AMERIJET INTERNATIONAL, INC., Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, Transportation Security Administration, and John S. Pistole, in his official capacity as Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration, Defendants.
Civil Action No.: 1:13-cv-01405 (RC)
United States District Court, District of Columbia.
Signed May 22, 2014
RUDOLPH CONTRERAS, United States District Judge
The facts of the instant case are reminiscent of Glaviano v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 13-2049, 2013 WL 6823122 (D.D.C. Dec. 27, 2013)—a recent case in this district that was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction after application of abstention principles—and compel the same result. The Glaviano plaintiffs, who had taken out a mortgage loan to finance certain property, filed a complaint that challenged the defendants’ foreclosure of the property on the grounds that the defendants did not have possession of the mortgage Note and thus did not have standing to foreclose. The plaintiffs argued that the foreclosure violated both their Constitutional rights and the Consent Orders issued in United States v. Bank of America, No. 12-361 (D.D.C. Apr. 4, 2012), and requested a cease and desist order to enjoin the foreclosure proceedings. Glaviano, 2013 WL 6823122, at *1 & n. 1. The Glaviano court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that it lacked jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claims because the plaintiffs were essentially “ask[ing] the federal district court to review state court rulings” and prevent a foreclosure that the state court had already ratified. Id. at *2 (citing Tremel v. Bierman & Geesing, L.L.C., 251 F.Supp.2d 40, 45-46 (D.D.C.2003)). Similarly, other cases in this district have involved mortgagor-plaintiffs seeking to prevent foreclosures state courts have ordered, and their complaints have been dismissed under Rooker-Feldman. See, e.g., Tremel, 251 F.Supp.2d at 45-46; Liebman v. Deutsche Bank Nat‘l Trust Co., No. 13-1392, 2014 WL 526712, at *4 (D.D.C. Feb. 11, 2014); Davenport v. Dore, No. 13-1007, 2013 WL 3438482, at *1-2 (D.D.C. July 9, 2013); Hunter v. U.S. Bank Nat‘l Ass‘n, 698 F.Supp.2d 94, 100 (D.D.C.2010). This Court finds no reason to depart from the reasoned judgment and collective wisdom of the many prior judges in this district who have considered this issue. Consequently, to the extent that the California courts have already ratified the foreclosure proceedings that Fontaine now seeks to challenge, this Court concludes that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine renders it without subject matter jurisdiction to review the instant complaint.
Accordingly, Defendants’ motions to dismiss are GRANTED, and the instant complaint will be dismissed in its entirety for lack of jurisdiction.2 A separate order consistent with this opinion will follow.
Kristina Ann Wolfe, US Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Defendants.
Re Document No.: 15
MEMORANDUM OPINION
GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff, Amerijet International, Inc. (“Amerijet“), has brought suit under the
II. THE STATUTORY AND REGULATORY SCHEME
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress created the TSA to increase protections for all modes of transportation and, in particular, charged the TSA‘s Administrator with overall responsibility for civil aviation security. See
Each all-cargo aircraft operator‘s security program must describe the procedures, facilities, and equipment employed to “prevent or deter the carriage of any unauthorized persons, and any unauthorized explosives, incendiaries, and other destructive substances or items in cargo onboard an aircraft[,]” and the TSA must approve the security program.
The TSA also has a process through which all-cargo aircraft operators may request an amendment to their approved security program. See
Finally, within this civil aviation regulatory scheme, the TSA is empowered to undertake investigation and enforcement actions to ensure compliance with the all-cargo aircraft security requirements, including the Security Directive. See
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Turning to the dispute before this Court, Amerijet is a Florida-based full all-cargo aircraft operator required to have a TSA-approved security program under the above-described statutory and regulatory scheme. Compl., ECF No. 1, at ¶¶ 26, 30. Amerijet transports cargo between the United States and various locations in the Caribbean and Latin America, and its operations are based at Miami International Airport. Id. ¶¶ 4, 27.
