Jоhn D. Allen, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 14AP-619
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
February 3, 2015
[Cite as Allen v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2015-Ohio-383.]
(Ct. of Cl. No. 2014-00030) (ACCELERATED CALENDAR)
Rendered on February 3, 2015
John D. Allen, pro se.
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Amber Wootton Hertlein, for appellee.
APPEAL from the Court of Claims of Ohio
SADLER, J.
{1} Plaintiff-appellant, pro se, John D. Allen, appeals from a judgment of the Court of Claims of Ohio in favor of defendant-appellee, Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (“DRC“). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Claims.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{2} Appellant is an inmate at a DRC faсility known as the Hocking Correctional Facility (“HCF“). According to appellant‘s complaint and affidavit, on June 18, 2013, his cellmate, Michael Decost, assaulted him by “punching [him] in the back (kidney).” On January 15, 2014, appellant filed a civil action against DRC alleging thаt DRC‘s employees
{3} DRC filed a motion for summary judgment on June 11, 2014. On July 1, 2014, appellant filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion. Appellant subsequently filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to
II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{4} Appellant assigns the following as his sole assignment of error:
The lower court erred by not affording Appellant his rightful civil remedies for Defendant‘s criminal acts.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
{5} Pursuant to
{6} “[T]he moving party bears the initial rеsponsibility of informing the trial court of the basis for the motion, and identifying those portions of the record before the trial court which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of fact on a material element of the nonmoving party‘s claim.” Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292 (1996). Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmovant must set forth specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 293. Because summary judgment is a
{7} Appellate review of summary judgments is de novo. Byrd v. Arbors E. Subacute & Rehab. Ctr., 10th Dist. No. 14AP-232, 2014-Ohio-3935. When an appellate court reviews a trial court‘s disposition of a summary judgment motion, it applies the same standard as the trial court and conducts an independent review, without deference to the trial court‘s determination. Id., citing Maust v. Bank One Columbus, N.A., 83 Ohio App.3d 103, 107 (10th Dist.1992). We must affirm the trial court‘s judgment if any of the grounds raised by the movant in the trial court are found to support it, even if the trial court failed to consider those grounds. Helfrich v. Allstate Ins. Co., 10th Dist. No. 12AP-559, 2013-Ohio-4335, ¶ 7 (10th Dist.), citing Coventry Twp. v. Ecker, 101 Ohio App.3d 38, 41-42 (9th Dist.1995).
{8} We also review judgments dismissing a complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the de novо standard. Cullinan v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 10th Dist. No. 12AP-208, 2012-Ohio-4836, ¶ 5, citing Windsor House, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 10th Dist. No. 09AP-584, 2010-Ohio-257, ¶ 8. The test is whether the complaint states a claim for relief cognizable in the forum. Univ. of Toledo v. Ohio State Emp. Relations Bd., 10th Dist. No. 11AP-834, 2012-Ohio-2364, ¶ 8, citing Crable v. Ohio Dept. of Youth Servs., 10th Dist. No. 09AP-191, 2010-Ohio-788, ¶ 8.
IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS
{9} In his sole assignment of error, appellant contends that the Court of Claims erred by not affording him his rightful civil remedies for defendant‘s criminal acts. We disagree.
{10} In his сomplaint, appellant alleges that DRC is subject to civil liability for the actions or omissions of its employees under the following legal theories: dereliction of duty, in violation of
{11} The Court of Claims concluded that it did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to determine DRC‘s civil liability under any of the legal theories specified in appellant‘s complaint. We agree.
{12} In Cullinan, the Supreme Court of Ohio made the following observations about the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Court of Claims:
The Court of Claims * * * is a court of limited jurisdiction having exclusive, original jurisdictiоn over claims brought against the state as a result of the state‘s waiver of immunity under
R.C. 2743.02 . The Court of Claims has exclusive, original jurisdiction over civil actions filed against the state for money damages sounding in law.
(Citations omitted.) Id. at ¶ 6.
{13} ”
{14} Similarly, it is well-settled law that the Court of Claims does not have subject-matter jurisdiction of actions alleging that the state violated an inmate‘s
{15} For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the Court of Claims lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to consider appellant‘s claims for relief grounded upоn DRC‘s alleged violations of appellant‘s constitutional or statutory rights as specified in the complaint. Thus, the Court of Claims did not err when it dismissed those claims.
{16} The Court of Claims went on to examine the material factual allegations of the comрlaint and concluded that appellant‘s complaint sounded in common law negligence, even though appellant had specified other legal theories. Accordingly, we will conduct a de novo review to determine whether the evidence gives rise to a reasonable inference of actionable negligence on the part of DRC.
{17} To prevail on a negligence claim, appellant must establish that (1) DRC owed him a duty, (2) DRC breached that duty, and (3) DRC‘s breach proximately caused his injuries. Briscoe v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 02AP-1109, 2003-Ohio-3533, ¶ 20, citing Macklin v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 01AP-293, 2002-Ohio-5069. “In the context of a custodial relationship between the state and its inmates, the state owes a common-law duty of reasonable care and protection from unreasonable risks of physical harm.” McElfresh v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 04AP-177, 2004-Ohio-5545, ¶ 16, citing Woods v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 130 Ohio App.3d 742, 744-45 (10th Dist.1998). “Reasonable care is that degree of caution and foresight an ordinarily prudent person would employ in similar circumstances.” Id. The state‘s duty of reasonable care does not render it an insurer of inmate safety. Williams v. S. Ohio Corr. Facility, 67 Ohio App.3d 517, 526 (10th Dist.1990), citing Clemets v. Heston, 20 Ohio App.3d 132 (6th Dist.1985). “However, ‘once [the state] beсomes aware of a dangerous condition[,] it must take reasonable care to prevent injury to the inmate.‘” Watson v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 11AP-606, 2012-Ohio-1017, ¶ 8, citing Briscoe at ¶ 20.
