Case Information
*1 In Re: M. P., No. 3, September Term, 2023
COLLATERAL ORDER DOCTRINE – MOTION TO DISMISS – JURISDICTION OF JUVENILE COURT – Supreme Court of Maryland held that juvenile court’s denial of motion of M.P., Appellant, to dismiss for lack of juvenile court jurisdiction was immediately appealable under collateral order doctrine.
Supreme Court further held that juvenile court does not have jurisdiction over child in delinquency proceeding where child was 10 to 12 years old at time of alleged delinquent act and petition for juvenile delinquency was filed against child, charging child with act that, if committed by adult, would not be crime of violence as specified in Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law (2002, 2021 Repl. Vol., 2022 Supp.) § 14-101, and petition was pending adjudication of delinquency in juvenile court as of effective date of Juvenile Justice Reform Act (“JJRA”), as part of which General Assembly amended Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. (2006, 2020 Repl. Vol., 2022 Supp.) § 3-8A-03. Supreme Court concluded that JJRA’s change to juvenile court jurisdiction applies to cases pending adjudication of delinquency when law took effect, and, as such, juvenile court erred in denying M.P.’s motion to dismiss.
*2 Circuit Court for Prince George’s County
Case No. JA-22-0183 IN THE SUPREME COURT
Argued: September 8, 2023
OF MARYLAND No. 3 September Term, 2023 ______________________________________ IN RE: M. P.
______________________________________ Fader, C.J.
Watts *Hotten Booth Biran
Gould Eaves, JJ.
______________________________________ Opinion by Watts, J.
Biran and Gould, JJ., dissent. ______________________________________ Filed: April 23, 2024 *Hotten, J., participated in the hearing of the case, in the conference in regard to its decision, and in the adoption of the opinion as an active judge. She retired from the Court and was recalled to senior status prior to the filing of the opinion.
In this case, we are asked to determine whether a legislative change to the jurisdiction of juvenile courts, removing children under the age of 13, except under limited circumstances, from a juvenile court’s jurisdiction in delinquency proceedings, applies to delinquency proceedings that were pending at the time of the law taking effect and therefore requires dismissal of the proceedings. Before reaching this question, we must assess whether the interlocutory appeal that brought the case to us is permitted.
The law in question, Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. (2006, 2020 Repl. Vol., 2022 Supp.) (“CJ”) § 3-8A-03, which the General Assembly amended as part of the Juvenile Justice Reform Act (“the JJRA”), see 2022 Md. Laws ___ (Vol. ___, Ch. 41, S.B. 691); 2022 Md. Laws ___ (Vol. ___, Ch. 42, H.B. 459), removed from the juvenile courts’ jurisdiction juvenile delinquency proceedings against children under 13 years of age, with the exception of those aged 10 to 12 years old charged with committing an act that would be considered a crime of violence if committed by an adult. See CJ § 3-8A-03(a)(1), (d)(7). The General Assembly enacted this change in juvenile delinquency law upon the recommendation of the Maryland Juvenile Justice Reform Council (“the JJRC”), which determined, among other things, that young children are harmed by involvement in the juvenile delinquency system, with evidence increasingly demonstrating that young children have limited ability to appreciate their culpability for delinquent acts or to understand delinquency proceedings. See JJRC, Final Report at 6, 17 (Jan. 2021), available at http://dls.maryland.gov/pubs/prod/NoPblTabMtg/CmsnJuvRefCncl/JJRC-Final-Report. pdf [https://perma.cc/4DS9-T5PH].
The jurisdictional change took effect on June 1, 2022, after the child in this case, *4 M.P., Appellant, had been charged in a delinquency petition in juvenile court with the theft of a motor vehicle and related acts that were alleged to have occurred when he was 12 years old. [1] On June 30, 2022, before the juvenile court held an adjudicatory hearing on the petition, M.P. filed a motion to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction, contending that the change in law divested the juvenile court of jurisdiction over him. The State, Appellee, opposed the motion. On August 8, 2022, the juvenile court denied the motion, concluding that it had jurisdiction over M.P. based on the delinquency petition having been filed before June 1, 2022, the effective date of the JJRA. M.P. noted an interlocutory appeal to the Appellate Court of Maryland and filed in the juvenile court a motion to stay proceedings pending appeal, which was granted. Before the Appellate Court resolved the appeal, M.P. petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari . In an answer to the petition, the State contended that the juvenile court’s denial of M.P.’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is an interlocutory ruling that is not immediately appealable, and that M.P.’s petition should be denied.
We granted the petition to resolve two questions: whether M.P.’s interlocutory
appeal is permitted under the collateral order doctrine, and whether the juvenile court was
correct in ruling that it maintained jurisdiction over M.P., a child charged with non-violent
acts allegedly committed when he was 12 years old, before the effective date of the JJRA.
On September 8, 2023, after oral argument in the case, we issued an order denying a motion
*5
by the State to dismiss M.P.’s appeal, concluding that under the common law collateral
order doctrine, an immediate appeal of the August 8, 2022 ruling of the juvenile court
denying M.P.’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is permitted. In the same order,
we reversed the juvenile court’s denial of M.P.’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
See In Re: M. P.,
In this Court, the parties disagree only as to whether an interlocutory appeal is allowed. M.P. contends that his interlocutory appeal is permitted under the collateral order doctrine as an exception to the general requirement that an appeal lies only from a final judgment. The State responds that the collateral order doctrine does not apply and includes in its brief a motion to dismiss the appeal. The parties agree, however, that, should this Court determine that M.P.’s appeal is not permitted under the collateral order doctrine, the Court may exercise its discretion to address the merits to provide guidance to juvenile courts about jurisdiction in this case and others like it.
As to the merits, the parties agree that the juvenile court erred in denying M.P.’s motion to dismiss. The parties agree that, under this Court’s case law, as a result of the jurisdictional change brought about by the JJRA, the juvenile court does not have jurisdiction over M.P. because he was charged with committing non-violent acts when he was 12 years оld and the case was pending in the juvenile court at the time that the JJRA became effective. M.P. and the State agree that applying the jurisdictional change from the JJRA to a delinquency case that was pending, but not final, on June 1, 2022, does not involve a determination as to whether the change applies retroactively, but rather rests on *6 the prospective application of a change in juvenile law, making the new law applicable to this case and others in a similar procedural posture.
In the petition for a writ of certiorari , as the second of two questions, M.P. asked this Court to determine whether an order denying a motion to dismiss for lack of juvenile court jurisdiction is immediately appealable. Because challenges to jurisdiction in juvenile matters may occur for a variety of reasons, we rephrase M.P.’s question as follows: whether a juvenile court’s denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine where the court determined that it maintained jurisdiction over a child who was 12 years old at the time he allegedly committed a non- violent delinquent act, [2] because the petition for juvenile delinquency was filed before the effective date of the JJRA. We answer the question “yes” and conclude that M.P.’s appeal is permitted under the collateral order doctrine.
Addressing the merits, we agree with M.P. and the State that the juvenile court erred in denying M.P.’s motion to dismiss. We hold that a juvenile court does not have jurisdiction over a child who was 10 to 12 years old at the time of an alleged delinquent act and charged in a petition for juvenile delinquency with the commission of an act that, if committed by an adult, is not a crime of violence as specified in Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law (2002, 2021 Repl. Vol., 2022 Supp.) (“CR”) § 14-101, where the petition was pending *7 adjudication of delinquency [3] in the juvenile court as of the effective date of the JJRA. See CJ § 3-8A-03(a)(1), (d)(7).
Given that the petition charging M.P. with delinquent acts was pending adjudication at the time that the JJRA took effect and there is no dispute about M.P.’s age at the time of the alleged acts (he was 12 years old) or that he was charged with conduct that, if committed by an adult, would not have constituted a crime of violence under CR § 14-101, based on the plain language of the JJRA, its legislative history, and our case law, the juvenile court erred in denying M.P.’s motion to dismiss. Therefore, in this and any other case in which a juvenile delinquency petition is pending on or after June 1, 2022, in which there is no genuine factual dispute concerning the juvenile’s age or whether the juvenile was charged with having committed an act that would not be a crime of violence if committed by an adult, the juvenile court no longer has jurisdiction over the juvenile and must dismiss the case.
BACKGROUND
On April 9, 2022, the General Assembly enacted the JJRA, with an effective date of June 1, 2022. See 2022 Md. Laws ___ (Vol. ___, Ch. 41, S.B. 691); 2022 Md. Laws ___ (Vol. ___, Ch. 42, H.B. 459). Among other changes, this legislation established, for the first time, a minimum age restriction on the jurisdiction of juvenile courts with regard to children alleged to be dеlinquent. See CJ § 3-8A-03(a)(1), (d)(7). Whereas, previously, the juvenile court had “exclusive original jurisdiction over[ a] child who is alleged to be delinquent[,]” Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. (2006, 2020 Repl. Vol., 2021 Supp.) (“CJ (2021)”) § 3-8A-03(a)(1), and there was no minimum age limitation, the JJRA restricted a juvenile court’s jurisdiction in delinquency proceedings to children “[w]ho [are] at least 13 years old [and] alleged to be delinquent” or “at least 10 years old [and] alleged to have committed an act[ t]hat, if committed by an adult, would constitute a crime of violence, as defined in” CR § 14-101, or “[a]rising out of the same incident as” such an act, CJ § 3-8A- 03(a)(1), (d)(7). [4] The JJRA also added CJ § 3-8A-03(f), which provides that “[a] child under the age of 13 years may not be charged with a crime.”
On May 5, 2022, prior to the effective date of the JJRA, the State filed a juvenile petition in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, sitting as a juvenile court, alleging that on March 12, 2022, M.P. committed motor vehicle theft and related delinquent acts. M.P. was 12 years old on the date of the alleged acts. On June 30, 2022, prior to the juvenile court’s adjudication of the petition, counsel for M.P. filed a motion to dismiss for *9 lack of jurisdiction because the JJRA had taken effect on June 1, 2022. The State opposed the motion. On August 8, 2022, the juvenile court held a hearing on the motion and denied it, ruling that the JJRA did not deprive the court of jurisdiction that had been established over M.P. at the time of the filing of the delinquency petition. The court stated that “the clear language of the statute[] does not appear to apply retroactively to any claims that arose prior to June 1st, 2022.”
On August 12, 2022, M.P. noted an appeal to the Appellate Court of Maryland. The same day, M.P. filed in the juvenile court a motion to stay proceedings pending the appeal, which the court granted on August 15, 2022.
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
On November 23, 2022, before the State filed a brief in the Appellate Court, M.P.
filed in this Court a petition for a writ of
certiorari
, raising two issues: whether the juvenile
court retained jurisdiction over M.P. after the effective date of the JJRA, and whether a
juvenile court’s denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is immediately
appealable.
[5]
In an answer to M.P.’s petition, although contending that the denial of the
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction was not immediately appealable, the State advised
*10
that, if this Court disagreed or concluded that the appealability issue merited review, the
State did not oppose the granting of the petition to consider M.P.’s question concerning the
applicability of the JJRA. The State filed a motion to stay proceedings in the Appellate
Court as this Court was considering M.P.’s petition for a writ of
certiorari,
and the
Appellate Court granted the motion. On March 24, 2023, we granted M.P.’s petition. See
In Re: M. P.,
DISCUSSION [6]
I. Appealability
A. The Parties’ Contentions In its brief, the State brings a motion to dismiss the appeal, contending that the juvenile court’s denial of M.P.’s motion to dismiss is not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. According to the State, M.P.’s appeal is not permitted under the collateral order doctrine because it fails to meet the requirement that the denial of the motion to dismiss “would be effectively unreviewable if the appeal had to await the entry of a final judgment.”
