*1 UNITED v. MOTEL, INC. ATLANTA OF HEART STATES et al. 14, 1964. 5, 1964. Decided Argued October December
No. *2 Moretón Rolleston, Jr., argued the cause and filed a brief for appellant.
Solicitor General Cox argued, the cause for the United States et al. With him on the brief were Assistant At- torney General Marshall, Philip B. Heymann and Harold H. Greene.
Briefs of amici curiae, urging reversal, were filed Kynes, James W. Attorney General of and Florida, Fred M. Burns and Joseph Jacobs, C. Assistant Attorneys Gen- eral, for the State of Florida; and Robert Button, Y. Attorney General of Virginia, and Frederick Gray, T. Special Assistant Attorney General, for the Common- wealth of Virginia.
Briefs of curiae, amici urging affirmance, were filed Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General of California, Charles E. Corker and Dan Kaufmann, Assistant Attor- neys General, and Charles B. McKesson and Jerold L. Perry, Deputy Attorneys General, for the State Cali- fornia; Brooke, Edward JV. Attorney General of Massa- for chusetts, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts; and Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General of New York, Samuel A. Hirshowitz, First Assistant Attorney General, and Shirley Adelson Siegel, Assistant Attorney General, for the State of New York.
Mr. Justice Clark delivered opinion the of the Court. This ais declaratory judgment action, 28 U. S. C. § 2201 and § (1958 ed.), attacking the constitution- ality of II Title Civil the Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. complaint relief the declaratory In addition 243.1 enforcement restraining injunction an sought allegedly on based appellees against damages Act required. was compliance event resulting injury (a) § 206 under enforcement counterclaimed Appellees court district three-judge for a asked of the Act under empaneled court, three-judge A (b). § 206 under ed.), sus- (1958 § S. C. U. as 28 (b) as well 206§ permanent issued Act and validity tained restraining appel- counterclaim appellees’ injunction which remains Act violate continuing to from lant 1. We Ct. 85 S. of Mr. Black, on order effect Justice judgment. affirm Background Factual Contentionss Tihe
Parties. facts. stipulated here on admissions comes case *3 Motel Atlanta of Heart operates and owns Appellant The rooms, guests. transient to available which has from two blocks Street, Courtland located is motel to readily accessible It Street. Peachtree downtown highways state and 85 and highways interstate outside from patronage solicits Appellant advertising national through various Georgia State circulation; it national magazines including media, signs highway within 50 billboards over maintains accepts motel; it soliciting patronage State, Georgia approximately from outside trade convention Prior out State. are from guests registered itsof 75% practice followed a motel had Act the passage to alleged that it Negroes, and to rooms rent refusing to perpet- to In an effort so. to do continue to intended filed. suit was this policy that uate passing that contends appellant I,Art. commerce under regulate its
Act exceeded Appendix. See 8,§ cl. of the Constitution of the States; United that the Act violates the Fifth Amendment because appellant is deprived of right to choose its customers operate its business it.wishes, resulting in a taking of its lib- erty and property without process due of law and a taking of its property just without compensation; and, finally, that requiring appellant to rent available rooms to Negroes against its will, Congress' is subjecting it involuntary servitude contravention of the Thirteenth Amendment.
The appellees counter the unavailability Negroes of adequate accommodations signifi- interferes cantly with interstate travel, and that Congress, under the Commerce Clause, has power to remove such obstruc- tions and restraints; that the Fifth Amendment does not forbid reasonable regulation and that consequential dam- age does not constitute a “taking” within the meaning of that amendment; the Thirteenth Amendment claim fails because it is entirely frivolous say that an amendment directed to the abolition of human bondage and the removal of widespread disabilities associated with slavery places discrimination in public accommodations beyond the reach of both federal and state law.
At the trial the appellant offered no evidence, submit- ting the casé on the pleadings, admissions and stipulation of facts; however, appellees proved the refusal of the motel to accept Negro transients after the passage of thé Act. Court, The District sustained the constitutionality of the sections of the Act under (§§ attack 201 (a), (b) *4 (1) (c) (1)) and issued a permanent injunction on the counterclaim of the appellees. It restrained the appellant from “[Refusing to accept Negroes guests in the by motel reason of their race or color” and from “[mjaking any distinction upon whatever the basis of race or color in the availability of the goods, services, 'facilities,
245 made or offered accommodations or advantages privileges, general to the or motel, of the guests to the available of Heart of the premises any upon or within public, Motel, Inc.” Atlanta the Act. History
2. legis- rights in civil its interest evidenced first Congress 9, April ofAct or Enforcement Rights the Civil in lation Civil fifth, the a Acts,3 with four followed There 1866.2 In series. culminating the 1875,4 1, March ofAct Rights accommodations public the down struck Court this 1883 Cases, 109 Rights Civil in the 1875 Act the sections been had field legislation major No 3.S.U. Rights Civil the when years for 82 Congress by
enacted Civil the by followed was It law. became of 19575 Act 19,1963, June later, on years Three of I960.6 Act Rights legislar rights for civil Kennedy called President late pro- attached he Congress message to in a tion was purpose stated Its bill. posed dis- eliminating welfare general promote
“to national religion, color, race, based crimination through accommodations . . . origin upon conferred powers exercise fourteenth provisions enforce it ... regulate amendments, fifteenth necessary laws make and to States, several
among the upon conferred powers to execute proper 124, 88th Doc. No. H. R. by the Constitution.” 14. Sess., at Cong., 1st 27. 2 14 Stat. Act of 50; Peonage Abolition Act, Kidnaping 14 Stat. Slave 140; 1870, Stat. May 31, 546; Act of 1867, 14 Stat. March 13. Stat. 20, 1871, 17 April
Anti-Lynching' Act 335. 4 18 Stat. 634. 71 Stat. Stat.
Bills were introduced in each House of the Congress, embodying President’s suggestion, one in the Sen- ate being S. 17327 and one in the House, H. R. 7152. However, it was not until July 2, 1964, upon the recom- mendation of President Johnson, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, here under attack, was finally passed.
After extended hearings each of these bills was favor- ably reported to its respective house, H. R. 7152 on November 20, 1963, H. R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., and S. 1732 on February 10, 1964, S. Rep. No. 872, 88th Cong., 2d Although Sess. each bill originally incor- porated extensive findings of fact these were eliminated from the bills as they were reported. The House passed its bill in January 1964 and sent to the Senate. Through a bipartisan coalition of Senators Humphrey and Dirksen, together with other Senators, a substitute was worked out informal conferences. This substitute was-adopted by the Senate and sent to the House where it was adopted without change. This expedited pro- prevented cedure the usual report on the substitute bill in the Senate as well aas Conference Committee report ordinarily filed in such matters. Our only frame of ref- erence as to the legislative history of the Act is, there- fore, the hearings, reports and debates on the respective bills in each house.
The Act as finally adopted was most comprehensive, undertaking to prevent through peaceful and voluntary séttlement discrimination in voting,, as well inas places of accommodation and public facilities, federally secured programs and in employment. Since Title II is only portion under attack here, we confine our consideration those provisions. accommodation 7S. 1732 solely dealt with public; A second accommodations.. Sen bill, ate S. 1731, contained the entire administration proposal. The Senate Judiciary Committee conducted the hearings on S. 1731 while the Committee on Commerce considered S. , 1732. the Act. oj II Title with beginning
This sections into seven is divided Title that: provides (a) § 201 equal the full and shall be entitled
“All persons facilities, privileges, services, goods, enjoyment any place and accommodations advantages, *6 section, in this accommodation, as defined public discrimination, ground on the segregation or without origin.” or national color, religion, race, classes of business estab- (b) in 201 four § listed There are a and “is public” which “serves the each of lishments, meaning of within the accommodation” place if commerce, or discrim- affect operations “if its (a) 201§ by action.” by supported it is State segregation ination or are: establishments The covered or establishment hotel, motel, other any inn,
“(1) guests, other than lodging to transient provides which building within a which located an establishment or hire five rooms for rent not more than contains proprietor actually occupied which is residence; as his such establishment n cafeteria . . here any restaurant, . “(2) [not involved]; here picture motion house . . .
“(3) any [not involved]; physically . . . which is
“(4) any establishment premises any establishment located within the or . . . within subsection, covered otherwise physically any of which is located such premises . here establishment .... covered [not involved].” phrase “affect commerce” as (c) defines the Section above establishments. It first declares to the applied or which inn, hotel, motel, other establishment “any guests” transient affects lodging to commerce provides Restaurants, cafeterias, etc., class two affect se. per in. only if they serve or offer to serve interstate
travelers ifor portion substantial of the food which they products serve or they sell have “moved in commerce.” picture Motion houses and other places listed class three affect commerce if they customarily present films, performances, etc., “which in com- move merce.” And the establishments listed in class four affect commerce if they are within, or include within their own premises, an establishment “the operations of which affect commerce.” Private clubs are excepted cer- under tain 201 (e). § conditions.. See
Section 201 (d) declares that “discrimination segre- or gation” is supported by state action when carried on under any color of law, statute, ordinance, regulation or any custom or usage required or enforced by officials of the State any or of its subdivisions.
In addition, § 202 affirmatively declares all per- sons- “shall be entitled to be free, any at establishment or place, from discrimination or segregation of any kind ground of race, color, religion, national origin, *7 if. such or segregation discrimination is or purports to be required any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, rule, or order of a State any or agency or political subdivision thereof.”
