Yancy D. Cook v. Steven R. Bayle, 16-1579-pr

On May 3, 2011, NYSP Trooper Kevin Manion stopped Yancy Cook after observing an ATV turn without signaling; Manion detected signs of intoxication, Cook failed field sobriety tests, and a portable breath screen was positive.
At the barracks Cook submitted to a breathalyzer (Draeger Alcotest 9510) that registered a BAC of .12%; Cook was indicted for Aggravated DWI (with a child) and two DWI counts.
At trial the prosecution introduced calibration and maintenance records for the breathalyzer (Exhibits 5, 6, 12) and a record testing the reference gas; Cook objected under the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause, relying on Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming.
The trial court admitted the records as non-testimonial; the jury convicted Cook on all counts. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding the records were maintenance/administrative and non-testimonial; the New York Court of Appeals denied leave.
Cook sought federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, arguing the admission of those records violated his confrontation rights; the district court denied the petition and this Court affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether breathalyzer calibration/maintenance and reference-gas records are "testimonial" under the Confrontation Clause	Records are equivalent to lab reports in Melendez-Diaz/Bullcoming, prepared by analysts, signed, sealed, and intended for use in prosecutions; thus testimonial	Records are non-testimonial maintenance/administrative documents created to ensure equipment accuracy, not to create an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony	Affirmed: records were non-testimonial under AEDPA deference; a reasonable court could find their primary purpose was equipment maintenance/accuracy, not trial substitute
Whether the state court unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent for § 2254(d)(1) purposes	The state court misapplied Crawford/Melendez-Diaz/Bullcoming and violated clearly established law	The state court’s decision fell within reasonable application because Supreme Court precedent does not categorically render such maintenance records testimonial	Affirmed: no unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law; fairminded disagreement possible

Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009) (laboratory certificates as testimonial statements subject to Confrontation Clause)
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011) (scientist’s report and need for testimonial declarant for Confrontation Clause purposes)
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (Confrontation Clause bars admission of testimonial out-of-court statements absent declarant unavailability and prior cross-examination)
Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344 (2011) (test for primary purpose determines whether statements are testimonial)
Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50 (2012) (plurality on use of out-of-court forensic results and primary-purpose analysis)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (AEDPA deferential standard; state-court decisions not unreasonable merely because federal court would reach different result)
Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685 (2002) (definition of unreasonable application under AEDPA)
Thaler v. Haynes, 559 U.S. 43 (2010) ("clearly established Federal law" means holdings of the Supreme Court must supply the rule)
Nevada v. Jackson, 569 U.S. 505 (2013) (framing of Supreme Court precedent at appropriate level of generality for AEDPA purposes)