The State likens M.P.’s contention that the denial of his motion to dismiss is
immediately appealable to that of the appellant in In re Franklin P.,
The State also asserts that there is no basis for M.P.’s contention that he has the right to an immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine because he has a right to not be subject to delinquency proceedings in the same way that a criminal defendant has a right to not be tried twice for the same offense under the Fifth Amendment prohibition against double jeopardy. The State maintains that this Court has already rejected comparisons between the denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction based on a violation of the double jeopardy right, which is immediately appealable, and other claims that the denial of a motion to dismiss is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. Finally, although the State contends that the appeal should be dismissed, the State advises that “this case presents one of the rare times this Court’s guidance on the merits may be warranted” because “the merits issue is an uncontested matter of statutory interpretation and [] there is a need for guidance in the lower courts[.]”
M.P. responds that the juvenile court’s denial of his motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine because the denial
of the motion to dismiss meets all four elements that this Court has established as necessary
*12
for the collateral order doctrine to apply, as the denial “(1) conclusively determines the
disputed question, (2) resolves an important issue, (3) resolves an issue that is completely
separate from the merits of the action, and (4) would be effectively unreviewable if the
appeal had to await the entry of a final judgment.” (Quoting Stephens v. State, 420 Md.
495, 502,
M.P. analogizes the circuit court’s denial of his motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction “to the denial of a motion to dismiss pursuant to the double jeopardy clause”
by a criminal defendant, which is immediately appealable under the collateral order
doctrine. Quoting Richardson v. United States,
B. Statutory Construction
“Our goal in statutory construction is to determine legislative intent[,]” starting
“with the plain meaning of the statutory language in question.” State v. Krikstan, 483 Md.
43, 65,
C. Relevant Case Law: Interlocutory Appeals
Generally, a party has a right to appeal only “from a final judgment entered in a civil
or criminal case by a circuit court.” CJ § 12-301. “The primary rationale is to prevent
piecemeal appeals and to prevent the interruption of ongoing judicial proceedings[,]” in
order “to promote judicial efficiency and economy.” Sigma Reprod. Health Ctr. v. State,
(2020) (citing Salvagno v. Frew,
Under the collateral order doctrine, an order is immediately appealable if it “(1) conclusively detеrmines the disputed question, (2) resolves an important issue, (3) resolves an issue that is completely separate from the merits of the action, and (4) would be effectively unreviewable if the appeal had to await the entry of a final judgment.” Id. at 502, 24 A.3d at 109 (cleaned up). To qualify for immediate appealability under the collateral order doctrine, an order must meet all four elements. See id. at 502-03, 24 A.3d at 109. We apply these elements “very strictly” in keeping with the narrow nature of the exception, which should apply “only in extraordinary circumstances.” Id. at 503, 24 A.3d at 109 (cleaned up).
It is well settled that an immediate appeal of the denial of a motion to dismiss on
the ground that the prosecution violates a defendant’s double jeopardy rights is permitted
under the collateral order doctrine. See id. at 505 n.4,
that a ruling denying a claimed violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause comes within the collateral order doctrine because the ruling constitutes a final rejection of the claim, the issue is entirely collateral to and separable from the issue of guilt or innocence, and most significantly, delay in appellate review until after a final judgment would undermine the very right accorded by the double jeopardy prohibition, that is, the “guarantee against being twice put to trial for the same offense.”
Id. at 505 n.4, 24 A.3d at 111 n.4 (quoting Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 661 (1977)) (emphasis in original).
In Stephens, we concluded that such was not the case, though, with the right
afforded by the statute at issue, which forbade the imposition of the death penalty without
the State having first presented to the jury or court biological or DNA evidence linking a
defendant to a murder; we determined that right, “akin to the right to a speedy trial, must
await appellate review following final judgment.” Id. at 498, 506,
Similarly, in Bunting v. State,
In Bunting, id. at 479-80, 540 A.2d at 808, we described a general problem that
could have arisen from a holding to the contrary by observing “that numerous ‘rights’ can
readily be characterized as entitling a party to avoid trial under some circumstances.” We
identified the denial of a motion for summary judgment or a motion to dismiss based on a
statute of limitations as situations that could potentially be described as a right to avoid
trial absent some prerequisite, and that permitting the collateral order doctrine to apply in
those instances would permit the doctrine to “largely erode the final judgment rule.” Id. at
480,
Fundamentally, Parrott’s point that his prosecution should not have been removed from Prince George’s County (or, if removed, should have been sent to a county of like demographics) will not be lost if there is a final judgment against Parrott and the point is made on appeal from that judgment. . . . Any right which Parrott asserts in opposition to the State’s suggestion of removal necessarily deals with the place of trial. But Parrott asserts no right which could prevent the trial itself.
Id. at 425-26,
In Franklin P., 366 Md. at 313-14, 783 A.2d at 677-78, we determined that the
collateral order doctrine did not allow an immediate appeal from a criminal court’s denial
of a juvenile defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The juvenile defendant
faced adult criminal charges as a result of the juvenile court having granted the State’s
motion for waiver of jurisdiction. See id. at 311-12,
In discussing the rationale for not permitting interlocutory appeals of orders waiving
juvenile court jurisdiction, we explained that the General Assembly had made clear that
“[a]ppeals of waiver decisions are interlocutory[,] intended to be resolved after the
conclusion of the proceedings in the criminal court trial[,]” and “not intended to be made
before a final decision in the criminal courts[.]” Id. at 325,
Recently, in O.P.,
D. M.P.’s Interlocutory Appeal
In this case, after careful reviеw of the authorities above, we conclude that the
juvenile court’s denial of M.P.’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction falls within the
“narrow class of cases excepted from the final judgment requirement” and presents one of
the rare circumstances in which an immediate appeal of an interlocutory order is permitted
by the collateral order doctrine. Parrott,
The fourth element—whether the issue would be effectively unreviewable if the appeal had to await entry of a final judgment—is where the controversy exists. Because M.P. phrased the question broadly to be whether a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction in juvenile court is immediately appealable, we have narrowed the question to focus on whether a juvenile court’s denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is immediately appealable where the juvenile court determined that it maintained jurisdiction over a 12-year-old, after the effective date of the JJRA, in a pending case that did not involve an act that, if committed by an adult, would constitute a crime of violence. We conclude that the denial of the motion to dismiss in question is effectively not reviewable after final judgment and embodies a decision affecting the well-being of a juvenile that is unlike other determinations with respect to jurisdiction that we have held not to be immediately appealable.
To reject M.P.’s argument that a juvenile’s court’s lack of jurisdiction under CJ § 3-8A-03 over a child under the age of 13 implies a right for the child to not be subject to delinquency proceedings would be to ignore the plain language and legislative history of the JJRA, as well as our case law. CJ § 3-8A-03(a)(1) provides that, in addition to the jurisdiction of a juvenile court concerning CINA cases, the juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction over a child:
(i) Who is at least 13 years old alleged to be delinquent; or (ii) Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section, who is at least 10 years old alleged to have committed an act:
1. That, if committed by an adult, would constitute a crime of violence, as defined in § 14-101 of the Criminal Law Article; or 2. Arising out of the same incident as an act listed in item 1 of this item[.]
CJ § 3-8A-03(d)(7) provides that the juvenile court “does not have jurisdiction over[,]” “[e]xcept as provided in subsection (a)(1)(ii) of this section, a delinquency proceeding against a child who is under the age of 13 years.”
In amending CJ § 3-8A-03, the General Assembly, based on extensive study, purposefully “limit[ed] the circumstances under which a child younger than age 13 is subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court[.]” S.B. 691 (2022), Revised Fiscal and Policy Note at 1 (Mar. 24, 2022), available at https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2022RS/fnotes/ bil_0001/sb0691.pdf [https://perma.cc/6LJA-BQRX]. The Revised Fiscal and Policy Note demonstrates that Senate Bill 691 (2022) generally implemented recommendations of the JJRC, which was created pursuant to Chapters 252 and 253 of the session laws of 2019 to *22 study the handling of children in the juvenile and criminal justice systems and which issued its final report in January 2021 and a supplemental report in October 2021. See id. at 9. In its final report, the JJRC explained that, with the assistance of the Vera Institute of Justice, it had researched “best practices regarding the treatment of juveniles who are subject to the criminal and juvenile justice systems and identif[ied] recommendations to limit or otherwise mitigate risk factors that contribute to juvenile contact with the criminal and juvenile justice systems.” JJRC, Final Report at 6.
In a section of the final report concerning policy, the JJRC stated that “[a] growing body of evidence has found that pre-teens have diminished neurocognitive capacity to be held culpable for their actions” and that they similarly “have little ability to understand delinquency charges against them, their rights and role in an adversarial system, and the role of adults in th[e] system.” Id. at 17 (footnote omitted). The JJRC reported that, “[r]ecognizing this developmental science, as well as recognizing the damage inflicted by putting relatively young children into the juvenile justice system, several states have recently moved to create a minimum age of juvenile court jurisdiction.” Id. [8] As such, the *23 JJRC recommended that the juvenile court should not have jurisdiction over children under the age of 10, that the juvenile court should have jurisdiction over a child of 10 to 12 years old only when the child is alleged to have committed specific identified acts, such as murder or rape, and that “[t]he juvenile court should have jurisdiction over a child at least 13 years old alleged to have committed a delinquent act.” JJRC, Final Report at 19. In the Racial Equity Impact Note for Senate Bill 691 (2022), the Conclusion section stated, among other things:
By establishing a minimum age of juvenile court jurisdiction for which a juvenile may be subjected to formal prosecution and court processes, the bill will significantly impact youths under the age of 13. There has been considerable discussion in the juvenile justice policy arena that preteens have diminished neurocognitive capacity to be held culpable for their actions and also lack the ability to understand legal charges against them. Specifically, Black juveniles under age 13 will benefit to the greatest extent under the bill given that they are disproportionately and disparately impacted by [Department of Juvenile Services] intakes, dispositions, and placements. While there was not sufficient data available to reliably estimate the impact of other changes made by the bill, the provisions regarding the expanded use of informal adjustments, limitations on probation, detention, and out-of- home placements, as well as the creation of a permanent commission to conduct evidence-based[] research regarding juvenile rehabilitation, will likely result in positive equity impacts in general.
S.B. 691 (2022), Racial Equity Impact Note at 7-8 (Mar. 28, 2022), available at https:// mgaleg.maryland.gov/Pubs/BudgetFiscal/2022RS-SB0691-REIN.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 73B6-YXYL].
Generally, under our case law, the nature of a challenge to a court’s denial of a
motion to dismiss counsels against allowing a ruling on such a motion to be immediately
appealable where the challenge depends on a condition precedent to dismissal being
appropriate or where the question is which of one or more courts has jurisdiction. See
*24
Stephens,
[11] In Bradford,
right to avoid trial, i.e ., a delinquency proceeding, altogether is at stake. It would be contrary to the General Assembly’s purpose in enacting the JJRA for this Court to conclude that M.P. and similarly situated children whose cases were pending adjudication of delinquency when the JJRA became effective must undergo adjudication and disposition in the juvenile justice system before an appeal is permitted.
In this case, there are no factual disputes about M.P.’s age at the time of the alleged delinquent acts (he was 12 years old) or whether he has or has not been alleged to have committed an act that, if committed by an adult, would constitute a crime of violence (he has not). Nor is there any dispute concerning a condition precedent to the applicability of the JJRA to M.P. Given that legislative removal of the juvenile courts’ jurisdiction over youth under a designated age is unlikely to reoccur, this provides an important limiting factor that gives assurance that applying the collateral order doctrine exception in this instance will not swallow the general rule that an appeal must await final judgment. Further, the particular emphasis placed by the General Assembly on the harm to young children from involvement in delinquency proceedings and the juvenile justice system, from which the General Assembly has sought to protect them, is the sоrt of “value of a high order” or “substantial public interest”—beyond the “mere avoidance of a trial”—that the Supreme Court has described as necessary to justify application of the collateral order doctrine. Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 352-53 (2006) (citation omitted). [12] These *27 dynamics provide a strong rationale for applying the collateral order doctrine to the facts of this case.