Finally, prohibits § 203 the withholding or denial, etc., any right of or privilege secured by § 201 and § 202 or the intimidation, threatening or coercion of any person with the purpose of interfering with any such right or punishing, the etc., of any person for exercising or attempting to any exercise right. such
The remaining sections of the Title are remedial ones any violations of of previous the sections. Remedies are to civil limited for preventive actions relief. The Attorney General may bring suit where he has “rea- sonable to cause believe that any person or group per- of sons is engaged in pattern a practice or of resistance to secured rights the of any of enjoyment full the a nature of such is practice or pattern the and that title, rights of the exercise full the deny to is intended and (a).. .” . . . described herein Attor- the which suit, bring may aggrieved person A days’ Thirty intervene. to permitted may be General ney given be must action any such filing before notice written the subdivision or State of a authorities appropriate to the which of and complained act the prohibits of which law there- relief grant may authority which an established has does condition such where In States (c). 204§ from. toit refer may filed is case after court the exist not established is Service Relations Community the estab- Title This (d). 204§ Act. the ofX Title under pro- Commerce, Department in the service such lishes with President by the appointed be to Director for a vides it certain grants and Senate consent the advice refer- with hearings, hold the including powers, from by reference attention its coming to matters ence involved persons communities or between court the Act. under the arising disputes Motel. Atlanta Heart II Title Application it brings motel the operation that admitted It that Act (a) 201§of provisions within Negroes for transient lodging to provide refused appellant con- intends to color race of their because restrained. unless policy tinue that constitution- therefore, is, posed question sole The these applied ofAct Right's ühe Civil ality of indicates Act history of legislative facts. Protection Equal 5 and on § Act based *8 power as its as well Amendment the Fourteenth Clause of3, 8, cl. I, § Art. under commerce interstate regulate Constitution.
The Senate Commerce Committee quite made it clear that the fundamental object of Title was to II vindicate “the deprivation of personal dignity surely accom- panies denials of equal access to public establishments.” At the time, same however, it noted that such an objec- tive has been and could be readily “by achieved congres- sional action based on the power commerce of the Con- stitution.” S. Rep. No. 872, supra, at 16-17. Our study of the legislative record, made in the light of prior cases, brought has us to the conclusion that Congréss possessed ample power regard, and we have therefore not considered the grounds other upon. relied This is not to say that the remaining authority upon which it acted was not adequate, a question upon which we do not pass, but merely that since the is sufficient for our decision here we have considered it alone. Nor is § (d) § having to do with state action, involved here we do pass not upon either of those sections.
5. 'The Civil Rights Cases,
Application. In light of our ground for decision, it might be well at the outset to discuss the Civil Rights Cases, supra, which declared provisions of the Rights Civil Act of 1875 unconstitutional. 18 Stat. 335, 336.- We think that decision inapposite, and precedential without value in determining the constitutionality present Act. Unlike Title II of present legislation, the 1875 Act broadly proscribed discrimination in “inns, public con- veyances on land or water, theaters, other places public amusement,” without limiting the categories of affected businesses to those impinging upon interstate commerce. In contrast, the applicability of Title II is carefully limited to enterprises having a direct and sub- stantial relation to the interstate flow of goods and peo- *9 Further, the is involved. action where state except pie, have in 1875 may not of businesses kinds certain fact that to war- commerce in interstate sufficiently involved been of the commerce the ambit within bringing them rant question same the dispositive of necessarily not power is mobil- present reached its had not populace .today. Our circulating as and goods facilities, services were nor ity,. Al- today. they are commerce as in interstate
readily are those today apply we principles though the in Gibbons v. Marshall Justice by Chief formulated first transpor- conditions (1824), the Ogden, 9 Wheat. dramatically, changed have and commerce tation state of present the principles those apply we must interstate in increase volume The sheer commerce. which in- discriminatory practices give
traffic alone would . com- the upon Nation’s larger impact far hibit travel of another economy on the had practices such merce than Rights Cases in Civil the language is day. Finally, there consider not fully did the Court that which indicates an exercise be could sustained the 1875 Act whether that observed Though Court power. of the commerce was con- pass power that “no will contend one last, of the adoption before tained Constitution Fif- Fourteenth, [Thirteenth, amendments three that the to note specifically went on the Court teenth],” power terms not “conceived” Act was out: expressly pointed congres- lack remarks course, these [as “Of in which cases apply to those not power] do sional powers plenary direct and with clothed accompanied subject, whole over the legislation power to of such implied denial express an . with with of commerce regulation in. the States, as with States, and among the several nations, foreign Congress has In these cases .... tribes Indian power pass laws for regulating the subjects speci- every fied in detail, and the conduct and transactions respect of individuals in thereof.” At 18.
Since the commerce was relied on by not the Gov- ernment and was support without in the record it is under- standable the Court narrowed inquiry its excluded the Commerce a possible Clause as source of power. In any event, it is clear such a limitation opinion renders authority devoid of proposi- .the *10 tion that the gives Commerce no power Clause to Con- gress regulate to discriminatory practices now found substantially to affect interstate commerce. We, there- fore, conclude the Rights that Civil Cases have no rele- vance to the basis decision here where the Act ex- plicitly upon relies power, and where the. record is filled with testimony of obstructions restraints resulting from the discriminations found to be existing. pass We to phase now that of the case.
6. The Congressional Basis Action.
While the Act adopted as carried congressional no findings the passage record its through each house is with replete evidence of the burdens that discrimination by race or places color upon interstate commerce. See Hearings before Senate Committee on Commerce on S. 1732, 88th Cong., 1st S. Rep. Sess.; No. 872, supra-, Hearings before Senate Committee the Judiciary on S. 1731, 88th Cong., Sess.; 1st Hearings before House Subcommittee No. 5 of the Committee on the Judiciary on miscellaneous proposals regarding Civil Rights, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 4; ser. H. R. Rep. 914, Ño. supra. This testimony included the fact that our people have become increasingly mobile with millions of people of all races traveling from State to State; Negroes in that particular have been subject of discrimination in transient" accommodations, having gréat travel dis- been they often have same; secure tances to had to call have accommodations to obtain unable 872, overnight, Rep. S. No. up put them upon friends had become these 14-22; at supra, .conditions lodging listing available require acute as so “dra- guidebook which was itself special Negroes Negroes encounter testimony to the difficulties” matic supra, Hearings, Committee in travel. Senate Commerce exclusionary practices were found at 692-694. These Secretary of Commerce nationwide, be Under “no that this discrimina- testifying question that there is degree” and in large tion in still exists to a the North This as well. at and Midwest Id.. West testimony qualitative quantitative indicated a as .well by Negroes. effect travel The former was on interstate impairment Negro pleasure of the obvious traveler’s continually resulted when he was convenience that uncertain finding lodging. latter, As for the there was uncertainty stemming evidence that this from racial dis- crimination discouraging had the effect of travel on the part of a portion Negro community. substantial of the Id., at only 744. This was the conclusion not Secretary Under of Commerce but also of the Adminis- *11 trator of the Federal Agency Aviation who wrote the Chairman Senate Commerce Committee it that was his “belief air that adversely commerce is by affected the denial to a substantial segment of traveling the of adequate desegregated and public accommodations.” Id., at. 12-13. We shall not burden this opinion with further details since the testimony voluminous presents overwhelming evidence discrimination hotels and impedes motels interstate travel. The Power Over Interstate Travel. power
The of Congress to deal with these obstructions depends on the meaning of the Commerce Clause. Its meaning was first years ago enunciated 140 great. Ogden, Gibbons
Chief John Marshall v. Justice. (1824), Wheat. these words: commerce; subject regulated “The to be is the extent of it nec- power, ascertain becomes essary meaning to settle the of the word. The appellee counsel traffic, would limit it to buying selling, interchange or the of commodi- ties something . . . but it more: is inter- . course . . between nations, parts of nations, in all branches, its regulated by prescribing and is carrying rules for on that intercourse. [At 189-190.] “To what commerce power does this extend? The constitution informs us, to commerce foreign ‘with nations, among States, several and with the Indian tribes.’ has,
“It we believe, been universally admitted, that these words comprehend every species of commercial intercourse .... No sort of trade can be carried on ... to which power does not extend. [At 193-194.]
“The subject to which is next applied, is to commerce ‘among the several States.’ The word ‘among’ means intermingled ....
“. . . may t very properly [I] be restricted to that commerce which concerns more States than one. . . . genius and character of the government whole seem to be, its action is to be applied to all the . . . internal concerns [of Nation] affect States generally; but not to those which are completely within a particular State, which do not affect other States, and with which it is not neces- *12 sary to interfere, for the purpose of executing some general powers government. [At 194-195.] “We are now arrived at the inquiry is this —What
power? “It is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to governed. be This power, all like others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other pre- than are - scribed in the . constitution. . If, . as has always been understood, the sovereignty of Congress is. ...
plenary as to those objects [specified in the Con- stitution], the power over commerce ... is vested in Congress as absolutely as it would be in a single government, having in its constitution the same restrictions on the exercise of the power are found constitution the United States.
wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the people, .and the influence which their con- possess stituents at elections, are, in this, as in many other instances, as that, for example, of declaring war, the sole restraints on which they have relied, to secure them from its abuse. They are the restraints" on which the people must often rely solely, all representative governments. [At 196-197.]” In short, the determinative test of the exercise of power by .the Congress undér the Commerce Clause simply whether the activity sought to be regulated is “commerce which concerns more States than one” and has a real and substantial relation to the national interest. Let us now turn to this facet of the problem.
