Case Information
*4 IKUTA, Circuit Judge:
Ortega-Lopez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of a ruling by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) that he was ineligible for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). We hold that the BIA reasonably concluded that Ortega-Lopez had been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude for which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed based on his conviction under 7 U.S.C. § 2156(a)(1) (criminalizing specified conduct relating to animal fighting ventures). We also defer to the BIA’s conclusion that an alien who has been convicted of such an offense is an alien “convicted of an offense under section . . . 1227(a)(2),” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C). Therefore, we deny the petition for review.
I
The question on appeal is whether Ortega-Lopez is ineligible for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) because he was “convicted of an offense under” 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (listing grounds of deportability). To understand this question in context, we begin with some historical background.
Before enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), “United
States immigration law established two types of proceedings
O RTEGA -L OPEZ V . B ARR
in which aliens can be denied the hospitality of the United
States: deportation hearings and exclusion hearings.”
Vartelas v. Holder
, 566 U.S. 257, 261 (2012) (quoting
Landon v. Plasencia
,
Under pre-IIRIRA law, “entry” was defined as a person’s
physical entry into the United States, whether lawfully or
unlawfully. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (1994) (defining “entry”
to mean “any coming of an alien into the United States, from
a foreign port or place”). Under this law, an alien who
entered the United States could be charged with grounds of
deportability in a deportation hearing.
See, e.g.
,
Mendoza v.
INS
,
IIRIRA amended this framework. Congress intended to
eliminate the anomaly “under which illegal aliens who have
entered the United States without inspection gain equities and
privileges in immigration proceedings that are not available
to aliens who present themselves for inspection at a port of
entry.”
Torres v. Barr
, ___ F.3d ___, ___, 2020 WL
5668478, at *8 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (quoting H.R. Rep.
104-469, pt. 1, at 225 (1996));
see also Matter of Valenzuela-
Felix
, 26 I. & N. Dec. 53, 60 n.7 (BIA 2012) (same).
Therefore, Congress replaced the term “entry,”
see
§ 1101(a)(13) (1994), with
the
term “admission,”
*6
§ 1101(a)(13)(A) (stating that “[t]he terms ‘admission’ and
‘admitted’ mean, with respect to an alien, the lawful entry of
the alien into the United States after inspection and
authorization by an immigration officer”). IIRIRA also
replaced the term “excludable aliens” with “inadmissible
aliens,” and replaced grounds for exclusion with grounds of
inadmissibility.
See Xi v. INS
,
Both inadmissible and deportable aliens may apply for cancellation of removal under § 1229b(b)(1). Under § 1229b(b)(1), the Attorney General has discretion to cancel removal of an alien who is inadmissible or deportable if the alien meets four statutory requirements. One such requirement is that the alien “has not been convicted of an offense under section 1182(a)(2), 1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(3) of this title.” [1] § 1229b(b)(1)(C). The three cross-referenced sections list various criminal offenses. The section at issue here, § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), relates to deportability and crimes involving moral turpitude:
(i) Crimes of moral turpitude. Any alien who—
(I) is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years (or 10 years in the case of an alien provided lawful permanent resident status under section 1255(j) of this title) after the date of admission, and
(II) is convicted of a crime for which a sentence of one year or longer may be *7 imposed,
is deportable.
II
We now turn to the facts of this case. Ortega-Lopez, a native and citizen of Mexico, unlawfully entered the United States in 1994. In January 2008, Ortega-Lopez was indicted on several criminal counts, including violations of 7 U.S.C. [1] This requirement is subject to the domestic violence waiver not applicable here. § 1229b(b)(1), (5).
§ 2156(a)(1) for sponsoring or exhibiting an animal in an animal fighting venture. In 2009, Ortega-Lopez pleaded guilty to a single count under § 2156(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) for knowingly aiding and abetting another person who sponsored or exhibited an animal in an animal fighting venture.
While his criminal case was pending, the government commenced removal proceedings against Ortega-Lopez. Because Ortega-Lopez had not been admitted into the United States, he was subject to grounds of inadmissibility. The government served him with a notice to appear which charged him as being removable on the ground that he was an “alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled.” § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Ortega-Lopez conceded he was removable and applied for cancellation of removal under § 1229b(b)(1). The immigration judge (IJ) denied Ortega- Lopez’s application for cancellation of removal on the ground that he had been convicted of a violation of § 2156(a)(1), a crime involving moral turpitude for which a sentence of a year or longer may be imposed. Ortega-Lopez appealed to the BIA. The BIA dismissed Ortega-Lopez’s appeal, Matter of Ortega-Lopez , 26 I. & N. Dec. 99 (BIA 2013) ( Ortega- Lopez I ).
