A.L.W.A.Y., L.L.C. v. Ohio Dept. of Transp.A.L.W.A.Y., L.L.C. v. Ohio Dept. of Transp.
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 23, 2025
Appearances:
Mansour Gavin LPA, Diane A. Calta, and Anthony J. Coyne, for appellants.
Dave Yost, Ohio Attorney General, Jennifer L. Deland, and Shantae Decarlow, Senior Assistant Attorneys General, for appellees.
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J.:
{¶ 1} Appellants A.L.W.A.Y., L.L.C. (“A.L.W.A.Y.“) and AVC Parking & Management, Inc. (“AVC“) appeal from a judgment of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas dismissing their administrative appeal against appellees Ohio
{¶ 2} After review, we conclude that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over appellants’ appeal. The Administrative Procedure Act set forth in
I. Relevant Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 3} On October 3, 2024, Boratyn sent via certified mail a “Finding, Notice and Order to Remove Obstruction or Encroachment from State Highway Right of Way” (the “Order“) to appellants pursuant to
{¶ 4} The following facts are contained in the Order. In the late 1950s, the Department acquired “perpetual limited access highway easements” over eight
{¶ 5} In 1989, the City of Cleveland conveyed its interest in the eight parcels to Albert Calta. Nine years later, Albert created A.L.W.A.Y. and conveyed the land to his newly created company. The quitclaim deeds conveying the land to both Albert and A.L.W.A.Y. expressly state that the parcels are subject to the highway easements.
{¶ 6} Albert created AVC in March 1993, establishing a self-pay parking lot on the land encumbered by the highway easements. In July 1993, the City issued a Certificate of Occupancy to Albert for a 135-car parking lot at 2100 Carnegie Avenue. In October 2021, the City issued a license to AVC to operate a 130-car parking lot at the same location. The Department stated in the Order that appellants built obstructions on its easements, including pavement, lighting, signage, fencing, and a self-serve pay station.
{¶ 7} The Department has “planned a major improvement to a portion of the Cleveland Innerbelt highway that includes the area of Interstate 90 at Carnegie Avenue, Cedar Avenue, and East 22nd Street under a project identified as CUY Interstate 90-Section 16.28,” which will include reconstruction from East 9th Street to Carnegie Avenue and replacement of the East 22nd Street bridge over I-90.
{¶ 8} The Department found that A.L.W.A.Y. and AVC have been using portions of the land that are encumbered with the highway easements as a self-serving parking lot without obtaining consent from the Department. The Department further found that “the continued private use” of the parking lot conflicts with, obstructs, and interferes “with the contemplated construction, reconstruction, improvement, maintenance, repair, or use” of “Interstate 90 and associated entrance or exit ramps and East 22nd Street and the bridge carrying it over Interstate 90 together with contiguous intersections at Carnegie and Cedar Avenues. . . .”
{¶ 9} The Department contacted appellants about the project and its need to use the eight parcels of land but said they “failed or refused to terminate and remove the parking lot use from those parcels.”
{¶ 10} The Department ordered Calta to terminate the “parking lot use” over any portion of the parcels and begin removing the parking lot and any improvements on the land within five days of receipt of the Order, which is the statutory time to do so set forth in
{¶ 11} Appellants appealed to the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas pursuant to
{¶ 12} The trial court granted the Department‘s Civ.R. 12(B)(1) motion and dismissed the appeal. It is from this judgment that appellants now appeal.
II. Law and Analysis
{¶ 13} In their sole assignment of error, A.L.W.A.Y. and AVC argue that the trial court erred by dismissing their notice of appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
A. Standard of Review and Jurisdictional Authority
{¶ 14} We review a Civ.R. 12(B)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction de novo. Rheinhold v. Reichek, 2014-Ohio-31, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.), citing Bank of Am. v. Macho, 2011-Ohio-5495, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.). When ruling on a Civ.R. 12(B)(1) motion, the trial court must determine whether it has the authority to decide the matter before it. Id. In a de novo review, we apply the same standards as the trial court. Muhammad v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm. 2013-Ohio-3730, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.), citing GNFH, Inc. v. W. Am. Ins. Co., 2007-Ohio-2722, ¶ 16 (2d Dist.).
{¶ 15} Subject-matter jurisdiction is “a condition precedent to the court‘s ability to hear the case. If a court acts without jurisdiction, then any proclamation
{¶ 16} The Ohio Constitution provides that “[t]he courts of common pleas and divisions thereof shall have such original jurisdiction over all justiciable matters and such powers of review of proceedings of administrative officers and agencies as may be provided by law.”
{¶ 17} The Administrative Procedure Act authorizes an appeal to the common pleas court from many administrative agency decisions.
{¶ 18} To determine whether
B. Pertinent Statutes
{¶ 19}
{¶ 20}
{¶ 21}
any official, board, or commission having authority to promulgate rules or make adjudications in the civil service commission, the division of liquor control, the department of taxation, the industrial commission, the bureau of workers’ compensation, the functions of any administrative or executive officer, department, division, bureau, board, or commission of the government of the state specifically made subject to sections 119.01 to 119.13 of the Revised Code, and the licensing functions of any administrative or executive officer, department, division, bureau, board, or commission of the government of the state having the authority or responsibility of issuing, suspending, revoking, or canceling licenses.