That the “intercourse” of which the Chief Justice spoke included the movement of persons through more *13 in the Pas early 1849, as was settled than one
States McLean Mr. Justice Cases, 283, How. where 7 senger part is a passengers of transportation “That stated: At 401. open question.” an is not now of for the speaking McKenna, Mr. Justice Again in 1913 have States, we among Court, said: “Commerce their citi intercourse and traffic between consists of said, persons property.” of transportation includes zens, and States, 308, 227 S. 320. And v. United U. ke Ho later in in Caminetti v. United only years four 1917 States, Day 242 S. Mr. Justice held the Court: U. transportation passengers
“The of interstate long regu- it has been is within the commerce, settled, latory, power Congress, under the commerce clause the-Constitution, authority Congress keep to the channels of interstate commerce free from immoral injurious uses has been frequently sustained, longer open and is no quéstion.” to. At 491. any does it make
Nor
difference whether
transporta-
,at
Id.,
tion is commercial
in character.
484r-486.
In
Morgan
Virginia,
v.
“The recent
in transportation brought about
coming
of automobiles
not seem of
[do]
great significance in
problem.
People of all
today
races travel
extensively
more
than- in 1878
when this
passed
Court first
upon
regulation
state
segregation
racial
in commerce.
empha
[It but]
sizes the soundness of this Court’s early conclusion
DeCuir,
in Hall v.
257 traffic has prompted carriers and the white-slave to Case, gambling, Lottery of its to extend the exercise to criminal (1903); enterprises, Brooks 188 S. 321 v. U. States, 432 (1925); deceptive prac
United 267 S.U. Federal Trade Comm’n products,
tices the sale of v. Bros., Inc., (1959);
Mandel 359 385 to fraudulent U. S.
security transactions, Exchange Securities & Comm’n v. Co., (1953);
Ralston Purina 346 S. 119 misbrand U. States,
ing drugs, Weeks v. United S.U.
(1918); wages hours, Darby, United States v. (1941); S. 100 to members of labor unions, U. Labor Laughlin Jones & Corp., Board v. Steel U. S.
(1937);
crop control,
Wickard
Filburn,
v.
317 U. S.
*14
111
to
against
discrimination
shippers,. United
(1942);
Co.,
States
Baltimore
v.
& Ohio R.
169 (1948);
U. S.
protection
to the
of small
injurious price
business from
Co.,
cutting, Moore v. Mead’s Fine Bread
That Congress was legislating against moral wrongs in many of these areas rendered its enactments no less valid.
In framing Title II of Congress this Act was also deal- ing with what it considered a moral problem. But fact does not detract from the overwhelming evidence fbsruptive of the effect that racial discrimination has had on commercial intercourse. It was this burden which empowered Congress to enact appropriate legislation, and, given this basis for the exercise of its power,. Con- gress was not restricted the fact that particular the to obstruction interstate commerce with which it was also, dealing was a deemed moral and social wrong. here is of a of the motel operation the
It is said true, to be But, assuming character. local purely pinch, feels it does commerce that it interstate is “[i]f applies which operation how local not matter squeeze.” Sportswear v. Women’s United States Mfrs. (1949). Labor Board v. Assn., 460, 464 See S.U. As Justice Laughlin Corp., supra. Chief Jones & Steel Darby, supra: in United States v. put Stone it Congress over interstate commerce power “The among of commerce regulation to the not confined intrastate to those the states. It extends activities exercise interstate commerce or the which so affect regula- Congress over it as make power of the appropriate them means to attainment tion of granted legitimate end, of a the exercise interstate commerce. power Congress regulate Maryland, 421.” McCulloch v. Wheat. See At 118. com- power promote interstate
Thus regulate the local inci- merce also includes thereof, including local in both States dents activities might origin destination, which have substantial upon only harmful effect that commerce. One need examine the we have discussed above to evidence Congress may prohibit see that racial discrim- —as has — serving travelers, ination motels' however “local” their *15 operations may appear. deprive the Act appellant liberty prop- Nor does or
. erty under the Fifth Amendment. The by Congress here is a specific plenary invoked and one by authorized the Constitution itself. only ques- The (1) tions are: whether had a rational basis for finding that racial discrimination motels affected com- merce, (2) if it had a basis, such whether means and the. to eliminate evil are it selected reasonable and appro-
259 priate. If they are, appellant has no “right” select to its guests as it fit, sees governmental free from regulation.
There nothing novel such legislation. about Thirty- two States8 now have it on their books either by statute or executive order and many provide cities regula- such tion. Some of these Acts go back fourscore years. It has been repeatedly held Court that such laws 8 following statutes indicate States which have enacted accommodation laws: Alaska Stat., to (1962); §§11.60.230 11.60.240 Code, Cal. Civil to (1954); 54 §§51 Colo. Rev. Ann., Stat. to 25-2-5 §§25-1-1 (1953); Conn. Gen. Ann., Stat. (1963 Supp.); Del. §53-35 Code Ann., 6, Tit. 45 (1963); c. Ann., Idaho Code 18-7301 to 18-7303 §§ (1963 Supp.); Ill. (Smith-Hurd Ann. Stat. ed.), 38, c. .to §§13-1 13-4 (1964), 43, c. (1944); 133 (Bums § Ind. Ann. ed.), Stat. 10-901 to (1956, 10-914 §§ and Supp.); 1963 Ann., Iowa Code and 735.2 (1950); §§735.1 Ann., Kan. Gen. Stat. (1961 §21-2424 Supp.); Me. Ann., Rev. 137, Stat. (1954); e. 50 Code, § Md. Ann. Art. 49B, 11 (1964); Laws, 140, § Mass. Ann. c. 5 (1957), and 8 272, c. §§ (1963 92A and 98 Supp.); §§ Ann,, Mich. Stat. 28.343 and §§ 28.344 (1962); Minn. Ann., Stat. (1947); §327.09 Mont. Rev. Codes,Ann., 64-211 (1962); Stat., Neb. § Rev. (1962); 20-101 and §§ 20-102 N. H. Rev. Ann., Stat. §§354:1, 354:2, 354:4 (1955, and 354:5 Supp.); 1963 10:1-7, N. Ann., J. Stat. 10:1-2 (1960), §§ (1964 to 18:25-6 Supp.); §§18:25-1 N. M. Stat. Ann., §§49-8-1 (1963 to 49-8-7 Supp.); Rights N. Y. Civil (McKinney Law ed.), Art-4, and 41 (1948, and Supp.), §§40 Law, Exec. 15, Art. 290 to (1951, §§ 1964 Supp.), Law, Penal 46, Art. 513 to §§ (1944); N-. D. Code, (1963 Cent. 12-22-30 Supp.); § Ohio Rev. (Page’s Code Ann. ed.), (1954); §§2901.35 2901.36 Ore. Rev. Stat., 30.670, 30.675 and (1963); §§ 30.680 Ann., Pa. 18, Stat. Tit. (1963); R. I. Ann., § Gen. Laws 11-24-1 (1956); §§ 11-24-6 Dak. Laws, S. (1963); Sess. c. 58 Ann., Vt. Stat. Tit. 1451 and. §§ (1958); Wash. Code, Rev. 49.60.170, §§49.60.010 9.91.010; Wis. Ann., § Stat. (1958); Wyo. 942.04 Ann., § Stat. (1963 Supp.). §§6-83.1 and 6-83.2 In 1963 Kentucky the Governor of issued an executive order requiring governmental all agencies supervision involved in the licensing of businesses to take all lawful necessary prevent action racial discrimination.
260 of the Fourteenth Process Clause Due not violate
do was in holding such the first Perhaps Amendment. Brad- Mr. where themselves, Justice Rights Cases Civil “by innkeepers, that inferentially found Court ley for the aware, are we are far as States, so of all the laws proper furnish facilities, to of their to the. extent bound, who persons unobjectionable to all accommodation At 25. for them.” good apply faith pro such now have 32 out, States pointed have As we attack where the cited us case has been and no visions in federal successful, either has been a statute state the Due Process Indeed, in some cases or state courts. specifi have been objections Clause Protection Equal Excursion Co. v. Bob-Lo in this Court. cally discarded (1948). As result .the Michigan, S. 28, 34, n. U. unques state statutes stands constitutionality such Government over authority of thé Federal tioned. “The differ,” it was held does not interstate Inc., 307 S. 533 Royal Co-op., v. Rock U. United States by the “in or character from that retained (1939), extent also commerce.” At 569-570. See states over intrastate Willingham, Bowles S. 503 v. U. (1944). long appellant
It if in the run will suffer is doubtful (cid:127) Experience loss a result of the Act. is to the economic completely is obliterated contrary where discrimination accommodations. whether this be as to all But spe has consequence not of no since this Court true a “member of the cifically held that fact that class may suffer economic losses not regulated which is shared legis has never been a barrier” to such . . others . Willingham, supra, Bowles at 518. Likewise lation. v. has the claim rejected line of cases this Court long in a in public of racial discrimination prohibition personal liberty. interferes with See accommodations Co., John Thompson Columbia v. R. 346 U. S. District cited, cases there where we (1953), concluded delegated law-making pov:°r had to the Dis police power “as broad as the of a trict Columbia *17 state” included the “a law adopt pro which to hibiting against Negroes discriminations the owners and managers of restaurants in the District of Columbia.” any At 110. Neither do we in find merit the claim that taking property just the is a without compensa Act tion. The are to contrary. Legal cases See Tender Cases, 12 457, (1870); Wall. 551 Omnia Commercial Co.
v.