We granted Ortega-Lopez’s petition for review and
remanded the case to the BIA for further consideration.
Ortega-Lopez v. Lynch
,
(
Ortega-Lopez II
). We ordered the BIA to consider the
language in
Nunez v. Holder
,
On remand, the BIA issued a precedential decision
reaffirming its dismissal of Ortega-Lopez’s appeal.
Matter of
Ortega-Lopez
, 27 I. & N. Dec. 382 (BIA 2018) (
Ortega-
Lopez III
). The BIA explained its view that moral turpitude
was broader than the categories identified by
Nunez
, and it
concluded that § 2156(a)(1) was categorically a crime
involving moral turpitude because the offense involved
intentional conduct that was morally reprehensible. at 386–87. It also addressed our intervening opinion in
Lozano-Arredondo v. Sessions
, 866 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir.
2017), and reaffirmed the interpretation of a prior BIA
[3]
Based on its review,
Nunez
held that a conviction in California for
indecent exposure was not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude,
because the full range of conduct prohibited by the statute (which included
nude dancing at bars) was not “base, vile, and depraved.” 594 F.3d
at 1133, 1136.
Nunez
did not defer to the BIA’s contrary decision,
because it was unpublished and provided only conclusory analysis. at
1133. After the BIA issued a precedential opinion reaffirming its
conclusion that the California indecent exposure statute was a crime
involving moral turpitude, we deferred to the BIA’s published opinion and
overruled
Nunez
.
See Betansos v. Barr
,
*9 decision holding that the cross-reference in § 1229b(b)(1)(C) incorporated only “the offense-specific characteristics contained in the cross-referenced sections—that is, the listed generic offense and any corresponding sentencing requirements,” but did not incorporate the requirement that the crime be “committed within five years . . . after the date of admission.” Ortega-Lopez III , 27 I. & N. Dec. at 391–92 (citing Matter of Cortez Canales , 25 I. & N. Dec. 301, 307 (BIA 2010)). The BIA then determined that Ortega-Lopez was ineligible for cancellation of removal and dismissed his appeal. at 398. Ortega-Lopez again petitions for review. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).
III
Ortega-Lopez raises two primary challenges to the denial of his application for cancellation of removal. First, he argues that 7 U.S.C. § 2156(a)(1) is not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude. Second, he argues that the BIA erred in concluding that he had been “convicted of an offense under section . . . 1227(a)(2)” because the government failed to prove that the crime was “committed within five years . . . after the date of admission,” § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). We consider each argument in turn.
A
We first consider Ortega-Lopez’s argument that his conviction for violation of § 2156(a)(1) was not a crime involving moral turpitude. We determine whether an offense is a crime involving moral turpitude by applying the categorical approach set forth in Taylor v. United States , 495 U.S. 575 (1990). See Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder , 558 F.3d 903, 912 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). Under the categorical approach, we determine whether the crime of conviction contains all the elements of the generic federal offense; in general, we first define the elements of the federal generic offense, and then compare it to the statute of conviction.
We accord
Chevron
deference to the BIA’s exercise of its
authority to give “ambiguous statutory terms concrete
meaning through a process of case-by-case adjudication.”
INS v. Aguierre-Aguierre
, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999);
Marmolejo-Campos
,
We have acknowledged that the phrase “crime involving
moral turpitude” is inherently ambiguous, and neither we nor
the BIA have established any clear-cut criteria “for
determining which crimes fall within that classification and
which crimes do not.”
Nunez
,
The BIA has defined a crime involving moral turpitude as
having “two essential elements: [1] reprehensible conduct and
[2] a culpable mental state.”
Matter of Silva-Trevino
, 26 I. &
N Dec. 826, 834 (BIA 2016). Conduct is reprehensible if it
is “inherently base, vile, or depraved, and contrary to the
accepted rules of morality and the duties owed between
persons or to society in general.”
Matter of Jimenez-Cedillo
,
27 I. & N. Dec. 1, 3 (BIA 2017) (citation omitted).
[4]
Because
this definition does not meaningfully delineate the elements
of the offense, the BIA “has sensibly moved from trying to
define the phrase itself to instead giving examples of the
types of offenses that qualify as ‘crimes involving moral
turpitude.’”
