105 N.E.3d 218
Ind. Ct. App.2018Background
- On Oct. 29, 2016 Reserve Officer Sean Dolan stopped Zachariah Marshall for allegedly exceeding the posted speed limit; the stop escalated into an OWI investigation and Marshall was arrested.
- Dolan did not issue a speeding citation; he testified he had run a BMV check and chose not to cite because Marshall would face OWI-related consequences.
- At deposition and hearing Dolan could not state the exact speed Marshall was driving, did not pace Marshall, did not record a speed, and could not consistently recall the posted speed at the location.
- Dolan stated his radar was functioning but could not testify to the radar reading; he testified he was “very certain, a hundred percent” Marshall was speeding.
- Marshall moved to suppress evidence as the stop lacked reasonable suspicion; the trial court denied the renewed motion to suppress and certified the denial for interlocutory appeal.
- The Court of Appeals reviewed de novo the constitutionality of the stop and reversed, holding the stop violated the Fourth Amendment for lack of specific, articulable facts showing Marshall was speeding.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Marshall) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the traffic stop was supported by reasonable suspicion that a traffic law was violated | Dolan’s testimony that Marshall was speeding, based on his training/experience and a working radar, provided sufficient reasonable suspicion | Dolan’s visual estimate without a recorded or articulated speed, pacing, or confirmed radar reading is insufficient to justify the stop | Reversed — insufficient specific, articulable facts to support the stop |
| Whether an officer’s visual speed estimation alone can justify a stop | Visual estimation grounded in officer expertise can be sufficient if the officer articulates the estimated speed and basis | Visual estimation without an articulated estimate or corroboration is conclusory and inadequate | Visual estimation insufficient here because no specific speed or corroboration was testified to |
| Whether the trial court erred in denying suppression when uncontested favorable evidence exists for defendant | Trial court relied on officer credibility and case law allowing estimates | Marshall pointed to uncontested facts (no pacing, no recorded speed, uncertainty about posted limit) showing lack of basis | Trial court erred; appellate review considers uncontested defendant-favorable evidence and found stop unconstitutional |
| Whether federal Fourth Amendment analysis resolves state constitutional claims | State did not need to separately decide broader Indiana constitutional protections after finding federal violation | Marshall also raised Indiana Constitution argument | Court did not address Indiana Constitution because federal claim failed and state protection may be broader |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. State, 785 N.E.2d 615 (Ind. Ct. App.) (standard of review for denial of motion to suppress)
- Campos v. State, 885 N.E.2d 590 (Ind.) (de novo review of constitutional rulings; deference to trial court fact findings)
- Bush v. State, 925 N.E.2d 787 (Ind. Ct. App.) (traffic stop is a seizure; requires reasonable suspicion)
- Abel v. State, 773 N.E.2d 276 (Ind.) (reasonable suspicion must be more than a hunch)
- Carter v. State, 692 N.E.2d 464 (Ind. Ct. App.) (use totality of circumstances to assess reasonable suspicion)
- State v. Butts, 269 P.3d 862 (Kan.) (officer’s visual estimate of speed supported by training/experience can suffice when officer articulates estimate)
- Allen v. State, 978 So.2d 254 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (officer’s speed estimate and pursuit can support reasonable suspicion)
- Barnhill v. State, 601 S.E.2d 215 (N.C. Ct. App.) (officer’s articulated speed estimate supported stop)
- L.W. v. State, 926 N.E.2d 52 (Ind. Ct. App.) (stop violated Fourth Amendment where officer lacked reasonable suspicion)