ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee, and LORENZO CAUSEY, Defendant.
No. 331885
STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS
October 3, 2017
FOR PUBLICATION; 9:00 a.m.; Wayne Circuit Court LC No. 14-014964-NF
Before: BECKERING, P.J., and MARKEY and RIORDAN, JJ.
Plaintiff Allstate Insurance Company, an assigned claims insurer, appeals by right the trial court’s order granting defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (defendant), the insurer of the at-fault driver, Lorenzo Causey, summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) (statute of limitations) and MCR 2.116(C)(10) (no genuine issue of a material fact).1 Because plaintiff’s reimbursement action was timely under
On October 31, 2012, Causey was driving a motor vehicle when he struck Amanda Pettaway as she was crossing the road at an intersection, causing her injuries. Pettaway applied for personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits through the Michigan assigned claims plan. In a letter dated April 10, 2013, the assigned claims plan informed Pettaway’s attorney that Pettaway’s claim had been assigned to plaintiff.
Plaintiff retained Data Surveys, Inc. (Data Surveys), to investigate Pettaway’s claim. Data Survey’s report dated May 10, 2013 confirmed that Causey was the owner of the vehicle involved in the accident but that the company had not been able to directly contact him. The According Data Survey report stated that Causey “refused to come to the front door and was conveying information through his daughter to the investigator.” Specifically, “that the involved vehicle reportedly was his only automobile” and that the vehicle was not insured.
On November 20, 2014, plaintiff brought suit against Causey seeking to recover under
Defendant asserted that plaintiff’s claim was untimely and barred by
Causey also moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) on the basis that plaintiff could not recover benefits from him because it was undisputed that his vehicle was insured by defendant State Farm on the date of the accident; therefore, he was not an “uninsured” motorist under
On November 18, 2015, defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and MCR 2.116(C)(10) on the ground that the amended complaint did not comply with
defendant argued, no controversy existed because defendant had already reimbursed plaintiff for the payments plaintiff had made within the year before filing the amended complaint.
In response to defendant’s motion, plaintiff asserted that it rather than defendant was entitled to summary disposition under MCR 2.116(I)(2). Plaintiff maintained that the limitations period was tolled because Causey fraudulently concealed that State Farm provided insurance coverage for Causey and his vehicle. Plaintiff also argued that the payments to it had made to Pettaway’s medical providers within one year of filing its amended complaint satisfied the requirements of
On January 8, 2016, the trial court heard oral argument on defendant’s motion. The first part of the hearing focused on whether the statute of limitations could be tolled because of Causey’s purportedly “fraudulent” behavior. The parties argued over whether plaintiff could prove its allegations because plaintiff had not attached any affidavits to its motion. The trial indicated it “begrudgingly” have to grant defendant’s motion, apparently based on plaintiff’s failure to present evidence that would be admissible to prove
Plaintiff moved the trial court to reconsider, arguing that under Farm Bureau Ins Co v Chukwueke (Chukwueke I), unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued January 17, 2013 (Docket No. 306827), plaintiff was entitled to reimbursement of the other payment it made to Van Dyke Spinal totaling $20,495.55. Defendant responded by arguing, in part, that, according to Farm Bureau Ins Co v Chukwueke (Chukwueke II), unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued June 16, 2015 (Docket No. 320600), plaintiff was only entitled to reimbursement for payments made after May 27, 2014, which defendant had already tendered. In denying plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, the trial court ruled that “[b]ased on the rationale in [Chukwueke I], Plaintiff is only entitled to reimbursement for payments made after May 27, 2014; these payments have been reimbursed by Defendant.”
Plaintiff now appeals by right.
I. ANALYSIS
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW / PRINCIPLES OF LAW
This Court reviews de novo a ruling on a motion for summary disposition. Nuculovic v Hill, 287 Mich App 58, 61; 783 NW2d 124 (2010). We also reviewed questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Dextrom v Wexford Co, 287 Mich App 406, 416; 789 NW2d 211 (2010).
MCR 2.116(C)(7) “permits summary disposition where the claim is barred by an applicable statute of limitations.” Nuculovic, 287 Mich App at 61. When addressing such a motion, a trial court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint unless contradicted by
the parties’ documentary submissions. Patterson v Kleiman, 447 Mich 429, 434 n 6; 526 NW2d 879 (1994). Although not required to do so, a party moving for summary disposition under subrule (C)(7) may support the motion with affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other admissible documentary evidence, which the reviewing court must consider. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 119; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). If no material facts are disputed, whether a plaintiff’s claim is barred by the pertinent statute of limitations is a question of law for the court to determine. Dextrom, 287 Mich App at 429.
