , 551 U.S. 249, 255-259, 127 S.Ct. 2400, [2406-2408,]168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007). . . . [T]o justify this type of seizure, officers need only “reasonable suspicion”—that is, “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped” of breaking the law. Prado Navarette v. California , 572 U.S. ---, ---, 134 S.Ct. 1683, 1687-88, 188 L.Ed.2d 680 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). . . .
“[T]he ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’” Riley v. California , 573 U.S. ---, ---, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2482, 189 L.Ed.2d 430 (2014) (some internal quotation marks omitted). To be reasоnable is not to be perfect, and so the Fourth Amendment allows for some mistakes on the part of government officials, giving them “fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community’s protection.” Brinegar v. United States ,338 U.S. 160 , 176, 69 S.Ct. 1302, [1311,]93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949).
Heien
, --- U.S. at ---,
[¶15] Trooper Tegdesth initially pulled the vehicle over for two suspected traffic violations: following too closely, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-210, and driving with a cracked windshield, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-955(a). Section 31-5- 210(a) of the Wyoming Statutes provides, in pertinent part, that a driver “shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of the vehicles and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-210(a) (LexisNexis 2015). Section 31-5-955(a) of the Wyoming Statutes prohibits a person from driving a vehicle with a “crack . . . which materially obstructs, obscures or impairs the driver’s clear view of the highway or any intersecting highway.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-955(a) (LexisNexis 2015). Mr. Allgier argues that neither provided reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle in which he was riding.
[¶16] With regard to the following too closely allegation, Mr. Allgier concedes that the vehicle he was in wаs traveling approximately one car length behind the vehicle in front of him. However, he argues the distance between the vehicles does not determine whether the vehicle was following too closely without knowing the speed at which they were traveling. He points out that Trooper Tegdesth did not know the actual speed of the vehicles, and he argues that because the two vehicles were following behind a semi-truck, they may have been traveling at a speed slower than the 65 miles per hour (mph) speed limit.
[¶17] In
Phelps
, the defendant challenged a traffic stop under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-
210, the statute at issue here.
[¶18] Here, as in Phelps , the district court made a factual finding that the car driven by Mr. Maestas was following too closely, and thаt finding was not clearly erroneous. Mr. Allgier argues that because there was no evidence of the speed they were traveling, the district court could not reasonably conclude that they were following too closely. The district court did make calculations premised on the assumption that the vehicles were traveling at the speed limit of 65 mph. [2] Nevertheless, the district court found that when the silver passenger car passed the trooper who was headed in the opposite direction on the highway, Mr. Maestas’s jeep was only approximately 50 feet behind. In addition, *8 Trooper Tegdesth testified that therе was “very little space” between the vehicles and that “if something were to happen, there would be little reaction time[.]” The district court relied upon the video recording to support the trooper’s testimony concerning his observations that the jeep was following too closely.
[¶19] Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the district court’s determination, we conclude that its findings were not clearly erroneous. Wyoming law prohibits following another vehicle more closely than is “reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of the vehicles and the traffic upon and the condition оf the highway.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-210(a). Trooper Tegdesth had a reasonable suspicion, “a particularized and objective basis,” for suspecting Mr. Maestas of breaking the law that prohibits following another vehicle more closely than is “reasonable and prudent.” After a de novo review of the applicable law, we find that the initial stop was reasonable under the circumstances and did not violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
[¶20] Because we have determined that the initial stop was permissible based upon the reasonable suspicion that there was a violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-210(a), we need not rеach the question of whether Trooper Tegdesth had a reasonable suspicion that the jeep was in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-955(a).
II. Was the subsequent search of Mr. Allgier’s jacket justified by an exception to the
constitutional prohibition against warrantless searches? [¶21] Mr. Allgier also takes issue with the search of his jacket. The district court applied the emergency assistance exception and concluded that because Trooper Tegdesth was faced with a medical emergency, the warrantless search of Mr. Allgier’s jacket for medication was reasonable. Mr. Allgier contends that the search was not justified by the medical emergency exceptiоn to the warrant requirement and that the search violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure. Although we agree the emergency assistance exception does not apply to these circumstances, the related community caretaker exception does.