Silva v. Barr
,
*11
Applying this approach here, the BIA determined that
“knowingly sponsoring or exhibiting an animal in an animal
fighting venture is a crime involving moral turpitude.”
Ortega-Lopez III
, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 387. The BIA derived
these elements of the offense from Congress’s criminalization
of this conduct in § 2156(a). To be convicted under 7 U.S.C.
§ 2156(a)(1) (2006), a person must “knowingly sponsor or
exhibit an animal in an animal fighting venture.”
[5]
The statute
[4]
We have held that crimes involving moral turpitude fall into two
categories: “[1] those involving fraud and [2] those involving grave acts
of baseness or depravity.”
Robles-Urrea v. Holder
,
[5] The statute also included a jurisdictional element: the government must prove that “any animal in the venture was moved in interstate or foreign commerce.” § 2156(a)(1). Such jurisdictional elements are . defined the term “animal” to mean “any live bird, or any live dog or other mammal, except man.” § 2156(g)(5) (2006) (current version at § 2156(f)(4)). It defined the term “animal fighting venture” to mean “any event which involves a fight between at least two animals and is conducted for purposes of sport, wagering, or entertainment.” § 2156(g)(1) (2006) (current version at § 2156(f)(1)). Excepted from the definition of “animal fighting venture” is “any activity the primary purpose of which involves the use of one or more animals in hunting another animal or animals, such as waterfowl, bird, raccoon, or fox hunting.” Id
The BIA explained why the language in
Nunez
, which
provided a categorization of crimes involving moral
turpitude, did not change its conclusion that the offense
described in § 2156(a) is a crime involving moral turpitude.
First,
Nunez
’s categories are “not exhaustive,” as the Ninth
Circuit has acknowledged.
Ortega-Lopez III
, 27 I. & N. Dec.
at 386 (citing
Rivera v. Lynch
,
[6] Although there have been amendments to § 2156(a)(1) since the time of Ortega-Lopez’s offense, the statute has not changed materially. Ortega-Lopez was charged with an offense committed in March 2007. In May 2007, Congress amended § 2156 to move the interstate-commerce nexus from § 2156(a)(1) to § 2156(f)(1) and to modify slightly the definitions of “animal” and “animal fighting venture.” See, e.g. , § 2156(f)(4) (deleting the reference to “live dog” in the definition of “animal”); § 2156(f)(1) (amending the term “animal fighting venture” to include fights “to be conducted”).
O RTEGA -L OPEZ V . B ARR
2016);
Nunez
,
[8]
We have also held, in caselaw not cited by
Ortega-Lopez III
, that
solicitation of possession of marijuana for sale is a crime involving moral
turpitude for immigration purposes.
Barragan-Lopez v. Mukasey
,
Cazarez-Gutierrez v. Ashcroft
,
Having addressed our instruction to consider
Nunez
’s
*13
categorization of crimes involving moral turpitude, the BIA
turned to providing a detailed explanation of its rationale for
the conclusion that sponsoring or exhibiting an animal in an
animal fighting venture is reprehensible.
Id.
at 387–89. The
BIA reiterated that animal fighting entails extreme suffering
(and sometimes death) of the animals involved, and gave
examples of the brutal manner in which such animal fighting
events were conducted.
Id.
The BIA reasoned that “the
exhibition and celebration of suffering in animal fighting
events” was “contrary to basic standards of decency and
humanity” and “debased and brutalized the citizenry who
flocked to witness such spectacles.”
Id.
at 388 (quoting
Paris
Adult Theatre I v. Slaton
,
Responding to Ortega-Lopez II ’s concern that a crime “involving harm to chickens” appeared to be outside the “normal realm” of crimes involving moral turpitude, Ortega Lopez II , 834 F.3d at 1018, the BIA explained that the immorality of the conduct stemmed from its infliction of suffering on sentient beings, so it applied to animals involved in cockfighting, as well as domesticated animals. Ortega- Lopez III , 27 I. & N. Dec. at 388–89 & n.7. The BIA distinguished this conduct from other practices, such as hunting and food production, that are “inevitably harmful to animals” but are “necessary or acceptable to accomplish the underlying utilitarian objective.” Id. at 389. The BIA also acknowledged that some jurisdictions in the United States do not criminalize cockfighting, but did not give this fact any weight. The BIA reaffirmed that the “clear consensus in contemporary American society” holds “sponsoring or exhibiting the spectacle of animal suffering” to be “morally reprehensible.” Id. at 390. Further, the BIA noted that offenses such as prostitution “that are widely viewed as morally turpitudinous” are not criminalized in every state.
