PEOPLE v HOUSTON
Docket No. 126025
Supreme Court of Michigan
Argued April 12, 2005. Decided July 26, 2005.
473 Mich 399
Docket No. 126025. Argued April 12, 2005 (Calendar No. 3). Decided July 26, 2005.
Duane Houston was convicted by a jury in the Genesee Circuit Court of second-degree murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. In applying the sentencing guidelines, the trial court, Robert M. Ransom, J., assessed twenty-five points for offense variable (OV) 3, which addresses physical injury to the victim, and sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment for the second-degree murder conviction as a second-offense habitual offender. The defendant argued on appeal that, because the victim died and his sentencing offense was a homicide, zero points should have been assessed for OV 3. The Court of Appeals, JANSEN, P.J., and MARKEY and GAGE, JJ., affirmed the defendant‘s convictions and sentences without addressing the scoring of OV 3, concluding that a life sentence would still be appropriate under the sentencing guidelines without the disputed points assessed for OV 3. 261 Mich App 463 (2004). The Supreme Court granted the defendant‘s application for leave to appeal. 471 Mich 913 (2004).
In an opinion by Justice YOUNG, joined by Chief Justice TAYLOR, and Justices CORRIGAN and MARKMAN, the Supreme Court held:
The trial court properly assessed twenty-five points under OV 3 for the death of the victim. The sentencing guidelines require the sentencing judge to assess the highest number of points applicable to OV 3. When a victim dies and homicide is an element of the sentencing offense, the sentencing court is precluded from assessing one hundred points. The sentencing court may assess zero points only if no physical injury occurred to the victim or if “[b]odily injury not requiring medical treatment occurred to a victim” and “bodily injury is an element of the sentencing offense.” Neither is applicable where a victim dies as a result of a gunshot wound to the head. Therefore, the proper score for OV 3 in that situation under the plain language of
Affirmed.
Justice CAVANAGH, joined by Justices WEAVER and KELLY, dissenting, stated that the trial court improperly assessed twenty-five points under OV 3 for the death of the victim. When a victim dies and homicide is an element of the sentencing offense, the proper score for OV 3 under the plain language of
SENTENCES—SENTENCING GUIDELINES—OFFENSE VARIABLES—PHYSICAL INJURY TO VICTIM.
When a victim dies and homicide is an element of the sentencing offense, the sentencing court must assess twenty-five points based on the life-threatening injury inflicted by the defendant (
Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, David S. Leyton, Prosecuting Attorney, and Donald A. Kuebler, Chief of Research, Training, and Appeals, for the people.
State Appellate Defender (by Gail Rodwan) for the defendant.
Amicus Curiae:
YOUNG, J. This appeal concerns the proper method of scoring offense variable 3 (OV 3), which addresses “physical injury to a victim.”
In determining defendant‘s sentence under the legislative guidelines, the trial court assessed twenty-five points for OV 3 because the victim suffered an injury—a gunshot wound. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment, in part on the basis of this scoring determination.
On appeal, defendant argues that he should not have been assessed any points for OV 3. This variable provides that the sentencing court must score one hundred points when a victim dies unless homicide is the sentencing offense. Defendant would have been appropriately assessed one hundred points but for the fact that second-degree murder, a form of homicide, was the sentencing offense. Defendant argues that none of the other variable elements requiring the assessment of points was applicable and, therefore, the trial court‘s only option was to assess zero points.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In December 2001, John Strong was the victim of an attempted robbery in Flint, Michigan. During the course of the robbery, Mr. Strong‘s assailant shot him in the head, killing him. Defendant Duane Houston was charged with Mr. Strong‘s death. Although he maintained his innocence throughout his trial, defendant was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder2 and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony,3 and was acquitted of assault with intent to rob while armed.4 The court sentenced defendant as a second felony offender to a term of life, plus a term of two years.