States,
(1923);
United
We find no in appellant’s merit the remainder of con- tentions, including “involuntary that of servitude.” As'* we seen, prohibit have 32 States racial in discrimination public accommodations. codify These laws but innkeeper long predated common-law rule Thirteenth It Amendment.' is difficult to believe that abrogate the Amendment was intended principle. this Indeed, _ opinion Rights the Court in the Civil Cases contrary having as we seen, have noted approval with the laws of “all prohibiting the States” discrimination. say We could not that requirements in regard the Act this are in any way “akin to African slavery.” Perry, Butler v. 240 U. S. (1916).
We, conclude that therefore, the action of Congress in the adoption of the Act as applied here to a motel which concededly serves interstate is within the travelers power granted byit the Commerce Clause of the Consti- as tution, interpreted by years. this Court It may argued be pursued that could other have methods eliminate the obstructions it found inter- commerce caused racial state But discrimination. is a policy matter of rests with entirely the Con-
gress not with the courts. How obstructions employed means are be
may removed —what be —is Congress. discretion of the within the exclusive sound chosen to one caveat —that the means subject only It is permitted to the end .by reasonably adapted be it must say cannot its choice here by the Constitution. We requires no more. adapted. so The Constitution was not
Affirmed. OF THE COURT. APPENDIX TO OPINION “TITLE RELIEF AGAINST II—INJUNCTIVE PLACES OF PUBLIC AC- IN DISCRIMINATION COMMODATION (a) All shall be to the persons
“Sec. entitled full goods, services, facilities, equal enjoyment advantages, any place and accommodations of privileges, accommodation, section, in this defined with- *18 segregation ground or on the of race, out discrimination origin. or national color, religion, “(b) following Each of the which serves establishments is place public of accommodation within the meaning operations of this if its title affect or commerce, if segregation discrimination or is supported by it action; State
“(1) any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which provides lodging to guests, transient other than an establishment building located within a which contains not more than five rooms for rent or actually hire and which is occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as his residence;
“(2) any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda or fountain, facility other principally engaged in selling for consumption food on the premises, including, such, but not to, any limited facility on the premises located retail any estab- lishment; any gasoline or station; house, theater, concert “(3) any picture motion of exhibi- place stadium or other hall, sports arena, entertainment; tion or (i) which is
“(4) any (A) physically establishment any establishment premises located within the (ii) or within subsection, otherwise covered any such premises physically which is located itself establishment, (B) covered which holds serving out as patrons such covered establishmént.
“(c) The operations an establishment affect com- meaning merce within (1) of this title if it is one of the establishments in paragraph (1) described of subsec- tion (b); (2) in the case of an establishment in described paragraph (2) of (b), subsection it serves or offers to serve interstate travelers or a portion substantial food which it serves, gasoline products or or other which has sells, ..commerce; moved in (3) the case of an establishment in.paragraph (3) described of-subsection (b), it customarily presents films, performances, athletic teams, exhibitions, or other sources of entertainment move commerce; (4) in the case of an estab- lishment described in paragraph (4) of subsection (b), -it physically located within premises or of, there is physically located within its premises, an establishment operations of which affect commerce within the mean- ing of this subsection. For purposes of this section, , ‘commerce’ travel, means trade, traffic, commerce, trans- or portation, communication among several States, between the District of Columbia and any or be- State, tween any foreign country or any territory or possession *19 any Státe or the District of Columbia, of between points in the same State through but any other Sta¿^^ countja the District of Columbia foreign or a “(d) Discrimination or segregate supported
is by State action wi(j if
title such discrimination or regula-
on color any law, statute, ordinance, under or (2) or is color of or tion; any carried under custom usage or officials of or required by enforced the State political thereof; (3) by subdivision or action required political or State subdivision thereof. .
“(e) provisions of this title apply shall not to a private or club other establishment not in fact to open .except to the extent that public, the facilities of such establishment are made available to the customers or of an patrons establishment within the scope sub- (b). section All persons
“Sec. 202. shall be entitled to be at free, any establishment or from place, segre- discrimination or gation any ground kind on the of race, color, religion, or national if origin, such discrimination or segregation is purports or to required by any law, statute, ordinance, be. order of a State or regulation, rule, or any agency or political subdivision thereof.. ' person “Sec. 203. (a) No shall withhold, deny, or attempt to withhold or or deny, deprive or attempt deprive, any person of any right or privilege by secured section or 202, (b) or intimidate, or threaten, coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, or any person coerce purpose with the of interfering with any right or privilege by secured section or 202, (c) or punish or attempt punish any person for or exercising attempting to exer- cise any right or privilege secured section 202. (a)
“Sec. any person has engaged or Whenever there are grounds reasonable to believe that any person is engage in' any act or practice prohibited by sec- about action, tion 203, a civil preventive relief, including an application for permánent or temporary injunction, or other order, may be instituted
jDrder,
upon timely application, the court the Attorney General permit if he certifies tion case *20 the by application Upon importance. of general may court the as circumstances such complainant for such attorney an appoint may court the just, deem of commencement the authorize may complainant or costs, fees, payment the without action civil the security. title, to this pursuant commenced action any “(b) In party, prevailing the allow may discretion, its court, in the attorney’s reasonable a States, the United than other be shall States and the United costs, the part fee as person. private aas same the costs for liable prohibited practice or act alleged of an case the “(c) In subdi- political State, or in a occurs title which this by prohib- local law or a State has which State, aof vision authorizing a establishing or practice or act iting such such from relief seek or grant authority or local State respect with institute., proceedings criminal toor practice may action civil thereof, no receiving notice upon thereto expiration the before (a) subsection brought under be or alleged act of such notice written after days thirty local or State appropriate the given has been practice provided person, in or mail registered by authority pend- action civil in such stay proceedings may court enforcement local or of State termination ing proceedings. prohib- practice or act alleged anof case
“(d) In sub- political or State, ain occurs which title ited law local or no State has State, of a division be may action civil practice, act such prohibiting court Provided, That (a): subsection brought under Service Community Relations matter refer may court as the long for Act of this X title established obtaining possibility reasonable ais there believes days: sixty than not more for but compliance, voluntary sixty- such expiration upon That further, Provided an addi- period such extend may court day period, tional period, not to exceed a cumulative total of one hundred and twenty if days, it believes there then exists a reasonable possibility of securing voluntary compliance.
“Sec. 205. The Service is authorized to make a full investigation of any complaint referred to it by the court under section 204 (d) and may hold such hearings with respect thereto as may be necessary. The Service shall *21 conduct any hearings with respect to any such complaint in executive session, and shall not release any testimony given therein except by agreement of parties all involved in the complaint with the permission of the court,- and the Service shall endeavor to bring about a voluntary settle- ment between parties. the (a) Whenever the Attorney General has
“Sec. reasonable cause to believe any person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the rights secured this title, and that the pattern- or practice is of such a nature and is intended to deny the full exercise of the rights herein described, the Attorney General may bring a civil action in the appropriate district court of the United States by filing with it a complaint .(1) signed by him (or in his absence the Acting Attorney General), (2) setting forth facts pertaining to pattern such or prac- tice, and (3) requesting such preventive relief, including an application permanent for a or temporary injunction, restraining order or other order against person the persons responsible for such pattern or practice, he as deems necessary to insure the full enjoyment of the rights herein described.
“(b) In any such proceeding the Attorney General may file with the clerk of such court a request that a court of three judges be convened to hear and determine the case. Such request by the Attorney General shall be accom- panied by a certificate in that, his opinion, the case is of general public importance. A copy of the certificate immediately be shall court three-judge for a request and of the judge chief the circuit to such clerk furnished the cir- of judge circuit presiding absence, the his in (or of receipt the' Upon pending. is case the in cuit) judge the chief duty the be it shall request such copy case the judge, circuit presiding or the circuit of the in such judges immediately three designate be, may judge a circuit shall least one whom at be circuit, court thé -judge a district be shall of whom another and deter- hear instituted, was proceeding the in which so judges duty the it shall be case, mine such earliest at hearing case assign the designated to hearing deter- in the participate date, practicable way every inbe case to cause thereof, mination of such judgment final from appear An expedited. Court. Supreme lie to
court will such to file fails Attorney General event “In the duty of shall be proceeding, any such request the act- absence, (or his district judge chief ,|he immediately pending case in which the judge) ing chief *22 determine to hear in such district a designate judge to district in the judge no the event In the case. judge the chief case, and determine to hear
available may case as the judge, chief acting or the district, of the the circuit judge the chief to certify this shall fact be, then who shall judge) acting chief absence, the his (or in hear to circuit judge or circuit a district designate case. and determine pursuant designated judge duty of the shall be
“It earliest hearing at the assign the case for to this section way every in case be cause date practicable expedited. States of the United courts (a) The district “Sec. pursuant instituted proceedings jurisdiction have
shall regard without same exercise the shall title to this to whether the aggrieved party shall have any exhausted administrative or other remedies may provided be by law.
