Zubik v. Sebelius, 983 F. Supp. 2d 576

Two RFRA/First Amendment challenges to the ACA contraceptive mandate were filed by Catholic Dioceses of Pittsburgh and Erie and related Catholic charitable/educational organizations.
Plaintiffs argue the contraceptive mandate, as applied via the accommodation, forces them to facilitate or initiate coverage for contraceptives, abortion-inducing drugs, sterilization, and related counseling, violating their religious beliefs.
Religious-exempt ‘exemption’ for houses of worship contrasts with the non-exempt religious-affiliated entities, creating a split within the Church’s operations and burdens.
The 2013 final rules created an “accommodation” requiring self-certification by eligible organizations and potential third-party administration of contraceptive coverage; self-certification would be signed by bishops on behalf of Plaintiffs’ entities.
Plaintiffs face potential penalties, including fines and liens, if they do not sign the self-certification or otherwise comply, and contend this causes irreparable harm to their religious mission and charitable activities.
The court finds Plaintiffs likely to succeed on the merits, concluding the accommodation imposes a substantial burden on free exercise of religion and that the government has not shown a compelling interest or least-restrictive means sufficient to justify it.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does the accommodation impose a substantial RFRA burden?	Plaintiffs argue the self-certification to trigger contraceptive coverage harms their religion.	Government contends burden is de minimis and not substantial.	Yes; accommodation places a substantial RFRA burden.
Are the Government’s asserted interests compelling and narrowly tailored?	RFRA requires the burden to be outweighed by compelling interests; government interests are not shown to be of the highest order here.	Government asserts interests in public health and equal access to care.	No; government interests are not shown to outweigh Plaintiffs’ religious claims.
Does the exemption vs accommodation framework unduly burden Plaintiffs by splitting the Church?	Exemption for worship and accommodation for good works divide the Church, burdening non-exempt entities.	Exemption simply reflects statutory structure; accommodation is a separate mechanism.	Yes; the dual regime unevenly burdens identical religious beliefs and activities.
Is the accommodation the least restrictive means to achieve its objectives?	There are other less restrictive options; the government has not demonstrated the accommodation is the least restrictive.	The accommodation is presented as the least restrictive means among explored alternatives.	No; the government failed to show the accommodation is least restrictive.

Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2013) (RFRA substantial burden and compelling interest analysis; exemption scope discussed)
Gilardi v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, 733 F.3d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (agency exemptions; religious employer status)
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Secretary of U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services, 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013) (RFRA application to contraceptive mandate; substantial burden concept)
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013) (RFRA and substantial burden in a corporate religious entity context)
Geneva College v. Sebelius, 960 F. Supp. 2d 589 (W.D. Pa. 2013) (preliminary injunction regarding nonprofit religious college)
Liberty University, Inc. v. Lew, 733 F.3d 72 (4th Cir. 2013) (RFRA review of contraceptive mandate; for-profit/nonprofit implications noted)