A.C. v. McKeeA.C. v. McKee
I.
Following a district court‘s grant of a motion to
The Students point to several components of Rhode Island‘s approach to civics education that have caused the alleged failure. First, Rhode Island does not require any civics courses, although some high schools in more affluent districts offer elective civics cоurses, nor does the state mandate testing for civics knowledge at the high school level or report student performance in these subjects, unlike reading, math and science. Due to limited time and resources, schools thus focus on these mandatory subjects that are tested statewide. Second, Rhode Island‘s current civics curriculum falls short. It has not adopted the College, Career and Civic Life (“C3“) framework for teaching civics, which various educators and policy organizations have endorsed. When courses do address civics concepts, the content is not as comprehensive as the C3 framework would provide. Moreover, current courses do not promote active classroom
As to the effect of the lack of civics education, the Students cite national studies reporting a lack of civic knowledge, and a disinterest and lack of participation in civic life (e.g., voting and volunteering) among young Americans when compared to previous generations. They also point to the “civic empowerment gap” for mаny African American and Latino students and students from low-income families, citing demographic analysis of the results of civics knowledge testing done on a national sample of eighth graders.
II.
We review the district court‘s grant of Rhode Island‘s motion to dismiss de novo. Gaspee Project v. Mederos, 13 F.4th 79, 84 (1st Cir. 2021).
A.
The Students appeal the district court‘s conclusion that
We turn first to the Supreme Court‘s precedent regarding the existence vel non of a fundamental right to education. Dating back at least to Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court has characterized education as “the most important function of state and local governments,” and as the “very foundation of good citizenship,” which is “required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities.” San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1973) (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Ed., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)); see Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221-23 (1982) (noting Court‘s recognition of education as a vital civic institution for preservation of American democracy). Nevertheless, the Court has distinguished the relative importance of education and its role in society from the fundamental rights inquiry under the Fourteenth Amendment and looked to whether it was “explicitly оr implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.”
Appellants here read Rodriguez to suggest that, if properly alleged, we may conclude that the Constitution protects the specific right to a civics education that prepares them to participate effectively in these important aspects of public life (e.g., voting or other civic participation). We read the language
Here, much like the petitioners in Papasan and Rodriguez, the Students do not plausibly allege that they were “deprived of a minimally adequate education,” i.e., state action tantamount to a “radical” or “absolute denial” of any “educational opportunity.” See Papasan, 478 U.S. at 284, 286; Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37. Instead, their complaint alleges that Rhode Island‘s policies vis-à-vis civics-related curriculum is substantively
We also takе judicial notice of relevant Rhode Island law, which has since 2007 required at least some civics education in its schools, even if it is not as comprehensive as the framework Appellants desire, and this law was amended recently during the pendency of this appeal to require civics proficiency, among other changes. See, e.g.,
For these reasons, this lawsuit stands in contrast to a case considered recently by the Sixth Circuit, upon which the Students heavily rely, where a panel majority concluded that students in Detroit Public Schools had plausibly alleged denial of their fundamental right to “a basic minimum education -- meaning one that plausibly provides access to litеracy.” Gary B. v. Whitmer, 957 F.3d 616, 648-49 (6th Cir. 2020), reh‘g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 958 F.3d 1216 (6th Cir. 2020). Surveying legal and historical authority,4 the court determined that access to literacy was a fundamental right because, in part, it is “viewed by our society as essential for students to obtain even a chance at political and economic opportunity.” See id. at 649-52.
In that lawsuit, which now remains dismissed, the plaintiffs specifically alleged facts describing conditions in
As described above, the complaint here fails to allege a total deprivation of a minimally adequate education (as opposed to specific subject-matter inclusion).5 See Papasan, 748 U.S. at
For these reasons, we affirm the district court‘s conclusion that the students have not plausibly alleged the deprivation of a fundamental right.6
B.