In the Complaint, Amerijet alleges that in July 2011, two months after the TSA Administrator issued the Security Directive,
At a December 2012 informal conference with the TSA that Amerijet requested, the TSA explained that Amerijet was not exempt from the requirement to screen all cargo covered by the Security Directive, despite its interpretation to the contrary. Compl., ECF No. 1, at ¶ 44. The TSA subsequently issued a Final Notice of Proposed Civil Penalty and Order with respect to the late 2011 inspection. Id. ¶ 79. In response, Amerijet requested a formal administrative hearing as permitted by the TSA regulations. Id. At this administrative proceeding, which is pending,5 Amerijet once again asserted that it is entitled to an exemption from the cargo screening procedures in the Security Directive. Id. ¶¶ 80-82.
Separately, in an effort to resolve the ongoing dispute, the TSA suggested that Amerijet submit an application for additional alternative procedures if it continued to desire a broader exemption from the Security Directive. Id. ¶ 54. In February 2013, Amerijet submitted a letter to the TSA requesting several alterations to its existing security procedures, which the TSA denied in May 2013. Id. ¶¶ 55-57. Amerijet then petitioned the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to review the TSA‘s denial of this request. See Amerijet Int‘l, Inc. v. John
In May 2013, Amerijet also applied for an extension of its two existing alternative procedures to the Security Directive. Compl., ECF No. 1, at ¶ 68. The TSA denied Amerijet‘s request for an extension of both of these alternative procedures in July 2013, but the agency allowed Amerijet to resubmit its request. Id. ¶¶ 71-72. Amerijet submitted its second application for alternate procedures on August 9, 2013, id. ¶ 73, and the operator continues to engage in discussions with the TSA about this request. See Defs.’ Mem. in Supp., ECF No. 15-1, at 15-16. Relevant to the dispute before this Court, Amerijet alleges that the TSA has granted its competitors’ requests for similar alternate procedures, including permitting competitors to utilize the Security Directive‘s cargo screening exemptions for which the TSA determined Amerijet was ineligible. Compl., ECF No. 1, at ¶¶ 87, 89.
In the meantime, the TSA continued to monitor Amerijet‘s compliance with the aviation security requirements throughout the Caribbean and Latin America. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 38, 58, 74. Several of these inspections revealed that Amerijet had committed additional violations of the Security Directive. Id. ¶¶ 58, 61. Amerijet responded to each TSA investigative action by asserting its “good faith belief that it was in full compliance with the [S]ecurity [D]irective through certain exemptions clearly applicable.” Id. ¶ 61. Disagreeing each time, the TSA issued to Amerijet an unspecified number of Notices of Proposed Civil Penalty for violations of the Security Directive. Id. ¶¶ 66, 78.
On September 16, 2013, Amerijet filed a Complaint in this Court alleging that the TSA‘s interpretation and enforcement of the aviation screening requirements constituted a pattern or practice of conduct that was arbitrary and capricious, in bad faith, contrary to law, and in violation of Amerijet‘s Fifth Amendment Equal Protection rights. Id. ¶¶ 95, 97. Amerijet seeks declaratory relief and a permanent injunction enjoining the TSA from enforcing, applying, or implementing the security measures and program in the allegedly unconstitutional and unlawful manner. Compl., ECF No. 1, at ¶¶ 104, 108, 112, 117. Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to
IV. LEGAL STANDARD
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.‘” Janko v. Gates, 741 F.3d 136, 139 (D.C.Cir.2014) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994)). On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the court has subject
V. ANALYSIS
Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) on the ground that Amerijet challenges a final TSA order—the Security Directive—and thus, pursuant to
[A] person disclosing a substantial interest in an order issued by the Security of Transportation (or the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security with respect to security duties and power designated to be carried out by the Under Secretary or the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration with respect to aviation duties and powers designed to be carried out by the Administrator) in whole or in part under this part, part B, or subsection (l) or [(r) ]7 of section 114 may apply for review of the order by filing a petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit or in the court of appeals of the United States for the circuit in which the person resides or has its principal place of business [.]8
In response, Amerijet rightly appears to concede that this Court lacks jurisdiction if the Complaint seeks review of the Security Directive. The plaintiff instead argues that § 46110(a) does not apply because the Complaint presents a broader challenge to the TSA‘s conduct. See Pl.‘s Mem. in
* * *
To determine whether this Court possesses subject matter jurisdiction within the framework of § 46110(a), it must answer two questions. First, does the Security Directive constitute a final “order” within the meaning of § 46110(a)? If the Security Directive is a final order, the second question is: does Amerijet assert challenges that require direct review of, or are inescapably intertwined with, the Security Directive such that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claims? The Court answers affirmatively to both questions and therefore concludes that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider the merits of Amerijet‘s Complaint.