{¶ 22}
C. Parties’ Arguments
{¶ 23} In their notice of appeal to the common pleas court, appellants stated that they were appealing the Department‘s Order pursuant to
{¶ 24} The Department argues that
{¶ 25} Appellants counter that the Order contained an adjudication as defined by
D. Asphalt Specialist and Brown
{¶ 26} In Asphalt Specialist, the director of the Ohio Department of Transportation relieved a contractor from control and supervision of a highway project for failing to correct deficient work. The contractor appealed to the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas pursuant to
{¶ 27} The Tenth District explained that the “narrow issue” before it was “whether a decision, by the Director of ODOT, to remove the contractor from a job is subject to the Administrative Procedure Act,
{¶ 28} The Tenth District went on to quote the pertinent sections of the statutes that were in effect at that time. Under the version of
{¶ 29} In Brown, 83 Ohio App.3d 879, the Tenth District was faced with the question of whether the owners of a motel had the right to challenge an order issued by the Ohio Department of Transportation to remove certain obstructions, including a swimming pool, parking lot, landscaping, flagpole, motel sign, and light pole that
{¶ 30} The Tenth District explained that based on the language of
{¶ 31} The Tenth District upheld the lower court‘s dismissal, concluding that (1) the Ohio Department of Transportation‘s actions were not expressly subject to
In the absence of an “adjudication” as defined in
R.C. 119.01(D) , the right to notice and hearing does not obtain and, consequently, in such a case the court lacks jurisdiction to review actions taken by a state administrative agency. State ex rel. Bd. of Edn. v. State Bd. of Edn. (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 173, 7 O.O.3d 357, 373 N.E.2d 1238. An act which is an adjudication is quasi-judicial in nature. A quasi-judicial proceeding involves the exercise of discretion, notice, hearing, an opportunity to introduce testimony through witnesses, and a finding or decision made in accordance with statutory authority. In re Seltzer (May 19, 1992), Franklin App. No. 91AP-677, unreported, 1992 WL 113142, appeal pending in case No. 92-1400, citing M.J. Kelly Co. v. Cleveland (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 150, 61 O.O.2d 394, 290 N.E.2d 562.In the present matter, R.C. 5515.02 does not provide for prior notice, a hearing or an opportunity to present witnesses. The court finds that the trial court did not err in determining that the agency action did not constitute an adjudication.
E. Analysis
2023 Amendments to R.C. 119.12
{¶ 32} First, we must determine if Asphalt Specialist, 53 Ohio App.3d 45, and Brown, 83 Ohio App.3d 879, are still good law after the amendments enacted in Am.Sub.S.B. No. 21, effective September 29, 2023. Appellants argue that Asphalt Specialist and Brown are not dispositive here because of the 2023 amendments. Appellants claim that the former version of the statute was more restrictive because the adjudication being appealed had to involve denying or issuing a license. Appellants assert that now, “the new language of Ohio Revised Code establishes that any party adversely affected by any order of an agency issued pursuant to an adjudication may file an appeal under Chapter 119.” (Emphasis in original.)
{¶ 33} While appellants are correct that
{¶ 34} And notably, the General Assembly explained that the amendments made to the Administrative Procedure Act in S.B. 21 were enacted to make it easier for people to sue state agencies in the county in which they live rather than solely in Franklin County. See Ohio Legislative Service Commission, Final Analysis, available at https://www.legislature.ohio.gov/download?key=21332 (accessed Sept. 23, 2025) [https://perma.cc/8H7E-MTML] (“Allowing an adversely affected party to appeal to the common pleas court in the county where a licensee‘s place of business is located or where the licensee is a resident, in lieu of appealing to the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas“).2
{¶ 35} Therefore, we conclude that Asphalt Specialist, 53 Ohio App.3d 45,
“Agency” and “Adjudication”
{¶ 36} Next, we must determine whether the Ohio Department of Transportation is an “agency” as defined in
{¶ 37} Turning to
{¶ 38} And even if we agreed with appellants that the Department was an agency for purposes of the Administrative Procedure Act, there was no adjudication as defined by
{¶ 39} In this case, the Department sent the Order pursuant to
{¶ 40} Finally, appellants argue that “because there are fundamental fee simple property rights at issue, there is an interest in protecting those interests by affording [them] appropriate due process.” They claim that “[i]f due process is not afforded, [their] constitutional rights will be violated.” According to the evidence filed in the common pleas court, however, the Department obtained the easements across appellants’ property many years before appellants owned it. Thus, appellants’ due-process rights are not being violated.
{¶ 41} Appellants’ sole assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 42} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellees recover from appellants the costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, JUDGE
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, A.J., and
MARY J. BOYLE, J., CONCUR