Young v. Commissioner of Social Security
3:15-cv-00277
| M.D. Fla. | Jun 15, 2016Background
- Plaintiff Kim Young applied for disability insurance benefits alleging onset Jan 1, 2011; applications were denied and an ALJ found her not disabled through the date last insured (June 30, 2013).
- Severe impairments found by the ALJ: degenerative joint/disc disease, affective mood disorder, obesity, ADHD, and anxiety.
- ALJ assessed an RFC for a restricted range of light work with limitations to occasional lower-left extremity use, limited posturals, short/simple routine tasks, moderate limits on detailed instructions and prolonged concentration, and limited public interaction.
- Treating psychiatrist Thomas Wikstrom, M.D., completed a May 30, 2013 mental health questionnaire opining marked/extreme functional limits, inability to work, and more than four absences per month, with onset as of December 2010.
- ALJ gave little weight to Dr. Wikstrom’s questionnaire, finding it inconsistent with his treatment notes and unsupported by the objective record; ALJ credited state agency and consultative opinions that showed only moderate limitations.
- With vocational expert testimony, the ALJ identified representative jobs (gate attendant, mail clerk, cleaner) and concluded Plaintiff was not disabled; the district court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the ALJ erred in discounting treating psychiatrist Dr. Wikstrom’s opinions | ALJ lacked "good cause" to give little weight to the May 2013 questionnaire; opinions should receive substantial/treating weight | ALJ articulated valid, supported reasons: questionnaire inconsistent with longitudinal treatment notes and other objective evidence | Court held ALJ had good cause; reasons supported by substantial evidence and affirmed the denial |
Key Cases Cited
- McRoberts v. Bowen, 841 F.2d 1077 (11th Cir. 1988) (scope of district court review of Social Security decisions)
- Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (Supreme Court) (substantial evidence standard)
- Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155 (11th Cir. 2004) (definition of substantial evidence)
- Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580 (11th Cir. 1991) (affirmance where substantial evidence supports Commissioner despite contrary evidence)
- Barnes v. Sullivan, 932 F.2d 1356 (11th Cir. 1991) (same)
- Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553 (11th Cir. 1995) (court must consider the record as a whole)
- Lowery v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 835 (11th Cir. 1992) (entire record scrutiny required)
- Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176 (11th Cir. 2011) (ALJ must state with particularity weight given to medical opinions)
- Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436 (11th Cir. 1997) (treating physician rule: give substantial weight absent good cause)
- Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2004) (defining "good cause" to discount treating physician)
- Marbury v. Sullivan, 957 F.2d 837 (11th Cir. 1992) (ALJ must clearly articulate reasons for rejecting treating physician opinion)