A. The Security Directive Is A Final Order Under § 46110(a)
Section 46110(a) is implicated only if a final TSA “order” is involved.9 See CSI Aviation Servs., Inc. v. Dep‘t of Transp., 637 F.3d 408, 411 (D.C.Cir.2011) (explaining, in the context of applying § 46110(a), that “[t]o avoid premature intervention in the administrative process, our review of agency action has been judicially restricted to review of final agency orders” (citation and quotation omitted)). Within the framework of § 46110(a), “the term ‘order’ ... should be read expansively.” Safe Extensions, Inc. v. FAA, 509 F.3d 593, 598 (D.C.Cir.2007) (citation and quotation omitted); see also Avia Dynamics, Inc. v. FAA, 641 F.3d 515, 520 (D.C.Cir.2011) (stating that the term “order” in § 46110(a) is broadly construed “because of its function in providing for judicial review“). Although § 46110 does not define “order,” the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has provided a test for determining whether an agency action constitutes a final order under the statute:
To be deemed final and thus reviewable as an order under
49 U.S.C. § 46110 , an agency disposition must mark the consummation of the agency‘s decisionmaking process, and it must determine rights or obligations or give rise to legal consequences.
Safe Extensions, Inc., 509 F.3d at 598 (citation and internal quotations omitted).
Here, the Security Directive “mark[s] the ‘consummation’ of the agency‘s decisionmaking process” because it is “not ... of a merely tentative or interlocutory nature.” Village of Bensenville v. FAA, 457 F.3d 52, 68 (D.C.Cir.2006) (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997)). The additional security measures pronounced in the Security Directive are mandatory and must be immediately implemented by each all-cargo aircraft operator
The Security Directive also “determine[s] rights or obligations [and] give[s] rise to legal consequences,” Safe Extensions, 509 F.3d at 598 (citation and internal quotation omitted), because it demands additional security measures that all-cargo aircraft operators transporting cargo into the United States must follow under the threat of penalty for noncompliance. See
B. Amerijet‘s Claims Are Inescapably Intertwined With The Security Directive
“It is beyond dispute that Congress ‘may prescribe the procedures and conditions under which, and the courts in which, judicial review of administrative orders may be had.‘” United Transp. Union v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 822 F.2d 1114, 1119-20 (D.C.Cir.1987) (quoting City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers, 357 U.S. 320, 336, 78 S.Ct. 1209, 2 L.Ed.2d 1345 (1958)). Here, Congress conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the courts of appeals to review challenges to final orders within the meaning of § 46110(a). The next crucial question therefore is whether Amerijet seeks review of a final order under § 46110(a)—i.e., the Security Directive—or if Amerijet is mounting a broader challenge that falls outside § 46110(a).
1. The Inescapably-Intertwined Doctrine
Amerijet need not allege a direct challenge to the Security Directive to fall within the ambit of § 46110(a)‘s exclusive jurisdiction scheme. Rather, the “inescapable-intertwinement doctrine gives the courts of appeals jurisdiction over not only direct challenges to final agency orders [under § 46110(a)] but also any claims inescapably intertwined with the review of those orders.” Durso v. Napolitano, 795 F.Supp.2d 63, 69 (D.D.C.2011) (citing Breen v. Peters, 474 F.Supp.2d 1, 4 (D.D.C.2007)). “The doctrine serves to prevent plaintiffs from collaterally attacking agency proceedings by presenting ostensibly independent claims.” Id. at 69-70 (citing Americopters, LLC v. FAA, 441 F.3d 726, 736 (9th Cir.2006)). “In the inescapable-intertwinement inquiry, a ‘critical point’ is whether review of the order by a court of appeals would allow for adjudication of the plaintiff‘s claims and could result in the relief that the plaintiff requests.” Id. at 70 (quoting Breen, 474 F.Supp.2d at 5).