“(b) The remedies provided this title be shall exclusive means of enforcing rights based this title, but nothing preclude title shall any individual or any State or local agency from asserting any right based on any other Federal State law not inconsistent with this, title, including any statute or ordinance requiring in public nondiscrimination establishments or accommo- dations, or from pursuing any remedy, civil or criminal, which may be available for the vindication or enforcement right.” such
Mr. Justice Black, concurring.* In the first of these two cases the Heart of Atlanta Motel, a large motel in downtown Atlanta, Georgia, appeals from an order of a three-judge United States Dis- trict Court for the Northern District of Georgia enjoining it from continuing violate Title II of the Rights Civil Act of 19641 by refusing to accept Negroes lodgers solely because their race. In the second case the Act- ing Attorney General of-.the United States and a United States Attorney appeal from judgment of a three-judge United States District Court the Northern District of Alabama holding that Title II cannot constitutionally be applied to Ollie’s Barbecue, a restaurant in Birming- ham, Alabama, which serves few if any interstate trav- elers but which buys a substantial quantity food which has moved in interstate commerce. It is undisputed that both establishments had and intended to continue a policy against serving Negroes. Both claimed that Con- opinion * [This applies also to *23 No. Katzenbach McClung, v. post, p. 294.] 1 78 Stat. 243-246, 42 Ü. S. C. (1964 §§ 2000a—2000a-6 ed.). attempt- in powers constitutional its gress had exceeded owned busi- privately their them to use ing compel to not want they did whom to serve customers nesses serve. II of Title parts immediately relevant most
The restaurant motel and this valid, if which, subject Act, language of The set out below.2 its are requirements in it intended passing that Title shows that granted in the Constitu- in part power exercise—at least — (1964 ed.), 2000a Act, of the 42 U. S. C. Section 201 Stat. § provides part: in enjoyment
“(a) equal persons to the full and All shall be entitled advantages, accom- goods, services, facilities, privileges, of the accommodation, defined in this any place public modations of race, ground of section, segregation on the without discrimination or origin. color, religion, or national public following which
“(b) serves Each establishments meaning of this title place within the is a accommodation segregation commerce, or operations or if discrimination if its affect supported action: it is State provides “(1) any inn, hotel, motel, other establishment which or lodging guests, an establishment located other than transient for rent building more than five rooms which contains not within actually occupied by proprietor of such or hire and which is residence; his establishment as counter, cafeteria, lunchroom, soda
“(2) any restaurant, lunch selling fountain, facility principally engaged in food for con- or other any including, to, sumption premises, but not limited such on the establishment; any facility or premises any located on the retail gasoline station;
“(c) operations within of an establishment affect commerce (1) described meaning this title if it is one of the establishments (2) paragraph (1) (b); in the case of establish- in of subsection an (b), paragraph (2) it or offers of subsection serves ment described portion or a substantial of the food to serve interstate travelers products sells, serves, gasoline or other which it has moved or purposes of this ‘commerce’ means For section, .... commerce, transportation, trade, traffic, travel, communication among . the several States . . .”
270 regulate by I, 8, among §
tion Art. “To Commerce . . . (b) by § several . . . .” 201 of Title II States Thus application its terms is limited in to a motel or restaurant “operations affect commerce, or [interstate] if segregation by discrimination it is supported by or State action.”,3 The action” provision “State need not concern us here since there is no Georgia contention that or Ala- bama at given any has this time support to whatever racially these establishments’ discriminatory practices. basic constitutional question decided the courts below and which this Court now must decide is whether Congress powers its regulate exceeded interstate com- pass merce and necessary all laws to such proper regulation in subjecting either this motel or this restau- rant to Title II’s applicants commands that for food and lodging be regard served without to their color. ifAnd regulation is otherwise within congressional com- merce power, motel and the restaurant proprietors further contend that it would a denial of process be due the Fifth under Amendment compel them to serve Negroes against their will.4 I agree that all these con- stitutional rejected. contentions must be
I. requires It no novel or strained interpretation of the Commerce Clause to sustain II applied Title as in either 3This last (b) definitional clause of together with § shows § congressional purpose rely part also to in 1 of the Four § Amendment, teenth any deny which forbids process State to due or equal protection of the laws. There is no contention in these cases Congress that relied on the fifth section of the Fourteenth Amend granting “power ment enforce, by appropriate legislation, provisions of” the Amendment. argues The motel also the law violates the Thirteenth prohibition Amendment’s slavery involuntary servitude and private property takes just use without compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Ogden, Gibbons v. 9 Wheat. since of these cases. At least an Chief Justice John opinion in 1824 in decided uniformly accepted Marshall, it has been among the States regulate commerce to its may be exercised plenary, “complete itself, other acknowledges limitations,, no extent, and utmost at Wheat., in the constitution.” prescribed than are as used the Commerce 196. Nor is “Commerce” It concept. narrow, Clause to be limited to a technical Act, in the only, Congress includes not has enumerated *25 transportation, or com- “travel, trade, traffic, commerce, transactions and munication,” unitary but also all other in than one. That place activities that' take more States may segments unitary transactions parts some such from cannot, course, take in one take place only State in Congress power regulate its to them plenary national interest.5 The facilities and instrumentalities railroads, truck carry commerce, used to this such to highways subject even are also lines, ships, rivers, arid necessary keep congressional regulation, so far as to fair The Daniel upon equal interstate traffic terms.
Ball,
Furthermore, long it has been held that the Necessary Proper I, 8, 18, Art. adds to the commerce Clause, § cl. power of Congress power regulate to local instrumen- talities if operating single within a State their activities burden the flow of commerce among States. Thus Case, Houston, Shreveport E. & W. T. R. Co. v. States, 342, 353-354, recog- United S. this U. Court fully carry respon- nized that not out its could sibility protect to interstate commerce were its con- regulate stitutional power strictly that commerce to be prescribing controlling things limited to for rules 5Compare Assn., United States South-Eastern Underwriters v. Olsen, 546-547; 1, 33-36; U. S. Board Trade v. 262 U. S. States, & United 375, 398-399. Co. v. 196 U. S.
Swift contracts, commerce or the trans
actually moving such activities, immediately concerning actions, and other Regulation purely them. intrastate railroad rates is a primarily problem state rather than national local Shreveport power control. But the sustained the Case Congress under Necessary the Commerce Clause and the Proper purely to control intrastate rates, Clause even though reasonable, where the effect of such rates was impose found to injurious discrimination to interstate holding commerce. This that Congress power had under clauses, merely these not to enact laws governing inter state activities transactions, regulate but also to even purely local activities and necessary transactions where protect foster and interstate commerce, amply sup was ported by (later Mr. Justice Justice) Mr. Chief Hughes’ reliance upon many prior holdings of this Court extend ing back to Ogden, Gibbons v. supra.6 And since the Shreveport Case Court has steadfastly followed, and indeed has emphasized time and again, time that Con gress has ample power protect interstate commerce from adversely activities and injuriously affecting it, which but for this adverse effect on interstate commerce would be beyond of Congress regulate.7 *26 genius “The government and character of the whole be, seem to that applied its action is to be to all the external concerns of the nation, and'to those internal concerns gen which affect the States erally; but not to those completely which are particular within a State, which do States, not other and with which it is not nec affect essary to interfere, purpose the executing general some the for of of powers government.” Ogden, Gibbons supra, v. Wheat., of at (Emphasis supplied.) See, g., e. Labor Board v. Reliance Corp., Oil Fuel 224; 371 U. S. Lorain Journal Co. States, v. United 143; 342 U. S. United States v. Sportswear Women’s Assn., 336 460; U. S. United Manufacturers Sullivan, States v. 689; 332 U. S. Filburn, Wickard v. 111; 317 U. S. Wrightwood United Dairy States v. Co., 110; 315 U. S. United States Darby, v. 100; 312 U. S. Labor Board Laughlin v. Jones & Steel racially discrimina- 201 declared §in Congress rooms five more than of a motel of tory “operations” if it commerce interstate adversely affect do hire rent or ; that a res- . .” guests to transient lodging “provides “it (1) if commerce affect such “operations” taurant’s. “a (2) or travelers” interstate serve offers to or
serves has , . . . it serves which the food of portion substantial de- thus Congress commerce.” moved in [interstate] operations of and extent nature scribed from establishments excluding some regulate, wished it believed policy of because for reasons the Act either interstate protect regulate and powers its be no doubt far. There can not extend so did here fall restaurant and the operations of both motel adopt Congress the measure chose within squarely constitutionally to show a adequate the Act and deemed of The choice effect on commerce. prohibitable adverse Congress'; power within the exclusive of policy is of course com- affect interstate particular operations whether but constitutional sufficiently to come under the merce a regulate ultimately judicial them is Congress can be settled legislative question, than a rather agree applied I that as to this finally only by this Court. restaurant the Act is a valid exercise motel and this because the congressional power, the motel case amply practice demonstrates that its of discrimina- record travel, directly tion to interfere with interstate tended in the case of restaurant because had ample concluding widespread practice basis for that a racial buying discrimination restaurants as substantial goods from quantity shipped other as this States buys impede restaurant could distort or interstate trade.
Corp.,
1; Kentucky Whip
301 U. S.
& Collar Co. v. Illinois Central
Co.,
States,
R.
