Alford, Melinda, 2013 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 943

Background

Around 1:00 a.m., two Wylie police officers on bicycles saw a parked car with two occupants; appellant Melinda Alford was initially the passenger, appeared to lean over her knees, and the officers approached out of concern for illness or a possible verbal disturbance.
During the officers’ approach the occupants switched seats, Alford became the driver, drove 6–8 feet, and an officer called through the driver’s window asking her to stop; when she stopped, the officer smelled alcohol and began a DWI investigation.
Alford was arrested for DWI, moved to suppress the contact and subsequent evidence, and the trial court denied the motion; the court made factual findings (crediting the officer) and concluded the stop was justified under the community‑caretaking exception.
At trial the State defended the denial of suppression on two theories on appeal: (1) community‑caretaking (theory argued below and adopted by trial court) and (2) alternatively, a consensual encounter (not argued below).
The court of appeals held the community‑caretaking justification unreasonable, ruled the State’s consensual‑encounter theory was procedurally defaulted (because not raised at trial), but nevertheless rejected the consensual theory on the merits and reversed Alford’s conviction.
The Court of Criminal Appeals granted the State’s petition on whether an appellate court may consider alternative theories not raised at trial and affirmed the court of appeals’ judgment, holding the court of appeals erred in its procedural‑default rationale but need not remand because it had addressed and rejected the alternative theory on the merits.

Issues

Issue	State's Argument	Alford's Argument	Held
Whether an appellate court may consider an appellee’s alternative legal theory not presented to the trial court to uphold a denial of a suppression motion	The State: prevailing party below may rely on any legal theory that supports the trial court’s ruling; ordinary procedural‑default rules (Rule 33.1) do not bar appellee from raising new theories on appeal	Alford: the State forfeited the consensual‑encounter theory by failing to present it at the suppression hearing/trial	Court: The court of appeals erred in applying ordinary procedural‑default rules to the prevailing party (the State). Prevailing parties are not barred from relying on alternative theories on appeal; but here remand was unnecessary because the court of appeals already addressed and rejected the consensual‑encounter theory on the merits
Whether the encounter was a consensual encounter or a seizure requiring reasonable suspicion	State: alternatively argued the interaction was consensual (no seizure), so no reasonable suspicion/probable cause required	Alford: the officer’s commands and actions created a seizure, so the contact was not consensual	Court of Appeals (on merits): interaction was a seizure, not consensual; Court of Criminal Appeals: did not disturb that merits rejection (State did not challenge that merits ruling in PDR)

Key Cases Cited

Corbin v. State, 85 S.W.3d 272 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (defines consensual encounter versus seizure standard)
State v. Mercado, 972 S.W.2d 75 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (appellate courts may consider alternate theories that support trial court’s ruling but may not reverse on new theories presented for first time by an appellant)
Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (will affirm trial court if ruling is correct for any applicable legal theory supported by the record)
Kelly v. State, 204 S.W.3d 808 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (legal conclusions reviewed de novo; appellate court not bound to trial court’s legal theory)
Duran v. State, 396 S.W.3d 563 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (appellate court may uphold trial court’s ruling on any applicable theory supported by facts)
Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (deference to trial court’s historical fact findings, especially credibility determinations)