[¶22] Mr. Allgier points out that Trooper Tegdesth had three stories as to why he
searched the jacket. First, the video evidence suggests that the trooper was searching the
jacket for medication. Second, in his affidavit of probable cause, Trooper Tegdesth
stated that he searched the jaсket because he believed Mr. Allgier was attempting to hide
contraband when he removed it. Finally, at the suppression hearing, Trooper Tegdesth
testified that he searched the jacket for additional weapons. He explained that he feared
for his safety because Mr. Maestas could possibly access the jacket and because he had
already found a weapon on Mr. Allgier’s person. Although giving three different
explanations at different times may not enhance one’s credibility, we recognize that all
three of them may have run through the trooper’s mind, and we defer to the district
*9
court’s assessment of witness credibility.
Ward
,
[¶23] The district court found the following: Trooper Tegdesth “was presented with an emergency situation when Mr. Allgier dropped to the ground and began to have an apparent seizure.” After securing Mr. Allgier and requesting an ambulance, Trooper Tegdesth returned and informed him that he had called for an ambulance and repeatedly told Mr. Allgier to relax. The trooper then asked if he had any medication. Mr. Allgier replied that he did not have his medication with him. At this point, Trooper Tegdesth yelled to Mr. Maestas, аsking him if he had any medication. Trooper Tegdesth located the jacket Mr. Allgier had removed earlier, held it up, and asked whether there was any medication in the jacket. The jacket pockets were not closed, and, as he looked at one of the pockets, he observed the purple prescription bottle with the label on it indicating it was prescribed to Mr. Allgier and which in fact contained marijuana. These findings of fact are supported by the evidence and are not clearly erroneous.
[¶24] In examining whether a search is justified, we look to “a standard of objective
reasonableness without regard to the underlying intent or motivation of officers
involved.”
Scott v. United States
,
[T]he subjective intent of the police officer is irrelevant unless it is conveyed to the person being detained, and like all search and seizure cases, the inquiry is very fact oriented. The reasonable person standard also means the subjective perceptions of the suspect are irrelevant to the court’s inquiry. Finally, the reasonable person standard “presupposes an innocent person.”
Wilson v. State
, 874 P.2d 215, 220-21 (Wyo. 1994) (citations omitted) (emphasis in
original) (applying same standard to issue of when consensual contact becomes seizure).
*10
[¶25] As we explained in the preceding section, the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures.
See
supra
¶ 13. Searches conducted without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.
Moulton v. State
,
[¶26] Two related, but distinct, exceptions to the warrant requirement are the community
caretaker and the emergency assistance exceptiоns.
See Campbell
,
[¶27] We first address the emergency assistance exception in order to clarify the
distinction between it and the community caretaker exception. The emergency assistance
exception allows police to enter homes in the event of an emergency. Because of the
“much greater expectation of privacy traditionally accorded the home, a higher standard
[than with the community caretaker exception] must be met to permit use of evidence
discovered by entry without a warrant.”
Id.
at ¶ 20, 339 P.3d at 263. Thus, under the
emergency assistance exception, evidence found after a warrantless entry into a home or
residence is admissible “only if the officer who enters has a reasonable belief that there
exists an emergency requiring immediate action to assist citizens or to prevent harm to
persons or property in the residence” and there is a reasonable nexus between the
emergency and the area searched.
Id
. at ¶ 20,
[¶28] In contrast to the emergency assistance exception, the community caretaker exception applies generally to places and situations wherе there is a lower expectation of privacy than in a personal residence or home, such as a vehicle:
Because of the extensive regulation of motor vehicles and traffic, and also because of the frequency with which a vehicle can become disabled or involved in an accident on public highways, the extent of police-citizen contact involving automobiles will be substantially greater than police-citizen contact in a home or office. Some such contacts will occur because the officer may believe the operator has violated a criminаl statute, but many more will not be of that nature. Local police officers, unlike federal officers, frequently investigate vehicle accidents in which there is no claim of criminal liability and engage in what, for want of a better term, may be described as community *11 caretaking functions, totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.
Dombrowski
, 413 U.S. at 441, 93 S.Ct. at 2528. Thus, the community caretaker
exception “pertains to police encounters with citizens in public places and in their
vehicles under circumstances giving rise to concerns about their welfarе or safety, even
though the circumstances do not present an emergency.”
Campbell
,
[¶29] The United States Supreme Court first applied the community caretaker doctrine
in
Dombrowski
, recognizing that local police officers have a responsibility to undertake
“community caretaking functions” for reasons of basic community safety. 413 U.S. at
441-42, 93 S.Ct. at 2528. The
Dombrowski
court approved the search of a car’s trunk
after the drunken driver had been involved in an accident which left him comatose. The
police searched the car bеcause the driver was an off-duty police officer from another
jurisdiction, and the police reasonably believed the officer’s service revolver would be a
hazard if left in the trunk of the abandoned car.
