J.C.D., III AND A.M.D. v. A.L.R. AND T.A.D.-R.
No. 13 MAP 2023
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA MIDDLE DISTRICT
October 18, 2023
TODD, C.J., DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, BROBSON, JJ.
ARGUED: May 23, 2023
OPINION
JUSTICE BROBSON
In this discretionary appeal, we must determine whether an order determining that grandparents have standing under Section 5325(3) of the Domestic Relations Code,
This matter arises out of an action for custody of E.J.R. and A.L.R. (collectively, the Children). In August 2017, A.L.R. (Father) and T.A.D-R. (Mother) (collectively, Parents) began residing with J.C.D., III, and A.M.D. (collectively, Grandparents), Mother‘s parents, at their home in York County, Pennsylvania. While Parents resided at Grandparents’ home, the Children were born to Parents: E.J.R. in April 2019, and A.L.R. in March 2021. Parents and the Children continued to reside with Grandparents until May 2, 2022, when, following a disagreement, Parents moved out of Grandparents’ home with the Children.
Thereafter, on July 20, 2022, Grandparents filed a complaint in custody with the York County Court of Common Pleas (trial court), seeking shared legal and partial physical custody of the Children. In response thereto, Parents filed preliminary objections, alleging, inter alia, that Grandparents lacked standing to pursue an action for custody of the Children. Following a hearing, the trial court found: (1) Parents and the Children lived in the same home as Grandparents for approximately five years; (2) during that time, Grandparents were not raising the Children and did not stand in loco parentis to the Children but, rather, were helping Parents with the Children as grandparents and as people sharing living quarters typically do; and (3) Grandparents filed their custody complaint within six months of when Parents removed the Children from Grandparents’ home. Based on these factual findings, the trial court entered an order (docketed on September 23, 2022), concluding that Grandparents did not have standing to file and pursue an action for shared legal and partial physical custody of the Children under Section 5324 of the Domestic Relations
Parents appealed the trial court‘s Standing Order to the Superior Court. Recognizing that there were outstanding custody claims pending before the trial court and that the trial court‘s Standing Order, therefore, did not appear to be final or otherwise immediately appealable, the Superior Court directed Parents to show cause as to why their appeal should not be quashed. In response, Parents argued that they are married, that they have always been an intact family with the Children, that they have made a joint determination that it is not in the Children‘s best interests to have a relationship with Grandparents, and that they do not wish for Grandparents to have any custody rights to the Children. Parents conceded, however, that the trial court‘s Standing Order was not a final order. Instead, Parents maintained that the trial court‘s Standing Order was appealable as of right under the collateral order doctrine. More specifically, Parents maintained that the trial court‘s Standing Order “meets the requirements of the collateral order doctrine because it is collateral to the main issue of child custody[,] . . . it impacts the number of parties who will participate in the action, and it cannot be delayed until a final order is issued without being lost.” (R.R. at 97a (internal quotation marks omitted).) The Superior Court disagreed, however, and, by per curiam order dated November 14, 2022, quashed Parents’ appeal as interlocutory, concluding that Parents did not present a legal basis for the Superior Court‘s jurisdiction.
Subsequent thereto, Parents filed a petition for allowance of appeal, seeking this Court‘s discretionary review, which we granted limited to the following issue, as stated by Parents:
Whether the Pennsylvania Supreme Court should exercise judicial discretion and grant an appeal to [Parents], as the trial court‘s order was appealable as of right under [Rule 313] as a collateral [order]?
J.C.D., III v. A.L.R., 292 A.3d 553 (Pa. 2023) (per curiam) (some alterations in original). The question of whether an order is collateral and appealable as of right under Rule 313 is a question of law. K.C. v. L.A., 128 A.3d 774, 778 (Pa. 2015). Consequently, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Id.
As a general rule, “an appellate court‘s jurisdiction extends only to review of final orders.” Shearer v. Hafer, 177 A.3d 850, 855 (Pa. 2018); see also
(a) General Rule. An appeal may be taken as of right from a collateral order of a trial court or other government unit.
(b) Definition. A collateral order is an order[: (1)] separable from and collateral to the main cause of action[; (2)] where the right involved is too important to be denied review[;] and [(3)] the question presented is such that if review is postponed until final judgment in the case, the claim will be irreparably lost.
