Alli v. Decker
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 12482
3rd Cir.2011Background
- Alli and Grenade, lawful permanent residents, were detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) based on alleged removability for prior offenses.
- They filed habeas and civil complaints seeking a bond hearing and, on behalf of a class, declaratory relief that detention without hearings violated the INA and due process.
- The District Court dismissed the class claims, holding § 1252(f)(1) barred class declaratory relief and declined class certification.
- Appellants pursued review of the district court’s denial of class certification while individual claims proceeded.
- The Third Circuit held that § 1252(f)(1) does not categorically prohibit class declaratory relief and remanded for further proceedings.
- Dissenting Judge Pollak argued for a broader reading of § 1252(f)(1) to bar declaratory relief for class actions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 1252(f)(1) bars class declaratory relief | Alli asserts § 1252(f)(1) bars any class relief restraining detention. | Decker contends restrain means only injunctive relief; declaratory relief is distinct. | No; § 1252(f)(1) does not include declaratory relief for class actions. |
| Whether context shows ambiguity to interpret restrain | Context and heading support broader meaning including declaratory relief. | Term is unambiguous and narrows relief to injunctive forms. | Context supports ambiguity; restrain may encompass declaratory relief. |
| Whether declaratory relief is functionally equivalent to injunctive relief | Declaratory relief could effectively restrain detention similarly to an injunction. | Declaratory relief is not necessarily equivalent to injunctive relief. | Declaratory relief can restrain the operation of § 1226(c); not categorically barred. |
| Whether § 1252(e)(1)(A) proper contrast shows § 1252(f)(1) ambiguity | Adjacent provisions show Congress barred declaratory relief in similar contexts. | Different provisions have different scope; § 1252(f)(1) may be narrower. | Context favors treating § 1252(f)(1) as allowing class declaratory relief; not controlling by itself. |
Key Cases Cited
- Chalmers v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 752 (3d Cir. 1994) (ambiguous language and context guide interpretation of statutory terms)
- Rosenberg v. XM Ventures, 274 F.3d 137 (3d Cir. 2001) (avoid superfluous reading of statutory terms)
- INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (statutory interpretation presumes purposeful inclusion or exclusion)
- Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749 (2009) (context and unified overhaul considerations apply to review procedures)
- Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393 (1982) (declaratory relief may suspend collection; supports narrow readings of relief limits)
- Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974) (declaratory vs injunctive relief distinctions hinge on context and availability)
- Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971) (declaratory judgments can have practical injunction-like effects)
- Arevalo v. Ashcroft, 344 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2003) (contextual interpretation relevant to § 1252(f)(1) questions)
- Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2010) (context and ambiguity inform § 1252(f) interpretations)
- Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc. v. Dept. of Revenue, 554 U.S. 33 (2008) (statutory headings aid doubt resolution about meaning)
- Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 340 (2006) (Dolan discusses interpretive approach to broad statutory terms)