Id
.,
The community caretaker function outlined in Dombrowski , 413 U.S. at 441, 93 S.Ct. at 2528, permits police to act in a manner that enhances public safety. The police officer’s observation of specific and articulable facts, Wilson’s lunging walk with a severe limp, reasonably justified a brief inquiry into his condition and the possible cause, such as whether Wilson was a victim of criminal conduct.
Wilson
,
[¶31] In
Morris
, we rejected the application of the community caretaker exception.
There, deputies found the defendant sleeping in the backyard of a private home, woke
him, and, because he was disoriented and unsteady, escorted him to the sheriff’s office in
their patrol car so that he could contact someone for a ride.
Morris
,
[¶32] Mr. Allgier claims that Trooper Tegdesth’s search of his jacket cannot be justified because, at the time of the search, he was not having a seizure and was awake and responsive. The community caretaker exception does not require a belief that immediate aid is necessary, rather, it requires a specific and articulable concern for public safety requiring the officer’s general assistance. Campbell , 2014 WY 156, ¶ 18, 339 P.3d at 263. Faced with making split-second decisions in this situation where Mr. Allgier had suffered what appeared to be a seizure moments earlier and while waiting for emergency medical care to arrive, even though Mr. Allgier said he had no medication, it was reasonable for Trooper Tegdesth in the exercise of his community caretaker function to search Mr. Allgier’s jacket for medication in an attempt to assist him.
[¶33] Our de novo review of the ultimate determination regarding the constitutionality
of the search of Mr. Allgier’s jacket in this case leads us to conclude that Trooper
Tegdesth’s actions did not violate constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable
searches and sеizures. We find that the district court’s conclusion that the emergency
assistance exception to the warrant requirement applies was erroneous. However, we can
affirm a district court judgment on any proper legal grounds supported by the record.
Lovato
,
CONCLUSION
[¶34] We affirm the district court’s conclusion that the initial stop of the vehicle in which Mr. Allgier was a passenger was justified: Trooper Tegdesth had reasonable suspicion to stop Mr. Maestas’s car for following too closely. Therefore, the initial stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Further, the subsequent search of Mr. Allgier’s jacket was supported by the community caretaker exception to the warrant requirement. Accordingly, the search of Mr. Allgier’s jacket did not violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Affirmed.
Notes
[1] Both pаrties briefed a third issue: the constitutionality of the initial detention of Mr. Allgier. However, at oral argument, Mr. Allgier’s attorney indicated that there are only two issues on appeal: the initial stop, and the search of Mr. Allgier’s jacket. Because the third issue was withdrawn at oral argument, we will not address it here.
[2] Trooper Tegdesth testified that the two or three second rule is often used to determine whether a vehicle
is following at a safe distance. In performing its analysis, the district court discussed the various ways a
trooper could determine a “reasonable and prudent” distance between two vehicles and specificаlly
addressed the two and three second rule referred to by Trooper Tegdesth, as well as the rule of thumb that
one ought to follow at one vehicle length for every ten mph of travel. The district court made a series of
calculations based upon an assumption that the vehicles were traveling at the 65 mph speed limit: “the
‘two second rule’ would require a minimum distance of about 190 feet and the ‘three second rule’ about
285 feet[,]” and the “‘one car length rule’ would require about 105 feet, assuming a vehicle length of
fifteen feet.” Because there was no testimony as to the speed of the vehicles, these calculations could not
provide an absolute answer to the question of what a safe distance would have been in this instance. We
note that the two or three second rule does not specifically require a calculation based upon the speed of
the driver. In fact, that is the benefit of the rule for a trooper on the side of the road. Instead of
calculating the speed of a following vehicle, the trooper need only count seconds between the vehicles to
determine whether there is adequate space.
See United States v. Hunter
,
[3] The district court noted: Trooper [Tegdesth] testified that he also wanted to make sure there were no weapons in the jacket, given the earlier discovery of Mr. Allgier’s knife and the fact that he was unable to devote any attention to Mr. Maestas because of the apparent medical situation. This may well be true, but it appears from the videotape that he was more interested in finding some medication for Mr. Allgier.