Zepeda-Lopez v. Garland, 38 F.4th 315

Petitioners (three Honduran-born siblings with derivative family members) fled Honduras in 2014 after repeated extortion, violent attacks, and threats by the Mara 18 gang; some family members also experienced prior violence in Nicaragua.
Petitioners hold Honduran citizenship and secondary Nicaraguan citizenship through their mother; they entered the U.S. without valid documents and applied for asylum, withholding, and CAT relief.
The Immigration Judge found Petitioners credible and that they suffered past persecution in Honduras and that the Honduran government could not protect them, but denied asylum under the BIA’s Matter of B-R- dual‑nationality rule, which required showing persecution in both countries of nationality.
The BIA affirmed in a short decision, expressly declining to overrule Matter of B-R-. Petitioners petitioned for review in the Second Circuit.
The Second Circuit held that the INA’s refugee definition requires a dual national to show persecution in any one country of nationality (singular), not in all countries of nationality; it vacated the BIA decision and remanded for proceedings under the correct standard.

Issue	Petitioners' Argument (Zepeda‑Lopez)	Government's Argument	Held
Whether a dual national must show persecution in all countries of nationality to be a ‘refugee’ under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)	Statute requires fear of persecution in any one country of nationality (singular ‘that country’)	Matter of B‑R‑ and the UN Convention support requiring fear in each country; agency interpretation merits deference	Held for Petitioners: statutory text and context unambiguously require fear in any one country of nationality, not all
Whether Chevron deference applies to the BIA’s Matter of B‑R‑ interpretation	N/A (argues statutory text controls)	Urges deference to BIA interpretation	Court: no Chevron deference needed because statute unambiguous; BIA reading is unreasonable in any event
Whether the UN Refugee Convention (and related legislative history) compels the BIA’s dual‑national rule	INA does not incorporate the Convention’s separate dual‑national definition; Congress omitted that provision	Points to Congress’ intent to conform to the UN Convention	Court: legislative history does not override unambiguous statutory text; Congress omitted the Convention’s explicit dual‑national provision, so it cannot be read in
Whether the BIA’s Matter of B‑R‑ was a reasonable interpretation of the INA	N/A	Matter of B‑R‑ is a permissible agency construction	Court: Matter of B‑R‑ is manifestly contrary to the INA’s text and therefore unreasonable; it is rejected

Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (establishes administrative deference framework)
INS v. Cardoza‑Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (discusses refugee definition and Congress’ intent to conform to UN Convention)
Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335 (2005) (courts may not read omitted provisions into statutes)
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (follow explicit statutory definitions over ordinary meaning)
Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2005) (review BIA decisions adopting IJ reasoning)
Iavorski v. U.S. INS, 232 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2000) (standard of review for BIA legal determinations)
Nwozuzu v. Holder, 726 F.3d 323 (2d Cir. 2013) (Chevron framework applied to immigration statutes)
Brathwaite v. Garland, 3 F.4th 542 (2d Cir. 2021) (when to afford deference to BIA interpretations)
Sall v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2006) (distinguishing refugee status from discretionary asylum relief)