942 F.3d 258
5th Cir.2019Background
- M.L., a San Benito High School student, was selected head varsity cheerleader but was dismissed after coaches found and cited a series of personal Twitter posts (likes/retweets and one original reply) containing profanity and sexual innuendo.
- M.L. and her mother had signed the Cheerleading Constitution, which required cheerleaders to maintain “appropriate” conduct on personal social-media accounts; M.L.’s Twitter bio identified her as a member of the varsity cheer team.
- Plaintiffs grieved to the principal, who denied relief after a hearing; the superintendent declined further review.
- Plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the coaches, principal, superintendent, and the district alleging violations of the First Amendment, due process, and equal protection; district court dismissed, granting qualified immunity to individual defendants and dismissing other claims.
- The Fifth Circuit affirmed: it held that (1) existing law did not clearly establish that disciplining M.L. for these off-campus social-media posts was unconstitutional (so individual defendants get qualified immunity), and (2) plaintiffs failed to plead viable vagueness, overbreadth, or municipal-liability claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether dismissal for off-campus Twitter posts violated the First Amendment | M.L.: off-campus, non-threatening tweets not directed at school are protected speech under Tinker | Defs: precedent on off-campus speech was unclear; extracurricular sanction and signed constitution distinguish this case | Court: did not decide the merits; found the law was not clearly established and granted qualified immunity to individuals |
| Whether individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity | M.L.: Supreme Court and circuit precedent (Tinker/Fraser/Morse/Bell) put defendants on notice | Defs: precedent did not clearly govern off-campus, extracurricular social-media discipline; reasonable officials lacked fair warning | Held: qualified immunity applies because no controlling precedent placed the conduct “beyond debate” |
| Whether the Cheerleading Constitution is unconstitutionally vague or overbroad | M.L.: provision regulating “appropriate” social-media conduct is vague/overbroad | Defs: claims not properly pleaded and plaintiff lacks a protected property/liberty interest in one year of extracurricular participation | Held: dismissed (plaintiffs failed to timely assert these claims and, on the merits, they fail) |
| Whether the school district is liable under Monell | M.L.: Board either adopted the Cheerleading Constitution or delegated policymaking authority to the principal | Defs: complaint alleges no facts connecting the Board to the Constitution or delegating policymaking authority | Held: municipal-liability claim dismissed for failure to plead that the Board adopted or delegated the challenged policy |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (U.S. 2011) (qualified-immunity standard: law must be clearly established)
- Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Comm. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (U.S. 1969) (student speech protected unless it causes or reasonably forecasts substantial disruption)
- Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (U.S. 1986) (schools may discipline lewd/offensive speech in school settings)
- Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (U.S. 1988) (schools may regulate school-sponsored student expression for legitimate pedagogical reasons)
- Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (U.S. 2007) (narrow exception allowing suppression of certain school-related advocacy of illegal drug use)
- Bell v. Itawamba County Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015) (applied Tinker to off-campus, intentionally school-directed threatening/harassing online speech)
- Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608 (5th Cir. 2004) (qualified immunity where law re: off-campus speech was unsettled)
- Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (U.S. 1978) (municipal liability requires unconstitutional policy or delegation of policymaking authority)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (U.S. 2009) (courts may decide qualified-immunity prongs in either order)
- Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692 (U.S. 2011) (courts may decide immunity without reaching constitutional merits)