Alford, Melinda
OPINION
delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
This сase addresses whether a court of appeals must consider all alternative legal theories raised on appeal, including those not argued at trial, that may serve as a basis to uphold a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress. In its sole issue in its petition for discretionary review, the State challenges the court of appeals’s decision
I. Background
In March 2009, shortly before one in the morning, two officers with the Wylie Police Department were on bicycle patrol when they observed two individuals sitting in a parked car on a dead-end street about 100 yards from them. 1 The car was in a dark area illuminated only by a streetlight neаr a restaurant where disturbances frequently occur at that hour. One of the individuals, who was later identified as appellant, opened the passenger door, put her legs outside of the car, and leaned her head over her knees.
After watching the car for more than five minutes and hearing loud vоices coming from it, the officers approached the car due to a concern that appellant was sick or needed assistance or, according to the trial court’s findings of fact, that “a possible verbal altercation was taking place.”
During the officers’ approach, the two occupants switched seats so that appellant, who was previously the passenger, became the driver. Appellant put the car in gear, took her foot off the brake, and drove the car about six to eight feet. Through the open driver’s side window, one officer asked appellant to stop the car so that he could see if everyone in the car was okay. Appellant then stopped the car.
One of the officers asked appellant if anyone was sick or if there was a verbal altercation between her and the other occupant of the car. Appellant responded that no one was sick and that there was not any altercation. As appellant spoke, the officer immediately noticed an odor of alcohol coming from appellant and began investigating whether she was driving while intoxicated (DWI). That investigation led to appellant’s arrest for DWI.
After she was charged with DWI, appellant filed a motion to suppress, which was denied by the trial court. Appellant pleaded not guilty and was convicted by a jury. She was sentenced to four months’ confinement, but the jury suspended the sentence and placed her оn community supervision for 12 months. After trial, the trial court made findings of fact, including that the police officer who testified both at the motion-to-suppress hearing and at trial was a credible witness and that his testimony was believable. The trial court also made. conclusions of law limited to the theory that the оfficers were justified in approaching appellant’s vehicle under the community-caretaking exception to the warrant requirement. The court concluded that the officers “had a reasonable belief, given the totality of the circumstances, that the defendant was in need of assis
Appellant appealed the conviction to the court of appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress.
Alford,
The court of appeals issued an opinion and two opinions on rehearing after the State twice filed motions for rehearing.
See id.
at *1. In its secоnd opinion on rehearing, the court of appeals determined that: (1) the officer’s exercise of his community-caretaking function was not reasonable, and (2) the State’s alternate theory on consensual encounter was (a) procedurally defaulted, or, alternatively, (b) unmeritorious.
Id.
аt *2-4. With respect to the procedural-default analysis on the consensual-encounter theory, the court of appeals stated, “Because the State limited its argument at the hearing on the motion to suppress and at trial to the issue of whether the community care-taking function justified the stoр in this case, the State has waived its complaint that the ‘stop’ was actually an ‘encounter.’ ”
Id.
at *2 (citing
After ruling that the State’s consensual-encounter theory had been procedurally defaulted, the court of appeals went on to reject that theory on the merits.
Id.
at *3. The court of appеals described the applicable law for consensual encounters, explaining that encounters with police officers are “consensual so long as a reasonable person would feel free to disregard the police and go about his business.”
Id.
at *2. It explained that, in situations involving сonsensual encounters, “the State is not required to prove the law enforcement officer had either a reasonable suspicion or probable cause to approach the citizen and ask questions.”
Id.
As authority, it cited this Court’s decision in
Corbin v. State,
We conclude [that the officer] created a situation in which a reasonable person would not have felt free to disregard the police and go about his business. Further, because [the officer] stopped appellant’s automobile, appellant was seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Id. (citations omitted).
In its petition for discretionary review, the State challenges only the procedural ruling by the сourt of appeals. It asks, “Did the court of appeals err in refusing to consider the State’s consensual encounter argument because the State did not raise the argument in the trial court?” The State asserts that, under the “long-estab
II. Analysis
We agree with the State that the court of appeals erred by holding that the consensual-encounter theory was procedurally defaulted, but we disagree that the judgment must be reversed for that reason because the court did, in fact, address the merits of that alternative theory in its analysis. The State has not presented any argument explaining why the court of appeals’s rejection of the consensual-encounter theory on the merits might be erroneous.
In support of its holding that the State had procedurally defaulted its consensual-encounter argument, the court of appeals cited
The court of appeals also relied on
State v. Mercado
for the proposition that “[o]rdi-nary notions of procedural default should apply equally to the defendant and the State.”
Although this Court has approved of appellate courts considering alternative theories of law applicable to the facts of the case which support the trial court’s decision, we have not afforded the courts of appeals lаtitude to reverse a trial court’s decision on new theories of law not previously presented to that court for its consideration.
Id. Thus, Mercado served to clarify that ordinary notions of procedural default apply equally to all appellants, regardless of whether the appellant in a pаrticular case is the State or the defendant. Id. at 78. It did not, however, alter the long-standing rule that the prevailing party in the trial court is not subject to ordinary procedural-default rules; rather, it reaffirmed that rule. See id. at 77.
Procedural-default rules are the same regardless of whether the trial court has made findings of fact and conclusions of law. Whether we infer the fact findings or consider express findings,
3
we uphold the trial court’s ruling under any applicable theory of law supported by the facts of the case.
See, e.g., Turrubiate v. State,
We hold that the court of appeals erred by applying ordinary procedural-default rules to the prevailing party in the motion to suppress, which in this case was the State. Rather, it should have applied the rule that permits the prevailing party at trial to rely on any applicable legal theory to uphold the trial court’s ruling on appeal.
See Mercado,
III. Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
Notes
. Some of the evidence was disputed at the motion-to-suppress hearing. This background section is written in accordance with the findings of fact made by the trial court.
.
See, e.g., Turrubiate v. State,
. Appellate courts should afford almost total deference to a trial court’s determination of historical facts supported by the record, especially when the trial court’s fact findings are based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor.
Guzman v. State,