Zhang Jingrong v. Chinese Anti-Cult World Alliance, 314 F. Supp. 3d 420

Background

Plaintiffs are Falun Gong adherents who proselytized, meditated, and protested at tables and a temple in Flushing, Queens; confrontations with defendants (anti-Falun Gong group) involved loud disputes and occasional minor physical contact.
Plaintiffs sued, alleging among other claims violations of the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACEA) § 248(a)(2) for violence/intimidation at a place of religious worship.
The court previously held Falun Gong is a religion for this case and construed "place of religious worship" broadly to include temporary street tables to avoid First Amendment problems.
Defendants raised a Commerce Clause challenge to FACEA's religious-protection provision, arguing the statute exceeds Congress's commerce power.
The district court analyzed Commerce Clause precedent, legislative history (FACEA primarily aimed at clinic access; the religion provision was later added), and empirical evidence that religious activity substantially intersects with interstate commerce.
The court denied the facial Commerce Clause challenge, concluded FACEA's religion provision is a permissible exercise of Congress's commerce power, and certified two questions for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether FACEA § 248(a)(2) exceeds Congress's Commerce Clause power	FACEA is a valid federal statute protecting religious exercise at places of worship; Congress reasonably concluded religious activity affects interstate commerce	Violence/intimidation at places of worship is non-economic (analogous to VAWA in Morrison); FACEA lacks express commerce jurisdictional element and legislative findings linking religion to commerce	Denied: Court held Congress could rationally conclude places of worship are economic in aggregate; FACEA is a constitutional exercise of commerce power
Whether "place of religious worship" includes temporary street tables used for proselytizing	Plaintiffs: broad construction required to avoid First Amendment discrimination between formal and informal worship sites	Defendants: legislative history suggested "established" places only; narrower reading would limit scope	Held for plaintiffs: Court construed the phrase broadly (including temporary structures) to avoid First Amendment problems
Whether defendants waived or forfeited their Commerce Clause challenge by pleading	Plaintiffs argued untimely/forfeited amendment	Defendants contended constitutional challenge may be raised by motion and was timely; jurisdictional nature allows challenge at any time	Held for defendants: Challenge not waived; leave to amend appropriate; Commerce Clause challenge may be raised and considered now
Whether interlocutory appeal should be certified under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)	Plaintiffs: trial should proceed; factual record supports prompt resolution	Defendants: controlling legal question with substantial ground for difference of opinion; avoiding costly trial pending appeal would materially advance litigation	Held: Court certified two questions for interlocutory appeal (constitutionality re: religion; scope of FACEA in this dispute)

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (limiting Commerce Clause; non-economic activity outside commerce power)
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (struck down VAWA civil remedy; gender-motivated violence is non-economic)
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (Congress may regulate an economic class of activities with a rational-basis finding)
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (aggregate economic effect doctrine)
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (national regulation of private discrimination under Commerce Clause)
Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing Township, 330 U.S. 1 (Establishment Clause principles on government and religion)
Murdock v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (overlap between religious activity and commerce; distribution of religious literature protected)
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any stage)
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (Rule 15 preference to decide cases on the merits)