Xavier Porter v. United States, 959 F.3d 800

Over six weeks Xavier Porter committed nine robberies in Louisville, KY, often using a pistol‑grip shotgun; he pled guilty to nine Hobbs Act robberies, one count of brandishing a firearm in relation to a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)), and one count of being a felon in possession (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)).
The district court sentenced Porter to 30 years, relying on § 924(c) and the Armed Career Criminal Act enhancement under § 924(e) based on three prior Georgia armed robbery convictions.
The Supreme Court later declared the residual clauses in § 924(c) and § 924(e) void for vagueness, so only the elements clauses could support Porter’s sentence (Davis; Johnson).
The central legal question on appeal: do Georgia armed robbery (as Porter’s priors) and Hobbs Act robbery qualify under the respective elements clauses as a “violent felony” or “crime of violence”?
The Sixth Circuit evaluated the statutes’ elements (not underlying facts), considered Georgia case law on “offensive/deadly weapon” and threats, and applied circuit precedent holding armed robbery and Hobbs Act robbery meet the elements‑clause standard.

Issue	Porter’s Argument	Government’s Argument	Held
Whether Georgia armed robbery qualifies as a "violent felony" under § 924(e) elements clause (use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force)	Georgia armed robbery can be committed by mere possession/replica, threats to property, or without explicit use of the word “force,” so it may not require physical force against a person	Georgia law treats "offensive/deadly weapon" robbery as involving use/threat of physical force against a person (weapon must be made known in victim’s presence), so it meets the elements clause	Georgia armed robbery qualifies as a violent felony under § 924(e) elements clause; circuit precedent supports this
Whether Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a "crime of violence" under § 924(c) elements clause	Hobbs Act robbery may not categorically require the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force	Hobbs Act robbery necessarily involves force or threats and is treated as a crime of violence in this circuit and others	Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under § 924(c); appellate precedent controls
Forfeiture/waiver of certain arguments	Porter (and government) asserted opposing forfeiture/waiver theories	Government urged waiver/forfeiture arguments too	Court declined to rest decision on waiver/forfeiture and resolved case on the merits

United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019) (held residual clause of § 924(c) void for vagueness)
Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (held residual clause of ACCA § 924(e) void for vagueness)
Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (categorical approach governs predicate‑offense analysis)
Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 544 (2019) (robbery‑type offenses can meet elements‑clause force requirement)
United States v. Gloss, 661 F.3d 317 (6th Cir. 2011) (robbery with deadly weapon involves use/threat of physical force)
United States v. Patterson, 853 F.3d 298 (6th Cir. 2017) (aggravated/armed robbery satisfies elements‑clause force requirement)
United States v. Gooch, 850 F.3d 285 (6th Cir. 2017) (Hobbs Act robbery as crime of violence under elements clause)
United States v. Camp, 903 F.3d 594 (6th Cir. 2018) (same: Hobbs Act robbery meets § 924(c) elements clause)
Perez v. United States, 885 F.3d 984 (6th Cir. 2018) (application of the "realistic probability" test in categorical analysis)
United States v. Thomas, 280 F.3d 1149 (7th Cir. 2002) (Georgia robbery by intimidation qualifies under elements clause)