Although the exact boundaries are somewhat murky, the breadth of the inescapable-intertwinement doctrine, as ap-
That a plaintiff describes its claims before a district court as constitutional challenges to agency action does not guarantee avoidance of § 46110(a)‘s grant of exclusive jurisdiction because such claims quite often remain inescapably intertwined with the TSA order at issue. See, e.g., Gilmore, 435 F.3d at 1133 n. 9 (finding that the plaintiff‘s due process vagueness and right to travel claims are “inescapably intertwined” with review of a TSA order); Nelson v. DHS, No. 06-0050, 2007 WL 1655344, at *2 (W.D.Va. June 7, 2007) (finding that the district court lacks jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff‘s constitutional challenge to a TSA order requiring the fingerprinting of persons seeking a driver‘s license to transport hazardous materials); Thomson, 2006 WL 770449, at *6 (finding that the district court lacks jurisdiction because the plaintiff‘s Fourth Amendment claim is inescapably intertwined with a review of the TSA‘s orders regarding airport screening procedures); Green v. TSA, 351 F.Supp.2d 1119, 1127 (W.D.Wash.2005) (finding that the district court lacks jurisdiction because the plaintiffs’ Fourth and Fifth Amendment challenges to the TSA‘s No-Fly List are “inescapably intertwined with a review of the procedures and merits surrounding the adoption of the No-Fly List“).
2. A Request For Declaratory And Injunctive Relief Does Not Remove Claims From § 46110(a)
Pursuant to § 46110(c), a court of appeals reviewing a final TSA order has authority to “affirm, amend, modify, or set aside any part of the order.”
3. The Gravamen Of Amerijet‘s Claims
The Court next must consider the factual content of Amerijet‘s complaints. A plaintiff may not “avoid the bar of a clearly applicable jurisdictional statute” simply by “drafting an artfully worded complaint.” United Transp. Union v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 822 F.2d 1114, 1120 (D.C.Cir.1987). Instead, the Court must
Amerijet describes its Complaint as alleging “a pattern or practice of conduct by Defendants in connection with a series of TSA investigations, alternative procedure requests and information requests pursuant to regulation, and preliminary enforcement proceedings from early 2012 and continuing as of the filing of this action.” Pl.‘s Mem. in Opp‘n, ECF No. 19-1, at 1. The plaintiff continues that “[t]he pattern of conduct complained of does not concern or relate to any particular individual formal civil penalty proceeding that Amerijet could contest before an administrative law judge and appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals under
Although in theory the various investigations and enforcement proceedings from the late 2011 Caribbean inspection onward could involve an unlawful pattern of conduct by the TSA, the Court finds that the proffered combination of alleged actions by the TSA is inadequate to remove Amerijet‘s claims from § 46110(a)‘s exclusive jurisdiction scheme. Rather, as is discussed in more detail below, Amerijet‘s claims effectively involve just two basic challenges, both of which would require this Court to review the procedures and merits of the TSA‘s interpretation, implementation, and enforcement of the Security Directive. See Gilmore v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1125, 1133 n. 9 (9th Cir.2006) (finding that “the district court [was] divested of jurisdiction” because the plaintiff‘s constitutional challenges were “inescapably intertwined with a review of the procedures and merits surrounding the ... order” (citation and quotation omitted; alternation in original)); Green v. Brantley, 981 F.2d 514, 521 (11th Cir.1993) (finding that the district court lacked jurisdiction under
a. Amerijet‘s Challenge To The TSA‘s Interpretation, Implementation, And Enforcement Of The Security Directive And Its Exemption Criteria
Amerijet‘s first challenge deals with the TSA‘s allegedly wrongful failure to agree with Amerijet‘s interpretation that it is exempt from the Security Directive‘s cargo screening requirements. See Compl., ECF No. 1, at ¶ 35. The disagreement about whether Amerijet is exempt sparked a variety of TSA enforcement actions, starting with a letter of investigation following the late 2011 Caribbean inspection in which Amerijet was found in noncompliance with the Security Directive. Id. ¶ 34. Amerijet continued to disagree with the TSA‘s interpretation and
In the meantime, the TSA continued to inspect various other Amerijet locations in the Caribbean and Latin America, during which the agency uncovered additional instances of noncompliance by Amerijet with the Security Directive‘s requirement of full direct physical screening of all-cargo aircraft bound for the United States. Id. ¶¶ 58-59. In each case, Amerijet received a letter of investigation for its noncompliance with the TSA requirements, to which Amerijet continued to respond that it was in compliance with the Security Directive because, in its interpretation, it qualified for certain exemptions—an interpretation the TSA never shared. Compl., ECF No. 1, at ¶ 61.
