ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
I. INTRODUCTION
Before the court is Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company’s (“State Farm”) motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Mot. (Dkt. # 12).) State Farm argues that John Zweber’s claims against it should be dismissed because they are barred by the doctrine of res judicata and by the applicable statutes of limitation. (See id. at 1.) With respect to res judicata, State Farm points out that there was a prior action between these same parties involving the same events and that Mr. Zweber should have raised his claims in that action. (Id. at 7-14.) The court agrees. Mr. Zweber raises a handful of arguments in response to State Farm’s motion, but none of them are persuasive. (See Resp. (Dkt. # 20) at 7-12.) Accordingly, the court GRANTS State Farm’s motion to dismiss and DISMISSES this case with prejudice.
II. BACKGROUND
This is an insurance dispute. Mr. Zwe-ber is a dentist from Mt. Vernon, Washington. (Compl. (Dkt. # 1-2) ¶ 2.3.) In 2005, he purchased an automobile insurance policy from State Farm for his 2006 Audi S4. (Id. ¶ 2.1.)- The policy provided coverage for liability, property damage, personal injury protection (“PIP”), and other coverage including underinsured motorist (“UIM”) bodily injury coverage in the amount of $250,000.00 per person. (Id.) During the policy term, Mr. Zweber was vacationing with his family in Arizona when he was struck by another vehicle. (Id. ¶ 2.2.) The other driver admitted 100 % fault, but the other driver’s liability coverage was limited to $100,000.00.
Mr. Zweber suffered serious injuries from the accident. Within 24 hours of the accident, both of his hands became numb. (Id. ¶ 2.3.) He experienced “stiffness, right lower back pain and numbness in his thumb, forefinger and middle finger of his left hand.” (Id.) He complained of “general body soreness and stiffness” and that “[movement] and use of his left hand became very problematic and he was unable to grasp and raise his left arm.” (Id.) His injuries prevented him from performing his work as a dentist. (Id.) Mr. Zweber alleges that he suffered a substantial amount of lost earnings and was eventually forced to sell his dental practice because of his injuries. (Id.) He alleges that, although he received “excellent medical care,” he is presently “unable to perform many of his day to day job related activities.” (/¿¶ 2.4.)
In early 2010, Mr. Zweber sued State Farm. {Id. ¶ 2.11.) He filed a complaint in Skagit County Superior Court on February 19, 2010, “compelling judicial resolution of [his] UIM claim.” {Id.) State Farm retained counsel and conducted extensive discovery. {Id. ¶ 2.12.) During discovery, Mr. Zweber provided State Farm with documentation regarding his losses. {Id. ¶ 2.12-2.14.) Near the end of discovery, Mr. Zweber sent a demand to State Farm “asking that [State Farm] consider all of the recent discovery that had been provided and agree to ... pay the Plaintiff all of the $250,000.00 UIM policy proceeds.” {Id. ¶ 2.14.) Mr. Zweber alleges that this was the first, time State Farm was able to review all of his lost income documentation. {Id.) State Farm still did not pay. {Id. ¶ 2.15.) Instead, the case proceeded to trial, and on March 8, 2012, a jury awarded Mr. Zweber $1,300,000.00 plus attorney’s fees and costs. (Id. ¶ 2.18.) State Farm paid Mr. Zweber the remaining $150,000.00 left on his policy in satisfaction of the judgment. (Greenberg Decl. (Dkt. # 3) Ex. C (“Satisfaction of Judgment”) at 19.)
Mr. Zweber then brought this action. On March 7, 2014, Mr. Zweber filed a complaint for damages in Skagit County Superior Court alleging breach of contract, violations of the Washington Consumer Protection Act, bad faith, and violations of Washington’s Insurance Fair Conduct Act (“IFCA”), RCW Chapter 48.30. {Id. ¶¶ 3.1-6.4.) He alleges that State Farm failed to pay him amounts he was entitled to after the accident, did not conduct a reasonable investigation, offered unreasonable settlement amounts, violated various insurance regulations, and acted in bad faith. {See id.) State Farm removed the case to federal court (Not. of Removal (Dkt.# 1)) and filed this motion for judgment on the pleadings two months later {see Mot.).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Standard on a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
“After the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). “ ‘Judgment on the pleadings is proper when the moving party clearly establishes on the face of the pleadings that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Point Ruston, LLC v. Pac. Nw. Reg’l Council of the United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am.,
On a Rule 12(c) motion, the court is not strictly limited to considering the face of the complaint. Just like on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court may consider material that is properly submitted as part of the complaint without converting the motion into a summary judgment motion. Point Ruston,
B. Res Judicata
The primary issue before the court is whether Mr. Zweber’s claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The court looks to the law of the forum state—here Washington—to determine the preclusive effect of a state court judgment. Smith v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. C 12-1505-JCC,
Under Washington law, the doctrine of res judicata precludes so-called “claim splitting.” Ensley v. Pitcher,
To determine whether res judicata applies, Washington courts apply a four-part test. Karlberg,
C. The Parties’ Arguments
State Farm argues that all of Mr. Zwe-ber’s claims are barred by res judicata. State Farm argues that this case “falls squarely within the claim preclusion doctrine.” (Mot. at 8.) State Farm asserts that all four elements of Washington’s test for res judicata are met and that Mr. Zweber should have brought his claims in the earlier action if he wanted to bring them at all. (Id. at 8-10.) State Farm cites Smith, a case from this district that rigorously examines many of the issues raised in this case. In Smith, the court concluded that claims for insurance bad faith and breach of contract were barred by a prior action related to UIM benefits. (Id. at 12-13 (citing Smith,
Mr. Zweber makes few arguments in response. He principally argues that this case does not involve the same subject matter or causes of action as the 2010 action. (Resp. at 7-9.) He points out that his new complaint raises four causes of action not litigated in the previous action. (Id. at 8-9.) His argument is premised on the idea that the purpose of the prior action was to determine the amount of UIM benefits and the purpose of the present action is to examine State Farm’s conduct. (Id.) The remainder of Mr. Zweber’s briefing on this issue attempts to establish that the cases cited by State Farm are “factually distinguishable” from this case for a variety of reasons. (Id. at 9-12.)