Defendant appealed by right to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court had misscored OV 3 and
In November 2004, we granted defendant‘s application for leave to appeal, limiting the parties to the following issues: “(1) whether Offense Variable 3,
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Statutory construction is a question of law subject to review de novo.9 Our paramount task is to discern and give effect to the Legislature‘s intent as manifest in the plain, unambiguous language of its statutes.10
I
We must begin, as always, with the language of the governing statutes. At the time defendant was sentenced,11
(1) Offense variable 3 is physical injury to a victim. Score offense variable 3 by determining which of the following apply and by assigning the number of points attributable to the one that has the highest number of points:
(a) A victim was killed........................................100 points
(b) A victim was killed........................................35 points
(c) Life threatening or permanent incapacitating injury occurred to a victim ..........................25 points
(d) Bodily injury requiring medical treatment occurred to a victim ..........................................10 points
(e) Bodily injury not requiring medical treatment occurred to a victim ..........................5 points
(f) No physical injury occurred to a victim........0 points
(2) All of the following apply to scoring offense variable 3:
(a) In multiple offender cases, if 1 offender is assessed points for death or physical injury, all offenders shall be assessed the same number of points.
(b) Score 100 points if death results from the commission of a crime and homicide is not the sentencing offense.
(c) Score 35 points if death results from the commission of a crime and the offense or attempted offense involves the operation of a vehicle, vessel, ORV, snowmobile, aircraft, or locomotive under the influence or while impaired causing death.
(d) Do not score 5 points if bodily injury is an element of the sentencing offense.
(3) As used in this section, “requiring medical treatment” refers to the necessity for treatment and not the victim‘s success in obtaining treatment. [Emphasis added.]
Defendant argues that, because the statute governing OV 3 prohibits the trial court from scoring one hundred points on the basis of the death of the victim when homicide is the sentencing offense, the court in this case was required to assess zero points. Implicit in this argument is the assumption that only the “ultimate outcome” of a defendant‘s criminal act—here, the death rather than the injury that preceded the death—may be considered in scoring OV 3. The prosecution argues, on the other hand, that the court correctly assessed twenty-five points for OV 3. Because the court was precluded from considering the victim‘s death under
Faithful application of the plain language of
The Legislature expressly prohibited the assessment of one hundred points when, as here, the underlying offense is homicide.12 Consequently, one hundred points under
Therefore, the trial court correctly assessed twenty-five points for OV 3. When defendant‘s offense variables are properly scored, his recommended sentence under the legislative guidelines is 180 to 300 months or life.
II
Our conclusion in part I follows from the plain language of the statute and the undisputed facts in this case.
Defendant offers three arguments to counter this reading of the statute governing OV 3. First, he asserts that only the ultimate outcome of the criminal act—the victim‘s death, in this case—may be considered in scoring OV 3. The statute obviously contains no “ultimate outcome” requirement.17 Rather, it instructs courts to “[s]core offense variable 3 by determining which of the following apply and by assigning the number of points attributable to the one that has the highest number of points.”18 This language indicates that the Legislature believed that multiple scoring factors may apply to a single offense. The statute simply indicates that the one scoring factor ultimately selected should (a) be applicable and (b) yield the highest number of points possible. Where more than one factor might apply (e.g., when a life-threatening injury requires medical treatment), the one generating the highest points is the correct one. The defendant‘s assumption that only the ultimate outcome of the defendant‘s act may be considered in scoring OV 3 is therefore undermined by the statutory language.
Defendant‘s second argument is a variation on the first. Defendant argues that OV 3 presents a “graduated scale,” meting out the greatest number of points to those who inflict the greatest harm. In light of this
This argument, however ironic,19 is unpersuasive for the reasons already noted. The Legislature intended for multiple factors to apply and directed courts to select one in order to assess the highest number of points possible. The Legislature has explicitly eliminated the option of assessing one hundred points in homicide cases, but not the requirement of assessing the “highest number of points” possible. The graduated nature of OV 3 therefore does not lead to the conclusion that defendant may receive zero points for this offense variable.