Thus, each time Amerijet remonstrates in the Complaint about some aspect of the TSA‘s enforcement activities—regardless if that challenge is described as a constitutional or APA claim—it is attacking the procedures and merits of the agency‘s interpretation, implementation, and enforcement of the Security Directive (including who is exempt from the directive), as that was clearly the main source of disagreement between Amerijet and the TSA, and the primary regulation under which the agency was acting during the relevant events.
Accordingly, when Amerijet complains about a lack of notice regarding the bases of its violations in letters of correction, it is asking for review of the TSA‘s procedures for enforcing the Security Directive. See Pl.‘s Mem. in Opp‘n, ECF No. 19-1, at 2. The same is true when Amerijet complains about the TSA‘s failure to supply the operator with notice of specific statutes or rules it violated in connection with preliminary enforcement proceedings initiated by a Notice of Proposed Civil Penalty. Id. Likewise, when Amerijet complains that the TSA conducted enforcement proceedings “to coerce in bad faith the acquiescence of foreign sovereign nations to TSA jurisdiction and oversight,” the plaintiff is seeking review of the TSA‘s implementation and enforcement of the Security Directive, as that is the basis for the allegedly wrongful enforcement actions at issue. Id. at 2-3. And when Amerijet complains that the TSA “knowingly permitted” the operator‘s competitors to disregard the full direct physical screening requirement for all-cargo aircraft but enforced that requirement against Amerijet, the plaintiff‘s Equal Protection claim is seeking review of the merits and procedures surrounding the TSA‘s enforcement of the Security Directive, which is the regulation imposing the complained-about procedures. Id. at 3; Compl., ECF No. 1, at ¶¶ 87-88, 98.
b. Amerijet‘s Challenge To The TSA‘s Denial Of Its Applications For Alternate Procedures
Amerijet‘s second complained-about topic is the TSA‘s continued refusal to approve the proposed alternate procedures when Amerijet sought an exemption from the Security Directive. See Compl., ECF No. 1, at ¶¶ 54-55. In December 2012, the TSA asked Amerijet to apply for alternative procedures to avoid further violations of the Security Directive, as is permitted under the regulatory scheme. Id. ¶ 54. In February 2013, Amerijet submitted an application for alternative proce-
Following the TSA‘s denial of the proposed alternate procedures in May 2013, Amerijet applied for an extension of its two existing alternative procedures under the Security Directive, which the TSA had granted back in July 2011. See Compl., ECF No. 1, at ¶¶ 32, 68. In July 2013, the TSA denied Amerijet‘s application for an extension at each of the locations in which Amerijet was previously found in noncompliance with the Security Directive during an inspection. Id. ¶ 71. At the TSA‘s request, Amerijet submitted another application for alternate procedures in August 2013, which the TSA has yet to approve or deny. See id. ¶ 73; Defs.’ Mem. in Supp., ECF No. 15-1, at 16 n.5.
Thus, when Amerijet complains about the TSA‘s failure to approve its applications for alternate procedures, it plainly is seeking review of the TSA‘s implementation, interpretation, and enforcement of the Security Directive, as that is the order under which the alternative procedures would be granted. The same is true for Amerijet‘s complaint that the TSA approved alternate procedures for its competitors in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. See Compl., ECF No. 1, at ¶¶ 89, 97. A court may evaluate such challenges only by closely reviewing the procedures and merits of the TSA‘s actions in connection with the Security Directive.
4. Amerijet‘s Claims Are Within The Scope Of § 46110(a)
Although cumbersome, a close factual review was necessary because it demonstrates that what Amerijet describes as a “pattern or practice” of wrongful conduct in violation of the Constitution and the APA, see Compl., ECF No. 1, at ¶¶ 97, 109, is really a disguised attack on the TSA‘s interpretation, implementation, and enforcement of the Security Directive—not a separate and collateral attack on agency action. See Mohamed v. Holder, No. 1:11-CV-50, 2011 WL 3820711, *6 (E.D.Va. Aug. 26, 2011) (“[T]he Court must decide ... whether [the plaintiff‘s] challenges are so related to the challenge of a TSA order that they are within the scope of Section 46110 or whether plaintiff has alleged a sufficiently independent cognizable injury, separate and apart from any TSA order that may relate to or issue out of the challenged conduct.“).
For this Court to determine whether the TSA has acted in violation of its statutory authority or the Constitution, it would have to evaluate how the agency acted in regard to applying the Security Directive specifically to Amerijet. This would require, among other things, a detailed factual review of Amerijet‘s alleged instances of noncompliance, the merits and procedures of each TSA enforcement action, how the TSA interpreted and applied the Security Directive‘s exemption criteria, and how the TSA evaluated applications for alternative procedures by Amerijet and its competitors. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 625 F.3d 827, 830 (5th Cir.2010) (finding that the district court lacked jurisdiction under § 46110(a) when the complaint alleged “procedural improprieties” by the FAA, challenged the “merits” of an FAA order, and required “evaluating whether the FAA had a legitimate reason for denying [the plaintiff‘s] application” because hearing such a claim would require a “balancing of the same evidence that the FAA had weighed” when issuing the order); Parker v. NTSB, No. 98-17173, 232
Accordingly, Amerijet sets forth nothing more than an “as-applied” challenge to the Security Directive, which, even if not a direct attack on the order itself, is clearly inescapably intertwined with a review of that order.10 See Gilmore v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1125, 1133 n. 9 (9th Cir.2006) (finding that the plaintiff‘s constitutional challenges are “inescapably intertwined with a review of the procedures and merits surrounding the order” (citation and quotation omitted; alternation in original)); Mohamed, 2011 WL 3820711, at *8 (concluding that the plaintiff‘s constitutional claims about having his name on the No-Fly List are “inescapably intertwined” with a TSA order because the alleged harm only occurred after issuance of the order).
