Yee v. Massachusetts State Police
121 N.E.3d 155
Mass.2019Background
- Warren Yee, an Asian-American lieutenant in the Massachusetts State Police assigned to Troop H (South Boston), requested a lateral transfer in December 2008 to Troop F (Logan Airport), stating Troop F had better overtime and paid detail opportunities.
- Troop F and Troop H lieutenants receive the same base pay and benefits, but Yee testified he sought Troop F for greater potential additional compensation; he repeatedly expressed interest but was never interviewed or offered the Troop F position.
- Between 2008 and 2012 seven troopers (all white males) were transferred or promoted to Troop F lieutenant; one comparator, Shawn Lydon, was moved from Troop H to Troop F after Yee wrote a discrimination complaint in September 2012 and earned roughly $30,000 more annually in overtime/detail pay while at Troop F.
- Yee sued under G. L. c. 151B alleging discrimination on the basis of race, age, and national origin for being denied the transfer; the State Police moved for summary judgment arguing no adverse employment action occurred and no discriminatory animus.
- The Superior Court granted summary judgment for the State Police, reasoning Yee produced only anecdotal evidence (Lydon) and had not shown a material, objective loss (e.g., a systematic earnings differential) from the denied lateral transfer.
- The Supreme Judicial Court vacated summary judgment and remanded, holding that denial of a lateral transfer can be an adverse employment action where the positions differ materially in compensation opportunities or in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, and Yee made the modest showing required at the prima facie stage.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether denial of a requested lateral transfer can be an "adverse employment action" under G. L. c. 151B | Yee: Yes — denial deprived him of materially greater overtime/detail compensation and thus materially affected terms/conditions of employment | State Police: No — lateral transfer denial isn’t an adverse action absent a promotion or clear objective change in employment terms; Yee’s evidence is anecdotal | Court: Yes — a denied lateral transfer may be adverse if positions differ materially in compensation/opportunities or terms, conditions, or privileges; Yee made sufficient prima facie showing to survive summary judgment |
| Whether Yee produced sufficient evidence to show Troop F offered greater overtime/detail opportunities than Troop H | Yee: Comparator Lydon’s $30,000/year change in overtime/detail earnings is evidence that Troop F offers greater opportunities | State Police: Lydon is anecdotal; Yee offered no statistical proof he would have earned same overtime as Lydon | Court: Lydon’s evidence, viewed favorably to Yee, suffices at the prima facie stage to create a genuine factual dispute; summary judgment was improper |
| Whether plaintiff met prima facie discrimination elements under McDonnell Douglas | Yee: He is in protected classes, performed adequately, similarly situated comparators received Troop F, and denial was adverse | State Police: Claims fail at adverse-action element and comparability | Court: Yee made the modest showing required for a prima facie case; burden shifts to employer to articulate nondiscriminatory reason |
| Whether case should be finally decided on summary judgment | Yee: No — factual disputes remain about motive and whether Troop F systematically offered greater pay opportunities | State Police: Yes — insufficient evidence to go to trial | Court: Vacated summary judgment and remanded for the motion judge to consider nondiscriminatory reasons and pretext under McDonnell Douglas, and to permit supplementation of the record if appropriate |
Key Cases Cited
- MacCormack v. Boston Edison Co., 423 Mass. 652 (defines adverse action as materially changing objective aspects of employment)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (framework for burden-shifting in employment discrimination cases)
- Trustees of Health & Hospitals of Boston, Inc. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 449 Mass. 675 (prima facie burden described as modest)
- College-Town, Div. of Interco, Inc. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 400 Mass. 156 (imputing supervisory decisionmaking to employer)
- Psy-Ed Corp. v. Klein, 459 Mass. 697 (adverse action defined as materially disadvantaging an employee)
- Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (treats wages/hours as conditions of employment)