X Corp. v. Bonta, 116 F.4th 888

California passed Assembly Bill 587 (AB 587), requiring large social media companies to post their terms of service and submit semiannual reports to the California Attorney General about their moderation of specific content categories.
The law mandates disclosure on how platforms define and address categories such as hate speech, extremism, misinformation, harassment, foreign political interference, and controlled substance distribution.
X Corp. (formerly Twitter) challenged AB 587, seeking a preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement, arguing the law violates the First Amendment and is preempted by federal law.
The district court denied X Corp.'s motion, concluding the reporting requirements were permissible compelled commercial speech under Zauderer and not unduly burdensome, and found no preemption.
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, X Corp. focused the challenge on the provisions requiring reports relating to the six state-specified categories (the "Content Category Report provisions").
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court, finding X Corp. likely to succeed on its First Amendment claim, and remanded for the district court to consider the severability of these provisions from the remainder of AB 587.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Do the Content Category Report provisions compel non-commercial speech?	X Corp.: The reporting provisions compel non-commercial, policy-based speech on controversial topics, subject to strict scrutiny.	Bonta: The provisions are commercial or factual transparency measures subject to lesser scrutiny.	Court: The compelled reports constitute non-commercial speech subject to strict scrutiny.
Do the provisions survive under strict scrutiny?	X Corp.: The law is not narrowly tailored and is overly burdensome relative to the state's interest.	Bonta: The law furthers transparency and consumer information, and is reasonably related to that interest.	Court: The law is not narrowly tailored to the state's interest, thus fails strict scrutiny.
Does the law violate the First Amendment on its face?	X Corp.: The law facially burdens protected editorial and policy expression, chilling speech across all covered companies.	Bonta: The law only requires companies to disclose existing policies, not adopt any particular viewpoint.	Court: The provisions raise the same First Amendment problem in every application and are facially invalid.
Is a preliminary injunction warranted?	X Corp.: Loss of First Amendment freedoms is irreparable; the equities and public interest favor an injunction.	Bonta: Transparency serves important public objectives; no irreparable harm.	Court: All preliminary injunction factors favor X Corp.; injunction warranted.

Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 (U.S. 1985) (sets the standard for compelled commercial speech)
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (U.S. 2015) (content-based restrictions on speech are presumptively unconstitutional)
Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (U.S. 1988) (distinguishes compelled speech from compelled silence under the First Amendment)
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (U.S. 2010) (states cannot create new categories of unprotected speech without historical basis)
McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464 (U.S. 2014) (importance of preserving an uninhibited marketplace of ideas)
Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (U.S. 2011) (strict scrutiny applies to content-based speech regulations)