“If it appears to the court that the opposing party, rather than the moving party, is entitled to judgment, the court may render judgment in favor of the opposing party.” MCR 2.116(I)(2). “The trial court appropriately grants summary disposition to the opposing party under MCR 2.116(I)(2) when it appears to the court that the opposing party, rather than the moving party, is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Rossow v Brentwood Farms Dev, Inc, 251 Mich App 652, 658; 651 NW2d 458, 461 (2002).
“The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature.” Atchison v Atchison, 256 Mich App 531, 535; 664 NW2d 249 (2003). “If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the statute must
B. APPLYING MCL 500.3175(3)
We conclude that the trial court erred in granting defendant summary disposition and in denying plaintiff summary disposition. Plaintiff’s reimbursement action was timely under
The purpose of the no-fault act,
In this case, neither Pettaway nor any relative domiciled in her household was a named insured in a no-fault insurance policy.
know that Causey had no-fault insurance, she sought PIP benefits through the assigned claims plan. “If no insurance is available, a person may obtain benefits through the Assigned Claims Plan, which serves as the insurer of last priority.” Titan Ins Co v American Ins Co, 312 Mich App 291, 298; 876 NW2d 853 (2015);
The parties also rely on
A person entitled to claim because of accidental bodily injury arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle as a motor
vehicle in this state may obtain personal protection insurance benefits through the assigned claims plan if no personal protection insurance is applicable to the injury, no personal protection insurance applicable to the injury can be identified, the personal protection insurance applicable to the injury cannot be ascertained because of a dispute between 2 or more automobile insurers concerning their obligation to provide coverage or the equitable distribution of the loss, or the only identifiable personal protection insurance applicable to the injury is, because of financial inability of 1 or more insurers to fulfill their obligations, inadequate to provide benefits up to the maximum prescribed. In that case, unpaid benefits due or coming due may be collected under the assigned claims plan and the insurer to which the claim is assigned is entitled to reimbursement from the defaulting insurers to the extent of their financial responsibility. [Emphasis added.]
In Allen v Farm Bureau Ins Co, 210 Mich App 593, 597; 534 NW2d 177 (1995), this court read the emphasized statutory language as the source of an assigned claims insurer’s “statutorily created right to reimbursement . . . .” But the emphasized language plainly refers to the situation where a no-fault insurer is unable to provide PIP benefits because of “financial inability;” it references to “that case,” apparently referring only to the last situation described in the preceding sentence when it states that the assigned insurer “is entitled to reimbursement from the defaulting insurers to the extent of their financial responsibility,”
An assigned claims insurer’s general right to reimbursement is found in
indemnity or reimbursement that could have been pursued by claimants against third parties.” Auto-Owners Ins Co v Mich Mut Ins Co, 223 Mich App 205, 210; 565 NW2d 907 (1997). “Third parties” as used in
In this case, the dispute centers on the limitations period found in
1. CLAIMANT
“No provision of the no-fault act expressly defines ‘claimant.’ ”. Covenant Med Ctr, 500 Mich at 218 n 37 (BERNSTEIN J., dissenting). Defendant does not dispute plaintiff’s assertion that “[a] medical provider is a claimant . . . .” This Court has recognized that under the no-fault act there exists a distinction between the terms “injured person”3 and “claimant.” See Lakeland Neurocare Ctrs v State Farm Mut Auto Ins, 250 Mich App 35, 40-41; 645 NW2d 59 (2002), overruled by Covenant Med Ctr, where this Court held in part that a medical provider could recover attorney fees as “a claimant” under
Personal protection insurance benefits are payable to or for the benefit of an injured person or, in case of his death, to or for the benefit of his dependents. Payment by an insurer in good faith of personal protection insurance benefits, to or for the benefit of a person who it believes is entitled to the benefits, discharges the insurer’s liability to the extent of the payments unless the insurer has been notified in writing of the claim of some other person. [
MCL 500.3112 .]
Of course, our Supreme Court’s recent decision in Covenant Med Ctr, casts significant doubt on whether medical providers can be considered claimants under the no-fault act. In that case, the Court overruled Lakeland Neurocare Ctrs and numerous other published opinions of this Court when it held “that healthcare providers do not possess a statutory cause of action against no-fault insurers for recovery of personal protection insurance benefits under the no-fault act.” Id. at 196; 895 NW2d at 493. The Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that numerous provisions of the no-fault act supported the conclusion that healthcare providers could maintain such actions. Id. at 204-217; 895 NW2d at 498-505. The plaintiff primarily relied on
directly pay healthcare providers for the benefit of an injured person, [but] its terms do not grant healthcare providers a statutory cause of action against insurers to recover the costs of providing products, services, and accommodations to an injured person.” Id. at 196; 895 NW2d at 493.