The law is well-settled in Ohio that ODRC is not liable for the intentional attack of one inmate by another, unless ODRC has adequate notice of an impending assault. Mitchell v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 107 Ohio App.3d 231, 235 (10th Dist.1995), citing Baker v. State, Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 28 Ohio App.3d 99 (10th Dist.1986). Notice may be actual or constructive, the distinction being the manner in which the notice is obtained rather than the amount of information obtained. Hughes v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 09AP-1052, 2010-Ohio-4736, ¶ 14. Actual notice exists where the information was personally communicated to or received by the party. Id. “Constructive notice is that notice which the law regards as sufficient to give notice and is regarded as a substitute for actual notice.” Id., citing In Re Estate of Fahle, 90 Ohio App. 195, 197 (6th Dist.1950).
Id. at ¶ 9.
{19} Appellant‘s affidavit provides in relevant part as follows:
[Appellant] has personally heard Michael Decost threaten to beat up inmates in the Day Room for not letting him watch his T.V. Programs. [Appellant] has personally heard Michael Decost threaten to beat up his wife as soon as he gets out of prison. [Appellant] has personally heard Michael Decost threaten to beat up the older inmates at HCF simply because they “pissed him off.” Michael Decost is in prison for Domestic Violence (5 different times) and Michael Decost continuously threatens other HCF inmates almost on a daily basis.
{20} The Court of Claims determined that appellant‘s affidavit did not give rise to a reasonable inference that DRC either knew or should have known of the impending attack by Decost on appellant. We agree.
{21} While the affidavit states that Decоst is a violent offender and that he has, in the recent past, made public threats of violence against other unidentified inmates, the averments in the affidavit do not permit the inference that Decost threatened to harm appellant in рarticular. Even if we accept appellant‘s claim that he feared an imminent assault by Decost, appellant does not claim that he personally informed DRC of his fears.
{22} Nor does appellant‘s affidavit contain sufficient facts upon which it may be reasonably inferred that DRC had сonstructive notice that an assault upon appellant was imminent. While appellant avers that Decost threatened other inmates, he does not claim that Decost ever made good on those threats. The fact that DRC knew that Dеcost was a violent offender who had made threats of violence toward other inmates is insufficient, standing alone, to establish constructive notice to DRC of an imminent attack on appellant. See Watson at ¶ 19 (declining to adopt the “deliberаte indifference” standard set forth in Greene v. Bowles, 361 F.3d 290, 294 (6th Cir.2004), and Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904 (7th Cir.2005)). See also Hughes at ¶ 15 (the fact that DRC was aware that an inmate was not taking his medication, mumbled to himself, and was acting erratically does not translate into actual or constructive notice to DRC that the inmate posed a risk of violence or that his attack on plaintiff was forthcoming). As the Court of Claims noted, ” ‘it is the inevitable nature of penal institutions that they will contain a fair proportion, perhaps a preponderance, of violent and dangerous individuals.’ ” (Court of Claims’ Decision, 4, quoting Kordelewski v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 00AP-1109 (June 21, 2001).)
{23} In short, construing the evidence in appellant‘s favor, we find that appellant has failed to produce evidence which would support a reasonable inference that DRC either knew or should have known of the imрending attack on appellant. Consequently, appellant‘s negligence claim fails as a matter of law. Watson; Mitchell; Hughes.
{24} Finally, to the extent that appellant‘s assignment of error challenges the denial of his motion for judgment on the pleadings, we notе that when presented with such a motion, a court must construe all the material allegations of the pleadings, in addition to any reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, in favor of the nonmovant. See Franks v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 195 Ohio App.3d 114, 2011-Ohio-2048 (10th Dist.). “Appellate review of mоtions for judgment on the pleadings is de novo, without deference to the trial court‘s determination.” Schmidt v. Grossman Law Office, 10th Dist. No. 14AP-127, 2014-Ohio-4227, ¶ 13, citing Fontbank, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 138 Ohio App.3d 801, 807 (10th Dist.2000). In its answer to the complaint, DRC admits that appellant is an inmate at HCF but denies all remaining allegations in the complaint. Thus, a de novo review revеals no basis for a judgment on the pleadings in appellant‘s favor.
{25} Based on the foregoing, we hold that the Court of Claims did not err when it denied appellant‘s motion for judgment on the pleadings, dismissed each of the claims specified in the comрlaint for the lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and granted summary judgment in favor of DRC as to appellant‘s negligence claim. Accordingly, appellant‘s sole assignment of error is overruled.
V. CONCLUSION
{26} Having overruled appellant‘s sole assignment of error, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Claims of Ohio.
Judgment affirmed.
DORRIAN and T. BRYANT, JJ., concur.
T. BRYANT, J., retired, formerly of the Third Appellate District, assigned to active duty under authority of the Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 6(C).