The Heart of Atlanta Motel is a large 216-room estab- lishment strategically located in relation to Atlanta and interstate travelers. It advertises extensively by signs along interstate highways and in various advertising media. aAs result of these circumstances approximately guests motel are 75% interstate transient travelers. It is thus important an facility for use interstate travelers who travel on highways, since travelers in their own, cars must find lodging places to make their journeys comfortably and safely.
The restaurant is located in a residential and industrial section of Birmingham, 11 blocks from the nearest inter- state highway. Almost if all, all, not its patrons are local people rather than transients. It has seats for about 200 customers and gross annual sales of about $350,000. Most of its sales are of barbecued meat sandwiches and pies. Consequently, the main commodity purchases meat, of which during the 12 months before the District Court hearing it bought $69,683. worth (representing of its total expenditures for 46% supplies), which had been shipped into Alabama from outside State. Plainly, goods it sells is a por- 46% “substantial” tion and amount. Congress concluded that restaurants which purchase a substantial quantity goods from other States might well burden and disrupt the flow of interstate if allowed to practice racial discrim- ination, because of the stifling and distorting effect that such discrimination on a wide scale might well have on the sale of goods shipped across state lines. Certainly this belief would not be irrational even had there not been a large body of evidence before the Congress to show the probability of this.adverse effect.8
8 See, g., e. Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Commerce on S. 1732, 88th Cong., Sess., 1st 1, Part 26, Ser. pp. 18-19 (Attorney .General Kennedy), 623-630 (Secretary of Labor Wirtz);Part 26, pp. Ser. (Under 695-700 Secretary of Commerce Roosevelt). my judg enough, than more facts are foregoing *28 discretion its acting within Congress t,o that ment, show and Clause the Commerce under power has judgment and racial discrimina to bar Clause Proper Necessary and Barbecue. and Ollie’s Motel of Atlanta Heart in the tion effect speculative remote, possible, every that recognize I con adequate anas accepted be not should on commerce the discard into throw uproot to ground stitutional purely is what between distinctions traditional our all what laws, and by- state controlled therefore local, and subject therefore and is interest national affects the isolated some recognize too I laws. federal by control people only to local sells lunchroom remote be may possibly locality in the supplies all its buys almost regulate Congress power of the reach beyond not covered an establishment such commerce, just as power deciding constitutional But in Act. present con we do not us before the two like cases in Congress one iso only interstate effect sider the fact regard event, without local individual, lated, many others when added local event single com on interstate a burden may impose nature a similar flow. distorting its volume reducing its merce 224; S. 371 U. Corp., Fuel Oil Reliance Board v. Labor 127-128; United 111, S. Filburn, U. v. Wickard Board v. 123; Labor 100, S. Darby, 312 U. v. States Employees Hotel 608-609; cf. Fainblatt, S. 306 U. are There S. Leedom, 358 U. v. No. 255
Local Many country.9 our Negroes 20,000,000 approximately among States travel do, to, are able of them discourage seriously it would Certainly automobiles. before the as evidence if, by them travel
such in the should they past,10 in the has been true indicated United of the Abstract Census, 1964 Statistical Bureau census). by 1960 Negroes (18,872,000 States, 25 Sess., 15-18. Cong., 2d Rep. 872, 88th g., No. See, S. e.
future continue to be unable to find a
place
decent
along
their way in which to lodge or eat.
Boynton
Cf.
Vir
v.
ginia,
Long this Court, again speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, said:
“Let- the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope
of the constitution, and all means which are appro-
priate, which are plainly adapted
that end,
to.
are not prohibited, but consist with the letter
and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.”
M‘Culloch v. Maryland,
By this standard Congress acted
its power
within
here.
In view of the Commerce Clause it is not possible to deny
that
the aim of protecting interstate
commerce from
undue burdens is a legitimate end.-
of the Thir-
In-view
teenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments,
it is not
possible to deny that the aim of protecting Negroes from
discrimination is also a legitimate end.11 The means'
11We have specifically upheld
power
the
of Congress to use the
power
commerce
to end racial
Boynton
discrimination.
Virginia,
v.
364
454;
U. S.
Henderson v.
States,
United
339 U. S. 816; Mitchell
v. United States, 313 U.
80;
S.
cf. Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U. S.
31; Morgan v. Virginia,
ever, serve they that requiring Amendment Fifth down comes argument This others. serve they if Negroes laws enact Congress to the broad that this: protect regulate proper- necessary and deemed nega nullified practically interstate be shall person no that commands constitutional tive process due without property, liberty, or “life, deprived “taken” shall not be property private that law” past this In the compensation. just without use use of. regulation consistently held has Court does States by the or Government Federal by the property Amend Fourteenth Fifth either violate not 726; S. Skrupa, 372 U. Ferguson v. g., e. See, ment. Co., S. U. Thompson R. John v. Columbia District of Co., S. U. Realty Ambler Euclid v. Village 100; regulation A York, 502. S.U. New Nebbia v. 365; come even not II does Title found such sense. constitutional in the “taking” being close Co., S.U. Mining Eureka Central States v. United Cf. require like clause vague less more or aAnd *30 “according to meaning originally process, for due ment Motor (National States, 267 U. S. 432 United Brooks v. Act); naping (Act 465 Simpson, 252 U. S. States v. Act); United Theft Vehicle v. State); Caminetti “dry” liquor into shipment forbidding Act); (White-Slave Traffic [Mann] States, 242 U. S. 470 United (White-Slave [Mann] Traffic States, 227 308 S.U. United Hoke v. (Pure Food States, 220 U. S. United Egg v. Co. Hipolite Act); (cid:127) inter- (Act fprbidding Lottery Case, 188 U. Act); Drugs S. tickets). lottery shipment state the law of the land” would be a highly inappropriate pro- vision on which rely to invalidate a “law the land” enacted Congress under a clearly granted power like to regulate interstate commerce. Moreover, it would be highly ironical to use the guarantee of due process guarantee which —a plays important so a part in the Fourteenth Amendment, an adopted amendment with the predominant aim of protecting Negroes from discrim- ination —in order to strip Congress of power to protect Negroes from discrimination.12
III.
For the foregoing reasons I
concur
holding that the
provisions
anti-racial-discrimination
of Title II of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 are valid as applied to this motél
and this restaurant.
I should add that nothing in the
Rights
Civil
Cases,
I. somewhat I am opinions, I Court’s Though join California, v. in Edwards I was here, reluctant Clause. Commerce solely on the to rest 177, 160, S.U. conviction any to not due is My reluctance of interests in the commerce regulate power lacks of right belief that my rather It is rights. human that discriminates action of state free be people persons of “right like the race, because against them California, v. (Edwards to State” from State freely move in our position protected a more “occupies 177), supra, at cattle, movement does system than constitutional Ibid. More lines.” state coal across fruit, steel abatement problem come we over, when 306, decided Hill, p. post, City Rock Hamm v. more for me much Court by the result reached day, the the Fourteenth measure under protective aas obvious For the Clause. under Commerce than Amendment indi status constitutional with former deals local activities impact with the not vidual or vice versa. McClung, v. Katzenbach applies to No. opinion also
* [This p. post, 294.]
Hence I prefer would to rest on legisla- assertion of tive in § contained 5 of the Fourteenth Amend- ment which states: “The Congress shall have power to *32 enforce, by appropriate legislation, provisions of the article” —a which the Court was concedes exercised at least in part in this Act.
A decision based on the Fourteenth Amendment would have a more settling effect, making unnecessary litigation within, particular whether a oyer restaurant or inn is the commerce definitions of the Act or a particular whether customer is interstate an traveler. Under my construc- tion, the Act would apply to all customers in all the enumerated places of public accommodation. And that. construction'would, put an end to all obstructionist strat- egies and finally close one door on a chapter bitter in American history.
My opinion last Term in Maryland, Bell v. 378 U. S. 226, 242, makes clear my position that the right to be free of discriminatory (based treatment on race) places in accommodation —whether intrastate or inter state —is a right guaranteed against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment and that state enforcement of the kind of trespass laws which Maryland had in that case was state action within the meaning of the Amendment. TXII.
I think the Court is correct in concluding that the Act is not founded the Commerce Clause to the exclusion of the Enforcement Clause the Fourteenth Amendment.
In determining the reach of an exertion of legislative is, power, customary it. to read granted various powers together. See Veazie Bank Fenno, v. 8 Wall. 533, 548- 549; Edye Robertson, v. S. 580, U. 595-596; United States v. Gettysburg Electric Co., R. S.U. 668, 683. As in McCulloch v. Maryland, stated Wheat. 421: admit, as all must “We admit, that powers the government
the are limited, and that its limits are con- sound the we think But be transcended. not must allow constitution of the struction respect discretion, with legislature national be are to confers powers by which means body enable will execution, which into carried man- in the it, assigned duties high perform to. be end Let people. to the beneficial most
ner constitu- of the scope within it be let legitimate, are which appropriate, are all means tion, and pro- not which are end, to that adapted .plainly spirit the letter with consist hibited, but constitutional.” constitution, are view my Act are present used “means” end to the adapted” “plainly
“appropriate” pro- well rights1 as Amendment enforcing Fourteenth commerce. tecting interstate *33 Amendment in Fourteenth (a) declares 201
Section equal access: right of language equal full and to the be entitled shall persons, “All
. facilities, privileges, services, goods, of the enjoyment of any place of accommodations advantages, and section, in this as defined accommodation, ground segregation or discrimination without origin.” national or religion, race, color, of- purview within clearly are protected rights Protection Clause Equal under the our decisions Amendment.2 Fourteenth
1 Appendix to history see the legislative synopsis of the For opinion. 2 (discrimination Greenville, U. S. 244 City 373 Peterson v. See (discrimination Louisiana, 373 U. S. v. Lombard in restaurant); S. Parking Authority, 365 U. Wilmington restaurant); Burton v. in Memphis, City restaurant); v. Watson in (discrimination Board Edu city park); Brown v. in (discrimination S. 373 U. Nixon system); public school (discrimination cation, 347 U. S. in voting). (discrimination Herndon, S. 536 273 U. v.
