EMILY ANDERSEN and SARAH WESTON, Plaintiffs, v. MOUNTAIN HEIGHTS ACADEMY, DELAINA TONKS, and GAVIN HUTCHINSON, Defendants.
Case No. 2:24-cv-00168
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF UTAH
December 17, 2024
District Judge David Barlow
Case 2:24-cv-00168-DBB-CMR Document 28 Filed 12/17/24 PageID.385 Page 1 of 18
Defendants Mountain Heights Academy (“MHA“), Delaina Tonks (“Ms. Tonks“), and Gavin Hutchinson (“Mr. Hutchinson“) (collectively “Defendants“) move to partially dismiss the complaint brought by Emily Andersen (“Ms. Andersen“) and Sarah Weston (“Ms. Weston“) (together “Plaintiffs“).1 Defendants also move for a more definite statement on Plaintiffs’ fifth cause of action.2 For the reasons stated below, Defendants’ motion is denied.
BACKGROUND
This lawsuit stems from MHA‘s termination of Plaintiffs in August 2023.3 MHA is a publicly-funded online charter school.4 Ms. Weston was initially hired by MHA to teach math in
Ms. Tonks was MHA‘s Executive Director and Plaintiffs’ direct supervisor.8 Plaintiffs allege Ms. Tonks engaged in unethical behavior, including using MHA funds for personal travel, taking days off work in violation of MHA policy, creating a hostile work environment, failing to perform her duties, and giving herself a salary that was incommensurate with her role at MHA.9
Plaintiffs’ allegations center on Ms. Tonks hiring her daughter, Ms. Lyons, to work for MHA in 2020.10 Ms. Lyons‘s employment was approved by the MHA Board and Mr. Hutchinson, the Chairman of the Board.11 Ms. Lyons was hired to work in MHA‘s middle school special education department as the “Para Coordinator,” where she would assist the special education program by creating training materials and supervising paraeducators.12 Ms. Lyons did not have teaching credentials and was not licensed to work in special education when she was hired.13 Ms. Andersen was Ms. Lyons‘s direct supervisor in this position, as she had oversight of
On October 27, 2022, Ms. Anderson reported Ms. Tonks and Ms. Lyons to Mr. Hutchinson for violations of MHA‘s policy forbidding faculty from residing outside the state of Utah.16 Mr. Hutchinson did not raise this matter to MHA‘s board.17 In December 2022, MHA‘s board changed its policy to allow all employees to work from out of state.18
On January 25, 2023, Ms. Weston met with Ms. Tonks to discuss the perceived favoritism for Ms. Lyons.19 Although Ms. Tonks allegedly admitted to wrongdoing, she “refused to stop giving Lyons preferential treatment and indicated that Weston needed to let it go.”20 Ms. Weston then sent a formal grievance to MHA‘s board reporting ongoing policy violations and the favoritism of Ms. Lyons.21 Ms. Weston also reported that she felt Ms. Tonks was threatening her job in retaliation for reporting these violations.22
Then, on January 31, 2023, Ms. Andersen met with Ms. Tonks to discuss whether Ms. Andersen was going to report the alleged policy violations to the MHA Board.23 At this meeting, Ms. Tonks stated that if Ms. Andersen made any reports, Ms. Tonks would terminate Ms.
On February 1, 2023, Ms. Andersen reported Ms. Tonks‘s alleged policy violations and other unethical conduct to the MHA board.26 Ms. Andersen then reported Ms. Tonks‘s decision to remove her from overseeing the special education department to the MHA Board, however, the Board did not take any action on this report.27
On March 1, 2023, Ms. Weston filed a complaint with the Utah State Board of Education Internal Audit and the State Charter School Board.28 The complaint reported Ms. Tonks‘s alleged violations of MHA policy and other legal violations, centering on her preferential treatment of Ms. Lyons.29 The same day, Ms. Andersen filed an additional complaint with the MHA board reporting Ms. Tonks.30 Around this time, Ms. Tonks began making allegations of insubordination against Ms. Andersen and Ms. Weston.31
On April 6, 2023, Mr. Hutchinson and MHA placed Plaintiffs on administrative leave without reason and ordered Plaintiffs not to have any contact with MHA students, parents, or employees.32 On April 11, 2023, Ms. Andersen made a formal complaint with the MHA Board reporting additional wrongdoing by Ms. Tonks.33 The same week, Ms. Weston filed a complaint alleging wrongdoing by Ms. Tonks with the MHA board and the State Charter School Board.34
Plaintiffs filed suit in Utah state court on December 21, 2023,39 and Defendants removed to this court on March 1, 2024.40 Plaintiffs assert five causes of action, including two federal claims and three state law claims. Plaintiffs seek reinstatement to their previous positions with MHA and damages. Defendants filed their Motion for Partial Dismissal and for a More Definite Statement on August 13, 2024.41 Plaintiffs filed their opposition on September 13, 2024,42 and Defendants filed their reply on September 27, 2024.43
STANDARD
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint alleges five causes of action. First, Defendants’ motion to dismiss the state law claims for whistleblower retaliation and breach of contract and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing are evaluated. Then, the two federal law claims are addressed. Finally, the court considers Defendants’ motion for a more definite statement on Plaintiffs’ final claim for failure to pay wages.
