Yenchi v. Ameriprise Financial, Inc.
123 A.3d 1071
| Pa. Super. Ct. | 2015Background
- In 1995–97 the Yenchis paid broker Bryan Holland (American Express/Ameriprise) for a financial analysis and purchased a consolidated universal life policy (1996) and a deferred variable annuity (1997) based on his recommendations.
- Later reviews showed the life policy was underfunded (premiums would increase and not cease) and the annuity would not mature when represented; penalties applied for early withdrawals.
- The Yenchis sued (2001; amended 2003) alleging negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation, UTPCPL violations, breach of fiduciary duty, bad faith, and negligent supervision; they later dismissed negligent misrepresentation as a claim before trial.
- Appellees moved for summary judgment arguing no fiduciary relationship existed as a matter of law; the trial court granted summary judgment on the fiduciary claim and excluded related evidence at trial; jury found for defendants on fraud and trial court ruled for defendants on UTPCPL.
- On appeal the Superior Court reversed the summary judgment insofar as it dismissed the fiduciary-duty claim, vacated the judgment, and remanded for a new trial on fraud and UTPCPL claims because exclusionary evidentiary rulings rested on the fiduciary dismissal; it affirmed rulings denying discovery of certain corporate documents, applying the pre‑1997 UTPCPL, and striking voir dire questions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether fiduciary/confidential relationship existed | Holland held himself out as a financial advisor and was paid for a comprehensive financial plan; that created a fact question whether a confidential/fiduciary relationship arose | Insurance sale is an arm’s-length transaction; no fiduciary duty absent evidence the client ceded decision-making authority | Reversed trial court: existence of fiduciary relationship is fact-specific; summary judgment improper because trial court applied an overly rigid rule excluding advisory-role evidence |
| Denial of motion to compel corporate sales-practices documents | Documents show management awareness of deceptive sales practices and are relevant to plaintiffs’ claims | Motion to compel was denied in a lead case; plaintiffs failed to timely pursue relief here | Denial affirmed as waived — plaintiffs failed to raise the issue in the trial court at a time it could be remedied |
| Exclusion of evidence via motions in limine (suitability/standard-of-care evidence) | Excluded evidence was relevant to misrepresentation and UTPCPL claims and prejudicial when fiduciary claim was dismissed | Motions in limine were proper given the trial court’s dismissal of the fiduciary claim; some evidence was irrelevant to fraud | Vacated exclusion rulings and granted a new trial on fraud and UTPCPL claims because the evidentiary exclusions flowed from the erroneous fiduciary dismissal |
| Which UTPCPL version applies | Plaintiffs argued for the amended (post‑1996) statute that adds “deceptive conduct” to the catchall | Defendants argued pre‑amendment law controls because alleged conduct occurred before amendment | Affirmed: pre‑amendment UTPCPL applies because the amendment created a new substantive cause of action and is not retroactive |
| Striking of proposed voir dire questions | Plaintiffs claimed court should have reformulated rather than strike questions probing juror views on corporate cheating and remedies | Court argued questions solicited opinions about the law/evidence, not juror bias; scope of voir dire is discretionary | Affirmed: trial court did not abuse discretion; questions were impermissible (seekers of law/opinion) |
Key Cases Cited
- DeArmitt v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 73 A.3d 678 (Pa. Super. 2013) (summary judgment standard and summary‑judgment implications for proof of cause of action)
- Willow Inn, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 399 F.3d 224 (3d Cir. 2005) (insurance contracting generally treated as arm’s-length)
- Wisniski v. Brown & Brown Ins. Co., 906 A.2d 571 (Pa. Super. 2006) (presumption that broker–client insurance relationships are not confidential; confidential relationship possible but fact‑specific)
- In re Estate of Mihm, 497 A.2d 612 (Pa. Super. 1985) (defining confidential relationship standard and fact question approach)
- Basile v. H & R Block, Inc., 777 A.2d 95 (Pa. Super. 2001) (confidential relationship cannot be reduced to fixed checklist; fact‑sensitive inquiry)
- eToll, Inc. v. Elias/Savion Adver., Inc., 811 A.2d 10 (Pa. Super. 2002) (distinguishing mere reliance on superior skill from a relationship creating fiduciary duties)