927 F.3d 898
5th Cir.2019Background
- In Sept. 2015 Young purchased three vacant houses and hired a contractor to renovate them; County Building Inspector Edwards posted a condemnation notice on one property on Sept. 18.
- Edwards testified he believed the properties complied with law and that he would not have posted the notice but for instructions from Board President R.D. “Dickie” Stevens.
- The Board unanimously voted in October 2015 to set a November 17 hearing “for condemnation”; its attorney sent Young a notice to remove debris by that date.
- Young requested a continuance, hearing was continued; after Young’s counsel notified the Board of an intent to sue, the Board declined to hold the hearing and referred the matter to its insurer.
- The condemnation notice remained posted for over two years; the Board never held a hearing or removed the notice until Feb. 2018, when it told Young he could enter and repair the properties.
- Young sued the Board under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging ratification of Stevens’s unconstitutional directive; trial resulted in a jury verdict for Young and damages, and the Board appealed the district court’s denial of JMOL/new trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether there was legally sufficient evidence to support municipal liability under § 1983 via ratification | Young: Stevens instructed Edwards to post an unfounded condemnation notice and the Board’s unanimous vote to proceed with condemnation ratified that action | Board: It never voted to approve Stevens’s instruction or the basis for it; ‘condemnation’ was a clerical error and it did not ratify posting the notice | Jury verdict upheld; evidence (Stevens’s instruction + unanimous vote + notice left for 2+ years) was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find ratification and municipal liability |
| Proper standard for municipal culpability (arbitrary-and-capricious vs. deliberate indifference) | Young: Board’s affirmative action (posting/ratifying a condemnation notice) is governed by arbitrary-and-capricious review; district court also instructed on deliberate indifference | Board: liability requires deliberate indifference (the typical standard for failures to act) | No reversible error; arbitrary-and-capricious applicable to government action and district court also instructed on deliberate indifference, so any error harmless |
| Whether it was error to let the jury decide whether Stevens was a final policymaker | Young: alternative theories (ratification) available; fact issues for jury matter | Board: policymaker status is a question of law for the court, not the jury | Even if submission on policymaker status was erroneous, harmless because ratification theory alone provided legally sufficient basis for verdict |
| Whether jury instructions misstated law by requiring proof of an official policy or custom for ratification | Young: ratification itself is a recognized route to municipal liability—no separate showing of an independent policy/custom required | Board: jury should have been instructed that an official policy or widespread custom must be proved | Rejected Board’s argument; ratification suffices to establish official policy for § 1983 liability—no separate policy proof required; verdict affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988) (ratification by a final policymaker can be charged to the municipality)
- Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838 (5th Cir. 2009) (elements for municipal liability under § 1983)
- World Wide St. Preachers Fellowship v. Town of Columbia, 591 F.3d 747 (5th Cir. 2009) (ratification theory limited to sufficiently extreme facts)
- Culbertson v. Lykos, 790 F.3d 608 (5th Cir. 2015) (ratification applied to economic injuries and employment decisions)
- Seibert v. Jackson Cty., 851 F.3d 430 (5th Cir. 2017) (standard of review for JMOL)
- F.D.I.C. v. Mijalis, 15 F.3d 1314 (5th Cir. 1994) (standard for reversible error in jury instructions)
- Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985) (application of arbitrary-and-capricious standard to governmental action)
- Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998) (discussion of deliberate indifference standard in municipal liability contexts)
- City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989) (deliberate indifference standard where failure to act constitutes policy)