The circumstances in Franklin P. provide little insight into the resolution of the issue
here.
[13]
To be sure, the State is correct that, in Franklin P.,
Supreme Court explained that the statutory judgment bar, although “arguably broader than traditional res judicata, [] functions in” a similar way, and “[t]he concern behind both rules is . . . of avoiding duplicative litigation, multiple suits on identical entitlements or obligations between the same parties.” Id. at 354 (cleaned up). The Supreme Court stated that the “rule of respecting a prior judgment by giving a defense against relitigation has not been thought to protect values so great that only immediate appeal can effectively vindicate them.” Id. at 355. Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that the statutory judgment bar “has no claim to greater importance than the typical defense of claim preclusion” and an order rejecting such a defense “cries for no immediate appeal of right as a collateral order.” Id.
[13]
Likewise, the fact that M.P.’s case is not on all fours with O.P.,
In Franklin P., id. at 314,
*29
The appeal in Franklin P. involved an issue that will continue to present itself in the
foreseeable future in juvenile delinquency cases, as long as juvenile courts are permitted
to waive jurisdiction. In contrast, the question before us is uniquely limited to application
of the recent amendments to CJ § 3-8A-03. In Franklin P.,
Even though we agree with M.P. that the collateral order doctrine applies, as in
Franklin P., id. at 335 n.25,
II. Applicability of CJ § 3-8A-03 to Juvenile Proceedings Pending as of June 1, 2022
A. The Parties’ Contentions
M.P. contends that, because his case was pending when the JJRA became effective
on June 1, 2022, its new jurisdictional limitations divested the juvenile court of jurisdiction
over him. M.P. asserts that this is because neither the plain languаge of the JJRA nor its
legislative history expressly indicates that the General Assembly did not intend it to apply
to cases pending at the time of its enactment. M.P. relies on Waker v. State,
M.P. points out that the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate
District, took a similar approach in In re David C.,
M.P. contends that the body of law concerning retrospective versus prospective applicability of statutes does not apply because this case does not involve a retroactive application of an amended statute to a previously adjudicated case. Nonetheless, M.P. asserts that, even under a retroactivity analysis, his case should be dismissed because applying the JJRA “retrospectively comports with the legislative intent to exclude young children as a class from the juvenile courts.” (Bolding omitted). M.P. asserts that any question about the applicability of the JJRA’s jurisdictional limits to his case under a retroactivity analysis should be resolved in his favor because the JJRA constitutes a procedural and remedial change in the law that does not impact substantive rights.
The State agrees that the change to the juvenile court’s jurisdiction under CJ § 3- 8A-03 ended the court’s jurisdiction over M.P. The State contends that, although the juvenile court “obtained exclusive original jurisdiction over the action” when the State filed the delinquency petition against M.P. on May 5, 2022, jurisdiction ended as a matter of law when the JJRA and its changes to juvenile court jurisdiction took effect on June 1, 2022.
The State agrees that this case does not involve an issue of retroactive application
of changes in juvenile court jurisdiction, and states that applying “CJ § 3-8A-03(d)(7) to
*32
prevent future judicial action is the same as apрlying a statute prospectively.” The State
contends that, under John Deere Constr. and Forestry Co. v. Reliable Tractor, Inc., 406 Md.
139, 147-48, 957 A.2d 595, 599-600 (2008), which incorporates the Supreme Court’s
holding in Landgraf v. USI Film Prods.,
B. Standard of Review
Because the question of whether the change to the juvenile court’s jurisdiction under
CJ § 3-8A-03 applies to M.P. is an issue of statutory interpretation, we review the juvenile
court’s decision without deference,
i.e.
,
de novo
. See Krikstan,
C. Jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court
Statutory Jurisdiction under CJ § 3-8A-03 and the Effect of the JJRA
The juvenile court is a court of limited jurisdiction that can exercise only authority
specified by statute. See Smith v. State,
Through the JJRA, the General Assembly amended CJ § 3-8A-03 by restricting the juvenile court’s jurisdiction in delinquency cases to children who are at least 13 years old, with the exception of those who are 10 to 12 years old and alleged to have committed an act that would be classified as a crime of violence if committed by an adult. See 2022 Md. Laws ___ (Vol. ___, Ch. 41, S.B. 691); 2022 Md. Laws ___ (Vol. ___, Ch. 42, H.B. 459). A provision in the same subtitle that predated the JJRA, and was unaffected by the new law, provides that “the age of the person at the time the alleged delinquent act was committed controls the determination of jurisdiction under this subtitle.” CJ § 3-8A-05(a). Thus, under CJ § 3-8A-05(a), the child’s age on the date of the alleged delinquent act is the determinative point for establishing a juvenile court’s jurisdiction in a delinquency case.
Relevant Case Law
In the absence of instruction otherwise from the General Assembly, our precedent
establishes that newly-enacted statutes generally apply prospectively, not retroactively.
See Langston v. Riffe,
This conceptual framework was laid out by the Supreme Court of the United States
in Landgraf,
We have held that, when the General Assembly lessens a penalty for a particular
criminal offense after the defendant’s alleged conduct occurred but before conviction and
sentencing, the new, lesser penalty applies. See Waker,
As M.P. points out, an appellate court in another jurisdiction has tackled a statutory
change to juvenile court jurisdiction and considered application of the statutory amendment
to cases that arose before the law changed. See David C.,
The Court relied on precedent of the Supreme Court of California under which the
legislature’s change to a statute that lessens penalties leads to “an inevitable inference” that
such “ameliorative changes” are intended, absent contrary instruction, “to extend as
broadly as possible, distinguishing only as necessary between sentences that are final and
sentences that are not.” Id. at 768-69 (quoting Estrada,
D. The Juvenile Court’s Jurisdiction over M.P.
We hold that, under the plain language of the JJRA, the juvenile court lost jurisdiction over M.P. on June 1, 2022, when the jurisdictional limits of the JJRA became effective. Leaving aside the question of retroactivity, under the plain language of CJ § 3- 8A-03(d)(7), the court lacked jurisdiction over the delinquency proceeding against M.P., who was under the age of 13 years at the time of the alleged delinquent acts—as CJ § 3- 8A-05(a) provides that jurisdiction is to be determined by the age of the person at the time the alleged delinquent act was committed, and the JJRA’s exception for 10- to 12-year- olds charged with an act that, if committed by an adult, would be a crime of violence does not apply. Nothing in the JJRA provides that its change in juvenile court jurisdiction does not apply to pending cases. Thus, based on the plain language of the statute, the juvenile court erred in failing to grant M.P.’s motion to dismiss.
By way of analogy, we note that in Parojinog v. State,
In assessing whether the new provision—
i.e.
, Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc.
(1974, 1975 Supp.) (“CJ (1975)”) § 3-807(b)—divested the juvenile court of jurisdiction,
we stated that “[i]t is the time the petition is filed, not the time of adjudication, which
determines the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and the applicability of” CJ (1975) § 3-
807(b). Id. at 265,
Parojinog and the cases cited in it endorse the principle set forth in CJ § 3-8A-05(a),
that the age of the child at the time that the alleged delinquent act was committed controls
the determination of the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. This is just as the State indicates
in its brief in this Court. Quoting Parojinog,
*40 CJ § 3-8A-07(a) provides that, “[i]f the court obtains jurisdiction over a child under this subtitle, that jurisdiction continues until that person reaches 21 years of age unless terminated sooner.” Jurisdiction can continue only where jurisdiction exists. As explained in detail herein, a juvenile court does not have jurisdiction over a child who was under the age of 13 at the time of an alleged non-violent delinquent аct where a petition was pending an adjudication of delinquency when the JJRA took effect.
By contrast, under circumstances very different than those of this case, in In re
Valerie H., 310 Md. 113, 116-17, 527 A.2d 42, 43-44 (1987), a CINA case, this Court
observed that, under Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. (1974, 1984 Repl. Vol.) (“CJ
(1984)”) § 3-806(a) (which is now CJ § 3-8A-07(a)), “jurisdiction, once acquired,
terminates [] only if the juvenile court so orders.” At that time, all juvenile causes—those
involving children alleged to be delinquent, in need of supervision, or in need of
assistance—were governed by the same statutory scheme, and CJ (1984) § 3-806(a)
provided that the juvenile court’s jurisdiction over those cases continued until the person
reached 21 years of age unless terminated sooner. See id. at 117,
With respect to children in need of assistance, i.e ., CINA cases, CJ § 3-804(b) differs from CJ § 3-8A-07(a) by providing: “If the court obtains jurisdiction over a child, that jurisdiction continues in that case until the child reaches the age of 21 years, unless the court terminates the case. ” (Emphasis added). In other words, in CINA cases, CJ § 3- *41 804(b) contemplates that the juvenile court’s jurisdiction, once acquired, continues until the child is 21 unless the juvenile court terminates the case, i.e. , so orders. In contrast, CJ § 3-8A-07(a), which applies to delinquency cases, provides that, “[i]f the court obtains jurisdiction over a child under this subtitle, that jurisdiction continues until that person reaches 21 years of age unless terminated sooner.” CJ § 3-8A-07(a) does not expressly require that jurisdiction be terminated by the court and jurisdiction can be terminated by operation of law where, as here, there is a change in the law or by order of the court. [18]
In Valerie H., 310 Md. at 114, 117, 527 A.2d at 43-44, our observation that
jurisdiction continues until a child is 21 unless terminated by order of the juvenile court
was made as we interpreted an earlier version of CJ § 3-8A-07(a) in a case in which a child
had been found to be CINA. The child’s care and custody had been committed to the
Department of Social Services for Baltimore City. See id. at 114,
In this instance, retroactive application of a jurisdictional amendment is not at issue
because the jurisdictional question here concerns the authority of the juvenile court to take
the action at issue subsequent to the effective date of the JJRA. The issue does not involve
a question of retroactivity “merely because [CJ § 3-8A-03(d)(7)] is applied in a case arising
from conduct antedating the statute’s enactment[.]” Landgraf,
Our precedent requires the outcome we reach because, without “a contrary
expression of intent, a cause of action or remedy dependent upon a statute falls with the
repeal of [the] statute.” Johnson, 285 Md. at 344, 402 A.2d at 878 (citations omitted).
With no indication in the JJRA that the General Assembly intended for the changes to CJ
*43
§ 3-8A-03 not to apply
[19]
to pending cases, jurisdiction over the delinquency petition and
proceeding fell with the repeal of the juvenile courts’ jurisdiction over children charged
with nonviolent conduct that occurred when they were under 13 years old. In Landgraf,
511 U.S. at 274, the Supreme Court explained that it had applied intervening statutes
removing jurisdiction, regardless of whether jurisdiction lay when the underlying conduct
occurred or when an action was filed. The Supreme Court explained that, in Bruner, 343
U.S. at 116-17, relying on its “consistent practice,” the Court “ordered an action dismissed
because the jurisdictional statute under which it had been (properly) filed was subsequently
repealed.” Landgraf,
Our conclusion is also consistent with our holding in Waker and a long line of
precedent providing that, where a statute is amended or repealed “after an alleged offense
or after an event giving rise to some alleged liability, a court, including an appellate court,
would generally apply the law as it existed when the court was considering the case and
not the law in effect when the alleged offense or event occurred.” Waker,
Lastly, we note that the general saving statute, GP § 1-205, is inapplicable.
