United States v. Rios
No. 14-4360
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
Decided: Feb. 3, 2015
592 Fed. Appx. 199
Escovio Rios appeals the 151-month sentence imposed by the district court following his conviction by a jury of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute at least fifty grams of methamphetamine, in violation of
Rios did not raise his sentencing claim in the district court; thus, we review for plain error. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (detailing plain error standard); see also Henderson v. United States, — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 1121, 1126, 185 L.Ed.2d 85 (2013). In Alleyne, the Supreme Court held “that any fact that increases the mandatory minimum is an element [of the offense] that must be submitted to the jury.” 133 S.Ct. at 2155 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Alleyne Court made clear, however, that its holding did not infringe on district courts’ otherwise “broad sentencing discretion, informed by judicial factfinding.” Id. at 2163; see United States v. Smith, 751 F.3d 107, 117 (3d Cir.2014) (“Alleyne did not curtail a sentencing court’s ability to find facts relevant in selecting a sentence within the prescribed statutory range.”).
We conclude that the district court did not violate Rios’ Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial by engaging in judicial factfinding at sentencing that did not affect the applicable statutory mandatory minimum and maximum sentences. See
AFFIRMED.
Andrew Tab KILPATRICK, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Danny HOLLIFIELD, Captain at Clay County Detention Center; Clay County Detention & Medical Staff, Defendants-Appellees
No. 14-7351
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
Decided: Feb. 3, 2015
592 Fed. Appx. 200
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Andrew Tab Kilpatrick appeals the district court’s order dismissing without prejudice his
“Whether a district court properly required a plaintiff to exhaust [his] administrative remedies before bringing suit in federal court is a question of law” that this court reviews de novo. Talbot v. Lucy Corr Nursing Home, 118 F.3d 215, 218 (4th Cir.1997). The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires a prisoner to exhaust his available administrative remedies before filing an action under § 1983.
Under the PLRA, failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense, which an inmate is not required to plead or demonstrate in his complaint. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216, 127 S.Ct. 910, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007). Rather, the defendant bears the burden to establish a prisoner’s failure to exhaust. Moore v. Bennette, 517 F.3d 717, 725 (4th Cir.2008). A district court is permitted to address the issue of exhaustion sua sponte, however, and may dismiss the complaint without input from the defendant if the “failure to exhaust is apparent from the face of the complaint,” and the inmate has been provided an opportunity to respond on the exhaustion issue. Anderson v. XYZ Corr. Health Servs., Inc., 407 F.3d 674, 682 (4th Cir.2005).
Our review of the record indicates that the failure to exhaust is not clear from the face of Kilpatrick’s complaint and associated pleadings. Particularly, it is unclear whether the detention center that housed Kilpatrick required further administrative steps beyond filing the inmate grievance and request forms Kilpatrick apparently filed. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the district court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We deny as moot Kilpatrick’s motions to appoint counsel, to amend his complaint, and to supplement his complaint. We express no opinion about the merits of Kilpatrick’s claims. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the material before this court and argument will not aid the decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED.