AMANA GLOBAL COMPANY, et al. v. KING COUNTY, et al.
Case No. C21-637-MLP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE
August 30, 2023
I. INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court on the following motions, both filed on July 6, 2023: (1) Defendants King County, Josh Baldi, John Taylor, Michael Murphy, Linda Holecek, and Brad Schabert‘s (collectively, “Defendants“) Motion for Summary Judgment (“Defendants’ Motion” (dkt. # 175)); and (2) pro se Plaintiffs Hafid Tahraoui and his sole proprietorship, Amana Global Company‘s, (together, “Plaintiffs“) Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (“Plaintiffs’ Motion” (dkt. # 180)). On July 7, 2023, Plaintiffs filed an “amended” version of their Motion and additional declarations and exhibits totaling over 200 pages. (Dkt. ## 182-84.)
Defendants filed an opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion (Defs.’ Resp. (dkt. # 202)), which included a request to strike the amended version of Plaintiffs’ Motion as untimely (id. at 5), and
Having considered the parties’ submissions, oral argument, the governing law, and the balance of the record, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion (dkt. # 175) and DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion (dkt. # 180). The Court GRANTS Defendants’ request to strike Plaintiffs’ Amended Motion (dkt. # 182).1
II. BACKGROUND
This case arises from King County‘s efforts to relocate tenants, including Plaintiffs, from a warehouse property that King County purchasеd in order to implement a flood management project. Plaintiffs occupied the property under a lease valid through August 2021. (First Tahraoui Decl. (dkt. # 181) at ¶ 3.)
A. Relocation, Condemnation, and Eviction Proceedings
In July 2016, Ms. Holecek, a King County relocation manager, sent Plaintiffs and other tenants a general notice of relocation rights. (Holecek Decl. (dkt. # 179) at ¶ 4.) On August 30, 2016, King County sent a 90-day notice letter informing Plaintiffs that they were required to move but not before December 5, 2016. (Id., Ex. 2 at 11.) The letter stated Plaintiffs were “eligible to receive relocation assistance in accordance with . . .
On June 1, 2017, King County sent a letter providing Plaintiffs “a summary of relocation entitlements [that] may be eligible for reimbursement based on estimates[.]” (First Tahraoui Decl., Ex. 4 at 73.) “Moving Entitlements” totaled over $1.177 million, and “Reestablishment Entitlements” totaled $50,000. (Id.) On September 25, 2017, Brad Schabert, a King County acquisitions manager, sent Plaintiffs a letter “acknowledg[ing] that the lease provides you with the right to stay at this location through August 2021 as long аs you are in good standing under the lease.” (Second Tahraoui Decl. (dkt. # 209) at ¶ 3, Ex. 1.)
On October 2, 2017, Plaintiffs sent King County a “Demand Letter” claiming $2.462 million in damages, including $1.457 million for “leasehold interest value.” (First Briggs Decl. (dkt. # 176) at ¶ 2, Ex. 1.) In January 2018, King County obtained a professional appraisal that opined “the prospective value of the leasehold interest” was $220,000. (Id. at ¶ 3, Ex. 2 at 15.) In June 2018, King County offered Plaintiffs $220,000 for the value of the lease, in addition to benefits under the Washington Relocation Assistance Act, but Plaintiffs rejected the offer. (Id. at ¶¶ 4-5, Exs. 3 at 87, 4 at 90.)
In July 2018, King County filed a petition for condemnation in King County Superior Court, seeking a decree of appropriation of Plaintiffs’ leasehold and a determination of just compensation. (First Briggs Decl. at ¶ 6, Ex. 5 at 93-96.) After August 2018, Plaintiffs were the only tenant occupying the warehouse. (Holecek Decl. at ¶ 14.)
On November 22, 2019, King County sent a notice to vacate and a 30-day notice letter informing Plaintiffs they were required to move by December 31, 2019. (First Tahraoui Decl., Exs. 1 at 34, 2 at 37.) In January 2020, King County filed a complaint for unlawful detainer because Plaintiffs had not moved. (First Briggs Decl. at ¶ 9, Ex. 8 at 208.)
Nevertheless, King County continued to negotiate with Plaintiffs, while making clear that the County would proceed with unlawful detainer if Plaintiffs did not cooperate. (See Baldi Decl. (dkt. # 178) at ¶¶ 9-13, Exs. 1 at 14 (“If at any time Amana does not honor the process and terms set forth above, the County reserves the right to proceed with the unlawful detainer action.“), 2-3.) In July 2020, Plaintiffs signed а new lease for a warehouse in Chehalis. (First Tahraoui Decl. at ¶ 34.) King County directly paid Plaintiffs $90,625 in July through December 2020, based on assurances that Plaintiffs would complete the relocation by December 31, 2020. (Baldi Decl. at ¶¶ 14-22, Exs. 4-8.)
On December 1, 2020, Plaintiffs sought an additional extension to April 2021. (Baldi Decl. at ¶¶ 22-25, Exs. 9-10.) King County did not grant the extension request, and Plaintiffs were evicted on May 10, 2021. (First Briggs Decl., Ex. 14; First Tahraoui Decl. at ¶ 43.) Between June and November 2021, King County paid approximately $2.542 million for movers
Plaintiffs appealed the eviction order, and the Washington Court of Appeals affirmed on November 28, 2022. (First Briggs Decl. at ¶ 16, Ex. 15.) The Court of Appeals found that “the lease agreement terminated by its terms, upon condemnation,” as of November 12, 2019. (Id. at 318-19.) The Court also found that “King County provided [Plaintiffs] more than 90 days’ notice to vacate the Property, while [they] lawfully occupied the Property[,]” in compliance with the Uniform Relocation Act and the Washington Relоcation Assistance Act, but once the lease terminated, Plaintiffs “no longer had any right or title to occupy the Property and became . . . ‘unlawful occupant[s],’ who [were] not entitled to further notice” under both statutes. (Id. at 320-21.) Plaintiffs appealed to the Washington Supreme Court, which denied review on July 12, 2023. (Second Briggs Decl. (dkt. # 203) at ¶ 2, Ex. A.)
B. Plaintiffs’ State Court Actions
On July 18, 2019, Plaintiffs filed suit in King County Superior Court against King County and other entities, alleging, as in the instant action, that King County unreasonably delayed relocation benefits, improperly failed to compensate Plaintiffs for their leasehold interest, and retaliated against and harassed them. (Compare Compl. (dkt. # 1) at ¶¶ 16-23 with First Briggs Decl. at ¶ 18, Ex. 16 at ¶¶ 16-21.) Plaintiffs asserted claims for breach of contract, fraud and negligent misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, breach of quiet enjoyment, breach of good faith and fair dealing, tortious interference with business expectancy, Washington
In their substantive due process claim, Plaintiffs alleged “throughout the acquisition and relocation process” the defendants “acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner[.]” (First Briggs Decl., Ex. 16 at ¶ 71.) In their privileges and immunities claim, Plaintiffs alleged “throughout the acquisition and relocation process” the defendants “treated Plaintiffs differently from similarly situated persons[.]” (Id. at ¶ 75.) The Superior Court dismissed several claims as a matter of law, including the constitutional claims, and a jury delivered a verdict in favor of King County on the remaining claims. (First Briggs Decl. at ¶¶ 19-20, Exs. 17-18.) Plaintiffs appealed. (Id. at ¶ 21, Ex. 19.)
On March 18, 2023, Plaintiffs filed in Lewis County Superior Court a petition for judicial review of King County‘s administrative decision not to reimburse Plaintiffs for travel time and mileage expenses for traveling to his warehousе to supervise movers. (First Briggs Decl. at ¶ 23, Ex. 21.)
C. Plaintiffs’ Federal Court Actions
Plaintiffs filed the instant action on May 13, 2021. (Compl.) Plaintiffs assert two declaratory claims: violation of Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process, and “equitable preemption“; and three causes of action: deprivation of Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process, deprivation of Fourteenth Amendment equal protection, and conspiracy to violate due process and equal protection rights under
Plaintiffs alleged several constitutional under claims
III. DISCUSSION
Defendants contend that, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine as well as res judicata and collateral estoppel principles, Plaintiffs’ claims must be dismissed to the extent they seek to overturn or review state court adjudication of the same issues. (Defs.’ Mot. at 8-13.) Defendants also contend Plaintiffs fail to establish that any County policy violated their constitutional rights; Plaintiffs fail to identify membership in any protected class for equal protection purposes; and Plaintiffs fail to show participation in the harm alleged by the individually named defendants, who in any case are entitled to qualified immunity. (Id. at 13-26.)
Plaintiffs contend that Washington statutеs and administrative codes are unconstitutional as applied because they violated Plaintiffs’ right to procedural due process under the Fourteenth
A. Summary Judgment Standards
Summary judgment is appropriate when the “movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Genuine disputes are those for which the evidence is such that a “reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257. It is the nonmoving party‘s responsibility to “identify with reasonable particularity the evidence that precludes summary
B. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine and Preclusion
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a federal district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review the final determinations of a state court in judicial proceedings. District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923); see also Doe & Assocs. L. Offs. v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001) (“The purpose of the doctrine is to protect state judgments from collateral federal attack.“). “[T]his doctrine applies even where the challenge to the state court decision involves federal constitutional issues.” Doe & Assocs. L. Offs., 252 F.3d at 1029.
Rooker-Feldman applies when a “plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous decision by a state court, and seeks relief frоm a state court judgment based on that decision” and “may also apply where the parties do not directly contest the merits of a state court decision, as the doctrine ‘prohibits a federal district court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over a suit that is a de facto appeal from a state court judgment.‘” Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 525 F.3d 855, 859 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d 609, 613 (9th Cir. 2007); Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2004)). A federal action is a de facto appeal where “claims raised in the federal court action are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with
Claim and issue preclusion also limit the matters a court may adjudicate but, by contrast, are not jurisdictional. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 293 (2005) (“Preclusion, of course, is not a jurisdictional matter.“). For both claim preclusion and issue preclusion, federal courts must “apply the rules of a particular state to judgments issued by courts of that state.” Robi v. Five Platters, Inc., 838 F.2d 318, 322 (9th Cir. 1988). Accordingly, here the Court applies Washington law and rules to interpret the preclusive effect of Washington court decisions.
”Res judicata, or claim preclusion, prohibits the relitigation of claims and issues that were litigated, or could have been litigated, in a prior action.” Pederson v. Potter, 103 Wn. App. 62, 67 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000). Under Washington law, for claim preclusion to apply, a prior judgment must be final and must have a concurrence of identity with a subsequent action in: (1) subject matter; (2) cause of action; (3) persons and parties; and (4) the quality of the persons for or against whom the claim is made. Loveridge v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 125 Wn.2d 759, 763 (Wash. 1995). Though “it is not necessary that all four factors favor preclusion to bar the claim,” see Zweber v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 39 F. Supp. 3d 1161, 1166 (W.D. Wash. 2014) (citations omitted), res judicata is also not applied in all situations where the elements of the doctrine are met. Reeves v. Mason Co., 22 Wn. App. 2d 99, 116-17 (Wash. Ct. App. 2022) (discussing circumstances in which res judicata is not applied, including exceptions made on the
Issue preclusion, also referred to as collateral estoppel, bars the relitigation of issues decided in a previous proceeding involving the same parties. Sprague v. Spokane Valley Fire Dep‘t, 189 Wn.2d 858, 899 (Wash. 2018). The Court considers four factors when deciding whether issue preclusion applies: (1) whether the issue decided in the prior action was identical to the issue presented in the second action; (2) whether the prior action ended in a final judgment on the merits; (3) whether the party to be estopped was a party or in privity with a party in the prior action; and (4) whether the application of the doctrine will work an injustice. Id. (citing Shoemaker v. City of Bremerton, 109 Wn.2d 504, 507 (Wash. 1987)). In addition, the issues to be precluded must have been actually litigated and necessarily decided in the first proceeding. Id. Further, the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues in the first proceeding. Id.
C. Analysis
Citing Exxon Mobil Corp., Plaintiffs argue that Rooker-Feldman does not apply because their appeal from the condemnation action was still pending before the Washington Court of Appeals when they filed this action. (Pls.’ Resp. at 6-7.) Defendants do not directly address the issue on reply. (See Defs.’ Reply at 4 (citing Exxon Mobil Corp.).) In Exxon Mobil Corp., the Supreme Court limited the ”Rooker-Feldman doctrine [to] cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries cаused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.”2 544 U.S. at 284 (emphasis added); see also Mothershed v. Justs. of Supreme Ct., 410 F.3d 602,
Nevertheless, issue and claim preclusion principles still apply. In Exxon Mobil Corp., the Court held that “[d]isposition of the federal action, once the state-court adjudication is complete, would be governed by preclusion law. The Full Faith and Credit Act,
1. Plaintiffs became unlawful occupants, nоt displaced persons, after the November 12, 2019 decree of condemnation
Plaintiffs argue that: (1) they were not unlawful occupants; and (2) even if they were, they “are still displaced persons and entitled to relocation assistance.” (Pls.’ Surreply at 4.)
Plaintiffs’ first argument fails because the Washington Superior Court, Court of Appeals, and Supreme Court have made a final determination that, after November 12, 2019, the leasehold was condemned, thereupon terminating by its own provisions, and that Plaintiffs accordingly became unlawful occupants. (First Briggs Decl., Exs. 6, 15; Second Briggs Decl., Ex. A; see also Pls.’ Reply at 6 n.1 (Plaintiffs “are not disputing the eviction judgment.“).) Because Plaintiffs’ status as unlawful occupants was actually litigated and necessarily decided by a final judgment on the merits, after Plaintiffs had a full and fair opportunity for litigation in the state courts, and because there is no indication that application of the doctrine will work an injustice,3 issue preclusion prevents relitigation in this Court. See Sprague, 189 Wn.2d at 899. There is no
Plaintiffs’ second argument fails because displaced persons are defined, in both the Uniform Relocation Act and the Washington Relocation Assistance Act, to specifically exclude unlawful occupants. See
Plaintiffs argue that they remained displaced persons because
Accordingly, the Court finds that there is no genuine disputе over the fact that, after November 12, 2019, Plaintiffs were not displaced persons.
2. Plaintiffs were not entitled to relocation benefits or 90-day notices
When Plaintiffs became unlawful occupants and not displaced persons, they were no longer entitled to relocation assistance. See
Plaintiffs submit a document, apparently from the Washington State Department of Transportation website, that they claim is from a manual showing “the process to be followed in acquiring property interest through condemnation or voluntary sale.” (Pls.’ Surreply at 4 n.1.) This document shows an unlabeled and unexplained flowchart, titled “Right of Way Requirements,” where “Relocation” comes after either “Acquire Property” or “Condemnation.” (Id., App‘x A.) Plaintiffs argue that this means that the Uniform Relocation Act “was specifically designed to help displaced person after entry of Decree” of condemnation. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiffs appear to argue that, even as unlawful occupants after entry of a condemnation decree, they are still entitled to relocation assistance. Nonetheless, there is no indication that a flowchart box labeled “Relocation” from the State Department of Transportation reflects an entitlement to financial relocation assistance benefits, and to interpret it as such would mean that no displaced person is entitled to any relocation assistance prior to a condemnation decree. Moreover, this flowchart cannоt establish rights or entitlements in contradiction to the plain text of the statutes at issue.
