ALMA ALFARO et al.,
2d Civil No. B313842
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION SIX
Filed 8/4/22
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION; (Super. Ct. No. 17CV02185) (Santa Barbara County)
This case illustrates the principle that an anti-SLAPP motion lies only as to “allegations of protected activity that are asserted as grounds for relief.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 395
Appellant Waterhouse Management Corp. is the property manager of Nomad Villagе Mobile Home Park (the Park), a 150-space mobile home park in Santa Barbara. Appellant Lazy Landing MHP, LLC, owns the long-term ground lease for the Park. Respondents are current and former lessees of mobile homes in the Park. They initially sued appellants for violations of the Mobilehome Residency Law (
After the filing of appellants’ malicious prosecution action, respondents amended their complaint in the original lawsuit to add an eleventh cause of action for unlawful retaliation in violation of
One of the mentioned acts was appellants’ filing of the malicious prosecution action. Seizing on this reference to protected activity, appellаnts filed a special motion to strike respondents’ entire eleventh cause of action as a SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation). (
of
The Anti-SLAPP Statute
“A court evaluates an anti-SLAPP motion in two steps. . . . [¶] . . . The defendant‘s first-step burden is to identify the activity each challenged
This is a “first-step” case. Because appellants failed to carry their first-step burden, we do not reach the second step.
The Eleventh Cause of Action
“‘As is true with summary judgment motions, the issues in an anti-SLAPP motion are framed by the pleadings.’ [Citations.] Thus, the act or acts underlying a claim for purposes of an anti-SLAPP statute is determined from the plaintiffs’ allegations.” (Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. ProjectCBD.com (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 869, 883.)
The eleventh cause of action is entitled, “UNLAWFUL RETALIATION.” It alleges that appellants “have violated Civil Code section 1942.5(d) by decreasing services, increasing rent, causing [respondents] to quit involuntarily by interfering with their peaceable enjoyment of their home and leasehold, bringing an action to recover possession, and/or by threatening to do these acts in retaliation for [respondents‘] peaceful and lawful exercise of their legal rights under the law.” (Italics added.)
dismiss [the malicious prosecution] action for a waiver of fees and costs, and (2) offered to dismiss [the] action in exchange for a dismissal of [respondents‘] claims . . . . [¶] . . . If [respondents] refused to dismiss their claims . . . , [appellants] would not dismiss their malicious prosecution action . . . and [they] would continue diverting resources intended for improving Park conditions and operations to litigation against [respondents] instead.” Appellants “expressly threatened to evict” three respondents “in the event they did not dismiss their claims against [appellants] . . . .”
Appellants’ Anti-SLAPP Motion
“[A]n anti-SLAPP motion may be directed to specific allegations of protected activity [within a causе of action] which constitute claims for relief but do not constitute an entire cause of action as pleaded.” (Newport Harbor Offices & Marina, LLC v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 28, 48.) Appellants’ anti-SLAPP motion was not directed to specific allegations of protected activity within the eleventh cause of action. They moved “for an order striking the Eleventh Cause of Action . . . in its entirety under the Anti-SLAPP statute.” Appellаnts argued: “[T]he entire bas[i]s of [respondents‘] claims against [appellants] arise[s] from the filing of [the malicious prosecution] lawsuit against [respondents] and alleged settlement communications . . . .” Therefore, “the conduct alleged in the [eleventh cause of action] falls squarely within the conduct protected under [the anti-SLAPP statute], as protectеd activity in a judicial proceeding.”
Trial Court Ruling
The trial court acknowledged “that the filing of a malicious prosecution action is protected activity” under the anti-SLAPP statute. (See Area 55, LLC v. Nicholas & Tomasevic, LLP (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 136, 151 [“‘““‘every claim of malicious prosecution is a cause of action arising from protected activity . . .‘“‘“].) Nevertheless, it denied the motion to strike because the eleventh “cause of action . . . [did] not arise from the malicious prosecution action.” Instead, it arose from the alleged
The trial court reasoned: “[T]he conduct that leads to liability [under
Standard of Review
“A ruling on a section 425.16 motion is reviewed de novo. [Citation.] We review the record independently to determine whether the asserted cause of action arises from activity protected under the statute . . . .” (Stewart v. Rolling Stone LLC (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 664, 675.)
Appellants’ Theory
Appellants contend: “Respondents’ Eleventh Cause of Action . . . is based upon [appellant‘s] alleged conduct in this litigation, their filing the malicious prosecution lawsuit against Respondents, and their allеged settlement communications in both actions. This is exactly the type of activity that the California Supreme Court has unequivocally held that the anti-SLAPP statute is meant to protect.” “Without the allegations of protected conduct, Respondents have no claim.”