Indeed, we have explained that “[w]e construe the collateral order doctrine narrowly so as to avoid ‘undue corrosion of the final order rule’ and to prevent delay resulting from ‘piecemeal review of trial court decisions.‘” K.C., 128 A.3d at 778 (internal citation omitted) (quoting Melvin, 836 A.2d at 47, and Pridgen v. Parker Hannifin Corp., 905 A.2d 422, 427 (Pa. 2006)).
With these basic principles in mind, we turn to the application of the collateral order doctrine to the facts presented in this appeal. As set forth more fully above, the collateral order doctrine “permits an appeal as of right from a non-final collateral order if the order satisfies the three requirements set forth in Rule 313(b)—separability, importance, and irreparability.” Shearer, 177 A.3d at 858. Here, Grandparents concede in their brief to this Court that Parents have satisfied the first two prongs of the collateral order doctrine as set forth in Rule 313(b).4 We agree. With respect to the first prong—i.e., separability—“an order is separable from the main cause of action if it is ‘entirely distinct from the underlying issue in the case’ and if ‘it can be resolved without an analysis of the merits of the underlying dispute.‘” K.C., 128 A.3d at 778 (quoting Commonwealth v. Blystone, 119 A.3d 306, 312 (Pa. 2015)). We previously held that a lower court‘s order denying intervention in a custody action for lack of standing is separable from the main cause of action because “the issue of whether
With respect to the second prong of the collateral order doctrine, “a right is important if ‘the interests that would go unprotected without immediate appeal are significant relative to the efficiency interests served by the final order rule.‘” Id. at 779 (quoting Commonwealth v. Williams, 86 A.2d 771, 782 (Pa. 2014)). More particularly, “the rights involved must implicate more than just the individual parties in the matter[] and, instead, must be ‘deeply rooted in public policy going beyond the particular litigation at hand.‘” Id. (quoting Blystone, 119 A.3d at 312). We have explained that, while a “claimed right to standing to intervene” in a custody proceeding “may, at first blush, appear to implicate only the individual parties involved, this right has important policy implications extending beyond [each] particular case, as the [Commonwealth] has a ‘longstanding interest in protecting the health and emotional welfare of children,‘” and decisions relative to who has “standing to participate in a child custody action directly impact the children involved in such actions.” Id. (quoting Hiller v. Fausey, 904 A.2d 875, 886 (Pa. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1304 (2007)). We have further explained that, “in the context of child custody proceedings, the [Commonwealth] has a ‘paramount concern’ in ‘the best interest and permanent welfare of the child[]’ and has deemed all other considerations ‘subordinate to the child‘s physical, intellectual, moral and spiritual well-being.‘” Id. (quoting In re Davis, 456 A.2d 614, 618 (Pa. 1983)). For these reasons, we previously held that the Commonwealth‘s “paramount interest in the welfare of children and, as a result, in identifying the parties who may participate in child custody proceedings, demonstrates that [a] claimed right to [standing to] intervene [in a custody proceeding] satisfies the importance prong of the collateral order doctrine.” Id. at 780. As a result, given that this matter involves the issue of whether Grandparents have a right—i.e., standing—to file and pursue an action for partial physical custody of the Children under
With the first two prongs so easily satisfied, our analysis focuses on the third prong of the collateral order doctrine—i.e., irreparability. To satisfy the irreparability prong, “the matter must effectively be unreviewable on appeal from final judgment.” Commonwealth v. Wells, 719 A.2d 729, 730 (Pa. 1998). Simply put, there is nothing about the present case that would make the trial court‘s Standing Order unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment in the underlying custody proceedings. In the event that the trial court, following a custody hearing, were to award some form of custody of the Children to Grandparents, Parents could at that time appeal both the trial court‘s Standing Order and the trial court‘s final
Parents attempt to avoid this conclusion for several reasons. First, Parents direct our attention to our prior decision in K.C. In K.C., we considered, relative to the irreparability prong, whether the appellants’ right to appeal from an order denying their petition to intervene in a child custody action on the basis of a lack of standing would be irreparably lost if they were not permitted to appeal immediately therefrom. K.C., 128 A.3d at 775-76, 780-81. Ultimately, this Court concluded that, because In re Barnes Foundation, 871 A.2d 792 (Pa. 2005) (Barnes),5 “unequivocally requires any party who was denied intervention and who satisfies the requirements of Rule 313 to appeal from the order denying intervention within 30 days of its entry or lose the right to appeal the order entirely, [the a]ppellants’ right to appeal from the order denying intervention in the instant case will be manifestly lost if they are not permitted to appeal the order.” Id. at 780. K.C.‘s reasoning and analysis with respect to the irreparability of the collateral order doctrine, however, has no applicability to the present matter. Here, Parents are not seeking to appeal from an order denying them the right to intervene in the underlying child custody action for lack of standing; rather, Parents are the parties against whom Grandparents filed their action for partial physical custody of the Children and are seeking to appeal from an order that determined that Grandparents have standing to file and pursue the custody action. Additionally, there is nothing about the trial court‘s Standing Order that requires that it be appealed within 30 days of the entry thereof or the right to appeal therefrom would be lost. In fact, as stated above, Parents may appeal the trial court‘s Standing Order once a final custody order has been entered.
