82 Cal.App.5th 26
Cal. Ct. App.2022Background
- Waterhouse Management (manager) and Lazy Landing (owner) operated Nomad Village mobilehome park; residents sued for failing to maintain the Park under the Mobilehome Residency Law and Mobilehome Parks Act.
- While that suit was pending, defendants filed a separate malicious-prosecution action against several resident-plaintiffs.
- Plaintiffs amended the original complaint to add an 11th cause of action for unlawful retaliation under Civ. Code § 1942.5(d), alleging various retaliatory acts (increasing rent, decreasing services, threats to evict, bringing actions to recover possession), and mentioning the malicious-prosecution suit and settlement communications as retaliatory conduct.
- Defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the entire 11th cause of action, arguing it arose from protected, litigation-related activity (the malicious-prosecution filing and settlement communications).
- The trial court denied the anti-SLAPP motion, concluded the § 1942.5(d) claim did not arise from the filing of the malicious-prosecution suit (that filing provided context only), and awarded plaintiffs $8,750 in fees as sanctions for a frivolous anti-SLAPP motion.
- The Court of Appeal affirmed: anti-SLAPP did not apply because the retaliation cause of action rests on statutory conduct described in § 1942.5(d), not on the protected litigation activity; the litigation privilege does not bar § 1942.5 claims; sanctions were not an abuse of discretion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the anti-SLAPP statute applies to the 11th cause of action (unlawful retaliation under § 1942.5(d)) | The retaliation claim is based on statuteally prohibited acts (rent increase, decreased services, threats, actions to recover possession); malicious-prosecution allegations are context, not the statutory violation | The 11th cause "arises from" protected litigation activity (filing malicious-prosecution suit and settlement communications) and thus must be struck as a SLAPP | Anti-SLAPP does not apply because the cause of action arises from § 1942.5(d) statutory wrongful acts, not from protected petitioning itself; malicious-prosecution allegations are contextual only |
| Whether allegations that defendants filed a malicious-prosecution action supply the elements of a § 1942.5(d) retaliation claim | § 1942.5(d) prohibits bringing an action to recover possession or threatening certain acts in retaliation; plaintiffs argued filing malicious prosecution is not a statutory basis for § 1942.5(d) liability | Defendants argued litigation-related conduct (filing suit/settlement communications) can give rise to liability and is protected petitioning | Court held § 1942.5(d) does not reach a lessor’s filing of a malicious-prosecution action; those allegations do not supply elements of the statutory retaliation claim |
| Whether the litigation privilege bars a § 1942.5(d) retaliation claim premised on litigation-related conduct | Plaintiffs: the Legislature intended § 1942.5 to provide remedies against retaliatory acts and these remedies supplement other law; the privilege should yield | Defendants: litigation privilege (Civ. Code § 47) protects litigation conduct, so it defeats the § 1942.5 claim based on filing suits or settlement communications | Court held the litigation privilege is inapplicable to the § 1942.5(d) claim because courts recognize a statutory exception: applying the privilege would nullify the statute’s remedial purpose |
| Whether the trial court abused its discretion by awarding fees as sanctions for a frivolous anti-SLAPP motion | Plaintiffs: motion was totally devoid of merit given controlling authority that incidental protected activity providing context does not make a cause of action a SLAPP | Defendants: anti-SLAPP filing was proper and aimed to vindicate petitioning rights | Court affirmed sanctions: any reasonable attorney would agree the motion lacked merit under precedent; fee award was within discretion |
Key Cases Cited
- Baral v. Schnitt, 1 Cal.5th 376 (Cal. 2016) (anti-SLAPP targets allegations of protected activity asserted as grounds for relief)
- Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc., 7 Cal.5th 871 (Cal. 2019) (two-step anti-SLAPP framework; defendant bears first-step burden)
- Park v. Board of Trustees of Cal. State Univ., 2 Cal.5th 1057 (Cal. 2017) (focus on the defendant activity that gives rise to liability)
- Bonni v. St. Joseph Health Sys., 11 Cal.5th 995 (Cal. 2021) (distinguishing protected activity that supplies claim elements from activity that merely provides context)
- Rand Resources, LLC v. City of Carson, 6 Cal.5th 610 (Cal. 2019) (definition of protected petitioning activity)
- Area 55, LLC v. Nicholas & Tomasevic, LLP, 61 Cal.App.5th 136 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021) (malicious-prosecution claims arise from protected activity)
- ValueRock TN Props., LLC v. PK II Larwin Square SC LP, 36 Cal.App.5th 1037 (Cal. Ct. App. 2019) (claim must "arise from" protected activity to be subject to anti-SLAPP)
- World Fin. Grp., Inc. v. HBW Ins. & Fin. Servs., Inc., 172 Cal.App.4th 1561 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (claims do not arise from protected activity merely because triggered by it)
- Banuelos v. LA Investment, LLC, 219 Cal.App.4th 323 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (litigation privilege must yield to § 1942.5 to avoid immunizing prohibited retaliatory conduct)
- Action Apt. Assn., Inc. v. City of Santa Monica, 41 Cal.4th 1232 (Cal. 2007) (legislature may create exceptions to the litigation privilege)