“State action” —the key Fourteenth Amendment guarantees by defined 201 (d) § —is as follows: or
“Discrimination segregation by an establish- ment is supported by State action within the mean- ing this title if such discrimination or segregation (1) is carried on under color of any law, statute, ordinance, or regulation; (2) is carried on under color of any custom or usage required or enforced the State or political officials of subdivision thereof; or (3) is required by action of the State or political subdivision thereof.” (Italics added.) That definition is within our decision of Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 S. 1, U. for the “discrimination” in the present cases “enforced officials of the e., State,” i. by the state judiciary under the trespass laws.3 As we wrote in Shelley v. Kraemer, supra, 19:
“We have no doubt that there has been state action in these cases in the full and complete sense of the phrase. The undisputed facts disclose peti- tioners were willing purchasers of properties upon they desired establish homes. The owners of the properties were willing sellers; and contracts of sale were accordingly consummated. It is clear that but for the active .intervention of the state courts, supported by the full panoply of state power, petitioners would have been free to occupy the properties in question without restraint.
“These are not cases, as has been suggested, which the States have merely abstained from action, *34 leaving private individuals free to impose such dis- criminations they see fit. Rather, these are cases have, in which the States made available . to such indi- Georgia- trespass law is found in Ga. Ann., Code 26-3005 § (1963 Supp.), and of Alabama in Ala. Code, Tit. 426§ C958 Recomp.). government of coercive full viduals color, or of race grounds on the petitioners, deny which premises rights in property of enjoyment acquire able to financially and willing are petitioners The dif- to sell. willing are grantors which the non- enforcement judicial between ference the dif- is covenants restrictive of enforcement of rights being denied between petitioners ference to of com- members other available to property of those enjoyment full being accorded munity and footing.” equal an rights on free be persons all right of 202 declares the
Section establish- public any at action kinds of state from certain of places enumerated previously at the just ment —not accommodation: public any at free, be be entitled shall
“All to. persons segre-' or from discrimination place, or establishment color, reli- race, ground any kind on gation or discrimination if such origin, or national gion, any law, be required purports is or segregation of a or rule, regulation, ordinance, order statute, thereof.” political or subdivision any agency State (cid:127) embodied guarantees many of the Thus the essence Fourteenth contained in are those in the Act Amendment. some of into sure, to be enters Clause,
The Commerce accommodation” “place the definitions included, a “restaurant” (c). (b) Thus §§ 201 to serve inter- “if it serves or offers (b)(2), ... § 201 of the food portion travelers or a substantial state which But (c)(2). §201 moved serves . . . has commerce.” lodging to provides “which tran- is included any “motel” within located than establishment guests, other an sient rooms for not more five than building contains pro- occupied actually or hire which is rent *35 prietor as his such establishment residence.” §§ (b)(1) (c)(1). Providing lodging “to transient guests” is strictly not Clause talk, Commerce for phrase aptly any guest describes or interstate. —local “place public
Thus some of the definitions of accom- (b) in 201 language § modation” are Commerce Clause (b) and some are explicitly § not. Indeed bifur- An cated. public establishment “which serves the is a place public says accommodation,” § 201 (b), under first, either of operations conditions: “if its affect two. commerce,” or “if second, or segregation discrimination it is supported State action.” Report emphasizes The House these dual bases on which the Act (H. rests Rep. 914, R. No. 88th Cong., Sess., p.' 20) 1st situation minority which a recognized —a wás being attempted Id., it opposed. pp. 98-101.
The Senate Committee laid emphasis on the Commerce- Clause. S. Rep. Cong., No. 88th Sess., pp. 2d 12-13. The use of the Commerce Clause to surmount what was thought to be the obstacle of Rights Cases, the Civil '3, U. S. is mentioned. And the Ibid.; aspects economic problems of discrimination are heavily accented. Id., p. 17 et seq. But it is clear objectives the Fourteenth Amendment by no means ignored. were As stated Report: the Senate
“Does the owner of private property devoted to use public as a establishment en'joy a property right to refuse to deal with any member of the public because of that member’s race, religion, or national origin? As noted English previously, common law question answered this negative. in the It rea- soned that who employed one his private property purposes of commercial gain by offering goods or services to must stick to his bargain. It is. to be remembered that right priyate owner to serve or property pleased sell to whom he was when never claimed laws were enacted prohibit- ing the private property owner from dealing with persons particular of a race. Nor were such laws ever struck down as an infringement upon this supposed right of property owner.
“But there are stronger and persuasive more rea- allowing sons for not concepts private of property to public defeat legislation. accommodations The in- private stitution of property purpose exists for the enhancing of the individual freedom liberty and of beings. human This institution assures that individual need not be at the of mercy others, includ- ing government, in order to earn a livelihood and prosper from his individual efforts. prop- Private erty provides the individual with something value of that will serve him well in obtaining what he desires or requires in his daily life.
“Is this time honored means to freedom liberty now to be twisted so as to defeat individual freedom and liberty? Certainly denial right of a . to discrimi- nate or segregate by religion race or would not weaken private attributes of property that make it an effective means of obtaining individual freedom. In in fact, order to assure that the-institution of private property serves the end of individual freedom and liberty it has been in restricted instances. The many most striking example of this is- the abolition of slavery. Slaves were treated as items of private property, yet surely no man dedicated to the cause of individual freedom could contend that individual freedom liberty suffered emancipation of the slaves.
“There is not any question ordinary that zoning laws place greater far restrictions upon the rights of private property owners than would accom- of the owner Zoning laws tell legislation.
modations prop- his type what business property private may erect he what structures devoted, may be erty may he devoté even whether property, that upon whatso- any purpose business property private his restricting private regulations laws and ever. Such beings may human necessary so that are property their, peace- in a reasonable communities develop restrictions presence such Surely the manner. ful property private role of from the detract does not liberty and freedom. securing individual racial or reasonably argued that can it be “Nor ability in the is a vital factor religious discrimination vehicle an effective to constitute property private pledge freedom. The assuring personal for individual; every freedom is to. secure Nation such elimination be furthered pledge will Id., pp. 22-23. practices.” Congress, the Court agree I with while Thus *37 Clause Act used the Commerce fashioning present (and properly also segregation, it used regulate racial of the Fourteenth § under so) of its some Amendment. should earlier, I that our decision
I said repeat what Amendment, thereby putting the Fourteenth be based on strategies allowing every an end to all obstructionist patronize race, creed, his color—to person —whatever discrimina- without places public all accommodation of intrastate. he travels interstate tion whether OF MR. JUSTICE APPENDIX TO OPINION DOUGLAS, CONCURRING.
(1) Bill (as in the Administration introduced Celler, 7152). H. Congressman it was R. House (a) finally law', became bill con- Act as it Unlike the discrimina- 10-13) which described findings (pp. tained tion in places public findings in accommodation and (h) (i) connected this discrimination to state action powers invoked Fourteenth Amendment to deal with problem; (b) setting forth the estab- lishments which covered, were it commerce- only used type language and did not anything contain like the present (d) (b) § 201 and its link to “or” § —the (b). § clause present Nor did the bill contain the § 202.
In hearings before the Judiciary House Subcom- mittee Attorney clearly General stated and repeatedly that while the bill “primarily” on the Commerce relied Clause, was also intended to rest on the Fourteenth Amendment. See Hearings before No. 5, Subcommittee House Judiciary Committee, 88th 1st 1375- Cong., Sess., 1376, 1388, 1396, 141Ó, 1417-1419.
(2) The (as Subcommittee Bill full reported to the House Judiciary Committee).
