Ameritech Publishing, Inc. v. Mayo Bail Bonds & Sur., Inc.Ameritech Publishing, Inc. v. Mayo Bail Bonds & Sur., Inc.
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YARBROUGH, J.
I. Introduction
{¶ 1} Appellant, Peggy Mayo, appeals the judgment of the Sandusky Municipal Court, finding her in contempt and ordering her to pay a $250 fine. For the following reasons, we affirm.
{¶ 2} On November 21, 2008, Ameritech Publishing, Inc. (“Ameritech“) filed a complaint with the Sandusky Municipal Court against Mayo Bail Bonds & Surety, Inc. (“MBBS“) stemming from MBBS’ alleged breach of contract. In the complaint, Ameritech asserted that the parties entered into an advertising agreement on August 30, 2005. Ameritech alleged that MBBS breached that agreement by failing to pay for advertising services that were provided pursuant to the agreement. Along with the complaint, Ameritech filed a copy of the advertising agreement and a bill summarizing the outstanding balance for advertising services provided to MBBS.
{¶ 3} Ameritech raised four causes of action in its complaint: (1) breach of contract; (2) accounting; (3) quantum meruit; and (4) unjust enrichment. Each of the four causes of action stem from MBBS’ failure to pay for Ameritech‘s advertising services. Finally, Ameritech‘s complaint requested judgment “on counts 1 through 4 in the sum of $6,069.69, plus interest at the agreed rate of 18.00% per annum from the date of [the] complaint, plus costs.”
{¶ 4} Three months after filing the complaint, Ameritech moved for default judgment, stating that MBBS failed to file an answer. Ameritech supported its motion for default judgment with an affidavit from one of its employees setting forth the amount owed.
{¶ 5} On February 20, 2009, the trial court granted Ameritech‘s motion for default judgment. In its judgment entry, the trial court stated: “Judgment in favor of the Plaintiff
{¶ 6} After Ameritech unsuccessfully attempted to garnish MBBS’ bank accounts, it moved the court to order MBBS to submit to a debtor‘s examination. On October 25, 2011, the court granted Ameritech‘s motion, set the debtor‘s examination for November 29, 2011, and instructed the bailiff to serve appellant, as MBBS’ statutory agent, with notice of the debtor‘s examination.
{¶ 7} On the date of the debtor‘s examination, appellant appeared without counsel and without the information necessary to conduct the examination. Since appellant failed to supply the necessary information, the court rescheduled the debtor‘s examination for January 17, 2012. On that day, appellant again appeared without counsel and without the information. Accordingly, the court rescheduled the debtor‘s examination for January 31, 2012, and ordered appellant to bring several items with her on that day. The court informed appellant that, if she failed to bring the requested information to the January 31 hearing, she would be held in contempt.
{¶ 8} At the January 31 hearing, appellant appeared, this time with counsel, and filed an answer and a motion for judgment on the pleadings. However, appellant did not provide the requested information. After a hearing on the matter, the court found
B. Assignments of Error
{¶ 9} Appellant timely appeals, assigning the following errors for our review:
- THE TRIAL COURT LACKED JURISDICTION TO ORDER A “DEBTOR‘S EXAMINATION” WHEN THE “JUDGMENT” UPON WHICH THE EXAMINATION WAS PREDICATED WAS NOT A FINAL JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO
CIVIL RULE 54(B) . - THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN THE COURT HELD A STATUTORY AGENT IN DIRECT CONTEMPT FOR ALLEGED MISBEHAVIOR THAT OCCURRED OUTSIDE OF THE COURT AND OUTSIDE OF THE ADJUDICATING JUDGE AND WHEN THERE IS NO JOURNAL ENTRY OR VALID COURT ORDER PRODUCED THAT WAS VIOLATED.
II. Analysis
A. Compliance With Civ.R. 54(B) Was Not Required
{¶ 10} In appellant‘s first assignment of error, she argues that the trial court was without jurisdiction to order a debtor‘s examination because the default judgment was not a final judgment under
{¶ 11}
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action * * * the court may enter final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay. In the absence of a determination that there is no just reason for delay, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties, shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.
