ADIRONDACK COMBUSTION TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Respondent, v UNICONTROL, INC., Appellant.
18 A.D.3d 912 | 793 N.Y.S.2d 576
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York
May 12, 2005
Plaintiff was a subcontractor to nonparty Albany Specialties, Inc. on a boiler repair project at the SUNY New Paltz power plant. Plaintiff was also defendant‘s sales representative, and brokered the sale of a controller device manufactured by defendant to Albany Specialties. Plaintiff installed the controller device into a boiler at SUNY New Paltz and, during a commission test of the boiler by plaintiff, the controller device failed to perform as expected, requiring an immediate shut down of the boiler. A consequent “puffback” explosion caused damage to the boiler. Plaintiff and two subcontractors hired by it performed repairs to the boiler. Plaintiff commenced this action seeking recovery from defendant of the cost of the repairs and injury to its business reputation, asserting causes of action in negligence, strict products liability, and breach of warranty. Defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and plaintiff cross-moved to amend the complaint. Supreme Court denied defendant‘s motion and granted the cross motion. Defendant appeals, and we now modify to dismiss plaintiff‘s claims for breach of express and implied warranties.
Turning first to the cross motion, it is well established that leave to amend a pleading is to be freely granted when the proposed amendment is not plainly lacking in merit and would not cause prejudice or unfair surprise to the nonmoving party (see
When a party seeks damages from a manufacturer based upon
Supreme Court erred, however, in failing to dismiss plaintiff‘s third cause of action sounding in breach of express and implied warranties. At oral argument, plaintiff conceded that it did not rely upon an express warranty made with respect to the controller device. A claim based upon a breach of an implied warranty requires a showing of privity between the manufacturer and the plaintiff when there is no claim for personal injuries (see Jaffee Assoc. v Bilsco Auto Serv., 58 NY2d 993, 995 [1983]; Arell‘s Fine Jewelers v Honeywell, Inc., 170 AD2d 1013, 1014 [1991]; County of Chenango Indus. Dev. Agency v Lockwood Greene Engrs., 114 AD2d 728, 730 [1985], appeal dismissed 67 NY2d 757 [1986]; Hole v General Motors Corp., 83 AD2d 715, 716 [1981]). While plaintiff presents a sales representative agreement between it and defendant to establish privity, that contract defines the rights, obligations and remedies of the parties with respect to plaintiff‘s agency on defendant‘s behalf, but it lacks any contemplation of plaintiff as an end user of the controller device at issue in this matter. Even affording plaintiff‘s papers the favorable view to which they are entitled on this motion (see Johnson City Cent. School Dist. v Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., 263 AD2d 580, 581-582 [1999]), there is nothing that permits the inference that plaintiff and defendant were in privity of contract related to the use of the controller device.
We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments and find them to be either meritless or academic.
