Zachariah J. Marshall v. State of Indiana, 117 N.E.3d 1254

Background

At ~2:40 a.m. on Oct. 29, 2016, Reserve Officer Sean Dolan, using a properly calibrated, dash‑mounted radar, heard a high‑pitch tone indicating an oncoming car was exceeding the posted 50 mph limit and stopped the vehicle.
Dolan testified he was “one‑hundred‑percent” certain the car was speeding, compared the radar reading to a 50 mph sign, and initiated the stop intending to cite for speeding.
After stopping the car, Corporal O’Dea detected signs of intoxication (odor of alcohol, slurred speech); the stop developed into an OWI investigation.
Dolan did not issue a speeding citation or otherwise document the radar speed; at deposition months later he could not recall the radar reading or the posted limit, though later he rechecked and confirmed the limit was 50 mph.
Marshall was charged with OWI offenses and moved to suppress evidence, arguing the initial traffic stop lacked reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment and was unreasonable under Article 1, § 11 of the Indiana Constitution.
Trial court denied suppression; Court of Appeals reversed on Fourth Amendment grounds; Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer and affirmed the trial court.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether officer had reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment to stop for speeding when radar indicated speeding but speed was not documented	Marshall: No reasonable suspicion because the officer did not document or later recall the precise radar speed or posted limit; visual/radar memory without a recorded number is insufficient	State (Dolan): Radar was on, calibrated, produced an audible/high‑pitch alert, officer compared radar to posted 50 mph and was certain defendant was speeding—these articulable facts suffice	Court: Held reasonable suspicion existed—radar indication, calibration, comparison to posted limit, and officer’s observations provided sufficient articulable facts to support the stop
Whether a bright‑line rule requires officers to record or document radar speed for a lawful speeding stop	Marshall: Court should require documentation (citation, warning, dashcam, affidavit) or at least a remembered numeric speed to support a stop	State: No bright‑line numeric/documentation requirement; reasonable suspicion is a totality‑of‑circumstances, non‑exacting test	Court: Rejected bright‑line rule; reasonable suspicion is flexible and need not include a recorded numeric speed
Whether the stop was reasonable under Article 1, § 11 (Indiana Constitution)	Marshall: Even if federal standard arguably met, Indiana Constitution may afford broader protection and the stop was unreasonable given lack of documentation and officer’s later inability to recall speed	State: Under Litchfield factors, officer had high degree of knowledge (radar), intrusion was minimal, and law‑enforcement interest in traffic safety is significant	Court: Held stop reasonable under Article 1, § 11—high degree of knowledge from radar, minimal intrusion, and strong enforcement interest balanced in favor of reasonableness
Whether officer credibility or late lack of recollection undermines validity of stop	Marshall: Officer’s failure to recall speeds undermines credibility and factual basis for stop	State: Trial court found officer credible; credibility determinations are for trial court and not to be disturbed absent clear error	Court: Affirmed trial court credibility finding and declined to disturb it

Key Cases Cited

Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014) (establishes that reasonable‑suspicion/probable‑cause analysis requires particularized, objective basis and tolerates mistakes of law in some contexts)
Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249 (2007) (vehicle stops constitute seizures under the Fourth Amendment)
Meredith v. State, 906 N.E.2d 867 (Ind. 2009) (traffic stops are subject to reasonable‑suspicion standard)
Prado Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393 (2014) (reasonable suspicion is a non‑exacting, totality‑of‑circumstances inquiry)
United States v. Sowards, 690 F.3d 583 (4th Cir. 2012) (visual estimation alone may be insufficient for speeding stops; radar or pacing are reliable indicia)
State v. Renzulli, 958 N.E.2d 1143 (Ind. 2011) (reasonable suspicion is not illusory and is distinguishable from probable cause)
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (authorizes brief investigative stops on reasonable suspicion)
Sokolow v. United States, 490 U.S. 1 (1989) (reasonable suspicion cannot be reduced to neat rules; totality‑of‑circumstances approach)