Xavier Pinckney v. Harold Clarke, 697 F. App'x 768

Background

In 2008, 17‑year‑old Xavier Pinckney committed a double murder, confessed, and was convicted in Virginia circuit court of capital murder and related offenses. The trial judge sentenced him to life imprisonment without parole plus additional terms.
At sentencing Pinckney sought a continuance to present mitigation (a psychological evaluation); the trial judge received and reviewed a presentence report and the expert report before imposing life without parole.
After direct review and state habeas proceedings, Virginia courts concluded the trial judge had statutory discretion under state law to suspend or commute a life term for a juvenile and that the judge had considered the available mitigation.
Pinckney filed federal habeas claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 asserting Miller v. Alabama required a new sentencing hearing; he did not, in state court, argue in detail that the trial court’s actual consideration of youth‑related mitigation was constitutionally insufficient.
The district court, after briefing prompted by Montgomery v. Louisiana, held the trial court had not satisfied Miller/Montgomery’s requirement to make an individualized youth‑focused determination and granted resentencing.
The Fourth Circuit vacated the grant of relief (but affirmed denial as to other claims), holding the district court relied on an unexhausted claim (insufficiency of the trial court’s youth‑based consideration) and so must dismiss Pinckney’s petition; the Circuit also rejected Pinckney’s preserved claim that the sentencing scheme in Virginia was categorical mandatory life without parole.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Pinckney)	Defendant's Argument (Director)	Held
Did Pinckney exhaust a federal claim that the trial court’s consideration of his youth and attendant characteristics was constitutionally insufficient under Miller/Montgomery?	He relied on Miller and requested a Miller‑compliant resentencing; cited that a judge must consider mitigating qualities of youth.	The state was never placed on notice of a discrete sufficiency claim; Pinckney advanced only a discretion/retroactivity theory in state court.	Not exhausted — Fourth Circuit held Pinckney failed to fairly present the sufficiency claim to Virginia courts, so district court erred to grant relief on it.
Was the district court required to give AEDPA deference to the state habeas court’s findings?	Pinckney argued de novo review was appropriate.	The Director argued AEDPA requires deferential review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).	AEDPA deference applies; district court correctly applied § 2254(d) standards to state court findings.
Under Virginia law, was the sentencing scheme a mandatory life‑without‑parole scheme for juveniles such that Miller automatically invalidates the sentence?	Pinckney contended the trial court believed it had no discretion and thus could not consider mitigating factors.	The Director and state courts argued Virginia statutes permit suspension/commutation and therefore do not create the categorical mandatory scheme Miller condemned.	The Fourth Circuit agreed the question of state‑law sentencing discretion is one of state law and rejected federal habeas relief on that ground; the district court properly denied relief on that claim.
Did the trial judge’s role as both sentencing judge and habeas judge render the state habeas proceedings defective?	Pinckney suggested the dual role was problematic.	The Director argued the sentencing judge was well‑placed to make factual findings on sentencing.	Rejected — the court found no defect; Schriro supports that the sentencing judge can be well‑situated to make postconviction factual findings.

Key Cases Cited

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (juvenile mandatory life without parole prohibited; sentencing must account for youth and attendant characteristics)
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (Miller clarified to require individualized sentencing process and made aspects retroactive)
Bennett v. Stirling, 842 F.3d 319 (4th Cir. 2016) (AEDPA standard of review discussion)
Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269 (2015) (look‑through rule for state court summary dispositions)
Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465 (2007) (postconviction judge who also was sentencing judge may be well situated to find facts)
Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216 (2011) (federal habeas does not lie for state‑law errors)
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (exhaustion and procedural default principles)
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (rules of retroactivity for new constitutional rules)