We conclude that the BIA has provided a well-reasoned
basis for determining that “knowingly sponsoring or
exhibiting an animal in an animal fighting venture is a crime
involving moral turpitude.” at 387. Because this
explanation is in a published opinion, it is entitled to
deference under
Chevron
.
Ceron
,
Ortega-Lopez raises one additional argument. He claims
that the BIA’s determination regarding § 2156(a)(1) should
not be applied to him, because he was convicted of an offense
under this statute many years before the BIA announced its
interpretation. We disagree. If “an agency consciously
overrules or otherwise alters its own rule or regulation” or
“expressly considers and openly departs from a circuit court
decision,” we must analyze whether the new rule applies to
conduct that took place before the agency reached its
conclusion.
See Garfias-Rodriguez v. Holder
,
In sum, we defer to the BIA’s permissible conclusion that knowingly sponsoring or exhibiting an animal in an animal fighting venture is a crime involving moral turpitude, and we reject Ortega-Lopez’s arguments to the contrary. Because no dispute exists that a sentence of a year or longer could be imposed for a violation of § 2156(a)(1), we determine that a conviction under this section was a conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude for which a sentence of a year or longer may be imposed.
B
We next turn to the question whether the BIA erred in concluding that Ortega-Lopez had been “convicted of an offense under section . . . 1227(a)(2),” § 1229b(b)(1)(C), because the government failed to prove that the crime was “committed within five years . . . after the date of admission,” § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i).
We again begin with some background. To be eligible for
cancellation of removal under § 1229b(b), the alien must not
have “been convicted of an offense under section 1182(a)(2),
1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(3),” among other things. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(b)(1). In
Gonzalez-Gonzalez v. Ashcroft
, we
[10]
Ortega-Lopez argues that the phrase “crime involving moral
turpitude” is unconstitutionally vague. We have repeatedly rejected this
argument on the ground that it is foreclosed by both Supreme Court and
Ninth Circuit precedent.
See, e.g.
,
Islas-Veloz v. Whitaker
,
In light of Gonzalez-Gonzalez , the BIA subsequently held that the cross-reference in § 1229b(b)(1)(C) unambiguously incorporated “only language specifically pertaining to the criminal offense, such as the offense itself and the sentence imposed or potentially imposed.” Cortez Canales , 25 I. & N. Dec. at 307–08. In Cortez Canales , the BIA rejected the alien’s argument that § 1229b(b)(1)(C) also incorporated language in § 1227(a)(2) “pertaining only to aspects of immigration law, such as the requirement that the alien’s crime be committed ‘within five years . . . after the date of admission.’” Id . According to the BIA, this exclusion of immigration-related elements “clearly follows” from the conclusion in Gonzales-Gonzales that “the plain language of section [1229b(b)(1)(C)] should be read to cross-reference a list of offenses in three statutes, rather than the statutes as a whole.” at 308.
To further support this conclusion, the BIA compared the cross-reference in § 1229b(b)(1)(C) to the cross-reference in § 1229b(d)(1) (the stop-time rule), which relates to an offense “that renders the alien inadmissible to the United States under section 1182(a)(2) of this title or removable from the United *17 States under section 1227(a)(2) or 1227(a)(4) of this title.” The BIA noted that the stop-time rule showed Congress knew “how to draft statutory language requiring an alien to be inadmissible or removable under a specific charge” in a cross-referenced section. Cortez Canales , 25 I. & N. Dec. at 308. The BIA concluded that, “[s]ince Congress did not include language requiring that an alien be inadmissible or removable in section [1229b(b)(1)(C)], it is clear that it did not intend for the immigration-related elements” of the three cross-referenced statutes to be incorporated in § 1229b(b)(1)(C). Id. The BIA explained in the alternative that, “even if the language of [§ 1229b(b)(1)(C)] were found to be ambiguous, we would interpret it in the same manner.”
In
Lozano-Arredondo
, we addressed the question whether
the cross-reference in § 1229b(b)(1)(C) to an “offense under”
§ 1227(a)(2) incorporates only the offense-related elements
or also included the immigration-related elements, namely,
that an alien is deportable if the alien commits a listed offense
“more than five years after his admission to the United
States.”
