Agustin Ortega-Lopez v. William Barr
978 F.3d 680
| 9th Cir. | 2020Background:
- Ortega-Lopez, a Mexican national who entered the U.S. unlawfully in 1994, pleaded guilty in 2009 to aiding and abetting a violation of 7 U.S.C. § 2156(a)(1) (sponsoring/exhibiting animals in animal fighting ventures).
- While his criminal case was pending, the government charged him as removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (present without admission); he applied for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1).
- The IJ denied cancellation, the BIA affirmed, and this Court remanded for the BIA to consider Ninth Circuit guidance on crimes involving moral turpitude (Nunez).
- On remand the BIA (Ortega-Lopez III) issued a precedential decision holding that § 2156(a)(1) is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) and that the § 1229b(b)(1)(C) cross-reference incorporates only offense-specific elements (not immigration prerequisites like the within-five-years/admission requirement).
- The Ninth Circuit deferred to the BIA on both points and denied Ortega-Lopez’s petition for review, holding his § 2156 conviction made him ineligible for cancellation of removal.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether 7 U.S.C. § 2156(a)(1) is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude | Ortega-Lopez: cockfighting harms animals and falls outside typical CIMT categories (per Nunez); statute should not be a categorical CIMT | BIA/Govt: statute requires knowing sponsorship/exhibition of animal fighting, which is morally reprehensible and has requisite culpability; BIA's published interpretation entitled to Chevron deference | Court: Defer to BIA; § 2156(a)(1) is categorically a CIMT and a sentence of ≥1 year may be imposed, so conviction is a CIMT |
| Whether the § 1229b(b)(1)(C) cross-reference incorporates immigration-related elements (e.g., committed "within five years after admission") | Ortega-Lopez: cross-reference ambiguous and should include within-five-years element (or admission redefined to mean entry for non-admitted aliens) per Lozano-Arredondo | BIA/Govt: cross-reference incorporates only offense-specific characteristics (the offense and sentence), not immigration prerequisites; redefining "admission" would conflict with IIRIRA purpose | Court: Defer to BIA; cross-reference limited to offense-related elements and does not incorporate the within-five-years/admission prerequisite; conviction under § 2156 renders alien ineligible for cancellation |
Key Cases Cited
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (establishing the categorical approach)
- INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415 (agencies get Chevron deference in immigration adjudication)
- Torres v. Lynch, 136 S. Ct. 1619 (partial incorporation by reference in the INA; interpretive principles)
- Lozano-Arredondo v. Sessions, 866 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir.: found § 1229b(b)(1)(C) ambiguous and remanded to BIA)
- Gonzalez-Gonzalez v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 649 (9th Cir.: read "convicted of an offense under" as cross-referencing lists of criminal offenses)
- Nunez v. Holder, 594 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir.: discussion of typical CIMT categories)
- Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. en banc: applying categorical approach to CIMT)
- Vartelas v. Holder, 566 U.S. 257 (explaining IIRIRA entry/admission changes)