Plaintiffs cite to a Washington Court of Appeals case for the proposition that they are still entitled to relocation assistance after condemnation. (Pls.’ Supp. Auth. at 2 (citing Pac. Coast Shredding, L.L.C. v. Port of Vancouver, USA, 14 Wn. App. 2d 484 (Wash. Ct. App. 2020))). But in that case, under the law of the case doctrine, there was no dispute over entitlement to relocatiоn assistance, only the amount. See Pac. Coast Shredding, L.L.C., 14 Wn. App. 2d at 487 (Defendant “informed [plaintiff] of its right under federal and state law to receive financial compensation for any reasonable and necessary costs that PCS incurred as a result of the taking.“). There is no indication that the tenant‘s lease terminated upon condemnation, as Plaintiffs’ lease did here.
Plaintiffs also point to
Plaintiffs fail to establish that they were entitled to relocation assistance after the decree of condemnation. Accordingly, all claims based on entitlement to relocation assistance must fail.
3. Declaratory Claims
In two declaratory claims, Plaintiffs challenge: (1)
In their Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim, Plaintiffs allege the challenged statutes, as applied to them, violated their due process rights under
In their claim for “Equitable Preemption,” Plaintiffs allege the challenged statutes, as applied to them, conflict with
4. Causes of Action
In their Fourteenth Amendment due process claim, Plaintiffs allege they were entitled to notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard on “Defendants’ decision to deny [them] relocation benefits.” (Am. Compl. at ¶ 134.) Plaintiffs allege the decision was “arbitrary and capricious.” (Id. at ¶ 131.)
In their equal protection claim, Plaintiffs allege Defendants “intentionally treated the Plaintiff[s] differently than other similarly situated persons when they denied [them] relocation
In their conspiracy claim, Plaintiffs allege Defendants acted with other entities “to violate Plaintiff[s‘] right guaranteed under the Due process and the equal protection clauses.” (Am. Compl. at ¶ 154.)
Plaintiffs raised nearly identical constitutional claims in their King County Superior Court civil action. (See First Briggs Decl., Ex. 16 at ¶ 71 (alleging Defendants “acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner” “throughout the acquisition and relocation process“), ¶ 75 (alleging Defendants “treated Plaintiffs differently from similarly situated persons” “throughout the acquisition and relocatiоn process“).) These claims were dismissed as a matter of law. (Id., Ex. 17.) Plaintiffs do not dispute that they could have alleged the federal constitutional claims in the same proceeding.
Claim preclusion requires concurrence of identity with the prior judgment as to: (1) persons and parties, (2) cause of action, (3) subject matter, and (4) the quality of persons for or against whom the claim is made. Loveridge, 125 Wn.2d at 763. Plaintiffs and King County were parties in the prior action, which resulted in a final judgment on the merits.4 (First Briggs Decl., Ex. 16 at ¶¶ 1-2, 5.) While the individually named defendants were not parties, they were in privity with King County for purposes of claim preclusion, as they were sued for actions undertaken as King County employees. “The employer/employee relationship is sufficient to establish privity.” Ensley v. Pitcher, 152 Wn. App. 891, 902 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009).
There is also concurrence of identity of the subject matter. Both actions involve the same relocation process and Plaintiffs’ entitlement to relocation benefits and 90-day notices. See Zweber, 39 F. Supp. 3d at 1168 (“[B]oth actions seek the same remedy for substantially the same harm, giving them identity of subject matter.“).
Finally, because the parties are identical or in privity, there is concurrence of identity of the quality of persons. Because all four elements are satisfied, claim preclusion prohibits litigation in this Court of Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims.
The Court concludes that preclusion applies to all of Plaintiffs’ claims. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion must be granted and Plaintiffs’ Motion denied.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion (dkt. # 175) and DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion (dkt. # 180). Plaintiffs’ Amended Motion (dkt. # 182) is STRICKEN.
Dated this 30th day of August, 2023.
MICHELLE L. PETERSON
United States Magistrate Judge