Contrary to the BIA’s view, Lozano-Arredondo deemed the cross-reference in § 1229b(b)(1)(C) to be ambiguous and susceptible to several interpretations. Id. at 1089. Lozano- Arredondo explained that the cross-reference in § 1229b(b)(1)(C) could refer to “(1) only the criminal offense itself—a crime involving moral turpitude; (2) the criminal offense plus one additional element of the deportable offense (i.e., the criminal offense plus either the within-five-years limitation or the sentence-length limitation); or (3) all three elements of the deportable offense.” at 1085, 1089–90.
Lozano-Arredondo
suggested that the “all three elements”
*18
interpretation was the most reasonable.
Id.
at 1091. It noted
that
Gonzales-Gonzales
“did not foreclose” an interpretation
of the cross-reference in § 1229b(b)(1)(C) that incorporates
the element in § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) requiring the crime to have
been “committed within five years . . . after the date of
admission.”
Lozano-Arredondo
,
Under the all-three-elements interpretation, an alien who
had committed a crime involving moral turpitude would still
be eligible for cancellation of removal if the crime had been
committed more than five years after the date of admission.
Lozano-Arredondo
acknowledged that some aliens seeking
cancellation of removal were never admitted and, if the cross-
reference in § 1229b(b)(1)(C) incorporated the within-five-
years element, aliens who were in the country unlawfully
“could
never
be deemed ineligible for cancellation under
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(i).”
Without holding that any one interpretation was the “only
reasonable interpretation,”
Lozano-Arredondo
“decide[d]
only that the inclusion of the word ‘admission’ as part of the
within-five-years element does not compel the conclusion
that Congress intended to exclude this element from the
‘offense under’ § 1227(a)(2)(A)(I).”
The BIA’s analysis in this case responded to Lozano- Arredondo ’s ruling that the cross-reference in § 1229b(b)(1)(C) to “an offense under” § 1227(a)(2) was ambiguous. The BIA first restated its prior interpretation in Cortez Canales , that the cross-reference in § 1229b(b)(1)(C) incorporated only the offense itself and the sentence imposed or potentially imposed. Ortega-Lopez III , 27 I. & N. Dec. at 392. The BIA then turned to the potential alternative interpretation suggested by Lozano-Arredondo , that § 1229b(b)(1)(C) incorporated the within-five-years element and simultaneously altered the meaning of admission “as that term is used throughout [section 1227(a)]” to mean “entry.” The BIA gave a reasoned explanation for declining to adopt this alternative interpretation and for reaffirming the interpretation it had adopted in Cortez Canales .
First, the BIA noted that “one of the overarching themes”
of IIRIRA “was to replace the term ‘entry’ with the term
‘admission,’ thereby providing that a person who had entered
the United States without meeting the specific statutory
requirements for an admission would be subject to grounds of
inadmissibility, rather than deportability.”
Id.
at 392–93.
Drawing on the explicit distinctions between “entry” and
*20
“admission” that were made in IIRIRA amendments to the
INA, the BIA held that “[c]onstruing the word ‘admission’ to
mean ‘entry’ would be contrary to that overall purpose.”
Id.
at 393. For instance, “Congress demonstrated that it
considered the terms to have different meanings because it
retained the term ‘entry’ in certain provisions.”
Id.
(citing
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(E));
see also
, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(13)(A)
(defining “admission” to mean “the lawful entry of the alien
into the United States after inspection and authorization by an
immigration officer”). The BIA noted that we had previously
rejected the argument that the terms “entry” and “admission”
were interchangeable.
Ortega-Lopez III
, 27 I. & N. Dec.
at 397 (citing
Xi
,
The BIA also reasoned that a statute’s cross-reference to
a different statutory section functions as an “incorporation”
of the referenced section and not as a “
modification
” of the
referenced section.
Id.
at 393 (citing
Torres v. Lynch
, 136 S.
Ct. 1619, 1626 n.5 (2016)). Thus, the “most reasonable
reading” of the cross-reference in § 1229b(b)(1)(C) to an
“offense under” § 1227(a)(2) was that § 1229b(b)(1)(C)
incorporated the offense-related elements of § 1227(a)(2) but
not the immigration-related elements.
Id.
(citing
Torres
,
The BIA rejected the suggestion that this reading would render superfluous the within-five-years element in § 1227(a)(2). Id. at 393–94. The BIA instead explained that its interpretation “actually avoids rendering language in the cancellation of removal statute superfluous,” because the BIA recognized the difference between lists of offenses that prevent an alien from being eligible for relief from removal and the prerequisites that render an alien removable. at 394.