In conducting our analysis of the Students’ equal protection claim, we first consider the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216-17; Toledo v. Sánchez, 454 F.3d 24, 33 (1st Cir. 2006). As a preliminary matter, we reject the Students’ argument that strict scrutiny applies, since we concluded above that their allegations do not implicate a fundamental right. Moreover, thе Students, suing on behalf of all public school students in Rhode Island, have not asserted that
The Students next argue that Plyler entitles them to some heightened standard of review. In Plyler, the Court “struck down under heightened scrutiny the exclusion of [undocumented] children from a free public education offered to other resident children as violative of equal protection.” Id. (citing Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230).7 We are not persuaded that Plyler‘s heightened standard of review applies here. First, the Plyler Court limited its application of heightened review to instances where the state “den[ies] a discrete group of innocent children the free public education that it offers to other children residing within its borders.” Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230; see Toledo, 454 F.3d at 33 (citing Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 459) (noting that since Plyler, the Supreme Court has employed rational basis to assеss policies “that burden the educational opportunities of a non-suspect class” when those burdens were not outright exclusions). Second, Plyler applied heightened review to the exclusionary policy because it denied undocumented children a “basic education.” Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223. Here, the Students allege neither that they comprise a discrete group of children (e.g., undocumented children),
Acсordingly, as there are no suspect classifications alleged or fundamental rights implicated, our equal protection review is “limited to a deferential, rational basis standard.” D‘Angelo v. New Hampshire Sup. Ct., 740 F.3d 802, 806 (1st Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). As the same applies to our substantive due process review, see Mulero-Carrillo v. Román-Hernández, 790 F.3d 99, 107 (1st Cir. 2015), we proceed accordingly.
C.
In reviewing state action under the “forgiving [rational basis] standard,” the state will prevail “so long as [it] articulates some ‘reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the [action].‘” Donahue v. City of Boston, 371 F.3d 7, 15–16 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting FCC v. Beach Commc‘ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993)); Mulero-Carrillo, 790 F.3d at 107 (applying same requirements at motion to dismiss stagе). The Students argue that the district court erred when it dismissed their complaint under rational basis review without the chance to present evidence, but we have previously rejected this argument, for under rational basis review, “any plausible justification [from the state] will suffice, and effectively ends the analysis.” Donahue, 371 F.3d at 15-16 (citations and internal
As to local control, the Students contend that Rhode Island has substantial authority over education and “should exercise this existing supervisory authority to ensure that civics education is a high priority for all Rhode Island‘s schools,” and that additional oversight of local education policy with respect to civics courses is more important than allowing school districts to make curriculum choices. These arguments again stress Appellants’ preferred policy outcomes but fail to negate the
The state‘s asserted reasons are at least “plausible,” which satisfies the “forgiving” rational basis inquiry. Donahue, 371 F.3d at 15 (citations omitted). In particular, we note that states, and more so schools and teachers, must grapple with limited resources and time to educate their students, all while satisfying multiple demands, including mandated federal standards for testing and proficiency, which can affect their funding. We do not doubt the importance of the civics curriculum proffered by the Students and their amici, but we also do not doubt the importance of reading, science and math, both for providing a basic education and for preparing students to succeed in higher education and the workforce.
Finally, as to thе equal protection claim, we note that the Students have also failed to tie the difference between their schools and more affluent ones (that do provide elective civics courses and experiences) to policies implemented or enforced by Rhode Island to create this alleged disparity, aside from mere mention that one district offers some optional courses. But to state an equal protection claim, the Students must connect the alleged disparity to a specific policy or action taken by Rhode
For these reasons, we affirm the district court‘s conclusion that Rhode Island‘s approach to civics education satisfies rational basis review.
D.
We briefly address whether the complaint states a claim for relief under the Guarantee and Privileges and Immunities Clauses. As to the Guarantee Clause, we have noted that it “makes the guarantee of a republican form of government to the states; the bare language of the Clause does not directly confer any rights on individuals vis-á-vis the states.” Largess v. Supreme Jud. Ct. for State of Mass., 373 F.3d 219, 224 n.5 (1st Cir. 2004) (emphasis in original). Even assuming arguendo that the Students had standing here, their Guаrantee Clause claim fails on the merits. Any such claim “is restricted to real threats to a republican form of government.” Largess, 373 F.3d at 227 (emphasis added); see New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 185-86 (1992) (dismissing state‘s Guarantee Clause challenge to a federal regulatory scheme where the threats did not “pose any realistic risk of altering the form or the method of functioning of [the state‘s] government,” noting that even under the scheme, the state “retain[ed] the ability to set their legislative agendas” and “state government officials remain[ed] accountable to the local electorate”
III.
We conclude by echoing the district court‘s observations in dismissing this case, that the Students have called attention to critical issues of declining civic engagement and inadequate preparation for participation in civic life at a time when many are concerned about the future of American democracy. See A.C., 494 F. Supp. 3d at 175-76, 181, 197. Nevertheless, the weight of precedent stands in the Students’ way here, and they have not stated any viable claim for relief.
We affirm the judgment of the district court.