Finally, defendant argues that zero points must be scored for OV 3 because the Michigan offense variables ”generally [indicate] a legislative policy of not assessing points for factors that are inherent in the elements of the offense for which the defendant is being sentenced.”20 Thus, defendant argues: “With the exception of the anomalous and later-added
This is an odd and unpersuasive argument. We consistently look to and enforce the plain language of statutes rather than some imagined “legislative purpose” supposedly lurking behind that language.21 The
Moreover, the Legislature has in this very statute demonstrated its ability to preclude the scoring of points for circumstances that are a necessary element of the sentencing offense. For instance,
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not err in assessing twenty-five points for OV 3 and sentencing defendant to life imprisonment. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.22
TAYLOR, C.J., and CORRIGAN and MARKMAN, JJ., concurred with YOUNG, J.
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting). I respectfully dissent from the majority‘s misguided interpretation of
I do not disagree that for offense variable (OV) 3, the trial court must determine which characteristics of the defendant‘s crime apply and assess the highest number of applicable points. I disagree, though, that § 33(1)(c) applies to a situation in which a victim dies. In a departure from the plain language of the statute, the majority‘s reading requires substituting “life-ending” for “life-threatening.”
In fact, the prosecutor‘s citations of dictionary definitions support my view. The prosecutor states that one dictionary defines “life threatening” as “potentially fatal.” Another defines it as “very dangerous or serious with the possibility of death as an outcome.” The prosecutor advocates that an injury that is “potentially fatal” is equivalent to an injury that is fatal. But an ordinary reading of the statute‘s phrase “[l]ife threatening . . . injury” indicates a situation in which a person receives an injury that threatens, but does not take, the person‘s life. Contrary to the majority, I would decline
Had the Legislature intended that a potentially fatal injury include an injury actually causing death, it would have said so. On the basis of the myriad examples in our statutes in which the Legislature specifies that death is included, such as in the phrase “injury or death,”1 I would find precluded an argument that where the Legislature says “[l]ife threatening or permanent incapacitating injury” it also means “life-ending injury.” So it is not that defendant assumes that only the “ultimate result” of his criminal act can be considered in scoring OV 3, an argument the majority attributes to him. See ante at 405. Rather, defendant correctly argues that the injury he inflicted was not the type for which points can be assessed under § 33(1)(c). Although a victim of a homicide presumably suffers an injury, the type of injury the victim suffers is a life-ending one, not a life-threatening or permanently incapacitating one.
Moreover, I find unpersuasive the argument that had the Legislature intended to exclude a situation in which a victim dies from the “[l]ife threatening or permanent incapacitating injury” condition specified by
The majority‘s reasoning results in an interesting conundrum and illuminates that its position is not true to the plain language of the statute or the Legislature‘s intent. Suppose a victim dies instantly.3 Can it truly be said that the victim suffered a permanently incapacitating or life-threatening injury? At what point between the death-causing act and the death was the injury suffered?
