Akron v. PeoplesAkron v. Peoples
Dated: February 9, 2011
CARR, Judge.
{¶1} Appellant, Wanakie Peoples, appeals her conviction out of the Akron Municipal Court. This Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} On August 26, 2007, Peoples was cited by an Akron police officer for one count of operating a vehicle under the influence in violation of
{¶3} Peoples pleaded not guilty and demanded a trial by jury. Prior to trial, Peoples filed proposed jury instructions, including a proposed instruction on the requirements for criminal liability pursuant to
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
“THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED APPELLANT PEOPLES’ RIGHT TO PRESENT A DEFENSE UNDER THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION BY REFUSING TO GIVE APPELLANT PEOPLES’ TENDERED JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON BLACKOUT AND INVOLUNTARY INTOXICATON.”
{¶4} Peoples argues that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury in regard to the affirmative defenses of involuntary intoxication and unconsciousness/blackout in regard to the charge of operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drug of abuse. This Court disagrees.
{¶5} This Court “review[s] a trial court‘s decision to give or decline to give a requested jury instruction for an abuse of discretion under the facts and circumstances of the case.” State v. Evans, 9th Dist. No. 07CA0057-M, 2008-Ohio-4772, at ¶12, citing State v. Wolons (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 64, 68 (specifically addressing a proposed jury instruction regarding intoxication). An abuse of discretion is more than an error of judgment; it means that the trial court was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable in its ruling. Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219. An abuse of discretion demonstrates “perversity of will, passion, prejudice, partiality, or moral delinquency.” Pons v. Ohio State Med. Bd. (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 619, 621.
{¶6}
{¶7} The Ohio Supreme Court has held:
“The proper standard for determining in a criminal case whether a defendant has successfully raised an affirmative defense under
R.C. 2901.05 is to inquire whether the defendant has introduced sufficient evidence, which, if believed, would raise a question in the minds of reasonable men concerning the existence of such issue.” State v. Melchior (1978), 56 Ohio St.2d 15, at paragraph one of the syllabus.
Moreover, “[i]f the evidence generates only a mere speculation or possible doubt, such evidence is insufficient to raise the affirmative defense, and submission of the issue to the jury will be unwarranted.” Id. at 20.
{¶8} Peoples was charged with a violation of
{¶9} Pursuant to
“(1) The person‘s liability is based on conduct that includes either a voluntary act, or an omission to perform an act or duty that the person in capable of performing [the actus reas requirement];
“(2) The person has the requisite degree of culpability for each element as to which a culpable mental state is specified by the section defining the offense [the mens rea requirement].”
R.C. 2901.21(A) .
{¶10} Peoples acknowledges that operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drug of abuse is a strict liability offense.
Involuntary intoxication
{¶11} Peoples does not dispute that she was intoxicated at the time she hit a University of Akron police cruiser with her vehicle. At trial, she presented evidence through her treating psychiatrist Dr. Roger Sparhawk who testified that he had prescribed a combination of Wellbutrin, Klonopin, and Paxil for Peoples. He testified that he added Paxil to her treatment plan five days prior to the accident. The doctor testified that, when Peoples appeared for an office visit on September 4, 2007, about a week after the accident, he told her to discontinue taking Paxil because she may be experiencing confusion related to its use. Dr. Sparhawk viewed the videotape of Peoples’ behavior at the police station and testified that she appeared to be suffering from delirium at the time.
{¶12} Peoples testified that she has always been sensitive to medications. She testified that she took all three of her medications approximately one-half hour before she planned to go to bed. She ran into the police cruiser with her vehicle at approximately 1:00 a.m. the next morning.
{¶13} The trial court instructed the jury that Wellbutrin, Klonopin, and Paxil are all “drug[s] of abuse.” Peoples did not challenge that instruction before the trial court or on appeal.
{¶14} Although four police officers testified that Peoples’ body emitted an odor of an alcoholic beverage, Peoples’ undisputed intoxication during the accident might have occurred as
Unconsciousness/blackout
{¶15} Peoples argues that her act of driving a vehicle which hit a police cruiser constituted an involuntary act because she was in a state of “blackout” and did not remember the incident after it happened.