[21]
To be
sure, in State v. Clifton,
The scenario in Clifton is readily distinguishable from the JJRA’s limiting jurisdiction in order to prevent children under the age of 13 years, with certain exceptions, from being subjected to juvenile delinquency proceedings. Put simply, Clifton does not support the applicability of the general saving clause to a law in which the General Assembly sought to avoid harm to young children by limiting their exposure to the juvenile justice system.
III. Conclusion
We hold that the juvenile court’s denial of M.P.’s motion to dismiss for lack of juvenile court jurisdiction was immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. We further hold that the juvenile court does not have jurisdiction over a child in a delinquency proceeding where the child was under 13 years old at the time of the alleged delinquent act, the petition for juvenile delinquency does not charge the child (if between 10 and 12 years old) with the commission of an act that, if committed by an adult, would be a crime of violence as specified in CR § 14-101, and the petition was pending adjudication of delinquency as of the effective date of the JJRA. See CJ § 3-8A-03(a)(1), (d)(7). In other words, the JJRA’s change to juvenile court jurisdiction applies to cases pending when the law took effect; as such, the juvenile court erred in denying M.P.’s *47 motion to dismiss. [22]
For the reasons set forth above, in the order issued on September 8, 2023, we denied
the State’s motion to dismiss the appeal in this case and reversed the August 8, 2022 ruling
of the juvenile court denying M.P.’s motion to dismiss the delinquency petition pending
against him in Case No. JA-22-0183. See M. P.,
Case No. JA-22-0183 Argued: September 8, 2023
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MARYLAND No. 3 September Term, 2023 ______________________________________ IN RE M.P.
______________________________________ ______________________________________ Fader, C.J., Watts, *Hotten, Booth, Biran, Gould, Eaves, JJ.
______________________________________ Dissenting Opinion by Gould, J. which Biran, J. joins ______________________________________ Filed: April 23, 2024 *Hotten, J., participated in the hearing of the case, in the conference in regard to its decision, and in the adoption of the opinion as an active judge. She retired from the Court and was recalled to senior status prior to the filing of the opinion.
I respectfully dissent. This case raises two questions of jurisdiction. The first is whether the juvenile court’s denial of M.P.’s motion to dismiss was immediately appealable. The second is whether the jurisdictional changes under the Juvenile Justice Reform Act (“JJRA”) divested the juvenile court of jurisdiction over M.P.’s delinquency proceeding on June 1, 2022.
On appeal, [1] the parties both contend that the JJRA divested the juvenile court of jurisdiction when the JJRA went into effect. The parties focused on the appealability issue at oral argument. Later that day, the Court, with a Majority concurring, entered an order reversing the juvenile court’s order. The Majority concluded that the juvenile court’s order was immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine and that the JJRA divested the juvenile court of jurisdiction when it went into effect on June 1, 2022. The order called for an immediate mandate and indicated that an opinion would follow.
At that time, I believed that my dissent would focus on the appealability issue. As I got deeper into the drafting process, I became convinced that the Court incorrectly determined that the JJRA divested the juvenile court of jurisdiction. I continue to believe that the collateral order doctrine does not apply, but my conсern about the ramifications of applying that doctrine here is mitigated by the narrow way the Majority applied it here. Thus, I will only briefly explain why I believe the Majority incorrectly decided that issue and devote the rest of this dissent to the jurisdiction issue.
*50 As to the juvenile court’s jurisdiction, the issue is not what “does not have jurisdiction” means in the context of subsection 3-8A-03(d)(7) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings (“CJ”) Article of the Maryland Annotated Code (2020 Repl. Vol., 2022 Supp.); [2] the question is whether subsection (d)(7) applies to pending cases. Because the text of the JJRA does not expressly say that it does not apply to pending cases, the Majority concludes that it does. In my view, the opposite conclusion should be drawn: The General Assembly drafted the JJRA under the presumption that its jurisdictional changes would not apply to pending cases and included no language to the contrary. I arrived at this conclusion for several independent reasons.
First, the Majority’s plain language analysis focuses on the introductory phrase of CJ § 3-8A-03(d) along with subpart (7) but disregards another relevant provision—CJ § 3- 8A-07(a). Subsection CJ § 3-8A-07(a) states that once the juvenile court acquires jurisdiction, such jurisdiction continues until the child reaches the age of 21 unless such jurisdiction is “terminated sooner.” Applying this provision over forty years ago, we held that a jurisdiction-narrowing amendment does not terminate jurisdiction acquired before the amendment’s effective date. See Parojinog v. State , 282 Md. 256, 265 (1978). The General Assembly was presumably aware of that precedent yet did not express a clear intention to abrogate it. We can fairly presume, therefore, that the General Assembly *51 intended to follow such precedent. The Majority’s discussion of Parojinog side steps the crux of our analysis and holding in that case.
Second, the Majority’s interpretation conflicts with Maryland’s general savings statute. Md. Code Ann., Gen. Provis. (“GP”) § 1-205 (2014, 2019 Repl. Vol.). The General Assembly was obviously aware of that statute and how it would apply to the JJRA yet failed to put the JJRA out of its reach. In contending that the general savings statute does not apply, the Majority dismisses without explanation the caselaw that, in my view, compels its application here.
And finally, the Majority’s interpretation allows for consequences that the General Assembly could not have intended. Had it so intended, the General Assembly would have had a practical reason to explicitly state that the JJRA’s jurisdictional changes would apply to pending cases: to avoid the waste of time and resources. The Majority’s interpretation requires acceptance of the premise that the General Assembly intended for resources to be devoted to investigating incidents and filing delinquency proceedings in the months before the JJRA’s effective date, even though it knew and intended that such cases would have to be dismissed. That, among other problematic consequences of the Majority’s analysis discussed below, supports the commonsense conclusion that the Generаl Assembly did not intend to divest the juvenile court of jurisdiction over pending cases when the JJRA went into effect.
THE COLLATERAL ORDER DOCTRINE
In my view, the Majority erred in applying the collateral order doctrine here. As the Majority explains, the collateral order doctrine is meant to be a limited exception to the *52 final judgment rule. Here, the Majority concludes that “[i]mplicit in the General Assembly’s enactment of the JJRA is the premise that children under the age of 13, who are not charged with having committed a violent offense, have a right to be free of involvement in the juvenile system.” Maj. Op. at 23. The Majority also cites legislative history to make the point that an immediate appeal fulfills the General Assembly’s goal of protecting “young children from involvement in delinquency proceedings and the juvenile justice system” without risking undue expansion of the collateral order doctrine’s applicability because there is no dispute about M.P.’s age and, the Majority speculates, further amendments removing “the juvenile courts’ jurisdiction over youth under a designated age [are] unlikely to reoccur[.]” Maj. Op. at 24. To prevent this narrow exception from swallowing the final judgment rule, the Majority tailor-made its analysis to fit the specific circumstances of M.P.’s case.
The collateral order doctrine applies if the order: “(1) conclusively determines the
disputed question, (2) resolves an important issue, (3) resolves an issue that is completely
separate from the merits of the action,
and
(4) would be effectively unreviewable if the
appeal had to await the entry of a final judgment.”
Stephens v. State
,
The fourth element “turns on whether there will be a serious risk of irreparable loss
of the claimed right if appellate review is deferred until after trial.”
Harris v. David S.
Harris, P.A.
,
An adverse finding and disposition, however, can be stayed and then reversed on appeal. Thus, an order denying a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction could be effectively reviewed on appeal. I would hold that the fourth element of the collateral order doctrine does not apply and would dismiss the appeal.
Ordinarily, when we dismiss an appeal, we do not address its merits.
Eastgate
Assocs. v. Apper
,
JURISDICTION OF THE JUVENILE COURT
The Juvenile Causes Statute
M.P. allegedly stole a car in March 2022, prompting the State to file a delinquency petition against him on May 5, 2022. When that petition was filed, the juvenile court acquired jurisdiction over M.P. under CJ § 3-8A-03 (2020 Repl. Vol.). Subsections (a) and (d), both of which are relevant to the analysis below, then provided: (a) In addition to the jurisdiction specified in Subtitle 8 of this title, the court has exclusive original jurisdiction over:
(1) A child who is alleged to be delinquent or in need of supervision or who has received a citation for a violation; (2) Except as provided in subsection (d)(6) of this section, a peace order proceeding in which the respondent is a child; and (3) Proceedings arising under the Interstate Compact on Juveniles. ***
(d) The court does not have jurisdiction over:
(1) A child at least 14 years old alleged to have done an act that, if committed by an adult, would be a crime punishable by life imprisonment, as well as all other charges against the child arising out of the same incident, unless an order removing the proceeding to the court has been filed under § 4-202 of the Criminal Procedure Article;
(2) A child at least 16 years old alleged to have done an act in violation of any provision of the Transportation Article or other traffic law or ordinance, except an act that prescribes a penalty of incarceration;
(3) A child at least 16 years old alleged to have done an act in violation of any provision of law, rule, or regulation governing the use or operation of a boat, except an act that prescribes a penalty of incarceration;
(4) A child at least 16 years old alleged to have committed any of the following crimes, as well as all other charges against the child *55 arising out of the same incident, unless an order removing the proceeding to the court has been filed under § 4-202 of the Criminal Procedure Article:
***
(5) A child who previously has been convicted as an adult of a felony and is subsequently alleged to have committed an act that would be a felony if committed by an adult, unless an order removing the proceeding to the court has been filed under § 4-202 of the Criminal Procedure Article; or
(6) A peace order proceeding in which the victim, as defined in § 3- 8A-01(cc)(1)(ii) of this subtitle, is a person eligible for relief, as defined in § 4-501 of the Family Law Article.
CJ § 3-8A-03 (2020 Repl. Vol.).
Thus, in the pre-JJRA version of CJ § 3-8A-03, subsection (a) identified the universe of cases over which “the [juvenile] court has exclusive original jurisdiction” and subsection (d) described the class of cases over which “[t]he [juvenile] court does not have jurisdiction[.]” This “has exclusive jurisdiction”/“does not have jurisdiction” structural framework can be traced back to 1969. Md. Code Ann., art. 26 § 70-2(a), (d) (1968 Repl. Vol., 1969 Cum. Supp.). As used in subsection (d), the phrase “does not have jurisdiction” has historically played a passive, jurisdiction-defining role.
The General Assembly worked within that existing structure when it amended section 3-8A-03 in the JJRA. Subsection (a) was amended to state that the juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction over children at least 13 years old, subsection (d)(7) was amended to include children under the age of 13 in the list of cases over which the court lacks jurisdiction, and the new subsection—subsection (f)—was added to close the loop by *56 barring the State from criminally charging children under the age of 13. CJ § 3-8A-03 (2020 Repl. Vol., 2022 Supp.). [4]
Because these provisions were intended to work in harmony, it is useful to look at them together:
(a) In addition to the jurisdiction specified in Subtitle 8 of this title, the court has exclusive original jurisdiction over:
(1) A child:
(i) Who is at least 13 years old alleged to be delinquent; or (ii) Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section, who is at least 10 years old alleged to have committed an act: 1. That, if committed by an adult, would constitute a crime of violence, as defined in § 14-101 of the Criminal Law Article; or
2. Arising out of the same incident as an act listed in item 1 of this item;
***
(d) The [juvenile] court does not have jurisdiction over:
***
(7) Except as provided in subsection (a)(1)(ii) of this section, a delinquency proceeding against a child who is under the age of 13 years.
***
*57 (f) A child under the age of 13 years may not be charged with a crime.
Id.