If a permanently incapacitating or life-threatening injury cannot be ascertained in the above example, which I do not believe that it can, the majority would then consider if perhaps § 33(1)(d) (“[b]odily injury requiring medical treatment occurred to a victim“) or § 33(1)(e) (“[b]odily injury not requiring medical treatment occurred to a victim“) would apply. The majority asserts that “a gunshot wound to the head is, quite obviously, a bodily injury that does require medical treatment.” Ante at 406 n 13. As such, it concludes that scoring five points under § 33(1)(e) (“[b]odily injury not requiring medical treatment occurred to a victim“) must be excluded. But in an instantaneous death, no medical treatment is required. Would the majority then believe that five points were possible for an injury
Certainly such an anomaly was not what the Legislature intended. I find incredible that the Legislature intended the courts to delve into these physiological, and even philosophical, questions to reach a proper OV 3 score. Rather, I find quite clear on the face of the statute that the Legislature intended a certain number of points to apply when a victim dies, and fewer points to apply when a victim suffers various degrees of injury. Otherwise, there would be no reason to differentiate so drastically between the number of assessable points for death, one hundred, and the number of points for life-threatening or permanently incapacitating injury, twenty-five.4
Thus, it is clear to me that the plain language employed by the Legislature in the statute concerning OV 3 compels a conclusion that points for a “[l]ife
THE AVAILABILITY OF A LIFE SENTENCE
If the twenty-five points that were erroneously assessed under OV 3 were subtracted from defendant‘s score, defendant would fall within the II-B cell of the sentencing grid contained in
In this case, the Court of Appeals determined that because defendant‘s upper minimum increased to 337 months by virtue of the habitual-offender statute, a life sentence was available. The Court of Appeals reasoned that other cells having an upper minimum of more than three hundred months offer the option of a life sentence, so the Legislature must have intended that any
Because the Legislature chose not to provide sentencing grids governing habitual-offender sentences, the plain language of the habitual-offender sentencing guidelines statute governs. The relevant statute,
(3) If the offender is being sentenced under section 10, 11, or 12 of chapter IX, determine the offense category, offense class, offense variable level, and prior record variable level based on the underlying offense. To determine the recommended minimum sentence range, increase the upper limit of the recommended minimum sentence range determined under part 6 for the underlying offense as follows:
(a) If the offender is being sentenced for a second felony, 25%.
Before applying the increase, defendant‘s upper minimum was 270 months. Two hundred seventy increased by twenty-five percent is approximately 337. Three hundred thirty-seven months is not life. I would conclude that if the Legislature had intended that a life sentence be an option, it would have so specified, either in the habitual-offender sentencing guidelines statutes or in a separate sentencing grid.
As such, I would decline to write the word “life” into the sentencing grid cell at issue; The Court of Appeals arbitrarily used three hundred months as a harbinger that a life sentence was available. But it is not at all clear that three hundred months is the dispositive guiding factor because cell III-A, in which 270 months is the upper minimum, allows for a life sentence. A more rational explanation is that the Legislature included a life option where it believed that the combined OV and PRV scores merited it. For instance, when a defendant
Here, neither defendant‘s OV nor PRV score changed by virtue of increasing his upper limit pursuant to the habitual-offender sentencing guidelines statute. Therefore, because a life sentence is not an option for defendants having the OV and PRV scores reflected by cell II-B, absent an articulated upward departure, a life sentence is not available even if the upper minimum is increased to reflect a defendant‘s habitual-offender status.
Thus, I would hold that in instances where a victim dies and homicide is an element of the sentencing offense, the proper score for OV 3 is zero points. Further, I would hold that if a defendant‘s upper minimum is increased pursuant to the habitual-offender sentencing guidelines statute, whether a life sentence is available depends on whether it is denoted in the legislative sentencing grids and not on the number of months in a defendant‘s upper minimum sentence. As such, I would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for the appropriate resentencing.
WEAVER and KELLY, JJ., concurred with CAVANAGH, J.
Notes
Nor does the dissent‘s distinction have much logical appeal. Suppose that Mr. Jones was the victim of a life-threatening injury—say, severe head trauma—on Day 1 and is hospitalized. On Day 50, despite heroic medical efforts to save him, Mr. Jones dies. The defendant is charged with homicide for the resulting death of the victim. Under the dissent‘s rationale, Mr. Jones‘s severe head trauma was never a “life-threatening injury” because, in the end, he actually died.
Thus, the dissent‘s “interesting conundrum” is purely the product of its own “contorted analysis.” Post at 413, 414. Contrary to the dissent, we think it can be said that a victim who “dies instantly” has suffered a “life-threatening injury.” Post at 413. In this case, the victim suffered a gunshot wound to the head. Although the shot may have killed him immediately, the fact remains that the injury itself was truly life-threatening. Indeed, to paraphrase Justice MARKMAN‘s dissenting statement in People v Hauser, 468 Mich 861, 862 (2003), the victim sustained an injury so life-threatening that it was followed by his death.