These are exactly the types of claims that could be—and must be—heard by the courts of appeals under § 46110(a), assuming the other conditions for federal judicial review are met, such as final agency action and ripeness. See Durso v. Napolitano, 795 F.Supp.2d 63, 69 (D.D.C.2011) (“In the inescapable-intertwinement inquiry, a ‘critical point’ is whether review of the order by a court of appeals would allow for adjudication of the plaintiff‘s claims and could result in the relief that the plaintiff requests.” (quoting Breen v. Peters, 474 F.Supp.2d 1, 5 (D.D.C.2007))). Indeed, if this Court was to entertain Amerijet‘s claims on the merits, it would be enabling the multi-forum, collateral litigation that Congress sought to prevent through § 46110(a). See City of Rochester v. Bond, 603 F.2d 927, 936 (D.C.Cir.1979) (“The rationale for statutory review is that coherence and economy are best served if all suits pertaining to designated agency decisions are segregated in particular courts.... The policy behind having a special review procedure in the first place similarly disfavors bifurcating jurisdiction over various substantive grounds between district court and the court of appeals.“). The Court therefore lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the merits of this action.11
C. Thunder Basin Coal Co. And Its Progeny Do Not Confer Subject Matter Jurisdiction On This Court
In its opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Amerijet asserts that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 114 S.Ct. 771, 127 L.Ed.2d 29 (1994), and its progeny. See Pl.‘s Mem. in Opp‘n, ECF No. 19-1, at 6-8. Under Thunder Basin Coal, district courts lack jurisdiction to review cases involving “delayed judicial review” schemes if “Congress has allocated initial review to an administrative body where such intent is fairly discernible in the statutory scheme.” 510 U.S. at 207, 114 S.Ct. 771 (citation and quotation omitted). Courts will “presume that Congress does not intend to limit jurisdiction if ‘a finding of preclusion could foreclose all meaningful judicial review‘; if the suit is ‘wholly collateral to a statute‘s review provisions‘; and if the claims are ‘outside the agency‘s expertise.‘” Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 130 S.Ct. 3138, 3150, 177 L.Ed.2d 706 (2010) (quoting Thunder Basin Coal, 510 U.S. at 212-13, 114 S.Ct. 771).
Here, it is clear that Congress, through § 46110(a), intended to grant courts of appeals exclusive review of certain final agency actions related to aviation security. Indeed, another federal court previously considered § 46110(a) under one of Thunder Basin Coal‘s progeny, Elgin v. Dep‘t of Treasury, — U.S. —, 132 S.Ct. 2126, 183 L.Ed.2d 1 (2012), and explained:
To determine whether it is “fairly discernible” that Congress intended to bar the district court from exercising jurisdiction in this proceeding, Elgin directs us to examine the text, structure, and purpose of § 46110. In so doing, we have no reason to look beyond the plain text of the statute, in which Congress clearly expressed its intention that any legal challenge to a § 46110 order ... be brought in the first instance in a court of appeals.
Blitz v. Napolitano, 700 F.3d 733, 740 (4th Cir.2012). Further, under the Thunder Basin Coal analysis, Amerijet‘s claims are not wholly collateral from a TSA order because they are inescapably intertwined with review of the agency‘s interpretation, implementation, and enforcement of the Security Directive, as was discussed above. Amerijet‘s challenges also are soundly within the TSA‘s expertise, and Amerijet does not lack meaningful judicial review because it may challenge a final agency action in the courts of appeals following consummation of the administrative process. See id. at 742 (“[Section] 46110 does
D. Whether To Transfer The Case Under 28 U.S.C. § 1631
Finally, when a federal district court concludes that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the court “only has the authority to make a single decision: to dismiss the case, or in the interest of justice, to transfer it to another court” pursuant to
Although Amerijet has made no motion requesting a transfer under § 1631, it remains within this Court‘s discretion to transfer an action sua sponte. See Halim v. Donovan, 951 F.Supp.2d 201, 204 (D.D.C.2013) (“While a Court may on its own initiative transfer an action under
Here, the Court finds that “it is in the interest of justice” to transfer this action to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. See
VI. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion is granted, and this action is transferred to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit pursuant to
RUDOLPH CONTRERAS
United States District Judge
Notes
In addition, the judicial review provision of § 46110(a) was previously codified as
Likely recognizing the inconsistency of its positions in the two forums, Amerijet attempts to constrain its court of appeals argument through a footnote distinguishing the informal adjudication Equal Protection claim from the Equal Protection challenge to the “notice and enforcement” of the TSA‘s security requirements now before this Court. See id. at 4 n. 2. The Court disagrees that any meaningful distinction exists. Instead, Amerijet‘s theory that it is being subjected to disparate treatment by the TSA‘s interpretation and application of the Security Directive through the informal adjudication regarding alternative procedures applies equally to its Equal Protection and APA complaints in this pending action—including the TSA‘s interpretation that Amerijet does not qualify for an exemption under the Security Directive and the related TSA enforcement actions against Amerijet for noncompliance with that directive.