Second, the BIA evaluated the legislative history cited in Lozano-Arredondo and concluded that it neither undermined Cortez Canales nor supported an alternative interpretation. The BIA determined that, notwithstanding the language in the House Conference Report on IIRIRA, it would be unreasonable to conclude that Congress intended to require that an alien who had never been admitted (and was subject *21 to grounds of inadmissibility, not grounds of deportability) was deportable for purposes of cancellation of removal, yet not actually deportable “in the sense that the term is normally understood.” Id. at 395. Moreover, Congress did not adopt the specific language set out in the House Conference Report (and quoted in Lozano-Arredondo ), even though it had adopted similar language for the stop-time rule. at 395–96.
Based on its reasoned analysis of the statutory language, and after giving detailed consideration to Lozano-Arredondo and relevant legislative history, the BIA concluded again that the best interpretation of § 1229b(b)(1)(C) “is that the ‘offense under’ language is a limited cross-reference, one that incorporates only the offense-specific characteristics of the cross-referenced sections.” Id. at 397. Therefore, the BIA reaffirmed its decision in Cortez Canales.
Presented with ambiguous statutory language, “we may
not supply the interpretation of the statute we think best (as
we would without an agency pronouncement).”
Marmolejo-
Campos
, 558 F.3d at 908. We are instead limited under
Chevron
to determining whether the agency’s interpretation
is permissible and “not clearly contrary to the plain meaning
of the statute.”
Parrilla
,
The BIA ignored neither legislative history nor our prior holding in Gonzales-Gonzales . It grappled with legislative history before it declined to adopt Lozano-Arredondo ’s alternative approach that would require “reconstruing a cross- referenced statute for the purpose of resolving an ambiguity in the referencing provision.” Ortega-Lopez III , 27 I. & N. Dec. at 393. The BIA instead favored a reasonable approach *22 that interpreted “an ambiguous statute in a manner that is consistent with its statutory cross-reference.”
We conclude that the BIA adopted a permissible interpretation of the statute based on its expertise and discretion. It is reasonable to conclude that the offenses described under the cross-referenced sections “apply to all aliens—regardless of admission status—for purposes of § 1229b(b)(1)(C)’s bar on cancellation of removal.” Lozano- Arredondo , 866 F.3d at 1090 (citing Gonzales-Gonzales , 390 F.3d at 652). It also reasonable to conclude that ambiguous statutory cross-references will not always incorporate every component of the referenced section. See Torres , 136 S. Ct. at 1625, 1634. And, in light of the statutory text and legislative history, it was reasonable for the BIA to reject an interpretation that would require a redefinition of a statutorily defined term, “admission,” that was central to the changes made by IIRIRA to the INA. Thus, given that Lozano-Arredondo determined that § 1229b(b)(1)(C) was susceptible to the BIA’s interpretation and the BIA’s interpretation is not clearly contrary to the plain meaning of the statute, we defer to the BIA’s interpretation.
[11]
Ortega-Lopez also raises an argument based on
Matter of Garcia-
Hernandez
, 23 I. & N. Dec. 590, 593 (BIA 2003).
Garcia-Hernandez
held that § 1229b(b)(1)(C) incorporated the “petty-offense” exception set
forth in § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(I), so that an alien who has been convicted of
a crime involving moral turpitude that falls within this exception is not
ineligible for cancellation of removal. In explaining its reasoning,
Garcia-
Hernandez
stated
that
it “view[ed]
the plain
language of
[§ 1229b(b)(1)(C)] as incorporating the entirety of [§ 1182(a)(2)],
including the exception for petty offenses set forth therein.” This broad
statement has been abrogated in part by
Gonzalez-Gonzalez
, which held
that “[t]he plain language of § 1229b indicates that it should be read to
cross-reference a list of offenses in three statutes, rather than the statutes
as a whole.”
IV
In sum, we defer to the BIA’s conclusion that knowingly sponsoring or exhibiting an animal in an animal fighting venture is a crime involving moral turpitude described under § 1227(a)(2). We also defer to the BIA’s conclusion that, pursuant to the cross-reference in § 1229b(b)(1)(C), an alien is ineligible for cancellation of removal if the alien has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude for which a sentence of one year or more may be imposed, regardless whether the alien meets the immigration prerequisites for inadmissibility or deportability. Because Ortega-Lopez was convicted of a violation of § 2156(a)(1), a crime involving moral turpitude, he is ineligible for cancellation of removal.
PETITION DENIED .