Wyno v. Lowndes Cnty., 824 S.E.2d 297

In Dec. 2011 Misty Wyno was killed by a neighbor's dog after multiple prior complaints to Lowndes County Animal Control about dogs at that address.
Jason Wyno sued the dog owners, Lowndes County, and four county animal control employees (official and individual capacities) alleging negligent performance/failure of duties under the county ordinance and state law, nuisance, and seeking punitive damages.
Lowndes County asserted sovereign immunity; the county employees invoked official immunity and also relied on former OCGA § 4-8-30 (Responsible Dog Ownership Law), which purports to make dog owners solely liable and shield local governments/employees from liability.
The trial court initially found the employees’ duties ministerial and denied summary judgment, but later upheld § 4-8-30 as constitutional and dismissed the employees; the Court of Appeals reversed as to individual-capacity claims and remanded.
On remand and after discovery, the Georgia Supreme Court held the employees’ duties under the county ordinance were discretionary, found no evidence of actual malice or intent to injure, and therefore affirmed summary judgment for the employees on the basis of official immunity under Art. I, § II, Par. IX(d).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Are the animal control duties ministerial or discretionary?	Wyno: Ordinance and practice imposed specific, mandatory duties (ministerial).	County: Ordinance requires judgment and choices by officers (discretionary).	Discretionary — investigation and enforcement require judgment; immunity applies.
Do county employees have official immunity under Article I, § II, Par. IX(d)?	Wyno: Paragraph IX(d) immunity for state employees does not extend to local employees absent a State Tort Claims Act; thus employees not immune.	County: Paragraph IX(d) applies to county employees; discretionary acts protected absent malice/intent.	Court assumed Paragraph IX(d) applies to counties and held employees immune because acts were discretionary and no malice shown.
Does former OCGA § 4-8-30 bar suit against local governments/employees?	Wyno: § 4-8-30 is not a State Tort Claims Act and may impermissibly expand Paragraph IX(d).	County: § 4-8-30 insulates local governments/employees or at least precludes tort claims against them.	Court did not decide the constitutional question; resolved case on official-immunity grounds instead.
Was there sufficient evidence of actual malice or intent to injure to override immunity?	Wyno: Repeated failures to act show culpability and warrant denial of immunity.	County: Record contains no evidence of deliberate intent or malice by employees.	No evidence of actual malice or intent; immunity not defeated.

Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744 (1994) (discusses development of official immunity and applies to counties)
Lathrop v. Deal, 301 Ga. 408 (2017) (discusses constitutional immunity post-1991 amendment)
Austin v. Clark, 294 Ga. 773 (2014) (definition of ministerial vs. discretionary acts)
Roper v. Greenway, 294 Ga. 112 (2013) (discretionary acts are immune absent malice)
Grammens v. Dollar, 287 Ga. 618 (2010) (written policy requiring exercise of discretion does not make act ministerial)
Keenan v. Plouffe, 267 Ga. 791 (1997) (official-immunity determinations are legal questions for the court)
Merrow v. Hawkins, 266 Ga. 390 (1996) (actual malice defined as deliberate intention to do wrong)
Murphy v. Bajjani, 282 Ga. 197 (2007) (actual malice excludes implied malice; requires deliberateness)
Nelson v. Spalding County, 249 Ga. 334 (1982) (example of ministerial duty where replacement of stop signs was mandatory)