{¶ 12} In its order granting Ameritech‘s motion for default judgment, the trial court expressly disposed of the breach of contract and accounting causes of action, but was silent as to the remaining equitable causes of action. Ordinarily the trial court‘s failure to expressly dispose of the remaining causes of action would require compliance with
{¶ 13} Here, the relief granted to Ameritech on its breach of contract and accounting claim rendered the unjust enrichment and quantum meruit claims moot. See Wells Fargo Fin. Leasing Inc. v. Gilliland, 4th Dist. Nos. 05CA2993 & 05CA3006, 2006-Ohio-2756, ¶ 25 (holding that when a party is liable under an express contract, claims for unjust enrichment are rendered moot). Because the remaining claims were rendered moot, the trial court‘s order granting default judgment disposed of all claims contained in the complaint. Thus, we hold that compliance with
B. Finding of Contempt
{¶ 14} In her second assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it held her in contempt for failing to provide the requested information at the January 31 hearing.
{¶ 16} The classification of contempt is two-fold. First, contempt may be classified as either criminal or civil. The distinction between civil and criminal contempt centers on “the purpose and character of the punishment which is imposed upon the contemnor by the trial court.” Newcomer v. Newcomer, 6th Dist. Nos. L-10-1299, L-10-1357, 2011-Ohio-6500, ¶ 45, citing City of Cleveland v. Geraci, 8th Dist. No. 64075, 1993 WL 526652 (Dec. 16, 1993). “The purpose of civil contempt proceedings is to secure the dignity of the courts and the uninterrupted and unimpeded administration of justice.” Windham Bank v. Tomaszczyk, 27 Ohio St.2d 55, 58, 271 N.E.2d 815 (1971). Punishment is remedial or coercive and for the benefit of the complainant in civil contempt. Brown v. Executive 200, Inc., 64 Ohio St.2d 250, 253, 416 N.E.2d 610 (1980). Further, the sentence is conditional in civil contempt, such that the contemnor will be freed from it if she complies with the order. Id., citing In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 461 (8th Cir.1902). Criminal contempt, on the other hand, is usually characterized by an
{¶ 17} Here, appellant was found in contempt and ordered to pay a $250 fine as a “purge condition” for the contempt. The judgment entry states that the fine “shall be rescinded if defendant provides to plaintiff‘s attorney either (a) the specific items previously ordered, or (b) an affidavit attesting to their non-existence. * * * If the purge conditions are met, the fine is waived.” Since appellant has an opportunity to purge herself of the $250 fine by complying with the court order to provide the requested information, the sentence is conditional. Thus, the trial court‘s finding of contempt was civil in nature.
{¶ 18} Second, contempt may be classified as either direct or indirect. Sano v. Sano, 5th Dist. No.2010CA00252, 2011-Ohio-2110, ¶ 13, citing In re Purola, 73 Ohio App.3d 306, 310, 596 N.E.2d 1140 (3d Dist.1991). Direct contempt is defined by
A person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished as for a contempt:
(A) Disobedience of, or resistance to, a lawful writ, process, order, rule, judgment, or command of a court or an officer[.]
{¶ 19} Prior to imposing a punishment for indirect contempt, the contemnor must be afforded certain procedural safeguards, including a written charge, entry on the court‘s journal, an adversary hearing, and an opportunity for legal representation.
{¶ 20} Here, appellant argues that the contempt should be classified as indirect contempt. Further, appellant argues that the trial court improperly found her in contempt without affording her the requisite procedural protections such as a hearing and a written charge. In support of her argument, appellant contends that her contemptuous conduct occurred outside the presence of the court. We disagree.
{¶ 21} The judgment entry from the January 31 hearing clearly indicates that the court, at the second debtor‘s examination hearing, instructed appellant to bring several pieces of information to the January 31 hearing.1 Instead of complying, appellant
{¶ 22} Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding appellant in direct contempt and ordering her to pay a fine of $250. Accordingly, appellant‘s second assignment of error is not well-taken.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 23} Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the Sandusky Municipal Court is hereby affirmed. Costs are hereby assessed to the appellant in accordance with
Judgment affirmed.
Arlene Singer, P.J. _______________________________
JUDGE
Thomas J. Osowik, J. _______________________________
Stephen A. Yarbrough, J. JUDGE
CONCUR. _______________________________
JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio‘s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court‘s web site at: http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/newpdf/?source=6.