While they acknowledge that K.C. is distinguishable from this matter relative to the third prong of the collateral order doctrine, Parents, nonetheless, maintain that their claim will be irreparably lost if
We certainly acknowledge that Parents have a fundamental right to direct the care, custody, and control of the Children. See Hiller, 904 A.2d at 885. We disagree, however, that the existence of that fundamental right is in any way applicable to the issue of whether Parents’ challenge to the trial court‘s Standing Order will be irreparably lost if appellate review thereof is postponed until a final custody order is entered in this matter. A determination of whether appellate review of a claim will be irreparably lost does not turn on the importance of the right allegedly implicated. As explained more fully above, the collateral order doctrine has three, separate prongs—separability, importance, and irreparability—and each of those prongs must be clearly present before a court can determine that an order is collateral and immediately appealable as of right under Rule 313. See
Parents also go to great lengths to distinguish this case from Beltran v. Piersody, 748 A.2d 715 (Pa. Super. 2000), a case cited by the Superior Court in its quashal order. Parents suggest that in this case, unlike in Beltran: (1) Grandparents have no parental claim to the Children, legal or otherwise; (2) Parents, who are married and are an intact family with the Children, have made the joint determination that it is not in the Children‘s best interests to have a relationship with Grandparents; and (3) there is no protracted litigation involving custody of the Children. In Beltran, the Superior Court considered whether a trial court‘s order granting intervenor status to a child‘s biological father in an ongoing custody action was immediately appealable. Beltran, 748 A.2d at 716-18. Recognizing, inter alia, that the order granting the child‘s biological father intervenor status was not a final order and
Initially, we note that Beltran, although decided 15 years prior, is essentially the converse of K.C.—i.e., pursuant to K.C., an order denying intervenor status in a child custody matter is a collateral order that is immediately appealable as of right pursuant to Rule 313, whereas, pursuant to Beltran, an order granting intervenor status in a child custody matter does not meet the requirements for a collateral order under Rule 313. See K.C., 128 A.3d at 781; Beltran, 748 A.2d at 719. Beltran, like K.C., however, does not render any support to Parents’ position in this matter. Contrary to Parents’ suggestions, Beltran is not distinguishable simply because the facts of that case are markedly different from the facts presented here. Indeed, while the underlying facts may have been relevant to the Superior Court‘s analysis of the separability prong—i.e., the intervenor was the child‘s biological father—the Superior Court did not rely upon those facts in its analysis of the irreparability prong. The sole question relative to irreparability was whether the appellant in Beltran could appeal the trial court‘s intervention order once a final custody order had been entered, which the Superior Court concluded he could. That situation is the exact situation presented here: Parents can appeal the trial court‘s Standing Order once the trial court enters a final custody order.
Overall, Parents maintain that they “have a fundamental constitutional right to parent [the C]hildren, which includes [the] right to be free of custody litigation involving third parties.” (Parents’ Br. at 20.) Parents contend that the quashal of their appeal from the trial court‘s Standing Order will result in them “being subjected to extensive litigation involving [Grandparents], including a custody conciliation conference . . . . a lengthy custody hearing[,] and a second appeal on the exact issue [they] now seek to raise.” (Id.) Parents further posit that, “[n]ot only would [they] incur a substantial financial burden as a result of this litigation, but they also could lose months of time as the custody hearing and appeals process drags on.” (Id.) Lastly, Parents suggest that, “[u]nder the unique circumstances of this case, a court could not hope to fully vindicate or restore [their] currently undisturbed constitutional right to parent [the C]hildren by the time of a second appeal.” (Id.)