I. State Law Claims
Defendants move for partial summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ first state law claim, arguing Utah‘s whistleblower protection statute does not apply to Ms. Tonks and Mr. Hutchinson without arguing the claim should be dismissed against MHA. Next, they argue the breach of contract claim should be dismissed because there was no actual or implied contract between the parties. The court addresses each in turn.
a. Whistleblower Retaliation
In their first state law claim, Plaintiffs allege that all Defendants violated the Utah Protection of Public Employees Act (the “UPPEA“). The UPPEA prohibits government
Defendants argue the whistleblower retaliation claim against Ms. Tonks and Mr. Hutchinson should be dismissed because the individual Defendants are not an “employer” under the UPPEA.51 However, they do not dispute that Ms. Tonks and Mr. Hutchinson were agents of MHA.52 As noted earlier, the UPPEA includes “agents of an employer” in its definition of employer.53 Therefore, a plain reading of the statute allows for MHA and its agents, which may include Ms. Tonks and Mr. Hutchinson, to be held liable for whistleblower retaliation.54 Defendants’ comparison to other statutory schemes, including the False Claims Act and Title VII,
Defendants also argue that UPPEA remedial provisions show a legislative intent to allow claims only against an employer as an entity.55 They argue that because the Act has separate provisions for civil fines against “a person” and for other remedies, the legislature did not intend for individuals to be held liable under the Act. Plaintiffs disagree with this construction, arguing instead that UPPEA‘s civil fine section displays a legislative intent for the Act to apply to individuals like Ms. Tonks and Mr. Hutchinson.56
The UPPEA allows for remedies including injunctive relief and damages.57 The UPPEA‘s civil fine section states that “[a] person who violates this chapter is liable for a civil fine of not more than $500.”58 The legislature‘s inclusion of a separate civil fine provision does not establish that agents cannot be held liable under the Act. Adding the civil fine provision to hold individuals accountable, as opposed to the public body that took a retaliatory action, shows a legislative intent for personal liability, at least up to the $500 maximum fine set forth in
In their second cause of action, Plaintiffs allege that MHA breached their employment contracts by failing to follow its policies and eventually terminating them.59 Plaintiffs assert they had a justified expectation that MHA would follow its policies, including its Travel Request Policy, Working from Out-of-State and work from home policies, Grievance Policy, and Termination Stats & Protocols (the “TSP“).60 Defendants argue this claim fails because Plaintiffs’ employment contracts were at-will and because MHA‘s policies did not constitute a contract.61
“Under Utah law, employment contracts of indefinite duration are subject to an at-will presumption that can be rebutted by, among other things, evidence of an implied or express agreement that the employment could only be terminated upon satisfaction of an agreed-upon condition.”62 “[A]n implied contract may arise from a variety of sources, including the conduct of the parties, announced personnel policies, practices of that particular trade or industry, or other circumstances.”63 “Although the existence of an implied contract is a factual question, ‘the court retains the power to decide whether, as a matter of law, a reasonable jury could find that an implied contract exists.‘”64
Defendants argue there is no enforceable contract because Plaintiffs’ Term Sheets stated that their employment was at-will and did not mention MHA policies or procedures.68 Defendants also argue that MHA‘s policy guide contained a clear and conspicuous disclaimer, so any employee manuals or similar materials cannot form an implied contract.69 Plaintiffs respond that they had an implied contract that altered their at-will status based on Defendants’ policies.70 Their argument focuses on the TSP, which states that:
We also understand that we live in a right-to-work state and that some of the language from our employee agreements causes some angst, such as the school having the right to terminate for no reason or any reason. Those are boilerplate legal phrases used in agreements in right-to-work states. Just because it says that in your agreement does not mean that we don‘t work hard to hire well up front, provide resources and mentoring for current employees, and support struggling employees with additional interventions and opportunities to improve prior to considering termination, unless the employee does something egregious.71
MHA‘s statements in the TSP may demonstrate that it voluntarily assumed additional duties upon which Plaintiffs may have relied. It states that MHA will follow certain procedures and seemingly deemphasizes employees’ at-will status. The TSP states that employees will receive support unless they do something “egregious.” Based on this language, a reasonable jury could find that MHA agreed to take on further responsibilities, creating an implied contract. Therefore, Plaintiffs have stated a plausible breach of contract claim, and Defendants’ motion to dismiss this cause of action is denied.