The Majority’s Interpretation
In concluding that the JJRA divested the juvenile court of jurisdiction, the Majority relies on the plain meaning of “does not have jurisdiction” in the introductory clause of subsection (d). Under this interpretation, the fact that the juvenile court properly acquired jurisdiction before the JJRA went into effect is not relevant. Rather, the moment the JJRA took effect on June 1, 2022, the prefatory phrase “does not have jurisdiction” sprang into action and divested the juvenile court of jurisdiction. As noted above, the Majority reasons that “[n]othing in the JJRA provides that its change in the juvenile court jurisdiction does not apply to pending cases.” Maj. Op. at 35.
Viewed in isolation, the Majority’s interpretation of “does not have jurisdiction,” as
it applies to subsection (d)(7), is reasonable. After all, as amended by the JJRA, subsection
(a)(1) already provides that the juvenile court has jurisdiction
over
children of at least 13
years of age. As a court of limited jurisdiction, if the statute does not affirmatively confer
jurisdiction in the juvenile court, then jurisdiction does not lie in that court. Thus subsection
(d)(7) was unnecessary if its only purpose was forward-looking. The Majority’s
interpretation, therefore, finds support in our long-standing preference to avoid
interpretations that render provisions superfluous.
See Comptroller of Md. v. FC-GEN
Operations Invs. LLC
,
Even so, “[j]ust as in the science of Physics every action has an equal and opposite
reaction, so it seems that every canon of statutory construction has an equal and opposite
canon.”
Kaczorowski v. Mayor and City Council of Balt.
,
In my view, the question is not what the plain language of the phrase “does not have
jurisdiction” means. The issue, rather, is whether subsection (d)(7) came with a temporal
limitation to its applicability. If it applies to a delinquency proceeding initiated before the
JJRA took effect, then the Majority’s “here today, gone tomorrow” interpretation would
be correct. But if it does not, then the Majority’s interpretation would be incorrect. The
phrase “does not have jurisdiction” as used in subsection (d) does not expressly address
that question. Nor does the provision establishing June 1, 2022, as an effective date for the
JJRA answer the question.
See Landgraf v. USI Film Products
,
But the General Assembly was not working from a blank slate when it enacted the JJRA. The Juvenile Causes Statute was first enacted in 1945, Md. Code Ann., art. 26 § 48C (1947 Cum. Supp.), and since then, has been amended over 45 times. The General *59 Assembly had the benefit of caselaw interpreting its provisions and developing the principles for determining whether a statute applies retroactively. As explained below, such cases compel the conclusion that the General Assembly did not intend for the jurisdictional changes to section 3-8A-03 to apply to pending cases.
CJ § 3-8A-07(a) and Parojinog v. State
The Majority focuses on CJ § 3-8A-03(d)(7) and gives short shrift to a different section of the statute with obvious relevance to the juvenile court’s jurisdiction—CJ § 3- 8A-07(a):
If the [juvenile] court obtains jurisdiction over a child under this subtitle, that jurisdiction continues until that person reaches 21 years of age unless terminated sooner.
Its plain language reveals three parts: a condition, a rule, and an exception to the rule. The condition is “[i]f the juvenile court obtains jurisdiction over a child under this subtitle[.]” When the General Assembly chose those words, it knew that over time, it could amend the statute to enlarge or shrink the scope of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. Yet in defining this condition, what mattered was that the juvenile court acquired jurisdiction, not when . This remained the case when the General Assembly enacted the JJRA, which changed not one word in subsection 3-8A-07(a). Because the juvenile court obtained jurisdiction over M.P. when the delinquency petition was filed on May 5, 2022, that condition was satisfied here.
The rule under this subsection is that once such jurisdiction is obtained, “that jurisdiction continues” until the child turns 21. Again, this rule has never depended on *60 when or under which version of the statute the juvenile court acquired jurisdiction. Under that rule, the juvenile court still has jurisdiction over M.P.
The exception under subsection 3-8A-07(a) is if the juvenile court’s jurisdiction is “terminated sooner.” Unless that exception applies, the Majority’s interpretation collapses under the weight оf CJ § 3-8A-07(a). The question, therefore, is whether “does not have jurisdiction” in the introductory phrase of subsection 3-8A-03(d) and subpart (7) operate as a termination of jurisdiction under subsection 3-8A-07(a). In making this determination, we must keep in mind that sections 3-8A-03 and 3-8A-07(a) are meant to work together. The former tells us if the juvenile court has jurisdiction; the latter tells us when such jurisdiction ends.
The phrase “does not have jurisdiction” has a passive, definitional connotation. Indeed, as noted above, that is precisely how that phrase was used before the JJRA— section 3-8A-03 defined the scope of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction with the “has exclusive jurisdiction”/“does not have jurisdiction” structure of subsections (a) and (d). The General Assembly drafted these provisions knowing that they would be applied by lawyers and non-lawyers alike. Thus, for example, when intake officers carried out their duty to “make an inquiry... as to whether the [juvenile] court has jurisdiction ,” as required under CJ § 3-8A-10(c)(1) (emphasis added), they did so by consulting the provisions of section 3-8A-03. If the facts appeared to support jurisdiction under subsection (a), the intake officers would know to consult subsection (d) to make sure such jurisdiction was not excluded thereunder.
The JJRA changed none of that. Section 3-8A-03 continues to use the same definitional structure in subsections (a) and (d), and intake officers continue to be required under CJ § 3-8A-10(c)(1) to consult those provisions when investigating a case to determine whether the juvenile court has jurisdiction. When it enacted the JJRA, the General Assembly knew that section 3-8A-07(a) would still expressly state that jurisdiction would continue “unless terminated sooner.” The Majority shrugs off this provision because it does not preclude a termination “by operation of law.” Maj. Op. at 39. True enough. But the moment the JJRA went into effect, subsection 3-8A-07(a) was also in effect and, by its plain terms, applied to all pending cases, including M.P.’s. So, with subsection 3-8A-07(a) firmly in place and unchanged by the JJRA, it seems unlikely that the General Assembly intended to countermand its effect on pending cases without expressly saying so. Nor do I think the General Assembly would have assumed that intake officers and courts would divine such intent from the introductory phrase to subsection (d)—“does not have jurisdiction”—which had been in the statute for decades and had played only a passive, definitional role, not a jurisdiction-terminating role.
We have precedent to guide us. In
Parojinog v. State
,
After the amendment went into effect but before the adjudication hearing, the juvenile court ordered the defendant to, among other things, pay restitution. 282 Md. at 258-59. Months later, the juvenile court waived jurisdiction, prompting the State to file an indictment in the circuit court based on the same alleged acts of arson. Id. at 259. Pointing to the penal effect of the post-amendment restitution order, the defendant advanced a double jeopardy defense in a motion to dismiss the indictments. Id. at 259-60. This circuit court denied the motion and the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed. Id. This Court granted the defendant’s petition for a writ of certiorari. Id. at 260.
The State argued that when the jurisdictional changes under Chapter 554 of the Acts of 1975 went into effect, the court was divested of jurisdiction to take any action other than to waive jurisdiction or dismiss the case, which meant that the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction when it ordered restitution. Id. at 264-65. And, without jurisdiction to “make an adjudication and disposition” of the case, jeopardy did not attach. Id. at 265. Thus, the State urged the Court to adopt the same “here today, gone tomorrow” approach adopted by the Majority today.
Only in
Parojinog
, this Court was not persuaded by that argument. We first
identified the “fallacy in the State’s argument” by observing that the delinquency petition
was filed
before
the amendment went into effect.
Id.
We stated that the petition’s filing
date, not the adjudication date, “determines the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and the
applicability of Ch. 554.”
[5]
Id.
We then turned to CJ § 3-806(a) (1974, 1977 Cum. Supp.),
the predecessor to today’s § 3-8A-07(a), which, as noted above, states that if the juvenile
court obtains jurisdiction over a child under this subtitle, “that jurisdiction continues until
that person[] reaches 21 years of age unless terminated sooner.”
Parojinog
,
None of the relevant legal principles have changed since
Parojinog
was decided.
Then, as now, the juvenile court acquired jurisdiction when the delinquency petition was
filed—which, in both cases was
before
the jurisdiction-altering amendment went into
effect.
Id.
at 260. Then, as now, the statute said that “the age of the person at the time the
*64
alleged delinquent act was committed controls the determination of jurisdiction.”
[6]
Id.
at 260 (citation omitted) (quoting CJ § 3-805(a) (1974, 1977 Cum. Supp.)); CJ § 3-8A-
05(a) (2020 Repl. Vol., 2023 Supp.). And then, as now, the statute provided that
“jurisdiction continues until that person[] reaches 21 years of age unless terminated
sooner.”
Parojinog
,
This Court recently emphasized the importance of crediting the General Assembly
with awareness “of this Court’s interpretations of statutes.”
Bellard v. State
,
*66
Thus, the Majority misses the point in stating that “[n]othing in the JJRA provides
that its change in the juvenile court jurisdiction does
not
apply to pending cases.” Maj. Op.
at 35 (emphasis added). Indeed, the Majority has it backward: The General Assembly’s
failure
to include such language or to otherwise “express a clear intention to abrogate”
Parojinog
or
In re Valerie H.
should be presumed intentional and as acquiescence to our
prior interpretation of the “terminated sooner” exception.
See Bellard
,
I would therefore hold that the JJRA did not divest the juvenile court of jurisdiction over any case for which jurisdiction properly attached before the effective date of the JJRA.
The General Savings Statute
Even without CJ § 3-8A-07(a), the same result is reached through the application of Maryland’s general savings statute:
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided, the repeal, repeal and reenactment, or amendment of a statute does not release, extinguish, or alter a criminal or civil penalty, forfeiture, or liability imposed or incurred under the statute.
(b) A repealed, repealed and reenacted, or amended statute shall remain in effect for the purpose of sustaining any:
(1) criminal or civil action, suit, proceeding, or prosecution for the enforcement of a penalty, forfeiture, or liability; and (2) judgment, decree, or order that imposes, inflicts, or declares the penalty, forfeiture, or liability.
GP § 1-205 (2019 Repl. Vol.).
Here, the relevant part of this statute is subsection (b)(1). Under its plain language, the statute vesting the juvenile court with jurisdiction—the pre-JJRA version of CJ § 3- 8A-03(a)(1)—“remain[ed] in effect for the purpose of sustaining” the delinquency *67 proceeding against M.P. Thus, M.P. is not entitled to a dismissal of the delinquency petition.
State v. Clifton
The case of
State v. Clifton
,
This Court reversed. Id. In doing so, we recognized the “fundamental principle that the law does not favor repeals by implication.” Id. We observed that there was “no indication in its language that the Legislature intended to abolish” the crime of which the defendant was charged and that because “the amended statute contains substantially the same provisions as the original, the continuity of the original as to those provisions is not affected.” Id. at 575. Thus, we concluded, that the “continuity of the original [statute] as to those provisions is not affected.” Id. That was the primary basis on which we reversed the trial court. Now to the part of Clifton that is relevant here.
We then determined that the same result would be reached even if the General Assembly had “absolutely repealed” the statute without replacing it with a substantively identical counterpart. Id. That’s because “the State could nevertheless prosecute the present case through the operation of the general saving statutes, which have been in force in Maryland since their enactment by the Legislature in 1912.” Id. We referred to the part of the savings statute that
provides that the repeal of any statute shall not have the effect of releasing or extinguishing “any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under such statute, unless the repealing Act shall so expressly provide, and such statute shall be treated as still remaining in force for the purpose of sustaining any proper action or prosecution for the enforcement of such penalty, forfeiture, or liability .”
Id. (quoting 1912 Md. Laws, ch. 365) (emphasis added). Of particular importance here, we noted that the general savings statute “rescinded” the common law rule that would have prevented any further proceedings based on the repealed statute. Id. at 576.
Our analysis of the general savings statute included an observation about its
origin—that it was copied from its federal counterpart.
Id.
at 575-76. We noted that “[t]he
Federal saving clause has been held by the United States Supreme Court to save any
prosecution for a pending violation committed during the time a statute was in force, even
though the statute was repealed before the time of the trial.”