{¶16}
“This voluntary act requirement is easily satisfied. The provision for involuntary acts is narrow and removes only truly uncontrollable acts from the realm of the voluntary. Neither proof of an irresistible impulse nor proof of duress negates the voluntariness of defendant‘s conduct.” 26 Ohio Jur.3d Criminal Law 624.
{¶17} First, Peoples presented no evidence that, although she could not remember the accident after it occurred, she was not aware of the events as they were happening. In fact, the State presented evidence that she was aware of her actions at the time. Officer Jamie McKinley of the University of Akron Police Department, whose cruiser Peoples hit, testified that she overheard Peoples speaking to her mother who had arrived at the scene after the accident after
{¶18} Second, Peoples did not otherwise present any evidence that her act of driving a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drug of abuse was involuntary. Although Peoples did not propose an explicit unconsciousness/blackout instruction1, this Court has recognized the standard instruction for blackout. See State v. Murray (Apr. 18, 1990), 9th Dist. No. 89CA004648. That instruction provides:
“‘Where a person commits an act while unconscious as in a (coma) (blackout) (convulsion) due to (heart failure) (disease) (sleep) (injury), such act is not a criminal offense even though it would be a crime if such act were the product of a person‘s (will) (volition).’ 4 Ohio Jury Instructions (1989) 62, Section 409.05.” State v. LaFreniere (1993), 85 Ohio App.3d 840, 848.
{¶19} Peoples’ mother, Karen Peoples, testified that she saw her daughter sleeping on a couch in their living room around midnight. She testified that her daughter called her approximately one-and-a-half to two hours later from the scene of the accident. The video taken by the police at the police station after the accident evidenced that Peoples was fully dressed, including shoes. Peoples told one of the police officers who was attempting to administer a breathalyzer test to her that she was only wearing one contact lens. Peoples does not dispute that
{¶20} A similar argument was raised by a defendant in State v. Grimsley (1982), 3 Ohio App.3d 265, wherein Grimsley argued that she could not be convicted of driving while under the influence of alcohol because she suffered from a multiple personality disorder and that one of her alternate personalities was in control during the commission of the crime. The First District disagreed, concluding that there was no evidence that Grimsley was unconscious and that it was “immaterial whether she was in one state of consciousness or another, so long as in the personality then controlling her behavior, she was conscious and her actions were a product of her own volition.” Id. at 268.
{¶21} The circumstantial evidence established that Peoples, in one state of consciousness or another, got up from the couch where she was sleeping, got dressed, obtained her car keys, entered her car, put the keys in the ignition, and drove on the roadway, hitting Officer McKinley‘s cruiser only because she made too wide of a right turn onto an adjacent street into the lane of on-coming traffic. Peoples’ actions constituted more than mere reflexive movements. She was even able to discuss the events with her mother soon after the accident.
{¶22} This case is distinguishable from the situation in Murray where we concluded that the trial court erred in failing to give a blackout instruction because Murray introduced sufficient evidence to warrant such an instruction. In that case, Murray presented evidence that he
{¶23} Based upon a review of the evidence, this Court concludes that Peoples did not present sufficient evidence to demonstrate that her act of driving her vehicle into a police cruiser while under the influence of alcohol, drug(s) of abuse, or a combination thereof was involuntary. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to give her proffered affirmative defense instructions to the jury. Peoples’ assignment of error is overruled.
III.
{¶24} Peoples’ sole assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Akron Municipal Court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Akron Municipal Court, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to
Costs taxed to Appellant.
DONNA J. CARR
FOR THE COURT
DICKINSON, P. J.
MOORE, J.
CONCUR
APPEARANCES:
J. DEAN CARRO, Appellate Review Office, School of Law, The University of Akron, for Appellant.
CHERI CUNNINGHAM, Director of Law, for Appellee.
DOUGLAS J. POWLEY, Chief City Prosecutor, and JEREMY A. VEILLETTE, Assistant City Prosecutor, for Appellee.