In making these arguments, however, Parents seemingly ignore two important points. First, the right that Parents advance is not, as they would like us to believe, the fundamental right to parent the Children free from interference from third parties. As it stands presently, there is no interim or final custody order in place that is at all interfering with Parents’ fundamental right to parent the Children.
Second, Parents could have sought permission to file an interlocutory appeal under Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 312. To that end, the concerns that Parents raise now, which we conclude fail to satisfy the collateral order doctrine, could have factored into a Superior Court determination of whether to grant permission
In sum, we conclude that Parents have failed to satisfy the irreparability prong of the collateral order doctrine, and, therefore, the trial court‘s Standing Order does not meet the requirements of a collateral order appealable as of right under Rule 313. In so doing, we emphasize that the collateral order doctrine is a narrow exception to the final order rule that must be narrowly construed. See Rae, 977 A.2d at 1126 (citing Melvin, 836 A.2d at 47, and Geniviva, 725 A.2d at 1214); Shearer, 177 A.3d at 858. Accordingly, we affirm the Superior Court‘s order.8
Justices Dougherty, Wecht and Mundy join
Justice Wecht files a concurring opinion.
Chief Justice Todd files a dissenting opinion in which Justice Donohue joins.
Notes
The following individuals may file an action under this chapter for any form of physical custody or legal custody:
. . . .
(3) A grandparent of the child who is not in loco parentis to the child:
(i) whose relationship with the child began either with the consent of a parent of the child or under a court order;
(ii) who assumes or is willing to assume responsibility for the child; and
(iii) when one of the following conditions is met:
. . . .
(C) the child has, for a period of at least 12 consecutive months, resided with the grandparent, excluding brief temporary absences of the child from the home, and is removed from the home by the parents, in which case the action must be filed within six months after the removal of the child from the home.
(continued...)
In K.C., this Court acknowledged that, “[w]hile Barnes did not involve a child custody action, its language is broad and applies to any ‘common pleas court‘s order denying intervention.‘” K.C., 128 A.3d at 780 (quoting Barnes, 871 A.2d at 794). As a result, this Court concluded that Barnes applied to the circumstances presented in that case:
[T]he rationale behind requiring the immediate appeal of a denial of intervention in Barnes—namely, the risk of interference with subsequent trial proceedings—is even more pronounced in the context of a child custody action, given the significant interests at stake. We, therefore, find that Barnes applies to the trial court‘s order in the instant case.
[T]he burden of litigating a domestic relations proceeding can itself be “so disruptive of the parent-child relationship that the constitutional right of a custodial parent to make certain basic determinations for the child‘s welfare becomes implicated.” In this case, the litigation costs incurred by [the parent] on her trip through the Washington court system and to this Court are without a doubt already substantial. As we have explained, it is apparent that the entry of the visitation order in this case violated the Constitution. We should say so now, without forcing the parties into additional litigation that would further burden [the parent‘s] parental right.
Id. at 75 (citation omitted).
Father has a fundamental constitutional right to parent [the c]hild. This includes the right to be free of custody litigation involving third parties. If we quash this appeal and remand to the trial court, Father will be subjected to extensive litigation involving Appellees, including a custody hearing and a second appeal on the exact issue he now seeks to raise. Not only would Father incur a substantial financial burden as a result of this litigation, but he also could lose months of time caring for and bonding with [the c]hild as the custody hearing and appeals process drags on. Under the unique circumstances of this case, where Father was deprived of [the c]hild by a private adoption agency without the benefit of a hearing or other due process protections, this [c]ourt could not hope to fully vindicate or restore Father‘s rights by the time of his second appeal.
Id. at 504. Consequently, the Superior Court concluded that the trial court‘s order granting in loco parentis standing to Appellees to pursue custody of the child satisfied all three prongs of the collateral order doctrine. Id.
While not cited in their brief to this Court, it is readily apparent that Parents derive at least some of their arguments relative to the irreparability prong from the Superior Court‘s rationale in K.W. (See Parents’ Br. at 20.); see also supra at 13 (summarizing Parents’ arguments). Given, however, that the parties have not addressed the applicability of K.W. or its continued viability in their briefs to this Court, we see no reason to disapprove of K.W. at this time.