Yesh Music v. Lakewood Church
727 F.3d 356
| 5th Cir. | 2013Background
- Yesh Music (plaintiff) licensed a song to Lakewood Church and later sued for copyright infringement in Texas; Yesh voluntarily dismissed the Texas suit under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i).
- The next day Yesh refiled the same claim in New York; after on-the-record discussion in the Texas court the parties agreed the case would proceed in Texas, and Yesh dismissed the New York suit under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii).
- Because Yesh had two voluntary dismissals, Rule 41(a)(1)(B) made the second dismissal operate as a dismissal with prejudice, potentially foreclosing refiling.
- Yesh moved in the Texas district court under Rule 60(b)(6) to vacate its first (Texas) voluntary dismissal and reinstate the original Texas suit; the district court granted relief.
- Lakewood appealed, arguing (1) Rule 60(b) applies only to "final judgment, order, or proceeding," and a unilateral Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) dismissal without prejudice is not a final disposition subject to Rule 60(b), and (2) even if jurisdiction existed, vacatur under Rule 60(b)(6) was an abuse of discretion.
- The Fifth Circuit majority affirmed, holding a Rule 41(a)(1)(A) dismissal without prejudice may be a "final proceeding" under Rule 60(b) and that the district court did not abuse its discretion given the parties' on-the-record agreement; Judge Jolly dissented.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a Rule 41(a)(1)(A) voluntary dismissal without prejudice is a "final judgment, order, or proceeding" under Rule 60(b) | A voluntary dismissal terminates the action and thus may be a final "proceeding" subject to Rule 60(b) relief | A unilateral notice of dismissal without prejudice is not a final disposition and therefore not subject to Rule 60(b) vacatur | Held: A voluntary dismissal without prejudice can qualify as a "final proceeding," so Rule 60(b) jurisdiction exists |
| Whether Rule 60(b)(6) relief was an abuse of discretion here | Vacatur justified by fairness and the parties’ on-the-record agreement to proceed in Texas; denying relief would be unjust | Granting relief improperly rewards a tactical litigation choice and lets plaintiff avoid Rule 41(a)(1)(B) consequences; extraordinary circumstances absent | Held: Not an abuse of discretion—district court permissibly exercised equitable power due to the parties’ on-record stipulation and manifest-injustice concerns |
Key Cases Cited
- Frazar v. Ladd, 457 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 2006) (standard of review: Rule 60(b) grant reviewed for abuse of discretion)
- Harvey Specialty & Supply, Inc. v. Anson Flowline Equip. Inc., 434 F.3d 320 (5th Cir. 2005) (Rule 41(a)(1) dismissal leaves plaintiff free to refile; not a "final judgment" for preclusion)
- Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 506 F.2d 914 (5th Cir. 1975) (Rule 41(a)(1) grants unconditional right to dismiss before answer or summary judgment)
- Williams v. Frey, 551 F.2d 932 (3d Cir. 1977) (voluntary dismissal held to be a proceeding that could be reopened under Rule 60(b))
- Nelson v. Napolitano, 657 F.3d 586 (7th Cir. 2011) (district court may in some instances grant Rule 60(b) relief after voluntary dismissal)
- Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375 (1994) (district court’s retention of jurisdiction over settlement-related matters)
- Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990) (Rule 41(a)(1) dismissal does not divest court of jurisdiction to adjudicate ancillary matters)
- Batts v. Tow–Motor Forklift Co., 66 F.3d 743 (5th Cir. 1995) (Rule 60(b)(6) is an extraordinary equitable remedy; narrow availability)
- Edward H. Bohlin Co. v. Banning Co., 6 F.3d 350 (5th Cir. 1993) (Rule 60(b)(6) cannot be used to relieve parties from free, calculated, deliberate choices)