II. Federal Claims
Plaintiffs’ two federal claims are brought under
Plaintiffs argue they had a property interest in their employment at MHA that was violated when they were terminated from their positions.75 Defendants argue that Plaintiffs did not possess a protected property interest to which due process applies, so the claims should be dismissed.76
“To assess whether an individual was denied procedural due process, courts must engage in a two-step inquiry: (1) did the individual possess a protected interest such that the due process protections were applicable; and, if so, then (2) was the individual afforded an appropriate level of process.”77 “In the employment context, a property interest is a ‘legitimate expectation in continued employment.‘”78 “In general, we look to state law to determine whether a property interest in employment exists.”79 “Such an interest can arise from ‘state statutes, regulations, municipal ordinances, university rules, and even express or implied contracts.‘”80
Defendants argue that because Plaintiffs’ employment was at-will, they did not have a protected property interest and their due process claim fails at the first step.81 Plaintiffs respond that “the at-will nature of their employment had been altered by internal policies and the conduct of the parties, creating an implied employment contract.”82
As discussed above, Plaintiffs have alleged facts that make it plausible they had a legitimate expectation of continued employment at MHA. Plaintiffs state that they signed employment contracts every year and that “it was stated and understood that as long as they performed the duties of the job their contract would be renewed.”86 Plaintiffs also allege that they were promised and understood that MHA would follow termination procedures in the TSP, which were not adhered to in their termination proceedings.87 Based on the facts alleged, Plaintiffs may be able to establish they had a property interest in continued employment based on an implied contract with MHA. Therefore, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ due process claim is denied.
Defendants argue both federal claims fail to meet the pleading requirements for
“Individual liability under
Plaintiffs allege that Ms. Tonks manufactured complaints against them and solicited another MHA employee to make a formal complaint against Ms. Andersen.94 They also claim
Similarly, the free speech claim sufficiently alleges in what conduct each Defendant engaged. Plaintiffs claim that Defendants terminated their employment because of their speech.98 They allege Ms. Tonks threatened Ms. Andersen that if she reported policy violations, she would have Ms. Andersen terminated.99 They allege that MHA expressly stated that it was terminating Plaintiffs for statements they made in their reports about Ms. Tonks.100 Plaintiffs also allege that Mr. Hutchinson was an official with final policymaking authority who used that authority to terminate Plaintiffs based on statements they made.101
In short, these are not summary allegations against a large group of defendants such that no individual can adequately respond.102 Plaintiffs have provided sufficient factual allegations so
e. Official Custom or Policy
Finally, Defendants argue that the federal claims should be dismissed because the Amended Complaint does not allege that a custom or policy of MHA caused the alleged constitutional violations.103 Plaintiffs respond that Mr. Hutchinson and Ms. Tonks were officials with final policymaking authority and that MHA ratified their decisions, which sufficiently pleads an official custom or policy.104
Under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978), a plaintiff “may sue local governing bodies directly for constitutional violations pursuant to the body‘s policies.”105 “[T]he government as an entity may only be held liable when execution of a government‘s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury.”106 “To establish municipal liability, a plaintiff must first demonstrate a ‘municipal policy or custom‘, which may take one of the following forms:
(1) a formal regulation or policy statement; (2) an informal custom amounting to a widespread practice that, although not authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law; (3) the decisions of employees with final policymaking authority; (4) the ratification by such final policymakers of the decisions—and the basis for them—of subordinates to whom authority was delegated subject to these policymakers’ review and approval; or (5) the failure
to adequately train or supervise employees, so long as that failure results from deliberate indifference to the injuries that may be caused.”107
Plaintiffs rely on the third and fourth bases for municipal liability, alleging Mr. Hutchinson and Ms. Tonks made the decision to violate their rights as employees with final policymaking authority.108 They further claim that MHA ratified these decisions.109 Therefore, Plaintiffs have adequately pleaded an official custom or policy, and their federal claims should not be dismissed.
III. Motion for a More Definite Statement
In their final state law cause of action, Plaintiffs claim MHA failed to them pay wages from August 25–31, 2023. Defendants do not move to dismiss this claim but ask the court to order a more definite statement.110 Plaintiffs argue that the allegations in the Amended Complaint are sufficiently detailed and do not require additional information for Defendants to be able to respond.111
Under
Defendants do not argue that the failure to pay wages claim is unintelligible. Instead, they argue that Plaintiffs have not stated whether they are “entitled to recovery under a theory of breach of contract, a violation of a state or federal statute, or some other legal theory.”115 However, Plaintiffs have stated the alleged dates MHA failed to pay them for and the amounts they claim they are owed.116 The allegations in the Amended Complaint are not so unintelligible that Defendants cannot respond to them. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for a more definite statement is denied.
ORDER
Defendants’ Motion for Partial Dismissal and for a More Definite Statement is DENIED.117
Signed December 17, 2024.
BY THE COURT
David Barlow
United States District Judge