D. Res Judicata Bars Mr. Zweber’s Claims
State Farm has the better of this argument. As discussed below, State Farm is correct that the four res judicata factors favor preclusion in this case. (See Mot. at 8-10.) State Farm is also correct that if Mr. Zweber wanted to litigate bad faith and related claims, he needed to either raise those claims at the outset of the prior action or else move to amend his
In particular, the court finds Smith highly persuasive. As Mr. Zweber points out, Smith and this case are not factually identical. (See Resp. at 9-10.) However, the reasoning of Smith is cogent and convincing, and many of the issues are the same as in this case. In Smith, which was also an automobile accident case, the insured sued the tortfeasor and State Farm intervened in the action. Smith,
Judge Coughenour found that res judi-cata barred the insured’s claims. Judge Coughenour walked through the res judi-cata analysis outlined above and concluded that the insured should have brought her extra-contractual claims in the previous action. Id. at *4-7. It did not matter that, in the previous action, the only dispute between the insured and State Farm was the correct amount of U I M damages. See id. at *2. Nor did it matter that some of the new claims involved conduct that occurred after the original complaint was filed. See id. at *3. Judge Coughenour reasoned that the insured’s claims arose “from the same transactional nucleus of facts,” sought to “redress the same wrongs,” and would involve presentation of “substantially the same evidence” as the prior action. Id. at *5. Judge Coughenour surveyed the same out-of-state authority cited in State Farm’s brief in this case and concluded that, as a general matter, a pri- or U I M action, not a subsequent and separate action, is the proper place to bring extra-contractual claims. Id. at *6-7. Accordingly, Judge Coughenour concluded that the insured’s claims were barred by res judicata.
The court finds Smith persuasive, but ultimately this case is not Smith and each case must be decided on its own unique facts. Consequently, the court does not rely solely on Smith or any of the other cases cited by State Farm, but instead conducts its own analysis of the res judica-ta factors established by Washington law.
Element (3) also favors applying the,doctrine because this action and the 2010 action involve the same subject matter. See Karlberg,
Element (2) is the most hotly contested, and also favors applying res judicata. To determine whether two actions have an identity of causes of action, Washington courts consider the following four flexible factors: (1) whether the rights or interests established in the prior judgment would be destroyed or impaired by prosecution of the second action; (2) whether substantially the same evidence is presented in the two actions; (3) whether the two suits involve infringement of the same right; and (4) whether the two suits arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts. Smith,
These factors demonstrate that there is an identity of causes of action between this case and the 2010 action. The first factor is not highly relevant here, but supports State Farm’s position to the extent it is relevant. This is because State Farm has already satisfied the judgment from the previous proceeding, and re-opening this dispute would impair this satisfaction by exposing State Farm to additional liability. The second factor is neutral. The first action would have involved evidence of damages and liability, whereas the second action would likely focus on State Farm’s conduct during claims handling. These differences would require different evidence. On the other hand, there would likely be a substantial amount of overlap between the evidence presented in both
The fourth factor also favors State Farm’s position. The transactional nucleus of facts is the same in both cases. In both cases the claims are, at a fundamental level, based on State Farm’s refusal to pay Mr. Zweber the policy limits on his claim. In the first action, Mr. Zweber claimed that he was entitled to more benefits than State Farm was offering him. In the second action, Mr. Zweber claims that State Farm violated its various duties by refusing to acknowledge that he was entitled to more benefits than State Farm was offering him. In both cases, the basic behavior being complained of is the same: refusal to pay benefits in the requested amount. Accordingly, the transactional nucleus of facts is the same in both cases.
On balance, these factors favor a finding of identity of causes of action and, in turn, all of the res judicata factors considered together weigh strongly in favor of applying res judicata to bar Mr. Zweber’s claims.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS State Farm’s motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. # 12) because Mr. Zweber’s claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Consequently, the court DISMISSES this case with prejudice.