Id.
at 576 (citing
United States
v. Reisinger
,
In dismissing the general savings statute as “inapplicable,” the Majority tries to distinguish Clifton from this case. But the Majority does not argue that a delinquency proceeding is not within the scope of subsection (b)(1) of the general savings statute. Nor does the Majority contend that the JJRA contains specific language that removes it from the reach of the general savings statute. Rather, the Majority declarеs, as if the proposition is self-evident, that:
The scenario in Clifton is readily distinguishable from the JJRA’s limiting jurisdiction in order to prevent children under the age of 13 years, with certain exceptions, from being subjected to juvenile delinquency proceedings. Put simply, Clifton does not support the applicability of the general saving clause to a law in which the General Assembly sought to avoid harm to young children by limiting their exposure to the juvenile system.
Maj. Op. at 44.
The Majority is entitled to its view that the public policy behind the JJRA is so important that it should not be subject to the general savings statute. But that is not our call to make. The general savings statute, by design, is meant to apply generally unless the General Assembly—not this Court—decides otherwise. In dismissing the general savings 23 Stat. 98). Because the alleged violation occurred before the statute’s repeal, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the general savings statute sustained prosecutions based on events that took place before the statute was repealed. Id. at 401-02.
statute as inapplicable, the Majority resorts to a form of “because we said so” reasoning untethered to precedent or statutory text and grounded only in its view of the public policy animating the JJRA.
State v. Johnson
The Majority misapplies another case from this Court:
State v. Johnson
, 285 Md.
339 (1979). Quoting our opinion from
Johnson
, the Majority declares that “[o]ur precedent
requires the outcome we reach because without ‘a contrary expression of intent, a cause of
action or remedy dependent upon a statute falls with the repeal of [the] statute.’” Maj. Op.
at 40 (quoting
Johnson
,
With no indication in the JJRA that the General Assembly intended for the changes to CJ § 3-8A-03 not to apply to pending cases, jurisdiction over the delinquency petition and proceeding fell with the repeal of the juvenile courts’ jurisdiction over children charged with nonviolent conduct that occurred when they were under 13 years old.
Maj. Op. at 40-41 (footnote omitted).
The Majority draws the wrong lesson from
Johnson
and, once again, the wrong
conclusion from the General Assembly’s failure to indicate that the changes to section 3-
8A-03 do not apply to pending cases. In
Johnson
, the defendant pleaded guilty to rape and
was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment, all suspended, and placed on probation for five
years.
To show why the Majority is incorrect that “[o]ur precedent requires the outcome
we reach[,]” Maj. Op. at 40, I will first summarize the Majority’s analysis of
Johnson
that
led to that conclusion. The Majority starts with the correct premise that the general rule is
that “newly-enacted statutes generally apply prospectively, not retroactively.” Maj. Op.
at 31. The Majority quotes
Johnson
for the proposition that an exception to the general rule
“is that a statute which affects a matter still in litigation when the statute becomes effective
will be applied by a reviewing court even though the statute was not then law when the
decision appealed from was handed down, unless the legislature expresses a contrary
intent.” Maj. Op. at 32 (quoting
Johnson
,
But the Majority stops its analysis of Johnson too soon and ignores that we then recognized that the general savings statute negates the very exception that the Majority applies:
Where penalties, rights or liabilities incurred or accrued under a prior version of a statute would otherwise be extinguished by its repeal, most legislatures have enacted general savings statutes which have the effect of continuing a repealed statute in force for the purpose of punishing offenses committed prior to repeal. Thus, a general savings statute preserves penalties imposed *72 under prior law except where a subsequent repealing act manifests the legislative intention to the contrary.
Johnson
,
Thus, in Johnson , we applied the general savings statute to hold that the defendant was not entitled to the benefit of the more lenient sentencing statute. In reaching that conclusion, we observed that “nowhere” did the new statute “indicate that the Legislature intended to restrict operation of [the general savings statute].” Id . at 345. In other words, the takeaway from Johnson is that the general savings statute applies unless the General Assembly expressly states otherwise.
Indeed, relying on Johnson , we reiterated that point in Graves v. State , 364 Md. 329, 339 n.10 (2001):
Ordinarily, a criminal defendant will not be entitled to a windfall from the amendment, revision, or repealing of a statute where the legislature altered the statute during the course of the litigation. See State v. Johnson, 285 Md. 339, 346,402 A.2d 876 , 880 (1979). Unless a statute specifically states an intent to the contrary, the provisions of Maryland’s general savings clause, Code (1957, 1998 Repl. Vol.) Article 1, § 3, operate to uphold “any penalty, forfeiture or liability incurred under a statute which is subsequently repealed or amended.” See id. at 345,402 A.2d at 879 .
So too here—nowhere does the JJRA say that it escapes application of the general savings statute. [11] In relying on the General Assembly’s silence as confirmation of a contrary intention, the Majority has it backward.
Bruner v. United States
The Majority makes the same mistake with
Bruner v. United States
,
Bruner
involved a claim for overtime pay by a civilian fire chief who had been
appointed by a local army commander under authority granted by the Secretary of War.
Just as the Majority overlooked the relevance of the general savings statute in Johnson , so too it ignores the general saving statute in its analysis of Bruner . In the very next sentence after the language quoted by the Majority, the Court explained that Bruner’s case was “not affected by the so-called general savings statute which provides that ‘repeal of any statute shall not have the effect to release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under such statute.’” Id. at 117. The Court went on to explain that, in Bruner’s case, “Congress has not altered the nature or validity of petitioner’s rights or the Government’s liability but has simply reduced the number of tribunals authorized to hear and determine such rights and liabilities.” Id. In other words, because Bruner’s substantive rights were not denied because he could still press his claim in a different tribunal, the Court declined to apply the general savings statute to save his district court proceeding. Id . Here, because the general savings statute does apply, Bruner ’s application of the general exception does not support the Majority’s conclusion.
Landgraf v. USI Film Products
The Majority’s reliance on
Landgraf v. USI Film Products
,
Although Landgraf was not about jurisdiction, the Majority still finds support in dicta discussing how a retroactivity analysis applies to statutes that alter a court’s jurisdiction:
We have regularly applied intervening statutes conferring or ousting jurisdiction, whether or not jurisdiction lay when the underlying conduct occurred or when the suit was filed. Thus, in Bruner v. United States , 343 U.S. 112, 116-117 (1952), relying on our “consisten[t]” practice, we ordered an action dismissed because the jurisdictional statute under which it had been (properly) filed was subsequently repealed. See also Hallowell v. Commons , 239 U.S. 506, 508-509, (1916); Assessors v. Osbornes , 9 Wall. 567, 575 (1870).
Observing that
Langraf
relied on
Bruner
in the above passage, the Majority then
explains that this Court’s “holding in Johnson parallels the rationale expressed by the
Supreme Court of the United States in Bruner[,]” before adopting this quote from
Bruner
:
“[W]hen a law conferring jurisdiction is repealed without any reservation as to pending
cases, all cases fall with the law[.]” Maj. Op. at 41 (quoting
Bruner
,
*76 Again, from these selected quotes, it is not difficult to understand why the Majority claims support from these cases for its conclusion that the JJRA divested the juvenile court’s jurisdiction over M.P. But, as discussed above, in disregarding how the general savings statute figured into the Courts’ analyses, the Majority draws the wrong lessons from Johnson and Bruner . Thus, the dicta from Landgraf quoted above does not support the Majority’s conclusion.
The Majority misapplies
Landgraf
in another respect. The Majority acknowledges
the general principle that retroactive application of statutes is disfavored. The Majority
insists, however, that “[r]etroactive application of a jurisdictional amendment is not at issue
because the jurisdictional question here concerns the authority of the juvenile court to take
the action at issue subsequent to the effective date of the JJRA.” Maj. Op. at 40. To support
that proposition, the Majority stitches together two quotes from
Landgraf
: one from the
Court’s opinion and one from Justice Scalia’s concurrence. The Majority states the
following, with the quote attributed to Justice Scalia italicized for easy reference:
The issue does not involve a question of retroactivity “merely because
[CJ § 3-8A-03(d)(7)] is applied in a case arising from conduct antedating the
statute’s enactment[.]” Landgraf,
Maj. Op. at 40 (emphasis added). From that proposition, the Majority concludes: In this case, M.P. does not seek to apply CJ § 3-8A-03 to any of the juvenile court’s actions prior to June 1, 2022, but rather to prevent the court from *77 exercising jurisdiction over him after that date, when the juvenile court no longer possesses jurisdiction.
Id. at 40.
A close look at
Landgraf
reveals how the Majority went astray. In deciding not to
apply the statute retroactively, the Court in
Landgraf
started with the premise that
retroactive application of statutes is disfavored but observed that “deciding when a statute
operates ‘retroactively’ is not always a simple or mechanical task.”
That was the context in which the Supreme Court stated that “[a] statute does not operate ‘retrospectively’ because it is applied in a case arising from conduct antedating the statute’s enactment,” id. at 269, on which the Majority relies. But in highlighting the difficulty of knowing when the rule against retroactive application applies, the Court was emphasizing that it is not enough that the statute applies to conduct pre-dating the statute. In the next sentence, the Court offered its formulation modeled after Justice Story’s vested rights approach, stating that, “[r]ather, the court must ask whether the new provision attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment.” Id. at 269-70. The Majority skips that part.
The Majority instead jumps to Justice Scalia’s concurrence—specifically the
passage italicized above—to advance a different formulation. But the Majority overlooks
*78
the context in which Justice Scalia wrote those words. Notice in the above passage that the
Majority picks up Justice Scalia’s statement in the middle of his sentence with “is the
moment at which that power is sought to be exercised.” Maj. Op. at 40 (quoting
Landgraf
,
Justice Scalia disagreed with the Court’s adoption of the “vested rights” test articulated by Justice Story and thought it was a mistake to use the vested rights approach to explain the Court’s prior decisions, particularly Bruner and Hallowell , in which jurisdiction-eliminating statutes were applied to pending cases. Id. at 292-93. Justice Scalia was referring to the Court’s explanation that applying such statutes “takes away no substantive right but simply changes the tribunal that is to hear the case.” [12] Id . at 274 ((Majority opinion) (quoting Hallowell , 239 U.S. at 508)). Justice Scalia responded that such an explanation only worked in some cases, noting that sometimes the jurisdictional amendment would deprive the claimant of any forum in which to pursue the claim. [13] Id . *79 at 292-93 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia proposed a different explanation for the Court’s prior jurisdiction cases, the italicized part of which is the segment quoted by the Majority:
Our jurisdiction cases are explained, I think, by the fact that the purpose of provisions conferring or eliminating jurisdiction is to permit or forbid the exercise of judicial power—so that the relevant event for retroactivity purposes is the moment at which that power is sought to be exercised. Thus, applying a jurisdiction-eliminating statute to undo past judicial action would be applying it retroactively; but applying it to prevent any judicial action after the statute takes effect is applying it prospectively .
Id . at 293 (emphasis added); see Maj. Op. at 40.
Thus, because he disagreed with the Court that the vested rights test explained the Court’s prior jurisprudence, Justice Scalia was merely offering an alternative rationale for the Court’s prior decisions; he was not announcing a new test on behalf of the Court for determining when the rule against retroactive application would apply. And, beyond Bruner , which does not support the Majority’s holding for the reasons explained above, all but one of the cases cited by Justice Scalia show that he was referring to cases involving action or proceeding, whether instituted prior to or after the date of the enactment of this Act , to enforce liability or impose punishment for or on account of the failure of the employer to pay minimum wages or overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, under the Walsh-Healey Act, or under the Bacon-Davis Act, to the extent that such action or proceeding seeks to enforce any liability or impose any punishment with respect to an activity which was not compensable under subsections (a) and (b) of this section.