Pertinent to this case, the plaintiff in Covenant Med Ctr also relied on
Plaintiff’s reliance on the references to “claimant” rather than “injured person” in
MCL 500.3145(1) andMCL 500.3148 is helpful to plaintiff’s argument only if healthcare providers are proper claimants under the no-fault act. The provisions cited by plaintiff do not establish that providers possess a claimunder the act. Because MCL 500.3145(1) andMCL 500.3148 do not create rights to PIP benefits that do not otherwise exist, plaintiff’s reliance on these provisions is misplaced. [Id.]
The Court also noted that “[t]he relevant dictionary definitions of ‘claim’ include ‘a demand for something due or believed to be due’ and ‘a right to something.’ ” Covenant Med Ctr, 500 Mich at 213 n 31; 895 NW2d at 501 n 31. The Court concluded “that to have a ‘claim’ under the no-fault act, a provider must have a right to payment of PIP benefits from a no-fault insurer[,]” id., and held that the plaintiff had not demonstrated that “the no-fault act elsewhere confers on a healthcare provider a right to claim benefits from a no-fault insurer.” Id. at 213-214; 895 NW2d at 501.
Important to this case, our Supreme Court in Covenant Med Ctr was not interpreting
We note that this interpretation of “claimant” if applied to
Another obvious example of a claimant being different from the injured person is where the injured person dies as a result of the accident. See e.g.,
In this case, the claimant is Pettaway, because she had a right to PIP benefits from plaintiff.
Indeed, in the first published case addressing
Our conclusion that a no-fault insurer’s payment to a healthcare provider who provides necessary services to the injured person constitutes a payment “to the claimant” for purposes of
2. SCOPE OF RELIEF
Having determined that plaintiff’s action was timely, we must consider the question of what damages it may recover. Plaintiff argues that this Court should determine it is entitled to reimbursement of all no-fault benefits paid to or on behalf of Pettaway if any single benefit is paid within one year of filing the reimbursement action. Defendant argues that where a plaintiff commences a reimbursement action more than two years after the assignment of the claim, as in this case,
Defendant does not assert that the one-year-back rule of
(1) An action for recovery of personal protection insurance benefits payable under this chapter for accidental bodily injury may not be commenced later than 1 year after the date of the accident causing the injury unless written notice of injury as provided herein has been given to the insurer within 1 year after the accident or unless the insurer has previously made a payment of personal protection insurance benefits for the injury. If the notice has been given or a payment has been made, the action may be commenced at any time within 1 year after the most recent allowable expense, work loss or survivor’s loss has been incurred. However, the claimant may not recover benefits for any portion of the loss incurred more than 1 year before the date on which the action was commenced. . . . [
MCL 500.3145(1) ;Emphasis added.]
Under the emphasized language, “even where the period of limitations is tolled under the notice of injury or payment of benefits exceptions, an insured can only recover benefits for losses incurred within one year preceding the commencement of the action.” Hudick v Hastings Mut Ins Co, 247 Mich App 602, 607; 637 NW2d 521 (2001) (citation and quotation marks omitted). But
Unlike
Furthermore,
To be clear,
As a statutory scheme, the no-fault act contemplates that the higher priority insurer will fully reimburse the Michigan automobile insurance placement facility and the assigned claims insurer; consequently, there is no restriction on the recoverable damages in a timely filed reimbursement action that can be read into
Defendant argues that its reading of the statute would frustrate the primary purposes of statutes of limitations of “(1) encouraging the plaintiffs to diligently pursue claims and (2) protecting the defendants from having to defend against stale and fraudulent claims.” Wright v Rinaldo, 279 Mich App 526, 533; 761 NW2d 114 (2008). Specifically, defendant argues that “[p]laintiff’s ability to revive old payments would maintain a constant threat of litigation, and would encourage delay in asserting a legal right that is practicable to assert.” But this argument ignores the requirement of the no-fault act that an assigned claims insurer “shall make prompt payment of loss in accordance with this act.”
In sum,
Here, plaintiff’s claim was timely because it was brought within a year of its last payment “to the claimant” for purposes of
Consequently, we hold that the trial court erred in granting defendant summary disposition, and it instead should have granted plaintiff summary disposition under MCR 2.116(I)(2).
Based on our holding regarding
We reverse and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Plaintiff, as the prevailing party, may tax its cost under MCR 7.219. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
/s/ Michael J. Riordan