Litigation-Related Activity is Protected Activity
“The anti-SLAPP protection for petitioning activities applies not only to the filing of lawsuits, but extends to conduct that relates to such litigation, including statements made in connection with or in preparation of litigation. [Citation.] Indeed, courts have adopted ‘a fairly expansive view of what constitutes litigation-related activities within the scope of section 425.16.‘” (Kolar v. Donahue, McIntosh & Hammerton (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1537; see also Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1024 (Bonni) [“claims that arise out of the filing of a suit arise from protected activity for purрoses of the anti-SLAPP statute“].) “Settlement negotiations while a suit is pending are likewise protected; they involve communications in connection with a matter pending before or under consideration by an official body, and so fall within the scope of
Respondents’ Claim for Relief in the Eleventh Cause of Action Does Not Arise from Litigation-Related Activity
“Although litigation-related activities constitute protected activity, ‘it does not follow that any claims associated with those activities are subject to the anti-SLAPP statute. To qualify for anti-SLAPP protection, the moving party must [also] demonstrate the claim “arises from” those activities.‘” (ValueRock TN Properties, LLC v. PK II Larwin Square SC LP (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 1037, 1046.)
“A claim arises from protected activity when that activity underlies or forms the basis for thе claim. [Citations.] . . . [T]he focus is on determining what ‘the defendant‘s activity [is] that gives rise to his or her asserted liability—and whether that activity constitutes protected speech or petitioning.’ [Citation.]” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1062-1063.)
“A claim does not arise from constitutionally protected activity simply because it is triggered by such activity or is filed after it occurs.” (World Financial Group, Inc. v. HBW Ins. & Financial Services, Inc. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1561, 1568.) “To focus on [the plaintiff‘s] litigation taсtics, rather than on the substance of [the plaintiff‘s] lawsuit, risks allowing [the defendant] to circumvent the showing expressly required by section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1) that an alleged SLAPP arise from protected speech or petitioning.” (City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 78.)
“When the Legislature declared [in the anti-SLAPP statute] that a ‘cause of action’ arising from activity furthering the rights of petition or free speech may be stricken unless the plaintiff establishes a probability of prevаiling, it had in mind allegations of protected activity that are asserted as grounds for relief. The targeted claim must amount to a ‘cause of action’ in the sense that it is alleged to justify a remedy.” (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 395.)
Respondents’ eleventh cause of action is for unlawful retaliation. The alleged violation of
The eleventh cause of action‘s allegations about appellants’ malicious prosecution action and subsequent settlement negotiations “merely provide context, without supporting a claim for recovery.” (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 394.) They do not “amount to a ‘cause of action’ in the sense that [they are made] to justify a remedy.” (Id. at p. 395.) They do not “supply the elements of a retaliation claim.” (Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1012.) Such “[a]llegations of protected activity that merely provide context, without supporting a claim for recovery, cannot be stricken under the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Baral, supra, at p. 394; see also Bonni, supra, at p. 1012 [“we mаy consider whether Bonni‘s various allegations supply the elements of a retaliation claim or merely provide context“].)
The only viable cause of action for unlawful retaliation is the alleged violation of
The trial court therefore did not err in denying appellants’ anti-SLAPP motion even though their filing of the malicious prosecution action and subsequent settlement negotiations were protected activity.
Appellants assert, “A cause of action brought under
The litigation privilege is here inapplicable. It does not bar an action against a landlord for violating
Award of Attorney Fees as Sanction
For making a frivolous anti-SLAPP motion, the trial court sanctioned appellants by awarding respondents their reasonable attorney fees of $8,750. “If the court finds that a special motion to strike is frivolous or is solely intended to cause unnecessary delay, the court shall award costs and reasonable attorney‘s fees to a plaintiff prevailing on the motion, pursuant to
In its written ruling imposing sanctions (see
For the reasons explained ante, at pages 7-11, the trial court did not exceed the bounds of reason in finding that any reasonable attorney would agree that appellants’ anti-SLAPP motion was “totally and completely without merit.” (
A Plea for Calm
At the trial level and here on appeal, the parties’ “scorched earth” postures exude acrimony: There have already been two appeals from anti-SLAPP rulings. We are hopeful that the law and motion wars will cease. The case should be settled or be tried.
The orders denying apрellants’ special motion to strike the eleventh cause of action and imposing sanctions of $8,750 for making a frivolous motion are affirmed. Respondents shall recover their costs on appeal.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.
YEGAN, J.
We concur:
GILBERT, P. J.
PERREN, J.
Timothy J. Staffel, Judge
Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
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James P. Ballantine, for Defendants and Appellants.
Allen, Semelsberger & Kaelin and James C. Allen, Jessica S. Taylor, for Plaintiffs and Respondents.