Id. (emphasis added). *80 statutes that expressly applied the jurisdictional changes to pending cases. [14] Here, as the Majority acknowledges, the General Assembly included no such language. [15] Landgraf , therefore, is of little analytical value here.
*81 Waker v. State
The Majority contends that its
conclusion is also consistent with our holding in Waker [v. State,
Problematic Consequences of the Majority’s Interpretation There are practical reasons to conclude that the General Assembly did not intend for the JJRA’s jurisdictional changes to apply to pending cases. When the General Assembly enacted the JJRA, it understood that the juvenile delinquency system had been operating for decades and that many children were already in the system in various stages—both pre-adjudication and post-disposition. The General Assembly had to draw the line somewhere in determining how the jurisdictional changes would be applied. The case *82 for the rule established in Parojinog becomes even stronger when the ramifications of the Majority’s interpretation are considered.
Although the JJRA was enacted on April 9, 2022, it was in the works since the beginning of the 2022 legislative session, when it was first read in the House of Delegates on January 20. [16] The General Assembly knew when it enacted the JJRA on April 9, 2022, that there would be 53 days before any of its provisions would go into effect. The Generаl Assembly would have assumed that during that interim, the juvenile justice system would continue its operations uninterruptedly; that every person involved in the system would continue to carry out their duties mandated by the existing statute . Thus, if the General Assembly intended to apply the jurisdictional changes to pending cases, it had a practical reason to express its intention clearly and unambiguously—to minimize the waste of time and money spent on efforts that would soon be rendered worthless. The timeline of M.P.’s case illustrates why this is so.
Although the juvenile court’s jurisdiction attaches upon the filing of a delinquency petition, the petition is the culmination of significant legwork by others, starting with the *83 “intake officer.” [17] The intake officer’s work begins upon receipt of a “[c]omplaint[] from a person or agency having knowledge of facts which may cause a person to be subject to the jurisdiction of the court under [subtitle 8A].” CJ § 3-8A-10(b)(1) (2020 Repl. Vol., 2023 Supp.). Within 25 days, the intake officer “shall” both investigate whether the juvenile court has jurisdiction and if so, determine whether “judicial action is in the best interests of the public or the child.” Id. § 3-8A-10(c). Within the same 25 days, the intake officer may take one of three courses of action: “(i) Authorize the filing of a petition or a peace order request or both; (ii) Propose an informal adjustment of the matter; or (iii) Refuse authorization to file a petition or a peace order request or both.” Id. § 3-8A-10(c)(3). The intake officer can choose the first option—authorize the filing of a delinquency petition—if “the intake officer concludes that the court has jurisdiction over the matter and that judicial action is in the best interests of the public or the child.” Id. § 3-8A-10(d)(1). [18] *84 Here, M.P. allegedly committed the delinquent acts in mid-March 2022—before the JJRA was enacted. The intake officer received the complaint on March 21, 2022. The 25- day period under CJ § 3-8A-10(b) and (c) began on March 21 and ended on April 15, straddling the April 9 enactment of the JJRA. Within that 25-day window, the intake officer determined that the juvenile court did have jurisdiction over M.P. and that judicial action did serve either M.P.’s or the public’s best interests. Thus, on April 11, just two days after the JJRA was enacted and with just four days to spare before the 25-day window closed, the intake officer authorized the State’s Attorney to file a delinquency petition against M.P.
Once the intake officer authorizes the filing of a delinquency petition, the ball is in the State’s Attorney’s court. Section 3-8A-13(b) provides that delinquency petitions “shall be prepared and filed by the State’s Attorney.” Further, “[a] petition alleging delinquency shall be filed within 30 days after the receipt of a referral from the intake officer, unless that time is extended by the court for good cause shown.” CJ § 3-8A-13(b). Here, as required by statute, the State’s Attorney prepared and filed the delinquency petition against M.P. on May 5, 2022.
To accept the Majority’s interpretation, we must assume that the General Assembly intended that, in the 53 days before the JJRA would take effect: (1) intake officers would continue to determine whether the juvenile court had jurisdiction over children under the age of 13 and whether a delinquency petition would serve the child’s or the public’s interest; (2) State’s Attorneys would, as required by statute, continue to timely file delinquency petitions when authorized by the intake officer; (3) court personnel would *85 continue to docket such cases and open files; and (4) the juvenile court would acquire jurisdiction for a brief period. All of this, only to abruptly lose jurisdiction on June 1, 2022.
If the General Assembly intended this result, it would have made its intentions known through explicit language so that time and money would not be wasted on matters that would have to be dismissed. Indeed, it is hard to imagine why the General Assembly would have intended to put a child through the ordeal of being charged with delinquent acts if it intended that such charges would soon be summarily dismissed. [19]
There are other anomalous consequences to the Majority’s interpretation. The thing excluded from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction under subsection (d)(7) is a “delinquency proceeding.” Notice the singular form in the phrase “ a delinquency proceeding.” (Emphasis added). Although “delinquency proceeding” is not defined in the statute, the General Assembly was not working from a blank slate. Indeed, on November 9, 2021, this Court adopted Title 11, Chapter 400 of the Maryland Rules of Court—dedicated solely to “delinquency and citation proceedings.” Md. Rule 11-401 (“The Rules in this Chapter govern delinquency and citation proceedings[.]”).
*86 Effective on January 1, 2022, these Rules cover, among other things: the child’s right to counsel “at every stage of all proceedings under this Chapter[,]” (Rule 11-404); taking a child into custody after the delinquency petition is filed (Rule 11-405); pre- adjudication placement into detention, community detention, or shelter care (Rule 11-406); jurisdiction waiver process (Rule 11-410); pre-adjudication studies by the Department of Juvenile Services (Rule 11-415); competency evaluations (Rule 11-416); emergency medical treatment of a child “who is already under the jurisdiction” of the juvenile court (Rule 11-417); motions practice (Rule 11-419); informal adjustments (Rule 11-420.1); the adjudicatory hearing (Rule 11-421); the disposition hearing (Rule 11-422); modifications or revisions to all orders of the delinquency court, including disposition orders (Rule 11- 423); procedures and hearings for probation violations (Rule 11-424); and termination of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction by court order (Rule 11-425).
Thus, when the General Assembly enacted the JJRA, it understood that in exercising its rulemaking authority just three months earlier, this Court deemed “a delinquency proceeding” to include every phase of a delinquency case, starting with the filing of the delinquency petition through and including all post-disposition matters. [20] Yet, based on the Majority’s interpretation, a child placed in shelter care before an adjudication hearing under CJ § 3-8A-15(b) would, on June 1, 2022, lose the right to a hearing under CJ § 3-8A-15(d) *87 and Rule 11-406(e), leaving the child’s status uncertain. It would also mean that a child subject to any disposition order would, on June 1, 2022, lose the right to seek a modification of such disposition because the juvenile court would no longer have jurisdiction. I do not believe the General Assembly intended such consequences.
For example, under the Majority’s interpretatiоn, on June 1, 2022, a child committed to the Maryland Department of Health for treatment in a mental hospital lost the right to future periodic progress reports and court reviews provided under CJ § 3-8A- 19(j). And, for example, a child subject to a restitution order lost the right to later seek a reduction of the restitution obligation based on a post-disposition change in circumstances. Md. Rule 11-423(a) (“The court may modify or vacate an order if the court finds that action to be in the best interest of the respondent or the public.”); see also In re Darnell F. , 71 Md. App. 584 (1987) (applying Rule 11-423’s predecessor to motions to modify restitution orders).
In sum, the Majority’s interpretation of subsection (d)(7) requires acceptance of the premise that when it enacted the JJRA, the General Assembly intended to divest the juvenile court of the jurisdiction to enter any post-disposition orders for children already in the system due to actions taken before their 13th birthday, including actions designed solely to benefit the child. Surely that is not what the General Assembly intended, yet that is where the Majority’s logic takes us. If the juvenile court was divested of jurisdiction over “a delinquency proceeding,” then the Majority’s plain language approach would apply to every delinquency proceeding involving a nonviolent act by a child while under the age *88 of 13, at any stage. [21] In contrast, holding that the JJRA’s jurisdictional changes did not apply to then-pending cases, as required by section 3-8A-07(a), Parojinog , and the general savings statute, yields no such problematic results.
***
For all these reasons, I would dismiss the appeal and remand the case to the juvenile court to proceed with the delinquency petition against M.P. On the merits, I would affirm the juvenile court’s denial of the motion to dismiss.
Justice Biran has authorized me to state that he joins this opinion.
Notes
[1] In the delinquency petition, M.P. was charged with theft of a motor vehicle, unauthorized removal of property, “rogue and vagabond,” theft of property having a value of at least $1,500 but less than $25,000, and driving without a license.
[2] “Delinquent act” is defined as an act that “would be a crime if committed by an adult.” CJ § 3-8A-01(l).
[3] If the juvenile court determines at an adjudicatory hearing that a child committed the delinquent act alleged in the petition, CJ § 3-8A-19(b)(1) requires the juvenile court to hold a separate disposition hearing, unless the hearing is waived in writing by all of the parties. CJ § 3-8A-01(p) defines a “disposition hearing” as “a hearing under th[e] subtitle to determine: (1) Whether a child needs or requires guidance, treatment, or rehabilitation; and, if so (2) The nature of the guidance, treatment, or rehabilitation.” (Paragraph breaks omitted). CJ § 3-8A-01(m) defines a “delinquent child” as “a child who has committed a delinquent act and requires guidance, treatment, or rehabilitation.” In In re Herbert B., 303 Md. 419, 424, 494 A.2d 680, 682 (1985), we stated that a fair reading of the relevant statutes demonstrates “that a child can be classified as a ‘delinquent child’ only after the court at the adjudicatory hearing finds that the child has committed a delinquent act and the court at the disposition hearing determines that the child is in need of the court’s аssistance, guidance, treatment, or rehabilitation.” (Citation omitted). In other words, for a child to be adjudicated a “delinquent child,” there must be both an adjudicatory hearing and a disposition hearing.
[4] Both CJ (2021) § 3-8A-01(d) and CJ § 3-8A-01(d) provide that “child” “means an individual under the age of 18 years.” 2005 Md. Laws 3303 (Vol. V, Ch. 580, H.B. 802).
[5] In the petition for a writ of certiorari , M.P. raised the following two questions: 1. As an issue of first impression, does the newly enacted statute which establishes a minimum age of jurisdiction for the juvenile court apply to cases pending at the time of the statute’s enactment? 2. As an issue of first impression, is an order denying a motion to dismiss for lack of juvenile court jurisdiction immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine?
[6] We will address in reverse order the two questions presented in the petition, one of which we have rephrased.
[7] We pointed out that the relevant statute did not provide a right to an immediate
appeal because the General Assembly had amended it to identify a waiver of jurisdiction
as interlocutory rather than immediately appealable, as a previous version of the statute
had stated. See Franklin P.,
[8] In its final report, the JJRC included a link to a report dated September 3, 2020, which indicated that several States had created a minimum age for juvenile court jurisdiction. See JJRC, National Practice for Raising the Age of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction (Sept. 3, 2020), available at http://dls.maryland.gov/pubs/prod/NoPblTabMtg/ CmsnJuvRefCncl/NATIONAL_CONTEXT_Under13_Presentation_VeraFormat.pdf [https://perma.cc/49JC-YHR5]. In that report, the reasons for creating a minimum age included the “[h]armful effects of [the] juvenile justice experience: To children with many adverse childhood experiences, [the] experience of the juvenile system is damaging, [and] leads to poor outcomes.” Id. at 4. Another reason was “[l]egal competence: Children have diminished ability to understand the charges against them, their rights, their role in an adversarial system, and the role of adults in this system.” Id.