The Attorney General against portions testified ¿dministration this bill. reiterated that He bill rested on the Fourteenth Amendment as well as on the Commerce Clause: Hearings, see House Judiciary Com- mittee on H. 7152, R. 5, Subcommittee No. amended 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 2693, 2700, 2764. this bill But for the first time a provision added similar to the present § 201 (d) only much broader. See full id., at first — (Apparently response this addition was in paragraph. urgings
to the of those who wanted to broaden the. bill comprehend and who failed the administration bill already despite its rested, language, Fourteenth Amendment.) The Attorney General feared provision the new went far. Further, too the new provision, present (d) unlike the § 201 like pres- but *38 202, coverage § ent did not limit to those establishments defined specifically places accommodation; all rather it businesses operating referred state under id., at 2656. See or license.” “authorization, permission, ought this: objected Attorney General generally Amendment Fourteenth the to invoke not that establishments ought specify rather but 2676, 2726. 2656, at id., See covered. would be 2675— covering done bill had only the administration This commercial had certain which establishments those characteristics. . he that indicated Attorney General
Subsequently additions of the Subcommittee accept portion would he made (d) 202; but ultimately §§ became that additions that these he did not understand it clear that Amendment foundation Fourteenth removed the did not bill. He placed had under its the administration confined the Fourteenth these additions understand that alone; to the additions foundation of the bill Amendment supported still language sections were the commerce See Amendment. by the Fourteenth the alternative p. 2698. id., 2727 with 2764; compare p. at especially these additions said it made The Subcommittee that re- was Fourteenth insure that order to Amendment Hearings, 2763; also Subcommittee id., See at lied on. Attorney repeated General 1413-1421. And supra, language was agree would to whatever 2764 that he p. at on the Four- make it clear that the bill relied necessary to the Commerce Clause. Amendment as well as teenth behind clear that a dual motive was seems Therefore it (d) ultimately §§ óf what became addition (2) coverage Act; to'make it (1) expand 2Ó2: invoking powers under the Congress was its clear Amendment. Fourteenth House). (as reported to the The Committee Bill
(3) present (d) §§ contains the This bill an even defi- given “state action” is broader except (d) than has in as then written §in nition 201(d). § present
289 Report House has the following statement: “Sec- tion 201 (d) delineates the circumstances under which discrimination or segregation by an sup- establishment ported State action within the meaning of title II.” Rep. H. R. No. Cong., Sess., p. 1st 21. On 117 88th Report Representative says: Cramer “The 14th amendment approach accommodations [in committee bill as contrasted with the administration bill} is not limited the narrower definition of ‘establishment’ under the interstate approach and covers broad State ‘custom usage’ or where discrimination is ‘fostered or encouraged’ by State (sec. action (d)).” 201 By implication the committee merely has broadened the coverage of the administration’s bill by adding the ex- state plicit action language; it has not thereby removed the Fourteenth Amendment from the com-. foundation merce language coverage.
Congressman. Celler introduced into the Congressional Record series of memoranda on the constitutionality of the various titles of bill; at pp. 1524-1526* the Four teenth Amendment is discussed; p. at 1526it is suggested that the- Thirteenth Amendment is to be regarded as “additional authority” for legislation.
p.At Congressman 1917 Willis introduces an amend- ment to strike out guests” “transient and to replace these words with “interstate travelers.” As says reported, Con- gressman Willis, the bill boldly undertakes regulate intrastáte commerce, least to at this extent. Ibid. The purpose of the amendment is simply to relate “this bill powers to the of Congress.” Ibid. Congressman Celler, the floor manager of the bill, will accept not the amend- ment, which an introduces element of uncertainty into the scope of the bill’s coverage. p.At 1924 Congressman
* A11 are 110,' citations -to Congressional Vol. Record. his under- indicating it is
Lindsay remarks makes § of 201 language portions standing the commerce Fourteenth Clause, while the only on the Commerce rest (d). only support § is invoked to Amendment MacGregor, a member Congressman p. But at response to Con- Judiciary Subcommittee, states, constitutionality challenge to gressman Willis’ gentle- guests” coverage, that: “When the “transient (1) page subparagraph man from Louisiana seeks circumscribe the number (b)(1)] tightly [§ *40 legisla- this motels to be covered under inns, hotels, and Court decision Supreme tion he does violence the authority under the where defines'the the it in light . Mr. of the Chairman, 14th . . amendment. from by gentleman decision cited Supreme Court the light decisions, in Louisiana, subsequent and of a score of legislative authority granted in the 14th precisely it is that we seek here to exercise.” amendment surrounding pp. At 1962-1968 there is the discussion striking of the Goodell amendment the word passage “encouraged” (d) (2) reported. § of the bill as from concerning in there is pages Likewise these the discussion amendment to the Goodell amendment: this Willis amendment eliminated the word “fostered.” After the usage of these amendments the or had adoption custom “required by merely to be or enforced” the State —not in encouraged” order “fostered or to constitute “state meaning of action” within the the Act. Congressman p. Virginia
At Smith offered an a amendment as substitute the Goodell amendment would have eliminated the lan- usage” “custom or guage altogether. Congressman Celler in defense of said usage or reported: the bill is not constituted “[C]ustom neighborhood merely by practice by a popular particular community. in a It attitude consists of a though practice which, not embodied in law, receives notice sanction to the extent that by enforced locality” the State or (pp. officialdom 1964-1965). Smith Amendment was rejected the House hv (p. 1967). seem would
It the action on this Smith substitute by Congressman statement Celler mean that a State’s enforcement of segregation custom places of public accommodation the use of its trespass laws is a violation of 201 (d)(2). §
(4) The House Bill. The House bill placed was directly on the Senate cal- endar .and go not did to committee. The Dirksen-Mans- field substitute adopted by the only Senate made one change in §§201 and changed 202: it “a” to “the” in §201 (d)(3). Senator Dirksen any made ex- nowhere plicit references to the constitutional bases of Title II.
Thus it is fair to assume that the Senate’s understanding question was no from the different House’s view. The Senate substitute was ¿dopted change without the House on July 2, 1964, signed by the President on the day. same Goldberg, Justice
Mr, concurring.* I join in opinions judgments j Court since I agree “that *41 Congress the.action in the adoption of the as applied Act here ... is within granted by it the Commerce Clause the Constitution, as interpreted by this Court for ante, 140 years,” at 261.
The primary purpose of the Rights Civil Act of 1964, however, as the Court recognizes, ,and as I would under- score, is the vindication of dignity and human not.mere economics. The Senate Commerce Committee made this quite clear: primary
“The pürpose of .. . Rights Civil [the Act], then, is to solve this problem, the deprivation of personal dignity that surely accompanies denials opinion applies * [This also to 543, No. Katzenbach v. McClung, p. post, 294.]
292 Discrimi- establishments. access equal hamburgers cents, and dollars simply is not
nation frustration, and humiliation, is the movies; when feel surely must a person that embarrassment of the a member as unacceptable he is told that he is equally It is or color. race of his public because of edu- regardless that child to a explain inability to be de- he morality will courtesy, civility, cation, though' treatment, even enjoy equal right to nied may well be States of the United he be a.citizen Nation assure this his life to lay down upon called 16. Sess., Cong., 872, 2d No. 88th Rep. S. continues.” the Act purpose of primary is the Moreover, that speaks (c) §201 while fact by the emphasized that^ commerce,” “affect of establishments in terms only on its only not this section based Congress it is clear on 5 of the § also Clause but the Commerce power under Court’s cited in the cases Amendment.1 Fourteenth its could exercise Congress are conclusive opinions by administration as statements well Hearings in as presented the administra original bill, that the spokesmen show resembled no clause which though it contained tion, so even was based which even provision action” (d) “state so-called 201§ —or —the Com g., Hearings See, before Senate e. “state action.” mentioned 27-28, Sess., 23, 1732, Cong., 1st 88th on S. mittee on Commerce Hearings 259; Senate 252-253, 256, before 250, 247-248, 74, 230, 57, 151, 152, 186; Sess., Cong., 1st 1731, 88th Judiciary S. bn Committee House Committee No. Hearings Subcommittee before 1410; Hear on H. R. Sess., 1396, Cong., 1st 7152, Judiciary 88th 7152, as amended Judiciary on H.'R. Committee ings House before 2699-2700; Sess., 2693, Cong., 1st 5, 88th No. Subcommittee Sess., The later additions Cong., 2d Rep. 88th S. No. (a) (d) did not remove language to § “state action” § support from Amendment Clause-Fourteenth the dual Commerce' nbt intend clause did added this bill, those who the rest of language and This basis. its constitutional thereby bifurcate the Act certain that first, in order make (d) added, were § to which this the situations all of all or would cover almost applied. Amendment Fourteenth 1 of the hold that might § Court *42 Congress so would not to do “embarrass ‘¿statedthat Hart .Senator 293 powers under the accomplish Commerce Clause purpose. (b) (c) As 201 undoubtedly §§ are a valid exercise the Commerce power Clause the reasons opinions stated of the Court, the Court considers that it is unnecessary to additionally consider whether it is supportable by Congress’ exertion its § under of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In my concurring opinion in Maryland, Bell v. 226, 317, however, U. S. I expressed my conviction that 1§ of the Fourteenth guarantees Amendment all Americans the right constitutional “to be treated as equal members of the community with respect to public accom- modations,” “Congress under authority § 5 [has] of the Fourteenth Amendment, or under the Commerce Clause, I,Art. 8,§ to implement rights protected § 1 of the Fourteenth give-and-take Amendment. In the legislative process, Congress can fashion a law draw- ing guidelines necessary and appropriate to facilitate practical'administration to distinguish gen- between uinely public private accommodations.” The- chal- lenged is just Act á such law and, in my view, clearly authority had under § both 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause to enact the Civil Rights ofAct
because . . . the reach of the bill administration would be less inclu sive than that right.” Court-established Hearings before Senate Committee, Commerce supra, at id., 256. See also at 259-262. Second, sponsors (d) of 201 trying were § .to make even clearer the Fourteenth Amendment basis of See, g., Title II. Hearings e. before Subcommittee 5No. Committee, House supra, at 1413- 1418; Hearings before the Senate Commerce Committee, supra, at 259-262. There is no they indication thought the inclusion of (d) would § remove the Fourteenth Amendment foundation of the rest of Third, the title. history provisions the bill after (d) similar were added § contains references to the dual foundation of all Title provisions II before Hearings us. See before No. 5 Subcommittee of the House Committee, supra, 1396, 1410; at Hearings before Judiciary House Committee, supra, at 2693, 2699- 2700; Cong. Rec. 1925-1928.