Alli v. DeckerAlli v. Decker
Lead Opinion
OPINION OF THE COURT
Appellants in this case seek to represent a putative class of aliens who are detained, pursuant to
I.
Appellants Alexander Alii and Elliot Grenade are lawful permanent residents whom the government deems removable from the United States as a result of past criminal convictions. See
After Alii and Grenade had been detained for, respectively, 9 months and 20 months, they filed a combined habeas petition and civil complaint alleging that their
The District Court granted appellants’ individual petitions but refused to consider their class claims, finding that
II.
A.
The District Court had jurisdiction under
Although not raised by either party, we briefly address a procedural wrinkle that implicates the mootness doctrine. The District Court denied appellants’ motion for class certification on August 10, 2009. Dkt. 56. In the same order, the District Court dismissed the portions of appellants’ complaint and habeas petition that sought class relief. But on January 26, 2010, the District Court ruled that both of appellants’ detentions were unreasonably prolonged, and thus ordered individualized bond hearings for each appellant.
B.
Regardless of the nature of the action or claim or of the identity of the party or parties bringing the action, no court (other than the Supreme Court) shall have jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or restrain the operation of the provisions of part IV of this sub-chapter, as amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act*1011 of 1996, other than with respect to the application of such provisions to an individual alien against whom proceedings under such part have been initiated.4
At issue in this case is whether the term “restrain,” in 1252(f)(1), encompasses, and thus bars, appellants’ class claim for declaratory relief regarding
The parties agree that use of the disjunctive “or” demands that “restrain” have some meaning other than “enjoin.” See Chalmers v. Shalala,
But the parties dispute what we may and may not consider in construing the statute. Appellants argue that the meaning of “restrain” may be derived by reference to the statute’s context (including neighboring provisions), while the government contends that resort to statutory context is only appropriate where the term in question is ambiguous. The government claims (and the District Court found) that “restrain” is not ambiguous, but merely broad, and thus that it is improper to consult the provision’s context. See Appellees’ Br. at 31 (“Ambiguity ... may [not] be read into a statutory term or phrase simply because Congress used a different term or phrase in another part of the same statute.”); Alii v. Decker,
It is true that “[w]here the statutory language is unambiguous, the court should not consider statutory purpose or legislative history,” Parker v. NutriSystem, Inc.,
We therefore turn to the statutory context of
Even if the contrast between “enjoin or restrain” in
In sum, viewing the provision in context and then taking into consideration the heading of the provision, it is apparent that the jurisdictional limitations in
The government contends that “restrain” should be construed to include declaratory relief because, in this context, such relief is the functional equivalent of injunctive relief. Specifically, the government contends that our interpretation leads to “an absurd result” by creating a “cause-of-action loophole that stops just short of ordering injunctive relief but establishes on a class-wide basis the right to such injunctive relief.” Appellees’ Br. at 29; see also, e.g., Lamie v. U.S. Trustee,
Under certain circumstances, declaratory relief has been deemed “functionally equivalent” to injunctive relief. For example, in California v. Grace Brethren Church,
But declaratory relief will not always be the functional equivalent of injunctive relief. In Steffel v. Thompson, the Supreme Court noted that “ ‘[t]he express purpose of the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act was to provide a milder alternative to the injunction remedy.’ ”
The reasoning of Stejfel significantly undermines the government’s wholesale attempt to equate declaratory and injunctive relief, and it supports the conclusion that our reading of
In summary, we conclude that construing
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The problem in this case is to determine the scope of what Congress intended in using the word “restrain” in
Notes
. In the District Court, appellant Grenade argued that part of his detention could not be authorized by
. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred most immigration-related functions of the Attorney General — including the detention authority at issue in this case — to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub.L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135. For the sake'of convenience, we use the term Attorney General as contained in the statutes.
. Neither appellant actually received a bond hearing. Instead, Alii was immediately released on no bond and, after a conference with the District Court, the parties agreed to a form of conditional release for Grenade.
.
.
. In Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee,
. For example, Florida Department of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc.,
. Thus it may be true that, as the District Court found, class declaratory relief would "restrain” the operation of the detention statutes if "restrain” were interpreted solely under its broad dictionary definition. See, e.g., 2 Oxford English Dictionary 554 (Compact ed. 1971) (defining "restrain” as “[t]o check, hold back, or prevent (a person or thing) from some course of action....”). But the Supreme Court has noted that
[t]he definition of words in isolation ... is not necessarily controlling in statutory construction. A word in a statute may or may not extend to the outer limits of its definitional possibilities. Interpretation of a word or phrase depends upon reading the whole statutory text, considering the purpose and context of the statute, and consulting any precedents or authorities that inform the analysis.
Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv.,
. Moreover, our reading is informed by the general rule that “the narrower construction of a jurisdiction-stripping provision is favored over the broader one.” ANA Int'l v. Way,
. In Arevalo, the First Circuit was called upon to interpret
. As a textual matter, it is not clear that Grace Brethren compellingly supports the government's position that “restrain” includes declaratory relief. The Court did not expressly state whether "suspend” or "restrain” — or, perhaps, the combination of the two — encompassed declaratory relief. And to the extent the Court did tie its analysis to a particular term, it appears that the Court read "suspend” — which is absent from
. The government relies on National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. City Savings to support its argument that declaratory and injunctive relief are, in this context, equivalent. Appellees’ Br. at 39. In National Union, we held that a jurisdiction-stripping statute includes an implicit prohibition on declaratory relief.
But the government fails to explain why the remedial equivalency in National Union mandates a similar finding of equivalency in this case. We are concerned here with the practical effect of allowing declaratory relief, whereas National Union discussed the constitutional effect of barring declaratory relief. Moreover, we need only find that Congress had a plausible basis for finding that, in this context, declarations and injunctions are not equivalent. As discussed above, the distinct purposes and effects of the two remedies are a sufficient basis. We accordingly decline to read National Union as a categorical pronouncement of the equivalency of declaratory and injunctive relief.
. We recognize that the judiciary has "long presumed that officials of the Executive Branch will adhere to the law as declared by the court.” Comm, on Judiciary v. Miers,
Dissenting Opinion
Dissenting.
The Majority concludes that, although
The statute at issue in this case provides as follows:
Regardless of the nature of the action or claim or of the identity of the party or parties bringing the action, no court (other than the Supreme Court) shall have jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or restrain the operation of the provisions of part IV of this subchapter, as amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, other than with respect to the application of such provisions to an individual alien against whom proceedings under such part have been initiated.
The District Court rejected Alli’s interpretation of
A class-wide declaratory judgment that aliens detained pursuant to
Alli’s class action petition for declaratory relief operates to “restrain” the operation of the law and is therefore barred by
I am not persuaded by the Majority’s reliance on Stejfel v. Thompson,
The concern in Samuels was that declaratory judgments would have the same practical effect of interfering with pending state proceedings as an injunction. Here, the concern is that a declaratory judgment has the same practical effect of interfering with pending immigration proceedings in immigration courts established by Congress and administered by the Executive branch. In both situations, a declaratory judgment will “serve as the basis for a subsequent injunction against those proceedings” and “even if the declaratory judgment is not used as a basis for actually issuing an injunction, the declaratory relief alone [would have] virtually the same practical impact as a formal injunction ----” Samuels,
Furthermore, the fact that district courts must consider a variety of factors in deciding between declaratory and injunctive relief is irrelevant to whether a declaratory judgment “restrains.” The Majority implies that a declaratory judgment only restrains if it is the “functional equivalent”
Indeed, if a declaratory judgment does not “restrain” — that is “restrict, limit, confine” or “keep ... under control” the operation of a law — then what does it do? At its inception, the concept of declaratory relief was controversial because of the concern that such judgments were merely impermissible advisory opinions. See 10B Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2753 (3d ed. 1998). These concerns remain real, which is why courts are required to ensure that a declaratory judgment action presents an actual controversy and not just an abstract question of law. See Simmonds Aerocessories, Ltd. v. Elastic Stop Nut Corp. of Am.,
Second, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of similar statutory phrases also supports my reading of
Alii is correct to point out that these statutes implicated concerns of federalism. But I find this attempt to distinguish the cases more illuminating than discouraging: if concerns of federalism were enough to persuade the Supreme Court to conclude that declaratory judgments would “enjoin, suspend or restrain” state tax systems, analogous concerns of inter-branch relations would seem enough to conclude that class-wide declaratory judgments would “enjoin or restrain” the operation of a system created by Congress and implemented by the Executive Branch.
Third,
Fourth, because the statute is not ambiguous, we do not need to look to other portions of the statute for guidance. Alii concedes that the title of a statute does not trump its plain text; the title is relevant only as a tool to resolve doubt about its meaning. See Appellant Br. at 16 n. 6; see also Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corrections v. Yeskey,
In my view, the Majority’s strongest argument regarding statutory context is that the closely adjacent provision of
Finally, Alii argues that he is not seeking a declaratory judgment to restrain the operation of the statute, but only to prevent a violation of it. This is legal sleight of hand. Alii wants to obtain a declaration that the Executive Branch’s execution of the law is unconstitutional. This is an attempt to “restrain” — to “keep in check or under control” the Executive Branch’s execution of the law.
In short, the language of
. The Majority asserts that, because the “injunction-like effect of a declaratory judgment” action does not occur until after appellate review is exhausted, Congress could plausibly assume that the effect of a declaratory judgment is different from the effect of an injunction. Maj. Op. at 1015 n. 13. This is indicative of the Majority's penchant for elevating form over substance. The timing of a judgment’s effect has no bearing on its substance. Moreover, even if the Majority is correct, a declaratory judgment can act to ''restrain” the operation of
. The illusion that a class-wide declaratory judgment ultimately differs in effect from a class-wide injunction quickly dissipates once it becomes apparent that every single member of the class can, and will, immediately seek an injunction grounded on the authority of the declaratory judgment. See Samuels,