Zia Shadows, L.L.C. v. City of Las Cruces
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 13391
| 10th Cir. | 2016Background
- Zia Shadows operated a mobile‑home park in Las Cruces under a special‑use permit and later applied (2008) to convert the park to a Planned Unit Development (PUD) as its zoning compliance plan.
- The City’s Planning & Zoning Commission recommended approval, but the City Council raised concerns about public‑benefit conditions (road widening payments or HUD‑defined affordable housing) and delayed/further conditioned approval; bankruptcy and foreclosure of Zia Shadows’ lender ultimately led to sale of the property.
- Zia Shadows sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming deprivation of property without due process (challenge to continued validity of the special‑use permit and to PUD approval process), a class‑of‑one equal‑protection violation, and First Amendment retaliation for plaintiffs’ prior public criticism of the City.
- The district court granted summary judgment to the City on due‑process and equal‑protection claims; the First Amendment claim proceeded to jury trial and resulted in a verdict for the City; post‑trial motions were denied.
- On appeal, Zia Shadows challenged (1) summary judgment on due process and equal protection, (2) a last‑minute change to the jury instruction on retaliation, (3) the district court’s refusal to strike a City employee juror for implied bias, and (4) that the jury verdict was against the clear weight of the evidence. The Tenth Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Zia had a protected property interest in its special‑use permit and in prompt/unconditional PUD approval (due process) | Zia: had legitimate entitlement to keep its special‑use permit and to Community Development Dept. approval of its PUD (per code §38‑73) without Council delay/conditions | City: ordinances give Council final discretionary authority over PUD concept/final site plan (code §38‑49); special‑use permits may be modified/revoked; no mandatory entitlement | Court: no protected property interest; summary judgment for City affirmed |
| Whether the City violated equal protection via class‑of‑one treatment | Zia: City treated it differently (only park required to comply; greater financial scrutiny; post‑sale owner not required to follow same rules) | City: plaintiff must prove others similarly situated and differential treatment; Zia failed to present evidence of materially similar comparators or reasons for any differential treatment | Court: Zia failed burden to show similarly situated comparators or lack of reasonable basis; summary judgment for City affirmed |
| Whether district court abused discretion by changing the retaliation jury instruction after close of evidence | Zia: court should have enforced the parties’ stipulated instruction (no chilling‑of‑ordinary‑firmness element) and City was estopped from changing position after plaintiffs relied on it | City: stipulations on law do not bind the court; correct law requires objective chilling standard; change was timely under Rule 51 | Court: court not bound by stipulation of law; correct instruction requires showing of chilling of a person of ordinary firmness (Worrell); Zia failed to show prejudice; no reversible error |
| Whether a City‑employee juror should have been struck for implied bias | Zia: employee of municipal party is presumptively biased and should be disqualified; juror might fear workplace repercussions | City: government employment alone does not create implied bias; juror’s duties (maintenance of pools) unrelated to zoning; no evidence of actual bias or special circumstances | Court: implied‑bias standard has high threshold; Wood and later precedent reject categorical disqualification of government employees; no implied bias here and district court did not abuse discretion |
Key Cases Cited
- Adler v. Wal‑Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664 (10th Cir.) (summary judgment standard)
- Hyde Park Co. v. Santa Fe City Council, 226 F.3d 1207 (10th Cir.) (property‑interest analysis in land‑use context)
- Nichols v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 506 F.3d 962 (10th Cir.) (due‑process property interest requires legally mandatory decision)
- Worrell v. Henry, 219 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir.) (elements of First Amendment retaliation; objective chilling standard)
- Kan. Penn Gaming, LLC v. Collins, 656 F.3d 1210 (10th Cir.) (class‑of‑one equal‑protection standard)
- Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (U.S.) (class‑of‑one theory)
- Bangert Bros. Const. Co. v. Kiewit W. Co., 310 F.3d 1278 (10th Cir.) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of evidence supporting jury verdict)
- Abuan v. Level 3 Commc’ns, Inc., 353 F.3d 1158 (10th Cir.) (when verdict may be overturned because evidence points only one way)
- Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183 (U.S.) (common‑law rule disqualifying party employees from juries)
- United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123 (U.S.) (rejection of categorical disqualification for government employees)
- Getter v. Wal‑Mart Stores, Inc., 66 F.3d 1119 (10th Cir.) (implied bias where juror had financial ties to party)
- Vasey v. Martin Marietta Corp., 29 F.3d 1460 (10th Cir.) (presumed bias in extraordinary situations; employee relationships discussed)