[9] See also Gruber v. Gruber,
[10] In a recent decision, the Supreme Court of the United States held the prohibition
against double jeopardy does not preclude a defendant from being tried by separate
sovereigns (
i.e.
, the federal government and a State government) for the same conduct. See
Gamble v. United States,
[12] In Will, 546 U.S. at 347, 355, the Supreme Court held that the collateral order doctrine did not apply to a trial court’s refusal to apply the judgment bar of the Federal Tort Claims Act, and, thus, the trial court’s ruling was not immediately appealable. The
[14] Currently, CJ § 3-8A-06(e) sets forth the factors the juvenile court must consider for waiver of its jurisdiction as follows: “(1) Age of the child; (2) Mental and physical condition of the child; (3) The child’s amenability to treatment in any institution, facility, or program available to delinquents; (4) The nature of the offense and the child’s alleged participation in it; and (5) The public safety.” (Paragraph breaks omitted).
[15] An additional point that counseled against permitting an interlocutory appeal in
Franklin P. is that the General Assembly had once provided that an order pertaining to a
waiver of jurisdiction was immediately appealable, but subsequently amended the relevant
statute to eliminate immediate appeals. See Franklin P.,
[16] The relevant provision is now CJ § 3-8A-07(e), which states that a juvenile “court has exclusive original jurisdiction, but only for the purpose of waiving it, over a person 21 years of age or older who is alleged to have committed a delinquent act while a child.”
[17] In Parojinog,
[18] In making this observation, we do not rule out the possibility that under CJ § 3- 804(b) jurisdiction may also be terminated by operation of law. That question, however, is not before this Court today.
[19] The General Assembly could have instructed that the change would not apply to pending cases, just as it could have explicitly directed that the jurisdictional change apply to such cases. But the General Assembly did neither—hence, our reliance on principles of statutory construction and case law.
[20] Like the Court in David C.,
[21] GP 1-205 provides: (a) Except as otherwise expressly provided, the repeal, repeal and reenactment, or amendment of a statute does not release, extinguish, or alter a criminal or civil penalty, forfeiture, or liability imposed or incurred under the statute. (b) A repealed, repealed and reenacted, or amended statute shall remain in effect for the purpose of sustaining any: (1) criminal or civil action, suit, proceeding, or prosecution for the enforcement of a penalty, forfeiture, or liability; and (2) judgment, decree, or order that imposes, inflicts, or declares the penalty, forfeiture, or liability.
[22] Nothing in this opinion should be interpreted as concluding that a juvenile court would lack jurisdiction with respect to a child under the age of 13 who had already been found delinquent at the time the JJRA took effect on June 1, 2022. The Court’s holding involves only the circumstances of this case, in which a petition, alleging that a child under the age of 13 had committed a non-violent delinquent act, was pending adjudication of delinquency in a juvenile court as of the effective date of the JJRA.
[1] The State is now represented by the Attorney General instead of the State’s Attorney for Prince George’s County.
[2] Unless the context indicates otherwise, when referring to a specific “subsection,” I am referring to a subsection of CJ § 3-8A-03. In addition, unless the context indicates otherwise, a reference to a “section” of a statute refers to a section in the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.
[3] Juvenile Justice Reform: Hearing on S.B. 691 Before the Md. S. Comm. on Judicial Proceedings , 2022 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2022), archived at https://perma.cc/DJ76-2LFP; Testimony of Senator Jill P. Carter in Favor of Senate Bill 691–Juvenile Justice Reform–Before the Md. S. Comm. on Judicial Proceedings , 2022 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 2 (Md. 2022) (statement of Sen. Jill P. Carter, Member, S. Comm. on Judicial Proceedings) (on file with the Maryland Department of Legislative Services); Md. Juv. Just. Reform Council, Final Report 17 (2021), archived at https://perma.cc/4DS9-T5PH.
[4] In CJ § 3-8A-03(d), the introductory phrase “does not have jurisdiction” applies in subsection (7) to delinquency proceedings against those children under the age of 13 who are not subject to the juvenile court’s jurisdiction under subsection (a)(1)(ii). Subsection (a)(1)(ii), in turn, confers jurisdiction in the juvenile court over children at lеast 10 years old “alleged to have committed an act . . . [t]hat, if committed by an adult, would constitute a crime of violence, as defined in § 14-101 of the Criminal Law Article.” For the sake of simplicity and brevity, when I refer to “children under the age of 13,” use a similar phrase to the same effect, or refer more generically to “a child” in the context of discussing subsection (d)(7), I am referring to those for whom the exception under subsection (d)(7) does not apply. Thus, I will not repeat the exception each time I reference or discuss this provision.
[5] For that proposition, we cited two then-recent cases,
In re Appeal No. 1038
, 32
Md. App. 239, 243 (1976) and
In re Appeals No. 1022 and 1081
,
[6] The Majority does not attempt to distinguish Parojinog on either the law or the facts. Instead, the Majority states: “Parojinog and the cases cited in it endorse the principle set forth in CJ § 3-8A-05(a), that the age of the child at the time that the alleged delinquent act was committed controls the determination of the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” Maj. Op. at 37. That’s true, and I have not suggested otherwise. It’s also not the take-away from Parojinog . Parojinog teaches that a jurisdiction altering amendment does not apply to pending cases. The Majority side steps that part of Parojinog .
[7] Although the Majority has not attempted to do so, one might try to distinguish Parojinog from the present case by focusing on the differences in the phrasing of the two amendments. In Parojinog , the amendment was framed in the affirmative—“[t]he court has exclusive original jurisdiction, but only for the purpose of waiving it, . . . .” 1975 Md. Laws, ch. 554 (emphasis added). Here, in contrast, § 3-8A-03(d)(7) (2020 Repl. Vol., 2022 Supp.) was framed in the negative—“The court does not have jurisdiction over . . . [e]xcept as provided in subsection (a)(1)(ii) . . . a delinquency proceeding against a child who is under the age of 13 years.” These structural distinctions are without a substantive difference. The amendment in Parinojog could just as easily be reframed in the image of § 3-8A-03(d)(7), without changing its meaning, by stating “except for the sole purpose of waiving it, the juvenile court does not have jurisdiction over . . . .” Conversely, § 3-8A- 03(d)(7) could be rewritten to mirror the format of the amendment in Parajinog , again without changing its meaning, to say that “the court has jurisdiction over a delinquency petition against a child under the age of 13 years, but only as provided in. . . .” The difference between the wording of the two amendments, therefore, is a matter of drafting style, not substance, and provides no basis to distinguish Parojinog from the present case.
[8] The Majority is correct that In re Valerie H. involved a child in need of assistance case (“CINA”), but is incorrect that that distinction matters here. When In re Valerie H. was decided, the “terminated sooner” provision applied to both CINA and delinquency cases. It still applies to delinquency cases, but not to CINA cases. If anything, that it no longer applies to the latter shows that the General Assembly consciously chose to keep that provision in place for the former. And, it did so with full knowledge of our decisions in Parojinog and In re Valerie H. , thus presumably the General Assembly had no intention to abrogate either decision.
[9] For example, the General Assembly could have easily added the phrase “pending before, on, or after the effective date” to § 3-8A-03(d)(7) in the following manner: “The court does not have jurisdiction over . . . a delinquency proceeding [, pending or filed before, on, or after the effective date,] against a child who is under the age of 13 years.”
[10] Given our reliance on it in
Clifton
,
United States v. Reisinger
is also instructive.
There, the defendant was indicted under a statute that made it a crime for an attоrney to
charge more than ten dollars in a pension case.
[11] The part of the general savings statute at issue in Johnson was the penalty clause in GP § 1-205(a). As explained above, the provision relevant here is GP § 1-205(b), which applies to pending proceedings (as opposed to previously imposed penalties). But the same logic that drove the Court in Johnson applies here with equal force.
[12] That such statutes only change the tribunal without taking away substantive rights was why the Court, in Bruner , declined to apply the general savings statute. 343 U.S. at 117.
[13] Interestingly, Justice Scalia’s example for that proposition was the Portal-to-
Portal Act of 1947.”
Landgraf
,
[14] Justice Scalia cited to
Hallowell v. Commons
,
[15] The Majority’s reliance on Justice Scalia’s critique of the vested rights test is
ironic given that the vested rights test is firmly entrenched in Maryland’s jurisprudence.
See Est. of Zimmerman v. Blatter
,
[16] The bill for the JJRA was introduced as House Bill 459 and Senate Bill 691 during the 2022 session. The House of Delegates voted in favor of House Bill 459 on February 25, and the Senate voted in favor of Senate Bill 691 on March 21. The House voted again to pass and enroll the bill after the Senate’s consideration on April 1. It was enacted without Governor Hogan’s signature on April 9, 2022, and it became effective оn June 1 of that year.
[17] An intake officer is the “person assigned to the court by the Department of Juvenile Services to provide the intake services set forth in” title 3, subtitle 8A of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. CJ § 3-8A-01(r) (2020 Repl. Vol., 2023 Supp.).
[18] The intake officer can choose that route upon determining that the juvenile court has jurisdiction but that the best interests of the child or the public would better be served with an informal adjustment. CJ § 3-8A-10(e). That option requires the consent of the child and the child’s parent or guardian, and when pursued, must be completed within 90 days unless extended by the court. Id. § 3-8A-10(e)(3), (f). And, if the intake officer later determines that the informal adjustment process isn’t working, then the intake officer must decide whether to authorize or refuse to authorize the filing of a petition. CJ § 3-8A- 10(f)(4). Thus, had the intake officer chosen an informal adjustment for M.P., under the Majority’s theory, M.P. would have had no incentive to cooperate because a delinquency petition filed before June 1, 2022 would have to be dismissed. When the General Assembly enacted the JJRA on April 9, 2022, it is hard to imagine that it intended such wasteful and fruitless efforts with respect to cases already in the pipeline.
[19] If the General Assembly had intended the jurisdictional changes to apply to pending cases, it could have minimized such wasted efforts by making the JJRA effective immediately, which it had the votes to do. For a bill to be enacted and effective immediately as emergency legislation, it must be “supported by three-fifths [60%] of all the members elected to each of the two Houses of the General Assembly.” Md. Const., art. XVI, § 2. The Senate passed the JJRA with the affirmative vote of 29 of its 47 members, or 61 percent of the chamber. The House enrolled the bill with 90 of its 141 members, totaling approximately 64 percent. Thus, with that level of support, the JJRA could have been passed as an emergency bill and made it effective immediately.
[20] Likewise, in section 11-503(a)(3) of the Criminal Procedure (“CP”) Article, the General Assembly deemed post-disposition proceedings to be included within “a delinquency proceeding.” CP § 11-503(a)(3) provides that: “In this section, ‘subsequent proceeding’ includes: . . . (3) in a juvenile delinquency proceeding , a review of a commitment order or other disposition under the Maryland Rules[.]” (Emphasis added.)
[21] The Majority recognizes this problem but declines to reason its way to a solution. In its conclusion, the Majority limits its holding to cases “pending adjudication of delinquency as of the effective date of the JJRA.” Maj. Op. at 44. And in footnote 22, the Majority cautions that “[n]othing in [its] opinion should be interpreted as concluding that a juvenile court would lack jurisdiction with respect to a child under the age of 13 who had already been found delinquent at the time the JJRA took effect on June 1, 2022.” That’s an astonishing disclaimer: The Majority purports to interpret the plain language of CJ § 3-8A- 07(d)(7) to the facts of this case; yet implies without explanation that the same plain language could take on a different meaning if the proceeding happens to be in the post- adjudication phase. There is no basis in the plain language of subsection (d)(7) or any other part of the JJRA for any such limitation.